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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
As of the date of this report, the Governor of the State of California has declared the 
drought over. Although restoration of water to aquifers will take years to accomplish, the public 
and private sectors are turning their focus on other socioeconomic issues. This current condition 
should be assessed as only a reprieve-a temporary relief in the hardships and impacts delivered 
by a drought-and implies that it will occur again. Whether the next drought occurs later this 
year or 10 years from now is not the issue here. What is relevant are the lessons learned from 
this recent drought experience and the actions to be taken to protect against and plan for 
mitigating adverse drought-related impacts. 
This report describes the lessons learned of the six-year California drought that are aimed 
at improving the management of water resources during future droughts in California and other 
states throughout the nation. These lessons capture the views of some 100 key members of the 
California water community representing 57 organizations. The participating organizations 
represented federal, state, regional, and local water supply agencies as well as environmental, 
private, and governmental entities that influence water management in the state. 
STUDY APPROACH AND REPORT DESIGN 
Our analytical approach is described in Chapter I, "Introduction." Our approach to 
identifying the important lessons of the drought consisted of three research activities: (1) 
literature review of published and unpublished documents, (2) field interviews, and (3) feedback 
critiques of the draft report by survey participants and other water professionals. 
The 1987-92 drought in California put the long-term strategy of drought protection as 
well as short-term drought response measures to a severe test. In order to allow the readers to 
draw their own conclusions about the emerging lessons, we included the relevant background 
information and data on California's economy and water resources and on the existing water 
management system. This information is included in Chapter IT, "California's Economy and 
Water Resources, " and Chapter lIT, "Water Management System." Chapter IV, "Recount of the 
1987-1992 Drought," contains the chronology of the major drought events and significant 
drought response actions during each consecutive year of the drought. Statewide statistics of 
water use during this drought by various types of water use sectors and water districts were not 
available and therefore were not included for evaluation. 
The three chapters that follow the background information summarize the views of the 
survey participants. Chapter V, "Survey Results: General Perceptions," summarizes the 
contents of the interviews pertaining to four general aspects of the drought: (1) critical drought 
impacts, (2) communication and cooperation, (3) the role and responsibilities of the media, and 
(4) response to the drought of the general public and water users. Chapter VI, "Survey Results: 
Water Management Issues," summarizes the results of the interviews that pertain to four major 
aspects of water management during drought: (1) new developments and innovative approaches, 
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(2) critical legislation, (3) timing of drought response actions, and (4) performance of water 
institutions. Finally, Chapter VIT, "Suggested Initiatives and Reforms," presents the views of 
survey participants on actions that should be taken to enhance the ability of California's water 
management system to cope with future droughts. These suggestions are presented under four 
broad categories including (1) water policy initiatives, (2) agricultural initiatives and needs, (3) 
urban water management, and (4) environmental protection. 
In presenting the survey results in these three chapters, our purpose was to summarize 
the views of survey participants and draw some conclusions from these opinions while 
withholding our judgment to the extent possible. We necessarily had to use our judgment in 
Chapter VITI, "Synthesis of Lessons Learned." This synthesis represents our understanding of 
the experiences of survey participants and factual information which allowed us to formulate the 
lessons of the drought. 
LESSONS FOR WATER MANAGEMENT 
The California drought experience provided the water community with many important 
lessons. Some of these lessons have been learned and acted upon during the later stages of the 
drought. Other lessons are yet to be confirmed and are presented in this report as 
recommendations of the survey participants for water management initiatives and reforms. The 
drought experience and emerging lessons apply not only to California but to all states that face 
the potential of long-term (multiyear) water shortages. This report should be gleaned by the 
national water community for experiences that reflect similar possible impacts in their region. 
Drought planning will improve relative to who learns these lessons and to what actions are taken 
by them to create improved drought policy. 
Table 1 lists the titles of new and continued lessons for long-term drought planning and 
for preparedness for drought response in the short term. A description of each lesson and 
background information can be found on pages shown after each title. 
The experiences and lessons of the ongoing 1987-92 drought were translated by survey 
participants into specific actions that should be taken in order to enhance the capability of 
California's water management system to cope with future droughts. Table 2 presents some of 
the participants' suggestions under the categories of strategic and tactical measures. The 
sequence of these suggestions does not follow any particular order. Complete listings of these 
suggestions are included in Appendix D and discussed in Chapter VIT. 
The 1987-92 drought focused the attention of the public and water institutions in 
California on the shortcomings of the existing water management system in the state as defined 
by water infrastructure, institutional arrangement, and the current system of water rights. The 
drought experiences clearly demonstrated the need for enhancing the infrastructure and reforming 
water institutions in order to achieve greater efficiency in using the existing sources of water 
supply as well as restoring and maintaining the state's environmental resources. Without such 
improvements, additional growth of the state's population and economy will translate into 
increased hardships and damages to the environment during future droughts. 
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TABLE 1 
SUMMARY OF LFSSONS LEARNED 
New Lessons for Strategic Planning 
• The nature of social, environmental, and economic impacts of a sustained drought points 
to a need for careful and more realistic drought planning (p. 183). 
• Severe drought can change longstanding relationships and balances of power in the 
competition for water (p. 185). 
• Irrigation can provide complementary environmental benefits (p. 186). 
• Land use regulation must be the mechanism for urban growth management policies which 
accept limited water supply (p. 187). 
• The success of drought response plans should be measured in terms of the minimization and 
equitable redistribution of actual impacts (as opposed to water shortages), but there is much 
to be learned about the best ways of accomplishing it (p. 188). 
• Severe droughts can expose some inadequacies in the performance and roles of state and 
federal water institutions (p.189). 
• The overall success of water rationing plans depends on their design and reliance on 
increases in water rates (p. 190). 
• Mass media can playa positive role in drought response, especially if some guidelines are 
followed (p. 192). 
• Market forces are an effective way of reallocating restricted water supplies (p. 193). 
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TABLE 1 (Continued) 
SUMMARY OF LESSONS LEARNED 
Conf"nmed Lessons of Previous Droughts 
• Water in the aquifers continues to be the most effective strategic weapon against drought 
(p. 194). 
• The surest way to mitigate the adverse social, environmental, and economic impacts of a 
sustained drought is to obtain more water (p. 195). 
• Early drought response actions and proper timing of tactical measures are essential in short-
term management of droughts (p. 196). 
• Local and regional interconnections among water supply systems proved to be a good 
insurance policy against severe water shortages (p. 197). 
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TABLE 2 
SUMMARY OF SUGGESTED CHANGES NEEDED IN WATER MANAGEMENT 
Strategic Measures Suggested by Survey Participants 
• The Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta problem has to be resolved (p. 198). 
• SWP facilities have to be completed (p. 198). 
• A permanent Water Bank should be established (p. 198). 
• The state should move away from "crisis management" and focus more on "long-term 
planning" (p. 198). 
• Marginal cost pricing should be incorporated into long-term water plans (p. 198). 
• Groundwater management should be improved (p. 198). 
• Water management should be centrally coordinated (p. 198). 
• The state should develop a computerized data bank (p. 198). 
• California water law should be revised to allow for in-stream water rights (p. 198). 
• Enforced mitigation of impacts on aquatic resources should be undertaken in order to 
enhance water quality and minimum-flow standards (p. 199). 
• More conservation technology and know-how should be infused into California's agriculture 
(p. 199). 
• Improved reliability of urban water supplies is needed (p. 199). 
• Long-term water management plan should take environmental needs into account (p. 199). 
• Environmental needs for water should be met (p. 199). 
• A better management of fish and wildlife under normal conditions is needed (p. 199). 
Tactical Measures Suggested by Survey Participants 
• State should develop and adopt clear triggering mechanisms for drought response (p. 199). 
• Californians should establish water use priorities (p. 199). 
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TABLE 2 (Continued) 
SUMMARY OF SUGGESTED CHANGES NEEDED IN WATER MANAGEMENT 
Tactical Measures Suggested by Survey Participants, Continued 
• A streamlined approval process for all water transfers should be developed (p. 199). 
• A massive public information and education program is needed (p. 2(0). 
• The state should cut down on the amount of firm hydroelectricity production during drought 
(p.200). 
• Agricultural water districts should be more flexible (p. 2(0). 
• A better accountability in agricultural water use must be achieved (p. 2(0). 
• Urban water suppliers should develop very clearly defined carry-over storage goals and 
adhere to them during drought (p. 2(0). 
• Urban water agencies should plan for water deficits (p. 2(0). 
• Water rationing should be done through pricing (p. 2(0). 
• Water agency representatives should improve the communication of their water supply 
situation (p. 2(0). 
• Environmental impacts must be given greater attention (p. 2(0). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
PURPOSE 
The purpose of this report is to identify, categorize, explain, and verify the important 
lessons learned during the mUltiyear California drought of 1987-92. The lessons of the drought 
were formed using a carefully designed research approach consisting of personal interviews with 
members of the California water community and other key individuals in the state as well as a 
thorough review of documents and reports pertaining to the drought. The resulting lessons 
pertain to various aspects of drought management. They are directed to federal, state, and local 
levels of government, water institutions, and water users (urban, agricultural, environmental, 
and others) for improving the management of water resources during future droughts in 
California and other states. 
This report is part of a comprehensive study that has been undertaken in response to 
recommendations of the National Drought Study. After the drought of 1988-89 that affected 
many regions of the United States, the President's budget included funds to begin a National 
Water Management During Drought Study (NWMDS) as part of the administration's 1990 
budget. Authority for the study was given to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil 
Works as provided in Sections 707 and 729 of the Water Resources Development Act of 1986. 
The Institute for Water Resources managed the study for the Assistant Secretary and the U. S. 
Army Corps of Engineers Headquarters. The NWMDS team thought that the California drought 
would provide worthwhile lessons learned for the rest of the nation, especially given California's 
existing water projects and preparedness, which were thought to be better than most in the 
country. 
This report follows several previous reports of the NWMDS performed by federal 
agencies. These reports include: 
• The National Study of Water Management During Drought: Report on the First 
Year of Study IWR Report 91-NDS-l, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Institute 
for Water Resources, May 1991 
• The National Study of Water Management During Drought: A Preliminary 
Assessment of Corps of Engineers Reservoirs. their Purposes and Susceptibility 
to Drought IWR Report 91-NDS-2, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Institute for 
Water Resources, September 1991 
• The National Study of Water Management During Drought: A Research 
Assessment IWR Report 91-NDS-3, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Institute for 
Water Resources, August 1991 
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STUDY OBJECTIVES 
The specific objectives and research design of the study have been developed based on 
extensive discussions between the Program Manager of the National Study of Water Management 
during Drought, his staff, the research study team, the staff of the California Department of 
Water Resources, and other water professionals in the state and the nation. Several research 
paradigms were considered in developing an appropriate approach. During preliminary 
discussions, it was recognized that the state of California has a sophisticated and complex water 
management system. Because of this complexity, the California system has not been addressed 
by a unified and comprehensive statewide drought management plan. In the absence of an 
evaluation of the performance of a formal statewide drought plan, the lessons learned had to be 
obtained by (1) contrasting "expectations" and "what actually happened," (2) examining the basis 
for decision making during the various stages of drought, and (3) analyzing the degree to which 
the California water management system met expectations. 
In light of the complexity of water management in California, specific study objectives 
were formulated as follows: 
• To characterize the setting for year-to-year management of water in the state in 
terms of the balance of supply and demand, legal framework, and water 
management institutions 
• To identify the overall approach to drought management that prevailed in the state 
prior to the onset of the drought in terms of the roles and responsibilities of water 
institutions and prior drought experience 
• To examine the current perceptions and concerns of key individuals in the 
California water community who control or influence water management at 
federal, state, regional, and local levels of government 
• To identify the lessons learned from the drought as viewed by the key individuals, 
with respect to several aspects of drought management including: 
Critical impacts of the drought (economic, environmental, and other) 
Role and performance of water institutions 
Public response to water shortages 
Communication and cooperation 
Role of the media 
Critical water management legislation 
Timing of drought response actions 
Innovative drought management approaches 
Most pressing needs for change in the present water management system 
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• To verify the validity of the lessons identified by the key individuals by placing 
them in the context of the: 
Chronology of major events during the drought 
Actual response actions and actual outcomes of these actions 
Data on economic, social, and environmental impacts of the drought 
Other measures of performance of drought management policies and 
actions 
• To conduct a synthesis of findings stemming from the previous objectives in order 
to determine: 
What worked and what did not work? 
What were the major gaps between expectations and actual performance? 
What needs to be changed, preserved, or done in the future? 
What are the most valuable lessons for governments, water institutions, 
and other parties in California and other states? 
By accomplishing these specific objectives, the sponsors of this study intended to use the 
lessons of the Great California Drought of 1987-92 in developing recommendations for a national 
strategy for better management of the nation's water resources during future droughts. 
STUDY APPROACH 
The following discussion describes the research method used to accomplish the preceding 
study objectives. It describes the process of identifying the water management structure in the 
state and selecting the key individuals of California's water community representing various 
levels and functions of this structure. 
Development of a Research Platform 
Several important design issues were confronted in devising an appropriate research 
approach: 
• What are the best sources of information on the drought? 
• How does one capture a full spectrum of opinions on lessons learned? 
• How does one identify and separate the political agendas in order to identify the 
objective and genuine lessons learned? 
• What is the best overall paradigm for identifying and verifying the important 
lessons of the drought? 
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These and other questions have led us to the development of the overall research platform 
that is presented in Figure I.l. This approach consisted of two intertwined research activities: 
literature search and field interviews. The purpose of each activity is briefly described below. 
Literature Search 
In order to understand the complexity of water resource management issues, especially 
in California, it was initially essential that we established and understood the existing water 
management system in the state. Literature sources and governmental documents were searched 
in order to obtain data and information that are indispensable to understanding the year-to-year 
management of water in California. These included statistical data on the state population, 
economy, water supply, and water use. In addition, information was collected regarding the 
legal framework for water management in the state, existing institutional structure, and major 
issues in water management. 
Once the background information was collected, we identified California's approach to 
managing droughts that existed prior to the 1987-92 drought. Again this information was 
gleaned through the search of drought literature. Documents pertinent to the 1976-77 drought 
in California provided a primary source of information for identifying the existing approaches 
to managing droughts in the state. 
The final component of the literature search was to obtain factual and, therefore, 
objective data and information on the 1987-92 drought. Extensive published information on 
drought events and response actions together with their chronology was obtained, studied, and 
assimilated into our knowledge base. Also, information on actual outcomes of response actions 
and data on impact measurements were recorded for further reference. 
Field Interviews 
The most important sources for identifying the lessons of drought are the key individuals 
who control or influence the management of water resources in California. By examining their 
firsthand views, opinions, and concerns and placing them in the context of factual data and 
information obtained through the literature review, we expected that the lessons of the drought 
would emerge. 
Dermition of a Lesson Learned 
The Random House College Dictionary (Revised Edition, 1984) gives the following 
meanings of the word "lesson": (1) "something to be learned or studies as in 'the lessons of the 
past'" or (2) "a useful piece of a practical wisdom acquired by experience or study." By adding 
the action modifier "learned," the identifiable lessons imply that the respondent has recognized 
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RESEARCH APPROACH AND METHODS 
(Analysis) 
LESSONS LEARNED 
IN TERMS OF: 
What worked? 
What did not work? 
Major gaps between 
expectations and actual 
performance 
What needs to be changed? 
What needs to be done? 
What is to be preserved? 
Lessons for controllers 
Lessons for influencers 
Lessons for other states 
After 1992 
the event as a lesson worth knowing and deserving attention during the development or revision 
of future drought contingency plans. The concept of a "learned" lesson should not be taken to 
mean that all who should have recognized the intrinsic value of the lesson have done so. 
Our survey was designed with this broad definition of the term "lesson learned" in mind. 
Purposefully, we did not offer a specific definition of the term "lesson learned" at the beginning 
of each interview. Instead, we encouraged the survey participants to look retrospectively on 
their experiences during the drought and give us answers to such questions as, what worked and 
what did not work? and what needs to be changed, preserved, or done in the future? We also 
asked for the respondents' opinions on various aspects of drought management. We analyzed 
all answers to our questions, as well as all statements offered by the respondents that went 
beyond our questions, in order to identify lessons for water management. Finally, we used 
published sources in order to determine the chronology of events and used actual response 
actions and their outcomes, and data on drought impacts to identify additional lessons and to gain 
better insights into the lessons identified from the interview material. 
Lessons that are presented in the concluding synthesis chapter are labeled as "lessons 
learned" because each lesson satisfies one or more of the following criteria: 
• It represents "useful pieces of practical wisdom" acquired from drought 
experience. 
• It represents new knowledge that was not available before the drought. 
• It emerged by analyzing changes in decision-making processes during the drought 
or examining the performance of the water management system. 
• It can be formulated as a recommendation for future actions that should be taken 
in order to avoid repeating the same errors or enhancing the performance of 
actions previously taken. 
This broad definition allowed us to include a number of "useful pieces of practical 
wisdom" gleaned from the experiences of the 1987-92 drought in California. In formulating the 
lessons for water management, we made an attempt to cast each statement in a format that would 
indicate changes and conditions needed for making decisions and taking actions for managing 
future droughts and avoid statements indicating general conclusions and observations or 
statements of fact. The reader may conclude that there are additional lessons after reading all 
parts of this report. 
Design of Survey Instruments 
The field interviews were conducted using two survey instruments: personal interview 
design and group interview design. These instruments were designed to obtain the participants' 
views on the relevant aspects of water management during drought. 
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Personal Interview Content 
Table 1.1 shows the content of the personal interview. The interview consisted of five 
questions on general aspects of the drought, which were followed by five questions on specific 
drought issues. At the end of each interview, the respondents were asked to clarify their 
answers and offer their observations on some prominent issues that surfaced during previous 
interviews. 
Each interview began with questions about the roles and responsibilities of the 
interviewee and his/her organization in drought management and about the interviewee views 
on the critical drought impacts, communication and cooperation, role of the media, and response 
of the public to the drought. Each of these topics delineated a potential category of lessons 
learned. 
The questions on specific drought issues were focused on (1) new developments and 
innovative approaches to drought management, (2) critical state and federal legislation, (3) 
timing of drought response actions, (4) role and performance of water management institutions, 
and (5) critical needs for change in water management. Again, each of these topics was selected 
for its potential in surfacing lessons learned. The last question was directed toward focusing 
participant attention on the implications of his/her experiences for water management in the 
future. 
Group Interview Guide 
Corresponding information was gathered through group interview sessions. Table 1.2 
shows the group interview guide used during these sessions. The number of participants in each 
session ranged from two to seven. 
The participants were graphically shown the identical areas of interest posed during the 
individual interviews. They were then asked to record on paper their views about the most 
important impacts of the drought and actions to be taken to preserve or change water 
management during drought. If some of the areas of interest did not surface during the 
participants' remarks or the free-flowing discussion, they were raised and appropriately discussed 
at the end of the session. 
Selection of Participants 
The usefulness of the field interviews was judged to be critically dependent on the 
selection of the institutions and individuals interviewed. In order to obtain representative views 
it was necessary to identify the institutional structure of water management in California. 
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TABLE 1.1 
PERSONAL INTERVIEW GUIDE 
PART A. GENERAL ASPECTS 
• Responsibilities and Roles 
Could you briefly describe the role of your organization and your personal involvement 
in drought management? 
• Drought Impacts 
What do you see as the most critical impacts of this drought on you, your organization, 
as well as, on other parties and activities (environmental, financial, social, economic, 
political, etc.)? 
• Communication and Cooperation 
How would you characterize the communication and cooperation between your 
organization and other water management organizations during the drought period? 
• Role of the Media 
How do you view the performance of the media and their desired role during drought? 
• Public Response 
What is your opinion of the public response and that of other water users to the drought? 
PART B. SPECIFIC ACTIONS 
• New Developments and Innovative Approaches 
Are there any new developments or innovative approaches to coping with drought that have 
been used during this drought? 
• Critical Legislation 
Are there any state and federal acts or local ordinances that you consider critical to 
managing this drought? 
• Timing of Drought Response Actions 
What is your view on the timing of response actions and the usefulness of triggering 
mechanisms? 
• Role and Performance of Water Institutions 
How would you characterize the role and performance during this drought of water 
institutions such as retailers, wholesalers, and state and federal agencies? 
• Things to Be Done 
What, in your view, are the things that should be done, changed, or preserved in the way 
water is managed during drought in California? 
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TABLE 1.2 
GROUP INTERVIEW GUIDE 
• Introduce interviewers and participants. 
• Present the objectives and design of the National Water Management During Drought 
Study and the Lessons Learned study. 
• Provide verbal directions for individual written responses: 
"We would like you to use these cue cards and spend four to five minutes writing down 
your thoughts regarding two aspects of this drought. " 
The first aspect is the IMPORTANT IMPACTS OF THE DROUGHT. What do you 
see as the most important impacts of this drought on you, your organization, as well as 
on other parties and activities (including environmental, financial, social, economic, 
political, and other). 
The second aspect is the THINGS TO BE DONE. What in your view are the things 
that should be done, changed, or preserved in the way water is handled during drought? 
For example, what are the needed changes pertaining to communication and cooperation, 
role of the media, public response, innovative approaches, legislation, timing of drought 
response actions, and performance of water institutions? 
• Solicit remarks from each participant and encourage free-flowing discussion. 
• Remind everyone to convey their personal thoughts based on their written notes. 
• Ask follow-up questions as needed. 
Figure 1.2 gives a representation of the water management structure in California devised 
for the purpose of this study. The water management institutions were placed into a hierarchical 
structure rising from the local level of communities and industries to the state and federal levels. 
The pyramid shape of the aggregated hierarchy shows that the number of organizations is the 
largest at the local level. At the state and federal levels there are fewer agencies, but their 
actions have considerable impact on water management in California. 
A horizontal distinction was also made within the pyramid. We distinguished "water 
controllers" from "water influencers" at each level of management. The controllers of water 
represent organizations and individuals who make direct decisions on water allocations, have 
been allocated water rights, and can decide on how, where, and when to release or move water. 
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These groups include the State Water Project (SWP), the Central Valley Project (CVP), and all 
water districts (both urban and agricultural) in the state. The influencers in water management 
do not make day-to-day decisions in storing, releasing, and wheeling water and may not have 
water rights, but they have critical influence on the decisions of water controllers. The 
influencer group includes all environmental organizations and government agencies that regulate 
water and related land resources. 
The participants were closely involved in preparing this report. Two workshops were 
held at the California Department of Water Resources in December 1992 at which they critically 
reviewed the preliminary draft report, especially its conclusions and lessons learned. Eleven of 
the organizations interviewed for the study participated in the workshops, representing about one 
quarter of all the agencies interviewed. Their comments and critique were considered and 
included in the final study document. 
Table 1.3 lists all institutions who participated in the individual interviews or group 
interview sessions and classifies them according to hierarchy and their controlling/influencing 
role. Several other organizations were approached but could or did not participate for various 
reasons. Some institutions cannot be readily compartmentalized because of their dual roles as 
controllers and influencers. However, the most important purpose of this structural 
representation was to make sure that all key players in California's water management were 
included in our survey. 
A total of 101 key individuals participated in 12 personal interviews and 22 group 
interview sessions. The participants represented 57 organizations. Some interviews of 
institutions included representatives of member organizations. Table 1.3 does not list all 57 
organizations. The 34 interviews were conducted over a six-month period. The first 14 
interviews conducted in December 1991 represented 20 organizations. The remaining 20 
interviews were completed in May-Iune 1992. Those participants represented 37 organizations. 
The total survey was made up of 20 interviews with controllers and 14 interviews with 
influencers. A summary of each personal interview or a group interview session was prepared 
from the interview notes and notes taken during playback of the recorded interviews. The 
summaries were used to identify the lessons learned. 
CHAYI'ER SYNOPSFS 
The sequence of chapters of this report generally follows the research sequence of this 
study. Chapters II-IV give the necessary background information on population, economy, and 
management of water resources in California and also present a chronological recount of the 
major events and response actions during the 1987-92 ongoing drought. Chapters V-VIII present 
perceptions of targeted interview participants in light of the background information and identify 
lessons learned. 
Chapter II gives background information on the state economy and water resources and 
presents the breakdown of water use in the state. 
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TABLE 1.3 
PARTICIPATING INSTITUTIONS 
Controllers 
I. Federal and nationwide 
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
ll. State or statewide 
Department of Water Resources 
C-DWR State Water Project 
C-DWR Drought Center 
California Resources Agency 
m. Regional and wholesalers 
San Francisco Water Department 
Metropolitan Water District 
of Southern California 
Westlands Water District 
Kern County Water Agency 
Glenn-Colusa Irrigation District 
Santa Barbara County Water Agency 
IV. Community and retailers 
Southern California Water Company 
East Bay Municipal Utility District 
Los Angeles Department of Water and Power 
City of Santa Barbara 
City of Goleta 
V. Commercial and industrial 
Pacific Gas and Electric 
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Influencers 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
Environmental Defense Fund 
Sierra Club 
Soil Conservation Service 
Department of Parks and Recreation 
Department of Fish and Game 
California Farm Bureau 
State Water Project Contractors 
Committee for Water Policy Consensus 
CVP Water Users Association 
California Urban Water Agencies 
Sacramento Bee 
Mono Lake Committee 
California Landscape Contractors Assn. 
California Energy Commission 
Green Industry Council 
Chapter ill displays the balance of water supply and demand under normal conditions and 
characterizes the existing water management system in California. The water management 
system is presented in terms of its legal and institutional setting. The chapter also describes the 
overall approach to preparing and responding to droughts in the state that existed prior to the 
1987-92 drought. It describes the roles of water institutions and other parties in drought 
management and contrasts these roles with experiences of the 1976-77 drought. The status of 
drought preparedness and the level of long-term drought protection are assessed. The chapter 
concludes with a summary of the major concerns and challenges facing the managers of water 
resources in the state. 
Chapter IV gives a recount of the major events and developments during the 1987-92 
drought. A chronology of events is re-created beginning with the early signs of drought 
followed by a description of significant drought response actions during each consecutive year 
of the drought. The last section of this chapter characterizes the current status of the drought. 
Chapter V presents the results of personal interviews and group interview discussions 
concerning four general aspects of the drought: (1) critical drought impacts, (2) communication 
and cooperation, (3) the role and responsibilities of the media, and (4) response of the general 
public and water users to the drought. 
Chapter VI summarizes the views of the key individuals concerning four specific issues 
of water management during the drought. These include (1) new development and innovative 
approaches, (2) critical legislation, (3) timing of drought response actions, and (4) performance 
of water institutions. 
Chapter VII presents views on initiatives and reforms needed in water management. The 
discussion summarizes the views of the survey participants on actions that should be taken to 
enhance California's water management system handling of future droughts. 
Throughout Chapters V-VII, the responses of the survey participants are supplemented 
with factual information to verify the opinions and perceptions of the participants. 
Finally, Chapter VIII delivers nine new lessons learned from the drought and four 
confirmed lessons of previous droughts based upon an analysis and synthesis of collected data. 
It outlines the expected approach to drought response and describes the important lessons for the 
development of future drought management policies in California and other states. Specific 
lessons and recommendations are given for strategic (long-term) and tactical (short-term) 
measures for drought planning. 
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n. CALIFORNIA'S ECONOMY AND WATER RESOURCES 
This chapter gives background information on water supplies and water uses in the state 
and characterizes the overall water management system. 
POPULATION AND ECONOMY 
Population Growth 
California's population was approximately 32 million in early 1993 and is projected to 
reach 41.4 million by 2010 (C-DWR, Statewide Planning Branch 1992h). Between 1980 and 
1990, California's population increased 27 percent (6.3 million persons). From 1980-85, net 
migration to California accounted for about 52.5 percent of the increase in population, while 
natural increase made up 47.5 percent. Average annual population increase in the state between 
1980 and 1985 was 2 percent or 481,000. The South Coast region constituted about 54 percent 
of the state population in 1985 and this region grew by the greatest number of people: 1.25 
million, between 1980 and 1985; and 3.3 million from 1980-90. Table IT. 1 and Figure 11.1 
depict the historical and projected population in California. 
Population growth in the counties of the South Coast region has been triggered by several 
factors. Increased migration from Asia and Latin America together with natural increase 
induced growth in Los Angeles County. The location of the San Bernardino and Riverside 
counties within the commute zone for the metropolitan Los Angeles area has made these counties 
major growth areas. Growth in Kern County since 1980 can be attributed to the incentives of 
relatively low living costs and the county's proximity to the Los Angeles metropolitan market 
area. The slowest growth in the state has occurred in the San Francisco Bay and Central Coast 
regions. 
Economic Activity 
California's economy ranks eighth largest in the world, slightly smaller than the United 
Kingdom (Spectrum Economics, Inc. 1991). The California gross state product has more than 
doubled during the last decade, from about $319 billion in 1980 to $697 billion in 1989 (U.S. 
Department of Commerce 1992). Private industries generally account for about 89 percent of 
the gross state product and the government makes up the remaining 11 percent. The top three 
contributors to the economy in 1989 were the services sector (21 percent); the finance, 
insurance, and real estate sector (20 percent); and the manufacturing sector (17 percent). Other 
private industry sectors listed in descending order of their contribution to the economy include 
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TABLE H.l 
CALIFORNIA'S POPULATION - 1980, 1985, AND 2010 
(In Millions) 
Increase 
Region 1980 1990 2010 1980-1990 
San Francisco Bay 
and Central Coast 5.8 6.8 8.3 1.0 17% 
South Coast 12.9 16.2 21.9 3.3 26% 
Sacramento River 1.7 2.2 3.3 0.5 29% 
San Joaquin River 
and Tulare Lake 2.2 3.0 4.7 0.8 36% 
Colorado River 0.3 0.5 0.8 0.2 67% 
Remaining regions 0.8 1.2 2.3 0.4 50% 
California total 23.7 30.0 41.4 6.3 27% 
Adapted from: C-DWR, Statewide Planning Branch 1992h. 
Increase 
1990-2010 
1.5 22% 
5.7 35% 
1.1 50% 
1.7 57% 
0.3 60% 
1.1 92% 
11.4 38% 
retail trade; transportation, communication, and utilities; construction; agriculture, forestry, and 
fishing; and mining (Table ll.2). 
Major Contributors to the California Economy 
Services Sector. The services sector leads the private industries in its contribution to 
economic development in California. Services constituted more than $146 billion of the gross 
state product in 1989. The leading tertiary activities included business services, health services, 
miscellaneous professional services, and legal services. 
Finance, Insurance, and Real &tate. This sector closely follows the services sector 
in stimulating economic development in California. Finance, insurance, and real estate services 
made up over $139 billion of the gross state product in 1989. 
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TABLEll.2 
CALIFORNIA GROSS STATE PRODUCT, SELECTED YEARS 
(Millions of Dollars) 
1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Private industries 
Agriculture, forestry, 
and fishing 10,883 12,142 12,920 15,043 15,800 
Mining 6,018 7,361 4,470 4,871 5,389 
Construction 16,132 21,765 24,593 27,686 30,577 
Manufacturing 58,892 92,572 98,495 105,827 113,010 
Transportation, communi-
cation, and utilities 24,051 39,208 42,273 44,005 46,526 
Wholesale trade 23,654 36,625 37,239 38,655 42,419 
Retail trade 32,806 50,721 53,579 57,168 61,946 
Finance, insurance, 
and real estate 55,236 87,060 97,334 109,189 120,613 
Services 53,336 95,343 105,736 119,870 133,866 
Private industries total 281,010 442,797 476,639 522,314 570,145 
Government total 38,311 57,742 62,667 66,997 72,165 
Grand total ~191~21 5fl1l1~~8 ~~9.~~7 ~§9.311 6421~02 
1989 
16,039 
5,111 
33,590 
117,782 
48,852 
46,325 
66,213 
139,138 
146,121 
619,169 
78,212 
697.3§1 
Source: u.s. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Department of Finance, Financial and Economic Research 
(California Statistical Abstract 1992). 
Manufacturing Sector. Manufacturing ranks third among the private industries and this 
sector contributed to over $117 billion of the gross state product in 1989. The manufacturing 
sector is led by high technology and defense industry groups-aircraft aerospace, computer, and 
computer components. These groups provide 27 percent of manufacturing employment in 
Southern California and 42 percent in the San Francisco Bay area. Each job in these industry 
groups indirectly supports 1.8 additional jobs in trade, services, and diversified manufacturing 
in the state (Spectrum Economics, Inc. 1991). California's manufacturing sector contributes to 
11 percent of the manufacturing employment in the United States (1987 Census of 
Manufacturers). 
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Other Contributors to the California Economy 
The three major contributors described above made up 58 percent of the California 
economy in 1989. Additionally, a number of sectors contribute to the state economy. The 
discussion that follows examines the role played by three of these sectors, agriculture, the "green 
industry," and recreation and tourism in the economy. 
Agricultural Sector. California agriculture is considered one of the most diversified in 
the world with over 250 different crops and livestock commodities (California Department of 
Food and Agriculture, 1990). According to the California Department of Food and Agriculture 
(DFA), agriculture had $18.3 billion in farm production in 1990, and it plays a dynamically 
influencing role in the state's and nation's economy. The 1990 statistics from the DFA revealed 
that California's 30 million acres of farmland (of which irrigable acreage is about 9 million 
acres) account for only 4 percent of the country's farmland but produce 50 percent of the value 
of the nation's fruits, nuts, and vegetables. California has been the leading agricultural state in 
the U.S. for the last 43 years and cash farm receipts for 1990 were estimated to have generated 
over $70 billion in related economic activities. 
In the livestock industry, cattle constitutes the largest livestock population, followed by 
sheep and lambs, and then hogs and pigs. The cattle population has varied from 4.65 million 
to 5.0 million from 1981 to 1991 (Table 11.3). Cash receipts for cattle showed a boost during 
1988 to 1990, and overall receipts for cattle and hogs (Table 11.3 and Figure 11.2) recorded a 
second high in 1990 (Gleick and Nash 1991). 
Green Industry. The "green industry" includes landscaping services, retail and 
wholesale nurseries, florists, garden stores, golf courses, and garden equipment manufacturers. 
California's environmental horticulture industry has economic activity exceeding $7.2 billion 
annually, but its various segments are not unified (pittenger, Gibeault, and Cockerham 1991). 
Additionally, an equipment category and industry service segments such as public facilities and 
golf courses were identified, but the value could not be determined. The previously cited report 
predicts that these segments would account for another $2 to $4 billion in value. 
Recreation and Tourism. Recreation and tourism is the largest single industry in 
California (Gleick and Nash 1991). This industry includes a number of activities such as hiking, 
boating, tourism to theme parks and beaches, and skiing in the Sierra Nevada. The 1989 
estimates reveal that nearly $50 billion was spent in California on recreation and tourism, and 
over 700,000 jobs are associated with this industry (Gleick and Nash 1991). 
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TABLE H.3 
CALIFORNIA LIVESTOCK POPULATIONS AND CASH RECEIPTS 
Population Cash Receipts 
(1,000 animals) (a) (1,000 dollars) (b) 
All Sheep and Hogs and All Sheep and Hogs and 
Year Cattle Lambs Pigs Cattle Lambs Pigs 
1981 4,760 1,205 180 1,262,907 37,867 29,627 
1982 5,000 1,210 160 1,481,400 52,541 28,169 
1983 4,900 1,115 160 1,325,141 44,358 27,952 
1984 5,000 1,115 155 1,463,485 51,209 26,811 
1985 4,960 1,065 140 1,275,693 51,771 22,142 
1986 5,000 1,065 145 1,347,044 57,830 28,134 
1987 4,750 980 150 1,350,012 74,034 33,414 
1988 4,650 970 140 1,616,615 61,250 20,860 
1989 4,700 940 130 1,575,944 53,698 21,617 
1990 4,800 1,000 140 1,739,859 44,583 38,486 
1991 4,750 1,015 180 
Notes: 
(a) Population numbers are for January 1981 to January 1991. 
(b) Cash receipts are for marketings ending December 1 of each year. 
Source: CASS 1991c, Gleick and Nash 1991. 
WATER RESOURCES 
Precipitation and Runoff 
The average annual precipitation in California is nearly 21 inches, ranging from almost 
zero in desert areas to more than 100 inches in the mountainous North Coast region (C-DWR 
1987). Table IT.4 shows that the North Coast region averages 53.5 inches of precipitation per 
year, while the annual average for the Central Valley region (including drainage areas of 
Sacramento and San Joaquin rivers) is about 27.8 inches. The region experiencing the lowest 
precipitation is the Colorado River region with 4.1 inches annually. 
About 60 percent of the total supply from precipitation, or almost 108 million acre-feet 
(MAF), is evaporated and transpired by native trees, brush, and other vegetation. The 
remaining 40 percent constitutes 71 MAF of streamflow that drains from the land in an average 
year (C-DWR 1987). It is evident from Table IT.4 that almost 29 MAF, or 40 percent, of the 
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average statewide runoff occur in the North Coast region. However, flows of North Coast 
rivers contribute only one water diversion to the rest of the state, since many rivers in the north 
are protected by state and federal laws that do not allow major export water developments. The 
Sacramento River region contributes 22 MAF annually to natural runoff, and the lowest runoff, 
about 0.2 MAF occurs in the Colorado River region. California's 71 million acre-feet average 
annual runoff displays a huge 120 MAF range, varying from an annual low of about 15 MAF 
in 1977 to an annual high of 135 MAF in 1983. 
Surface-Water Resources 
Most of the surface-water resources in the state originate from runoff that is generated 
within the state. Relatively small amounts are provided from Oregon and from the Colorado 
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TABLEll.4 
CALIFORNIA WATER RESOURCFS 
Average annual precipitation (Inches) 
Statewide by hydrologic region 
North Coast 
Central Valley 
San Francisco Bay 
Central Coast 
South Coast 
Lahontan 
Colorado River 
Average annual natural runoff (MAF) 
Statewide by hydrologic region 
North Coast 
Sacramento River 
San Joaquin River 
Tulare Lake 
Central Coast 
North Lahontan 
South Lahontan 
San Francisco Bay 
South Coast 
Colorado River 
Surface-Water storage 
State jurisdiction 
Dams and reservoirs 
Gross storage capacity, acre-feet 
Federal (in and adjacent to California) 
Dams and reservoirs 
Gross storage capacity, acre-feet 
Total number of dams and reservoirs 
Total storage capacity, acre-feet 
22 
53.5 
27.8 
23.4 
20.4 
18.5 
8.7 
4.1 
28.9 
22.4 
7.9 
3.3 
2.4 
1.8 
1.3 
1.2 
1.2 
0.2 
1,188 
19,700,000 
125 
22,900,000 
1,313 
42,600,000 
TABLE 11.4 (Continued) 
CALIFORNIA WATER RESOURCES 
Number of major reservoirs 
Total capacity, acre-feet 
Historical average storage 
on October 1, 1990, acre-feet 
Area of California, sq. mi. 
Average renewable supply, acre-feet/year 
Groundwater resources 
Sources: 
Number of wells 
Irrigation wells 
Public supply wells 
Community supply wells 
Household wells 
Total number of wells 
Annual overdraft, acre-feet 
1. USGS 1984. 
2. C-DWR 1991b. 
155 
37,688,000 
22,497,000 
158,295 
78,600,000 
67,770 
8,143 
3,320 
359,584 
438,817 
2,000,000 
3. C-DWR 1987, including updated infonnation from C-DWR, Statewide Planning Office. 
River. The Oregon streams provide an inflow of about 1.4 MAF, and imported water from the 
Colorado River contributes an additional supply of 4.8 MAF. 
The North Coast is California's wettest region, but the abundance of distributable water 
has been curtailed by designation of wild and scenic rivers to protect their natural state. This 
category includes about 1,200 miles of streams contributing about 17.8 MAF of runoff. The 
wild and scenic category incorporate parts of the Klamath, Trinity, Eel, Smith, Van Duzen, 
Salmon, and Scott rivers (C-DWR 1987). 
The state has jurisdiction over the safety of 1,188 dams and reservoirs with a total 
storage capacity of 19.7 MAF. In addition, there are 125 federal dams and reservoirs in and 
adjacent to the state of California with a gross storage capacity of 22.9 MAF. Altogether there 
are 1,313 state and federal dams and reservoirs that store about 43 MAF. Figure ll.3 shows the 
location of the major storage reservoirs and aqueducts that are found in California (C-DWR 
1987). 
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Groundwater Resources 
Major Groundwater Aquifers 
Groundwater occurs primarily in unconsolidated'sedimentary deposits that underlie much 
of the state's agricultural lands and large portions of the urban areas. California has abundant 
groundwater resources, and in absolute terms, these resources are much larger than the state's 
surface-water reservoirs. On a statewide basis, there are nearly 400 groundwater basins that 
store nearly 850 MAF (C-DWR 1987). However, much of the groundwater is not available for 
use because of factors such as economical extraction, high pumping lifts, usable storage capacity 
of good quality water, limited potential for annual natural recharge, and distribution limitations. 
In areas overlying usable groundwater basins, the basin characteristics, hydrology, and water 
quality must be examined to determine the amounts and qualities of groundwater that may be 
utilized. 
Groundwater Storage and Safe Yield 
Groundwater pumpage in California amounts to an average of 16.6 MAF on a yearly 
basis, accounting for about 39 percent of the state's applied water requirements for municipal, 
industrial, and agricultural uses (C-DWR 1987). Groundwater basins in the state range from 
hundreds to millions of acres in size. However, much less than half the groundwater in storage 
lies close enough to the earth's surface to be pumped economically. The usable groundwater 
reserves are estimated to be 250 MAF (C-DWR, personal communication 1992h). 
Groundwater recharge plays a significant role in assuring the production of reliable good 
quality water from groundwater basins. Recharge occurs in various ways (C-DWR 1987) in the 
state and these include the following: 
• An average of 5.8 MAF occurs through natural recharge from rainfall, snowmelt, 
and stream seepage. 
• Annual return flows from agricultural, municipal, and industrial uses account for 
7.4 MAF. 
• Imported surface water of about 1.1 million MAF annually is used to recharge 
groundwater basins in the southern area of the state. 
• Seepage water from unlined irrigation canals makes up about 300,000 acre-feet 
of additional annual recharge. 
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Artificial and natural recharge makes up about 14.6 MAF of total recharge, but it does 
not completely replace the 16.6 MAF volume of water pumped annually. Statewide groundwater 
pumping exceeds recharge by an average of 2.0 MAF annually. This condition is referred to 
as overdraft (or groundwater mining). However, the amount of groundwater extracted varies 
considerably from year to year. The ability to increase withdrawals from the groundwater basins 
during drought emergencies is California's most important drought management mechanism. 
ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES 
The drought impacted fisheries and aquatic resources. The chinook salmon emerge from 
eggs in the cold headwaters of a river and then move downstream to the saltwater conditions of 
the ocean, where they mature into 20- to 50-pound adults. At 3 to 4 years of age, they respond 
to instinct and return from the ocean, completing the trip upstream to spawn. This trip upstream 
by the chinook salmon is referred to as escapement. The numbers of troll salmon (chinook and 
coho) were about 1.06 million in 1979 and about 0.68 million in 1990. During these years, the 
catch value was $22 million and $12 million, respectively. Figure II.4 illustrates the annual 
salmon catch and catch value for the state from 1979 to 1990 (pacific Fishery Management 
Council-PFMC 1991, Gleick and Nash 1991). The numbers of fish reveal a fluctuating trend, 
recording a low of 0.48 million in 1983 and a high of 1.56 million in 1988. The record catch 
of salmon during the 1979-90 period occurred in 1988, the second year of the drought. The 
fisherman were catching upward of three-quarters of all salmon in the ocean moving toward 
California streams. 
The Sacramento-San Joaquin system has the major salmon runs in the state. A total of 
120,000 fall-run chinook salmon returned to spawn in the Sacramento River basin in 1990. 
However, the salmon runs exhibit declining trends. The 1990 estimate of 26 percent was below 
the escapement averaged in the 1971-75 period (Gleick and Nash 1991). The escapement of fall 
chinook in the San Joaquin in 1990 was about 1,100 fish, and this represented only 8 percent 
of the 1971-75 average (Figure II.5). 
In addition to the fall-run chinook, which represents the major salmon fishery in 
California, there are three other distinct runs of salmon: late fall, winter, and spring 
(Table II.5). All of these salmon runs have fluctuated and declined since 1987 (Gleick and Nash 
1991). Since 1989, the winter run, which is already classified as a threatened species, has 
reached extremely low numbers and it may be near extinction. 
San Francisco Bay, one of the world's largest estuaries, is vulnerable to "Delta outflow, " 
i.e., reduced freshwater inflows from the Sacramento and San Joaquin Delta. The striped bass, 
an introduced species representing the principal sport fish in the estuary, has been a common 
indication of the Bay's ecological condition. The industries related to striped bass contribute 
about $45 million to local economies. Figure II.6 shows the fluctuations of the index in larval 
abundance from a high of about 110 in 1967 to about 80 in 1974, and to less than 10 during the 
1976-77 drought. Besides the striped bass, the abundance of the Delta smelt in the San 
Francisco Bay Delta region has shown considerable decline since 1984, and this is closely 
correlated with the prevalence of reversed flows in the Delta (Gleick and Nash 1991). 
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Figures 11.4 and 11.5 sources: PFMC 1991, Gleick and Nash 1991. 
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TABLE n.s 
SACRAMENTO RIVER LATE FALL, WINTER, AND SPRING 
CHINOOK SALMON SPAWNING ESCAPEMENTa ESTIMATES, 1981-1991 
(Thousands of Fish) 
Year Late Fall Winter Springb 
1971-75 c 19.0 30.6 7.2 
1976-80 c 11.2 15.4 11.7 
1981 7.0 20.0 22.0 
1982 4.9 1.2 27.4 
1983 15.2 1.8 8.0 
1984 10.4 2.6 9.4 
1985 10.2 5.0 14.9 
1986 7.0 2.3 17.2 
1987 15.7 2.3 12.4 
1988 16.6 2.1 16.7 
1989 11.4 0.5 10.8 
1990 8.4 0.5 8.3 
1991 7.1 unknown unknown 
Notes: a Escapement refers to the number of fish that successfully complete the trip upstream to spawn. 
b Spring-run totals include Feather River hatchery fish. 
c 5-year average. 
Sources: PFMC 1991, Gleick and Nash 1991. 
The Central Valley of California also supports millions of wintering waterfowl. 
However, the bird populations have declined over the last decade. In 1980, long-term averages 
indicated that the wintering population was about 10 to 12 million, while the 1990 population was 
estimated at around 2 million (Gleick and Nash 1991). The state and national wildlife refuges 
that receive water from the SWP and CVP project supplies provide a major part of the wetlands 
for the waterfowl. The current average annual water deliveries (1975-85) to the refuge, which 
are designated as Level 2 condition of the wetlands, have been estimated at 380,000 acre-feet 
(Table ll.6). For the current potential of the refuge to be fully used, an average annual supply 
of 493,000 acre-feet would be needed, and with full development of the refuges optimum 
management would required 526,200 acre-feet (Gleick and Nash 1991). 
WATER USE 
California's agricultural, urban, and other regional uses were approximately 40.5 million 
acre-feet (MAF) of freshwater in 1985 (Table ll.7), two years before the current drought (C-
DWR 1987). This amount represents water removed from the ground or diverted from surface-
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SAN FRANCISCO BAY STRIPED BASS INDEX 
Sources: SWRCB 1991, Gleick and Nash 1991. 
water sources for public water supply, industry, irrigation, livestock, thermoelectric power 
generation, and other uses. Approximately 24 MAF (or 57 percent) of water withdrawn is not 
available for further use and is referred to as consumptive use. This portion of water is 
evaporated, transpired, incorporated into products or crops, or consumed by humans or 
livestock. Much of the difference between applied water and consumptive use is reused either 
as groundwater percolation or as surface drainage water (irrigation return flows). 
Approximately 60 percent of freshwater use is supported by surface-water sources (Le., 
reservoirs, lakes, and rivers). The other 40 percent is withdrawn from groundwater aquifers. 
The availability of groundwater and surface-water storage affords the state a fair degree of 
protection against droughts. 
California accounts for the highest percent of total freshwater withdrawals in the nation, 
because the withdrawn water also serves the highest percent of the United States' population. 
In 1985, 10.9 percent of the United States' population lived in California, and the state used 
11.1 percent of total freshwater withdrawals in the nation. These withdrawals were equivalent 
to 1,420 gallons of water per capita per day. The national average per capita use of freshwater 
was 1,400 gallons per day. 
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TABLE n.6 
WATER SUPPLY NEEDS FOR 
WILDLIFE REFUGES IN THE CENTRAL VALLEY 
(In Acre-Feet> 
Refuge Levell Level 2 Level 3 
ModocNWR 18,500 15,550 19,550 
Sacramento NWR 0 46,400 50,000 
Delevan NWR 0 20,950 25,000 
Colusa NWR 0 25,000 25,000 
Sutter NWR 0 23,500 30,000 
Gray Lodge WMA 8,000 35,400 41,000 
Total Sacramento Valley 26,550 169,800 190,500 
Grassland RCD(a) 50,000 125,000 180,000 
Volta WMA 10,000 10,000 13,000 
Los Banos WMA 6,200 16,670 22,500 
Kesterson NWR 35,000 3,500 10,000 
San Luis NWR 0 13,350 19,000 
Merced NWR 0 13,500 16,000 
MendotaNWR 25,463 (b) 18,500 24,000 
Pixley NWR 0 1,280 3,000 
Kern 0 9,950 15,050 
Total San Joaquin Valley 95,163 211,750 302,550 
Total 121.713 381.559 493·950 
Level 1: Existing firm water supply. 
Level 2: Current average annual water delivers. 
Level 3: Full use of existing development. 
Level 4: Optimum management if refuge were fully developed. 
Level 4 
20,550 
50,000 
30,000 
25,000 
30,000 
44,000 
199,550 
180,000 
16,000 
25,000 
10,000 
19,000 
16,000 
29,650 
6,000 
25,000 
326,650 
526.200 
(a) As of 1985, Grassland River Conservation District (RCD) no longer receives agricultural drainage flows due to water quality 
concerns. 
(b) Only 18,500 acre-feet can be delivered to the Mendota WIldlife Management Area (WMA) without modifications of existing 
facilities . 
Source: USBR 1989, Gleick and Nash 1991. 
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TABLE ll.7 
REGIONAL USE OF CALIFORNIA'S DEVEWPED WATER SUPPLIES, 
1980, 1985, AND 2010 
(In 1,000s of Acre-Feet) 
APPLIED WATER 
Agricultural Urbaa Other Totals 
Regions 1980 1985 2010 1980 1985 2010 1980 1985 2010 1980 1985 2010 
San Francisco Bay 1,310 1,320 1,260 1,210 1,360 1,600 110 100 110 2,630 2,780 2,980 
and Central Coast 
South Coast 990 900 650 2,780 3,120 4,020 30 20 30 3,800 4,040 4,700 
Sacramento River 9,600 7,800 9,000 560 630 840 250 270 270 10,410 8,700 10,110 
San Joaquin River 18,890 17,600 17,680 830 920 1,400 170 170 190 19,890 18,690 19,270 
and Tulare Lake 
Colorado River 3,580 3,660 3,280 210 250 410 20 20 20 3,810 3,930 3,710 
Remaining regions 1,750 1,630 1,620 270 310 440 280 380 400 2,300 2,320 2,460 
STATE TOTALS 36,120 32,910 33,490 5,860 6,590 8,710 860 960 1,020 42,840 40,460 43,220 
Percent of total 84.3 81.3 77.5 13.7 16.3 20.2 2.0 2.4 2.4 100 100 100 
APPLIED WATER is the quantity of water delivered to the intake to a city's water system or a farm headgate; water diverted from a stream 
or pumped from underground sources, as in self-developed supplies; and water supplied to a wetland for wildlife. Because of the large amount 
of reuse that occura, this term overstates the supply of water needed for a large region. 
NET WATER USE 
Agricultural Urbaa Other Totals 
Regious 1M 1985 2010 1980 1985 2010 1M 1985 2010 1980 1985 2010 
San Francisco Bay 1,020 1,010 980 1,160 1,310 1,530 130 130 130 2,310 2,450 2,640 
and Central Coast 
South Coast 790 750 570 2,510 2,820 3,590 210 190 200 3,510 3,760 4,360 
Sacramento River 6,900 6,710 6,880 460 500 680 270 270 270 7,630 7,480 7,830 
San Joaquin River 13,880 13,650 13,860 490 530 760 340 370 390 14,710 14,550 15,010 
and Tulare Lake 
Colorado River 3,400 3,480 3,120 140 170 270 560 380 300 4,110 4,030 3,690 
Remaining regions 1,350 1,350 1,340 220 260 360 320 340 390 1,890 1,950 2,090 
STATE TOTALS 27,340 26,950 26,750 4,980 5,590 7,190 1,830 1,680 1,680 34,150 34,220 35,620 
Percent of total 80.1 78.8 75.1 14.5 16.3 20.2 5.4 4.9 4.7 100 100 100 
NET WATER USE is computed by adding evapotranspiration (the amount of water taken up by plants, transpired by them, and evaporated from 
the soil), the losses from a water distribution system that cannot be recovered, and outflow leaving an area. This estimate is essential in 
determining whether an area needs more water .• 
Source: C-DWR 1987. 
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While the statistics on freshwater withdrawals do not distinguish California from other 
states in the union, the statistics on consumptive water use do. The state accounts for almost 
23 percent of total consumptive use in the nation, more than two times its share of population. 
This situation can be attributed to the nature of agricultural and manufacturing activities found 
in the state. Approximately 17 percent of all irrigated land in the United States is located in 
California, and the size of livestock in the state almost equals the livestock in Texas. Also, the 
state has a large food-processing industry. These factors and the desert climate of the major 
agricultural areas contribute to the high consumptive use of water. 
Agricultural Water Use 
Irrigation Use 
According to the C-DWR, 1985 agricultural withdrawals amounted to 32.9 MAF and 
accounted for almost 81 percent of total freshwater withdrawals in the state (fable IT.7). 
Approximately two-thirds of the withdrawals came from surface-water sources, with the balance 
obtained from groundwater. An additional 263,000 acre-feet of irrigation water were obtained 
by reclaiming wastewater (Solley et ale 1988). 
According to the USGS 1985 estimates, the irrigation withdrawals (net of 1.04 MAF of 
conveyance losses) were applied on 9,580,000 acres of irrigated lands including farm and 
horticultural crops, as well as public and private golf courses. Irrigation water is primarily 
applied to land through flood irrigation (including flooding, furrow, and ditch methods). 
Approximately 80 percent of irrigated acres are flooded, and the remaining 20 percent are 
irrigated using center pivot, traveling gun, trickle, and drip irrigation methods. 
In 1987, slightly more that 90 percent of 7,676,000 acres, representing total harvested 
cropland, were irrigated (U.S. Department of Commerce 1989). In 1982, the agricultural 
products from irrigated farms were valued at $10.3 billion, or 82 percent of all farm production. 
On average, 3 acre-feet of water are applied per acre of irrigated land (Bajwa, Crosswhite, and 
Hostetter 1987). 
Livestock Use 
Livestock use is sometimes referred to as agricultural nonirrigation use. Livestock water 
use includes multipurpose uses, including water for stock watering, feed lots, dairy operations, 
fish farming, and other on-farm needs. Livestock freshwater use in California totaled 201 
million gallons per day (or 225,000 acre-feet per year). About 80 percent of the total applied 
use came from surface-water withdrawals and 20 percent from groundwater withdrawals. About 
78 percent (176,000 acre-feet per year) of the total applied livestock water was consumptive use. 
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Urban Water Use 
There are about 300 urban water agencies in California that were affected by the Urban 
Water Management Planning Act (Act), Section 10610 of division 6 of the Water Code. This 
act was known as Assembly Bill (AB) 797 and became effective on January 1, 1984. The 300 
urban agencies that have to prepare and adopt an urban water management plan represent water 
suppliers providing water for municipal purposes to more than 3,000 customers, or supplying 
more than 3,000 acre-feet of water annually. 
A recent survey by the C-DWR's District Offices summarized per capita water use for 
129 of the 300 urban agencies from 1980 through 1990 (C-DWR 1992b). The analysis 
conducted through the survey indicates that most urban areas reduced their peak summer use 
during the drought years 1988 through 1990. The average annual statewide per capita water use 
for 1987 was 195 gallons per capita per day (GPCD), and this decreased to 191 GPCD for the 
1988-90 period. Some of the reductions, however, were accompanied by increases in water use 
during the dry winters (C-DWR 1992b). 
The magnitude of the state's projected urban growth will increase the need for additional 
water supplies. California's projected increase in population is estimated to increase urban 
applied water deliveries by 32 percent from 1985 to 2010 (Table n.7). The consumptive use 
or net urban water use is projected to increase by about 4 percent from 1985 to 2010. This 
increase is due largely to the state's coastal regions, where 80 percent of California's population 
lives. More specifically, net urban use is increasing in the warmer inland coastal areas. The 
projected increase in urban consumptive use is accompanied by the development of several 
significant trends aimed at reducing per capita water consumption. These trends (outlined in C-
DWR 1987) include: 
• Construction of more multiunit housing 
• Reduction in residential lot sizes 
• Increasing the number of residences built since mandatory low water use fixtures 
have been instituted 
• Local agency water conservation programs including the influence of Best 
Management Practices (BMPs) 
• Increased plantings of low water-using landscapes 
• More efficient watering 
• Increased recycling of industrial process water 
Baseline unit urban demand is projected to increase 10 percent in the 1990-2020 period 
due to increased growth in the warmer, drier areas inland from the coast. However, the trends 
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outlined above should cause a downward shift of about 15 percent, so the net change in unit 
urban demand is projected to be about -5 percent. 
This also reflects other factors: 
• More parks 
• More landscape greenery for highways and businesses 
• Population shifts inward to hotter drier climates 
• Smaller household sizes 
SUMMARY 
California's economy was worth more than $760 billion in 1992, and the three major 
contributors have been the services sector; the finance, insurance, and real estate sector; and the 
manufacturing sector. These sectors made up 58 percent of the California state product in 1989. 
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing accounted for about 2 112 percent of the state's GDP, but one 
dependent upon the availability and usability of more than three-fourths of California's delivered 
water resources. 
California has abundant groundwater resources, and in absolute terms, these resources 
are much larger than the state's surface-water reservoirs. However, much of the groundwater 
is not available for use, and annual groundwater pumpage amounts to an average of 16.6 MAF. 
The state and federal dams and reservoirs store about 43 MAF. The 1985 net water use for 
agriculture accounted for 78.8 percent, urban use was 16.3 percent, and other uses accounted 
for 4.9 percent. The water use is based on 1985 conditions and will vary with changing 
assumptions across time. 
With this underpinning knowledge of the California economy and water-using sectors, 
let us now move to a discussion of the management systems for the delivery and allocation of 
this water. 
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m. WATER MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
This chapter describes the existing water management system in California. It 
characterizes (1) the statewide balance of water supply and demand, and regional differences in 
supply availability, (2) the large-scale water development projects that serve to mitigate regional 
supply deficiencies, (3) the California system of water law, (4) the institutional structure of 
water management, and (5) the overall approach to managing the recurrent droughts in the state 
that existed prior to the 1987-92 drought. 
SUPPLY-AND-DEMAND BALANCE 
The atmospheric circulation patterns and the location of the major mountain chains of the 
Coast Ranges, southern Cascade Range, and Sierra Nevada produce very uneven spatial 
distribution of precipitation and runoff. The values of normal annual precipitation range from 
3 inches in the desert areas of Southern California to 120 inches in the coastal mountains in the 
northwestern comer of the state. At the same time, the areas of highest precipitation and runoff 
are least populated and removed from the areas with irrigated agriculture. As a result, the 
northern half of the state is rich in renewable water supplies, while the southern half has to deal 
with a natural condition of water scarcity. In addition to the uneven spatial distribution of water 
surplus and deficit areas, there is a temporal disparity between the seasonal water needs for 
irrigated agriculture and seasonal precipitation. Precipitation is rare during the summer growing 
season. Most of the annual precipitation falls during the winter months of November through 
March, with much of that precipitation as snowfall in the higher elevations. 
In order to alleviate the uneven temporal and spatial distribution of precipitation and 
runoff and the mismatch of water supply-and-demand areas, a complex water management 
system has been developed. Hundreds of reservoirs and extensive water conveyance systems 
have been built to compensate for the seasonal and year-to-year variation in runoff, as well as 
to move water to deficit areas. This supply system has developed in response to water needs 
of each local area and region and over the 140-year period since California was declared a state. 
On average (or during years of normal precipitation and runoff), California can be 
viewed as a water surplus state. Average renewable statewide surface supply is 78.6 million 
acre-feet. This estimate includes 72.4 MAF of runoff generated within the state, 1.4 MAF from 
Oregon streams, and 4.8 MAP of imported water from the Colorado River. Total freshwater 
withdrawals are estimated at 40 MAF per year. They consist of 16 MAP of groundwater and 
24 MAF of surface water. Groundwater withdrawals exceed natural and artificial recharge by 
about 2.0 MAP. This condition is referred to as groundwater overdraft. The consumptive use 
in the state is 24.0 MAF or approximately 30 percent of average renewable supply. However, 
statewide statistics may give a false impression of the availability of water supply for all regional 
areas within the state. Severe imbalances between the demand for water and the available supply 
can be found in various regions, especially in the densely populated southwestern comer of the 
35 
state. Because of these imbalances, California has developed an extensive plumbing system of 
intrastate water transfers illustrated in Figure ill. I. 
Widespread water development continues. However, the pace of development has slowed 
during the last two decades because of environmental concerns and other issues affecting water 
management. The following section describes the major water development projects that when 
taken together, constitute a major portion of the existing system of water supply and distribution 
in the state (and are referred by California water professionals as "developed water"). 
CALIFORNIA MAJOR WATER PROJECTS 
A major portion of the state can be served by water obtained from two prime water 
suppliers who operate major storage reservoirs and aqueducts-State Water Project and Central 
Valley Project. The water distribution systems operated by SWP and CVP can reach more than 
75 percent of the state's population (C-DWR 1987). Both projects export water from the 
Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta, which has become the focal point for a number of water-related 
issues. The complex network of the natural and man-made Delta channels is shown in 
Figure llI.2. The Delta is a major hub for California water transfers and, because of the 
problems of saltwater flows, creates a bottleneck in the operations of SWP and CVP. Currently 
the pumping stations in the Delta are operated by releasing extra water to the Bay (called 
carriage water) in order to control reverse flows. Depending on the existing flow conditions, 
the amount of carriage water may reach a significant portion of water released for export during 
a period of drought. 
According to Contra Costa Water District (CCWD 1992), limitations on CVP and SWP 
pumping are imposed by the SWRCB, which requires salinity and flow standards to be met by 
the projects. It has been assumed for about 30 years that there is a carriage water requirement, 
with carriage water being additional outflow required to maintain some salinity standards when 
exports cause net reverse flows. The C-DWR proposed the hypothesis in the early 1960s, but 
never tested its validity (CCWD 1992). The District maintains that the data of the last 20 years 
contradict the hypothesis and the carriage water model. In fact, the data suggest that outflow 
requirements to meet a standard decrease with increased pumping, not increase, the exact 
opposite of the assumptions. The CCWD maintains that C-DWR acknowledged that the District 
had "raised valid points." However, C-DWR's official position, i.e., carriage water is needed, 
remains unchanged. 
In addition to the SWP and the CVP, there are four large regional projects-Colorado 
River, Hetch Hetchy, Mokelumne River, and Los Angeles aqueducts. In addition to the 
Colorado River aqueduct in the southeastern comer of the state, the Colorado River water is 
distributed by two federal aqueducts-Coachella Canal and All American Canal. A brief 
description of each major project is given below. 
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1. SOUTH BAY AQUEDUCT 1SO,OOO 
2. CQIITRACOSTACANAI. .',000 
3. MQCe.UMNEAQUEDUCT 210,000 
4. HETCH HETCHY AQUEDUCT 240,000 
EXISTING INTRASTATE WATER TRANSFERS 
AT 1980 LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT 
ACRE-FEET PER YEAR 
FIGURE ill. 1 
EXISTING INTRASTATE WATER TRANSFERS 
AT 1980 LEVEL OF DEVEWPMENT (Acre-Feet per Year) 
Source: C-DWR 1983. 
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FIGUREill.2 
NATURAL AND MAN-MADE DELTA CHANNELS 
Source: C-DWR 1987. 
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State Water Project 
The history of the State Water Project dates back to 1947, when the state legislature 
funded the water resource investigation that resulted in the publication of The California Water 
flail. The plan laid a foundation for the design of waterworks for transferring surplus water 
from the north to the water-deficient south (C-DWR 1990). In 1959, the state legislature 
enacted the California Water Resources Development Act (known as the Burns-Potter Act) that 
authorized funding for the construction of SWP facilities. Initial facilities included two dams 
and reservoirs (Oroville and San Luis) and three aqueducts (South Bay Aqueduct, North Bay 
Aqueduct, and California Aqueduct). The first SWP water deliveries were made in 1962. 
Currently the existing SWP facilities consist of 22 reservoirs including 2 built and 
operated in cooperation with the Central Valley Project. The total storage of the 20 SWP 
reservoirs is 5,279,000 acre-feet, with additional 1,062,000 acre-feet share of SWP in San Luis 
Reservoir and 29,600 acre-feet in O'Neill Forebay Reservoir. These reservoirs are connected 
with 445 miles of aqueducts served by 21 pumping plants with design flows ranging from 80 to 
13,200 cubic feet per second (cfs) and an average annual energy demand of 12.4 billion kilowatt-
hours (kwh), which constitutes the SWP share. The SWP facilities also include 13 power plants 
capable of producing 7.324 billion kwh of hydropower. 
The SWP is managed by the California Department of Water Resources. In 1960, C-
DWR and the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California signed the first water supply 
contract. Currently 30 agencies have long-term water supply contracts that call for water 
deliveries to eventually total 4.2 MAF. The current firm yield of SWP is estimated at 2.3 
MAP. In 1990, the contractors' requests for water totaled about 3.2 MAP. 
The service areas of the SWP long-term water supply contractors total 24.8 million acres, 
or 25 percent of the state's total area. Population of these areas totals 19.7 million persons, or 
70 percent of the total state population. The SWP water is used primarily for urban and 
industrial purpose in all of the SWP service areas except for the San Joaquin and Feather River 
areas. 
Central Valley Project 
The federal Central Valley Project (CVP) was developed in order to transfer surplus 
water from the northern to the southern portion of the great Central Valley of California. 
Although the California legislature and the voters authorized the construction of CVP in 1933, 
federal authorization and financing were requested under the Rivers and Harbor Act of 1937, 
due to lack of funds. The U.S. Congress authorized the construction of the project by the 
Bureau of Reclamation (USBR) for the purpose of flood control, irrigation and domestic uses, 
and power generation on the San Joaquin and Sacramento Rivers. Subsequent reauthorization 
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of the project added recreation and fish and wildlife as project purposes. The export of water 
to the south began in 1940 after a partial completion of the 48-mile-Iong Contra Costa Canal. 
Today the Central Valley Project includes twenty reservoirs with combined storage 
capacity of 13.6 MAF. Five reservoirs (i.e., Shasta Lake, Clair Engle Lake, Folsom Lake, San 
Luis, and New Melones) represent 92 percent of the total storage (approximately 12.5 MAF). 
San Luis and three smaller reservoirs (O'Neill, Los Banos, and Little Panoche) are operated by 
the state and used jointly with the SWP. The project water is distributed within the region by 
eight aqueducts with a combined length of 613 miles. The four longest aqueducts include Friant-
Kern (151 mi.), Delta-Mendota (116 mi.), Tehama-Colusa (113 mi.), and San Luis (101 mi.). 
CVP delivers about 7 MAF of water annually to some 300 water contractors. The long-
range net yield of the CVP presently available for allocation to water users is about 7.8 MAF 
per year, assuming full use of water by present and potential water contractors (C-DWR 1987). 
Colorado River Project 
The Colorado River Aqueduct extends 242 miles from Lake Havasu to its terminal 
reservoir, Lake Mathews, near Riverside. The aqueduct and pumping plants were completed 
in 1941 by the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California. The facilities were expanded 
in 1961 to a capacity of about 1.2 MAF per year. Metropolitan's dependable supply from the 
Colorado River water is 550,000 acre-feet (entitlement amount). 
Coachella and All American Canals 
California's basic apportionment of Colorado River supplies is 4.4 MAF per year plus 
not more than half of any surplus water. The Colorado River Project waters are part of 
California's basic apportionment of Colorado River supplies. The major portion of this supply 
(almost 4 MAF) is delivered to the Imperial Valley and Coachella Valley by the Coachella and 
All American canals and to the Palo Verde Valley. These canals are operated by the U.S. 
Bureau of Reclamation. The four agricultural agencies that receive the Colorado River water 
include Imperial Irrigation District, Coachella Valley Water District, Palo Verde Irrigation 
District, and the Yuma District. 
Los Angeles Aqueducts 
The city of Los Angeles obtains a major portion of its water supply from the Owens 
Valley and Mono Basin through the Los Angeles aqueducts. The first aqueduct was completed 
in 1913 and extended from the city to Owens Valley. In 1940, this aqueduct was extended to 
Mono Basin. In 1970, a second barrel was added to the aqueduct. 
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The Los Angeles Aqueduct has historically supplied an average of about 450,000 acre-
feet/year, of which 360,000 acre-feet/year were obtained from the Owens Valley and 90,000 
acre-feet/year from the Mono Basin. Recently, the city's diversions from the Mono Basin have 
been reduced because of litigation. 
East Bay MUD Project 
In 1929, the East Bay Municipal Utility District built the 90-mile Mokelumne Aqueduct 
in order to import water from the Pardee Reservoir on the Mokelumne River. In 1963, another 
reservoir, Comanche, was built. The combined storage of these two reservoirs is 640,000 acre-
feet. 
The San Francisco Hetch Hetchy Project 
In 1934, the city and county of San Francisco completed the construction of a 152-mile-
long Hetch Hetchy Aqueduct in order to import water from the Hetch Hetchy reservoir. The 
Hetch Hetchy reservoir, which lies within Yosemite National Park on the western slope of the 
Sierra, about 170 miles east of San Francisco, has a capacity of 360,400 acre-feet. In 1956, a 
second reservoir, Lake Lloyd (Cherry Valley), was added. The combined storage capacity of 
all San Francisco reservoirs is approximately 880,000 acre-feet. 
CALIFORNIA SYSTEM OF WATER LAW 
There are two major tenets of water law in California. First, water within the state is 
"the property of the people of California [Le., the state] and the people of California have an 
interest in its use." Second, individuals can obtain "a right to the use of that water," but that 
right is limited by what is "reasonable and beneficial." The guiding water law regime in the 
state recognizes both riparian and prior appropriation water rights and is referred to as a "dual" 
system. In addition to the riparian and appropriative rights to surface water, historic pueblo 
rights and unique groundwater doctrines also exist. 
Surface-Water Laws 
The adoption of the prior appropriation system dates back to the 1849 gold rush that 
brought about judicial protection of the "first in time, first in right" customary use of water in 
mining operations. After California acquired statehood in 1850, the California Supreme Court 
decided that both riparian and appropriative rights were to be recognized. Today, California 
remains the only western state to permit the initiation of new riparian uses. 
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Riparian Rights 
The riparian rights in California are subject to several limitations. The riparian parcel 
of land must be contiguous at some point to the stream in which the right is claimed. Water 
may be used only on the portion of the riparian parcel that is within the watershed of the stream. 
If a portion of the riparian parcel is severed from contiguity, it loses its riparian right unless 
such a right is expressly reserved. Finally, the right does not extend to seasonal storage of 
water on the riparian land. 
Riparian rights are not quantified in terms of the amount of water that can be diverted. 
However, they designate only the amount of water that can be reasonably and beneficially used 
on the riparian parcel without imposing on other riparian rights on the watercourse. Transfer 
of riparian rights occurs only through the conveyance of the riparian parcel. A transfer of right 
for use on nonriparian land can be permitted only if it harms no other riparian rights holder or 
is approved by the other holders. 
Appropriative Rights 
Prior appropriation rights were recognized by the courts as early as the mid-1850s but 
were not administered by the state until 1914. The Water Commission Act of 1913 required all 
new appropriations to make application to, and be approved by, a state agency (now the State 
Water Resources Control Board [SWRCB]). Currently the permit system is the only mechanism 
for acquiring a new nonriparian water right in California. The SWRCB, prior to granting an 
appropriative permit, must investigate existing water rights, conduct a public hearing, and issue 
a finding that unappropriated water is available. All existing riparian uses in a watercourse must 
be satisfied before appropriators may take water. Upon issuing the permit, water must be put 
into beneficial use before the right is perfected and a license for use is granted. Once perfected, 
water right carries a priority dating back to the time of permit application. Water rights carrying 
senior priority dates must be satisfied even if this requires the suspension of uses by junior rights 
holders. Domestic use does carry a statutory preference, but this applies primarily to competing 
applications for unappropriated water rather than to existing appropriative rights. Appropriative 
surface-water rights are transferrable, but changes in the type of use, place of use, and point of 
diversion must be approved by the SWRCB. 
Pueblo Rights 
A small number of communities founded under Spanish laws hold pueblo water rights 
that are based on the needs of a community to serve its inhabitants. Today's water rights 
priorities for the cities of Los Angeles and San Diego have pueblo rights that have been 
recognized by the California Supreme Court a.a~rson's Guide to Water Ri2hts Law 1986). 
The pueblo rights may be considered to expand with the growth of the municipality and are 
42 
senior to all riparian and appropriative rights. They are not transferrable and are not subject to 
loss through nonuse. 
In-stream Water Rights 
Historically, the development of water rights in the United States was focused more on 
providing water for human needs, industry, and agriculture than on protecting in-stream uses 
such as navigation, hydropower, fish and wildlife habitat, and recreation. An increasing 
environmental awareness brought about greater attention to in-stream flow values. In the 
western United States, 16 of the 18 states have a specific in-stream-flow water law, or the state 
law has been interpreted to include in-stream water rights (Wright 1986). 
In California, flow for in-stream beneficial use may be provided by water right permit 
conditions, protected rivers authorizing legislation for water projects, project operation, or 
application of the public trust doctrine. In determining the amount of water available for 
appropriation, the SWRCB refers the application for a permit to the Department of Fish and 
Game for recommendation regarding the amount of water that may be required for the 
preservation and enhancement of fish and wildlife. The SWRCB is also required to take into 
account the water required for recreation. In addition, California adopted a Wild and Scenic 
Rivers Act that identified and closed natural rivers in Northern California to all or some types 
of water appropriations. 
Also, many of the federal and state water projects in California are required to provide, 
in addition to other water uses, in-stream flows for navigation, water quality maintenance, 
hydropower, fish and wildlife management, recreation, and protection of endangered species. 
Another method of protecting in-stream uses in California is through the operation of water 
storage projects to provide the desired in-stream flows. 
Finally, protection of in-stream flows in the state can be achieved by the application of 
public trust doctrine. This doctrine rests on the premise that each state owns certain property 
that it holds in trust for public uses. The public trust doctrine has been invoked in a recent 
Mono Lake case. The California Supreme Court directed the city of Los Angeles to reduce its 
diversions from tributaries to Mono Lake in order to prevent extensive environmental damage 
to the lake. 
Groundwater Rights 
Groundwater in California is not subject to administrative allocation by the SWRCB. 
Groundwater rights are defined by the "correlative rights doctrine" under which owners of land 
overlying a groundwater basin are to share the water in common for reasonable beneficial use 
upon the overlying lands. When the availability of groundwater becomes limited, the reductions 
in use are shared proportionately by all. 
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Groundwater may not be exported outside of the basin unless there is surplus water. If 
nonoverlying users continue their withdrawals after the overdraft begins, those uses may acquire 
prescriptive rights against the existing correlative rights. 
California legislature has adopted very few statutes affecting groundwater rights. This 
is an unusual situation in western states water law. Only Texas is similar in this regard. The 
existing laws (as described below) have been developed by the courts. In dealing with depleted 
basins in Southern California, the courts developed a doctrine of "mutual prescription" under 
which the water users are given a share of the "safe yield" of the basin. Usually the rights were 
prorated on the basis of the use of water during the five years prior to adjudication. 
In 1975, the California Supreme Court overturned the "mutual prescription" doctrine and 
held that prescriptive rights do not apply against public entities. Under the court rulings, the 
operators of major water projects can spread and have a prior right to recapture imported water 
in basins with empty storage exceeding the present uses. Figure ill.3 depicts the existing rights 
to groundwater in full and overdrawn basins in California. Currently total withdrawals are 
limited to amounts that will not adversely affect the basin (Le., permanent damage or adverse 
effects on the basins's long-term supply). 
Administration of Water Rights 
Before 1914 appropriators secured their water rights by taking and using the water or by 
posting a notice at the point of diversion and filing a copy of the notice with the county recorder. 
After 1914 the state established a permit system to administer appropriations of surface water. 
Permits for post-1914 appropriative rights are now under the jurisdiction of the State Water 
Resources Control Board. 
The SWRCB was created by the state legislative in 1967 and was given the authority to 
allocate surface-water rights and regulate water quality control. The board is composed of five 
full-time appointees of the Governor supported by a staff. 
STATUTORY LAWS AND OTHER LEGAL INSTRUMENTS 
In addition to the common-law principles of riparianism and prior appropriation, the 
development and use of water in California is governed by (1) constitutional provisions, (2) 
statutes approved by the state legislature or the Congress, (3) statutes approved by the state 
legislature and then approved by the people, (4) judicial decisions in both state and federal 
courts, and (5) contracts and agreements between water management organizations. Appendix 
A contains an extensive list of significant water policy legislation, litigation and agreements and 
drought legislation since 1991. Brief descriptions of state and federal laws and regulations are 
given below. 
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RIGHTS TO GROUND WATER 
IMPORTED WATER PROJECT 
OPERATOR AND CUSTOMERS 
NO WATER AVAILABLE FOR 
EXPORT BY APPROPRIATORS 
NOTES: 
FULL BASIN 
OVERLYING LANDOWNERS SHARE 
COEQUALLY OR CORRELATIVELY 
FOR BENEFICIAL USES ON OVER 
LYING LANDS WITHOUT REGARD 
TO TIME OF USE. 
OVERDRAWN BASIN 
c:;:, 
.::.:::: .... 
IMPORTED WATER MAY USE STORAGE SPACE 
NOT NEEDED FOR NATURAL RECHARGE 
OVERLYING LANDOWNERS SHARE 
NATURAL WATER COEQUALLY 
SECOND PRIORITY 
ttt 
• Total uses 01 water limited to amount which will not do permanent damage to basin or have adverse elleets on the basins 
long-term supply. 
• Old Pasadena vs Alhambra 'mutual prescription' rule which apportioned water among all users both ovarly"mg and 
appropriative on basis of uses during the last 5 years 01 overdraft prior to fUing adjudicatory action is no longer the law. 
The case 01 Loe Angeles vs San Femendo overturned the 'Mutual prescription' doctrine and held prescriptive rights do 
not apply against Public entities. 
• Also the old Pasadena vs Alhambra rule which limited ground water withdrawalS of overlying landowners and appropriators 
to the 'safe yields,' that is, the average annual natural recharge 01 the basin, has been modilied to allow withdrawals in 
amounts which will not adversly ellect the basin. 
FIGUREID.3 
RIGHTS TO GROUNDWATER IN CALIFORNIA 
Source: C-DWR 1975. 
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Constitutional Provisions 
A 1928 amendment to the California State Constitution was adopted to limit the amount 
of water controlled by riparian rights holders. It included the requirement of reasonable and 
beneficial use of water which is not typically a part of common-law riparianism. 
State Water Policy Legislation 
A number of state laws have been enacted to enhance water management in the areas of 
water conservation, water transfers, groundwater protection and water quality, and safe drinking 
water. 
Water Conservation. The basis of California statutes regarding water conservation is 
that water should be put to reasonable and beneficial use. Article X, Section 2, of the California 
Constitution in 1928 aimed at preventing the waste of water and promoting conservation. The 
conservation programs instituted during the 1976-77 drought revealed the significant amount of 
water savings achieved by the people of California. This cutback in water use led to an upsurge 
of local and state conservation programs during the 1980s. Executive Order B-62-80 of 
February 1980 emphasized the implementation of water conservation practices among all state 
agencies, departments, boards, and commissions. Executive Order B-68-80 of July 1980 
required the C-DWR to take specific steps to ensure that conservation was high priority in the 
management of SWP. Additionally, C-DWR was to recycle agricultural and brackish water. 
The SWRCB was also urged to request water conservation plans when authorizing water rights. 
Water conservation in the private sector was promoted by Public Utilities Code Section 761 and 
770. This law gave the California Public Utilities Commission (PUC) the authority to ensure 
that water conservation was practiced among private utilities regulated by the PUC. Assembly 
Bill 797 (AB 797), the Urban Water Management Planning Act of 1983 required all urban water 
suppliers, serving more than 3,000 customers or supplying more than 3,000 acre-feet/year, to 
design water management plans and submit them to C-DWR. Similarly, agricultural water 
suppliers were expected to prepare water management plans through Assembly Bill 1658 (AB 
1658). 
Water Transfers. Water transfers assisted the state in coping with the 1976-77 drought 
and this marketing and sharing process was expanded after the drought. During the period 
1980-86, six laws were enacted to promote water transfers. Water transfer legislation was 
designed to: 
• Encourage voluntary transfers. 
• Allow water agencies to transfer their surplus water. 
46 
• Facilitate the use of unused conveyance capacity by public agencies. 
• Generally allow for greater flexibility in effecting transfers. 
Groundwater Protection and Water Quality. Generally, groundwater is controlled by 
overlying pumpers who mainly represent local government agencies (C-DWR 1987). Senate Bill 
187 (SB 187) was enacted in 1985, authorizing C-DWR to include feasible groundwater projects 
as features of the State Water Project. AB 2668 and AB 3127, legislated in 1986, applied 
existing provisions pertaining to well construction standards and reporting requirements to 
monitoring wells. These laws were also designed to improve groundwater quality by ensuring 
the protection of groundwater aquifers from contamination. Water quality gained even greater 
prominence in the state since the 19608, and the Water Quality Control Act of 1969 authorized 
the state to regulate the quality of surface- and groundwater reserves. Additionally, a number 
of state laws have been passed to deal with groundwater problems and groundwater protection. 
For example, the Water Conservation and Water Quality Bond Law of 1986 authorized financial 
assistance for water conservation, groundwater recharge, and agricultural drainage management. 
Other State Legislation 
The 1980s have also witnessed the enactment of other state legislation and these included: 
• AB 3792 of 1984 dealing with off-stream storage, authorizing as part of the SWP, 
the construction of Los Banos Grandes Reservoir, south of the Delta 
• Four laws enacted from 1984 to 1986 aimed at the protection and enhancement 
of fish and wildlife 
• Legislation aimed at ensuring the protection and maintenance of Delta levees 
Federal Legislation 
The federal government's Clean Water Act was passed in 1972, providing capital to 
control pollution mainly through the construction of municipal and industrial sewage treatment 
facilities. The Clean Water Act proved to be the forerunner of a number of federal and state 
laws to deal with the issue of water quality. Problems and issues included (C-DWR 1987): 
• Land disposal 
• Groundwater protection 
• Underground storage tanks 
• Solid waste management 
• Agricultural chemicals and pesticides 
• Hazardous and toxic wastes 
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Environmental protection has been the focus of most federal legislation since the 1980s. 
Public Law 98-541 (PL 98-541) and PL 99-552 were designed to maintain fish and wildlife in 
the Trinity and Klamath River basins, respectively. Previously referred to as H.R. 429, Public 
Law 102-575, Title 34-Central Valley Project Improvement Act (October 1992), was introduced 
to protect, restore, and enhance fish, wildlife, and associated habitats in Central Valley and 
Trinity River basins of California. The law also addresses the impacts of the CVP on fish, 
wildlife, and associated habitats. 
Judicial Decisions 
Water management in California is also significantly affected by the major court decisions 
pertaining to the state and federal authority over water projects, environmental protection, and 
the authority of the SWRCB. 
United States Supreme Court Cases 
The 1978 litigation, California v. United States strengthened the state's water rights 
appropriation process and increased the authority of SWRCB over water rights matters. The 
1978 case of United States v. New Mexico, applied state law to determine the acquisition of 
water for primary and secondary purposes. 
California Cases 
The 1986 cases, Imperial Irrigation District v. SWRCB and United States v. SWRCB 
confirmed the authority of the SWRCB to impose conditions on federal projects, to protect 
public trust values wherever feasible, and to apply its discretionary powers over water rights and 
water quality issues. The state's responsibility for its navigable waters was affirmed in the 1983 
case of National Audubon Society v. Su,perior Court. The state, under the supervision of the 
SWRCB, was to ensure protection of public trust values such as navigation, fisheries, and 
environmental values. 
Agreements 
The Joint Exercise of Powers Act enables agencies to enter into agreements aimed at 
improved management of water resources in the state. Several such agreements are described 
below. 
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The Coordinated Operation Agreement 
In 1986, the California Department of Water Resources and the U.S. Bureau of 
Reclamation signed the Coordinated Operation Agreement (COA) for coordinating operation of 
the Central Valley Project and the State Water Project to ensure that each project shares 
equitably in the obligation to limit exports to meet Delta water quality standards (under 
controlled flow conditions). 
Suisun Marsh Preservation Agreement 
The Suisun Marsh covers 55,000 acres of wetland area in the Central Valley and provides 
a feeding and resting area for wintering waterfowl along the Pacific Flyway. Reduction in Delta 
outflows affected the viability of the marsh, and this led the SWRCB in 1978 to impose water 
rights Decision 1485 requiring the USBR and C-DWR to establish a plan to protect the marsh. 
The C-DWR developed the plan, and in 1981 initial facilities were completed. The Suisun 
Marsh Preservation Agreement of 1987 involved four agencies: C-DWR, USBR, the 
Department of Fish and Game (DFG), and the Suisun Resource Conservation" District. The 
agreement was designed to protect the water quality in the marsh by moderating the effects of 
future upstream diversion and construction of proposed facilities. These facilities are beneficial 
to the nontidal portions of Suisun Marsh (about 80 percent), but they do not afford the same 
protection to the tidal marshes. 
Fish Protection Agreement 
The Delta Pumping Plant, at the head of the California Aqueduct, had initially installed 
seven of its eleven pumping units. The intended installation of the four additional units in the 
1980s led to negotiations between C-DWR and DFG concerning the preservation of fish affected 
by the operation of the Delta pumps. The Fish Protection Agreement was signed by these two 
departments in December 1986 in order to ensure the protection of fisheries from adverse 
impacts of the SWP. The agreement requires the calculation of direct annual fishery losses, and 
the C-DWR is responsible to pay for mitigation projects that would compensate for the losses. 
Initial actions will be directed at offsetting losses of striped bass, chinook salmon, and steelhead. 
Mitigation of losses impacted on other species will be handled later. C-DWR will also begin 
a restoration program to stabilize fishery levels to what they would have been, had the Delta 
Pumping Plant not been in operation. 
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PREVIOUS DROUGHT EXPERIENCE IN CALIFORNIA 
Lessons of the 1976-1977 Drought 
As stated in Chapter I, there is no formal statewide drought plan in California. 
Accordingly, this study was not designed to track the performance of a specific drought plan 
during the 1987-92 drought. If a preexisting plan was available, then the structure of the study 
would have been different. It would have been scientifically most feasible to first identify the 
elements of the drought plan prior to the onset of the 1987-92 drought; thereafter, look at the 
actions taken during the drought; and finally examine these actions in light of the plan in order 
to determine the lessons learned. However, this evaluation was not possible, since there was 
no written and comprehensive statewide plan developed, nor was there a plan on hand at the 
beginning of this drought. Additionally, there was no documentation of expected actions of 
controllers and influencers prior to the onset of the current drought. Therefore, we first defined 
a general drought strategy from historical records of actions taken during and following the 
1976-77 drought. Second, we qualified those actions as being unannounced ingredients of a 
plan. Third, through the interview process, we compared what actually happened during the 
drought with what was perceived by controllers and influencers in California. 
The lessons learned during the 1976-77 drought had a significant influence on the overall 
approach to managing droughts in California. Therefore it is important to remember these 
lessons and contrast them with drought response actions of the 1987-92 drought. The following 
is a list of lessons learned as presented in two sources: (1) a memorandum to the Secretary of 
the California Resource Agency dated September 8, 1977, and (2) the C-DWR Bulletin "The 
1976-77 California Drought: A Review" published in May 1978. 
Lessons of the 1976-1977 Drought by C-DWR Drought Group 
The Drought Group prepared a memorandum on September 8, 1977, to answer two 
questions asked by the Director of the Department of Water Resources: (1) What have we 
learned from this drought? and (2) What should we do differently on the basis of what we have 
learned so far? The following ten lessons were identified. 
• There is a considerable waste of water during normal water years. 
• Freshwater is a more limited resource than many people had realized before the 
drought. 
• Water agencies, farmers, and people in general have not prepared advance 
contingency plans for a drought as severe as the 1976-77 drought. 
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• In a drought, urban residents will generally conserve water voluntarily, without 
mandatory rationing, if they perceive a legitimate need. Mandatory rationing 
with fines serves best to impress the public with the seriousness of the situation. 
• Industrial use also can be reduced but probably not as much as urban use. Many 
industries are capable of taking cuts up to 25 percent without substantial economic 
loss. 
• Farmers can get by on somewhat less water, but not to the same degree (in terms 
of percentages) as urban users. 
• Farmers tend to use total available water supply in a given year rather than cut 
back to save water in case the following year is dry. 
• In a dry year, more water is generally needed and would be used if available. 
The patterns of water use also change as more water than normal is used earlier 
in the year to make up for lower-than-normal soil moisture and because of higher 
air temperatures. 
• Although the carry-over surface-water storage helped in maintaining the economy 
and domestic uses during the drought, it was primarily the state's vast 
groundwater resources that have prevented 1977 from becoming a disaster. The 
pumpage of groundwater basins in 1977 was about 25 MAF, and this exceeded 
natural recharge by 10-11 MAF. 
• There is always a possibility of a severe drought. To be prepared, water systems 
should be capable of being put into full operation, despite the fact that full 
capacity operations are almost never required under normal conditions because 
of redundancies in design. 
The last lesson pertains to the operation of the Colorado River Aqueduct. On March 1, 
1977, Metropolitan Water District turned on all nine pumps at each of its five pumping plants 
on the aqueduct to maximize the importation of Colorado River water into the state. All 45 
pumps went into operation on a 24-hour day, 7-day per week schedule, with no backup pumps 
available. As a result, 320,000 acre-feet of Metropolitan's entitlement water from SWP were 
released for use in the northern and central portions of the state that had no alternate sources of 
supply. 
In recommendations stemming from the 1976-77 drought that pertained to the "things to 
be done," the Drought Group emphasized (l) the need for preparing drought contingency plans 
both by the state and all local water supply agencies, (2) promotion of water conservation, (3) 
high priority for conjunctive use of surface and groundwater storage and groundwater recharge, 
and (4) reevaluation of California water law, particularly groundwater law to take into account 
the unique water needs that are encountered in a drought. 
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Lessons of the 1976-1977 Drought by C-DWR Drought Review 
In its fifth and final report on the 1976-77 California drought, the Department of Water 
Resources discussed lessons learned from the drought and suggested future actions for improved 
water management in the state. The following is an abbreviated listing of the lessons learned 
section of this report ("The 1976-1977 California Drought: A Review," pp. 167-75). 
• An extreme variation in year-to-year annual precipitation is possible, giving the 
state no guarantees that any of the next several years will not be dry. 
• Runoff in California rivers also has an extreme year-to-year variation with no 
apparent weather cycles. 
• An important role of the Department is to educate the public and provide 
information useful in making more beneficial use of the water resource. 
• The social and economic impacts of a repeat of the 1976-77 drought can be 
minimized so as to create even less strain than in 1977. There is a substantial 
advantage in spreading out the urban impacts of drought over two years. The 
urban problems encountered in 1977, including the rationing and its adverse 
consequences, were a direct result of starting urban water conservation too late. 
• Some water conservation in urban areas persists beyond the end of the critical 
period, thus forcing some agencies to increase water rates and leading some water 
district officials to believe that during the drought urban dwellers have learned 
how to conserve water and will continue to do it. 
• The experience of 1977 clearly showed that Californians can carry on nearly all 
domestic activities, with little more than a minor crimp in lifestyles, with a rather 
substantial reduction in water consumption. Few people really suffered from 
water shortage; they changed habits to "waste" less. 
• Urban conservation in 1977 achieved an estimated one-year reduction in water 
usage of 1 MAP (or approximately 3 percent of 32 MAP used annually in the 
state prior to the drought and about 20 percent of urban water use statewide). 
• Urban areas are able to reduce water consumption more readily than agricultural 
users and should be expected to do so. The existing contract priorities that 
require agriculture to take the first and largest deficiencies seem to be backward. 
The drought has shown that the reverse is easier and less disruptive economically. 
• California agriculture has demonstrated its ability to take shortages by changing 
cropping patterns, using the more efficient drip and sprinkler irrigation 
techniques, and reusing tail water supplies. 
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• The ability to interconnect urban and agricultural water systems is necessary 
because it allows the ready exchange of water from areas of surplus to areas of 
need. 
• Farmers and urban users were willing to pay more for water during the drought. 
Farmers who normally pay $7 to $25 per acre-foot paid from $40 to $80 per 
acre-foot (three to five times more). Urban users who normally pay $40 to $150 
per acre-foot paid from $50 to $375 per acre-foot (two times or more higher). 
• The drought allowed the SWRCB to "fine tune" the standards for water quality 
in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta during extremely dry years. During 1977, 
C-DWR and the USBR were unable to provide normal minimum releases from 
the upstream storage for purposes of maintaining Delta water quality. 
• The drought demonstrated the need for cooperation among various users in the 
Delta, as well as upstream users in order to maintain water quality standards in 
order to protect existing water rights, anadromous fish, wildlife, and the 
productivity of the bay. During the drought, the actions of each users, in many 
cases, adversely affected the other users. 
• Conventional hydrologic techniques for predicting water supply were inadequate. 
Because of the extreme dryness of the ground, much of the precipitation during 
the drought percolated directly into the ground, thus reducing expected river 
flows. Water from the rivers flowed to the lowered groundwater tables, reducing 
still further the expected surface-water supply. Also, agricultural water demand 
began earlier in the year and increased during drought because natural rainfall did 
not "preirrigate" the fields. 
• The drought has shown that operational techniques and criteria long used by 
major water projects do not work well enough in a major drought. For example, 
SWP delivered too much surplus water in 1976 instead of maintaining higher 
carry-over storage for 1977. The CVP forced low-quality water upon one of its 
major urban customers. Other multipurpose projects made large releases for 
power generation at the expense of other uses. 
• Federal drought response efforts were too slow, inflexible, and lacking 
communication with the public. Because of the delayed response, what might 
have become "mitigation measures" actually became "relief efforts." 
• The drought and the growth of California showed that additional water supplies 
must be found so that a recurrence of the natural drought cycles does not find the 
state unprepared. 
Several conclusions (Le., lessons) from the experience of 1976-77 drought call for 
additional elaboration. First, water managers kept hoping that the drought-induced conservation 
behavior of water users would continue into the future. By 1980, water use did return to normal 
predrought levels. Second, urban users who responded so well to drought by conserving almost 
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20 percent of water used in urban areas were only given credit for "wasting less" with "a minor 
crimp in lifestyles." Third, although it is true that urban areas can reduce consumption on a 
short notice, shifting the burden of water deficiencies from agriculture to urban areas cannot be 
justified on the case of urban conservation alone. Economic impacts of urban conservation are 
not small, and the achievements of urban conservation from the statewide perspective is not high 
(Le., 20 percent cutback represents about 1 MAF in applied urban use but about 7 MAP in 
applied agricultural use). Fourth, the criticism of reservoir operation rules has to be considered 
in the context of the worst dry year on record, it clearly was unexpected. Finally, the 
environmental impacts as well as role of the media are absent from the lessons learned. 
Actually, the water quality standards in the Delta were relaxed in order to conserve water stored. 
Summary of the 1976-1977 Drought Lessons for Water Management 
A water management strategy has emerged from the 1976-77 drought. The drought has 
shown that water storage alone cannot solve the drought problem. It has to be supplemented 
with efficient water delivery systems and efficient use for urban, agricultural, and other purposes 
including greater recycling. To accomplish this, it was suggested that the major water projects 
and groundwater basins in the state would best be operated as a single system under a set of 
coordinated policies. In lieu of this, water transfers allowed by the construction of the 
appropriate facilities as well as the development of additional conjunctive use capacity can serve 
to improve the existing system (C-DWR personal communication 1992i). 
These lessons of the 1976-77 drought were used by the authors in this study to formulate 
(or reconstruct) a statewide drought management plan that existed prior to the onset of the 1987-
92 drought. The reader should be aware that what follows is a "conceived and derived" plan 
that is not documented or formally adopted except within the framework of this study. 
PRE-1987 CALIFORNIA'S DROUGHT MANAGEMENT PLAN 
The approach to drought management that existed prior to the 1987-92 drought can be 
defined in terms of strategies and tactical response actions that would be expected given the 
experiences of the 1976-77 drought. The sponsor of this study, Institute for Water Resources 
of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, has devised a planning framework for studying the 
performance of water management systems and developing a better way to manage water during 
drought. According to this framework, all responses toward water shortages can be categorized 
as strategic, tactical, or emergency. 
Strategic measures are defined as long-term planning actions that tend to reflect 
permanent water conservation or drought mitigation measures. They may involve changes to 
existing water storage or source infrastructures, local ordinances, or regional/statewide 
legislation. Tactical drought preparedness measures tend to lessen the impact of a recognized, 
oncoming drought, with actions to induce reductions in water use proportional to the growing 
drought intensity. Finally, emergency measures are taken to reduce immediately water use or 
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loss when all other measures have been exploited. Tactical and emergency measures are short-
term drought response actions instituted and governed by existing laws and infrastructure. These 
measures can be divided into two categories: demand reduction measures and supply 
management measures (Ihe National Study of Water Mana&ement During Drought: A Research 
Assessment. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Institute for Water Resources, August 1991). 
A proper understanding of the roles of strategic, tactical, and emergency measures is 
critical to the effective overall drought management. Water supply agencies emphasize strategic 
long-term measures which would limit the need for tactical (short-term) measures and minimize 
the chances of reaching crisis situations during which emergency measures must be invoked. 
Environmental community tends to favor tactical measures, since these actions will prevent 
additional water development at the expense of in-stream uses of water. The U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers planning framework designates strategic and tactical measures as "drought 
planning." By definition, a crisis situation cannot be "planned for" because we pursue drought 
planning in order to prevent "crisis." We can only prepare for crisis by designating the disaster 
declarations and relief assistance responsibilities. 
The California water community is not clear on what constitutes "a crisis in water 
supply." Some outcomes of a water supply shortage, such as drained or contaminated water 
distribution system in a community, would likely be seen as a crisis by the majority of water 
professionals and general population. It is less clear, however, whether "water rationing" 
represents a crisis situation. If water rationing represents a crisis, then the tactical and strategic 
measures should be developed to minimize the chances of having to implement water rationing 
during future droughts. If rationing is an acceptable tactical measure, then it can become a 
component of the plan for coping with droughts. This dilemma can only be solved by 
California's society. The social behavior during the 1976-77 drought indicates that the general 
population views severe water rationing with enforcement as an emergency measure taken in 
response to a "real crisis situation." Numerous studies show that individuals will change their 
behavior (Le., conserve water) if they believe that there is a crisis. In other words, the general 
public tends to see water supply conditions as either "crisis" or "normal" (Le., noncrisis). The 
success of rationing programs measured as deep cutbacks in water use provides a proof that the 
situation was perceived as a crisis. If the supply shortages were not viewed by the public as 
"crisis," then most rationing programs would fail to produce the called-for reductions in water 
use. 
Accordingly, we can classify rationing programs as tactical measures as long as they are 
aimed at eliminating water waste and improving the efficiency of water use. All plans that call 
for "significant sacrifice" by allocating fixed quantities of water to each user that are insufficient 
for supporting normal lifestyles and that result in property damage, inconvenience, and 
significant burden should be classified as emergency measures taken in response to a crisis 
situation. Such a distinction is by no means arbitrary. It reflects the views of the general 
population as to what is a crisis that calls for a temporary change in their behavior and sacrifice 
in their lifestyles. Again, if crisis conditions can be avoided by planning, then they should be. 
We can include "water deficits" in water supply plans, but not "water shortages" that would 
result in crisis conditions. 
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Strategic Long-Term Drought Protection 
The water management system in California has been established in order to provide 
"dependable supplies" to the major population centers and agricultural areas in the state. The 
dependability of supplies relates to drought protection and planning preparedness. Therefore the 
major water development projects, such as the Central Valley Project and the State Water 
Project, were designed and are operated to provide adequate protection to water users against 
periodic droughts. Given the existing water storage capacity, the degree of drought protection 
is a function of the amount of "carry-over" storage in the major reservoirs. However, a higher 
level of drought protection (or dependability in water supply) can only be achieved at the 
expense of the amount of water made available to users during normal and slightly less-than-
normal supply. In other words, much of water management in California centers on the trade-
off between the amount of water stored for a potential drought year and water made available 
during a normal year. 
In general, the long-term drought protection in the state consists of the following five 
features: 
• Provision of extra storage in surface-water reservoirs and maintenance of the 
stored water as carry-over water 
• Conjunctive use of surface water and groundwater to optimize the availability of 
total supply during periods of drought 
• Development of a statewide water distribution system to move water from supply 
surplus areas to water shortage areas 
• Improvement in the balance of supply and demand by increases in efficiency of 
water use (Le., water conservation) 
• Development of additional supplies to enhance supply reliability 
The above long-term features of the water management approach in California, if provided at 
some optimal level of development and optimal operation, would carry the state through all 
drought events less severe than the droughts of record without the need to impose restrictions 
on water use or adverse impacts on the state environmental resources. Only during the most 
rare events would there be a need to mitigate potential shortages of water supply through tactical 
drought response measures. However, the experience of the 1976-77 drought demonstrated that 
the level of long-term drought protection in California is not adequate for protecting against 
drought events that approach in severity the bench-mark events used for planning purposes. This 
lack of reliability is viewed by water supply agencies as being due in large measure to the failure 
to complete the SWP and other planned projects because of the virtual standstill of project 
development for the last two decades. Tactical restrictions on water use must be used in order 
to reduce the risk of running out of water at the end of two critically dry years. In some 
communities, water shortages lead to crisis conditions calling for emergency measures. 
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Long-term drought planning and preparedness for a potential drought implies adequate 
planning and preparation to cope with an occurrence. In California, drought planning is required 
by the California Urban Water Management Planning Act (Water Code Sections 10610 through 
10656 were added by Statute 1983, Chapter 1009) which became effective on January 1, 1984. 
The act was known as Assembly Bill (AB) 797 while pending before the Legislature. The act 
requires that "every urban water supplier providing water for municipal purposes to more than 
3,000 customers or supplying more than 3,000 acre-feet of water annually to prepare and adopt 
... an urban water management plan. " 
Water-conserving codes passed by the local city council can require water-conserving 
.plumbing devices such as low-flow showerheads and 1.6 gallon capacity toilets in new residential 
developments. Long-term drought impact reduction can include the provision of sufficient local 
and regional storage of water in times of high rainfall for use during periods of drought. Long-
term protection against regional drought can also be achieved by developing interregional water 
transportation systems (Le., aqueducts) that can import water from distant sources. 
The SWP and the CVP facilities in California are examples of interregional water 
transportation systems. Local city ordinances and state and federal legislation also include 
strategic adjustments to drought. For example, the Warren Act restricts the movement of water 
through the CVP to urban users. This legislation is presently under revision. The six-year 
drought in California revealed that the Warren Act is outdated. Presently, there is verbal 
opinion from the Regional solicitor with concurrence from the Washington, D.C. solicitor that 
restricts the Bureau of Reclamation from executing Warren Act-type contracts for agricultural 
purposes. However, this verbal opinion does not restrict the Bureau from executing Warren 
Act-type contracts for municipal and industrial purposes (USBR, personal communication 1993). 
During the sixth year of the drought there was a move to bring the CVP under state control. 
Presently, these negotiations are for all practical purposes It dead," and the issue remains 
unresolved (USBR, personal communication 1993). 
Other long-term adjustments to drought are evident in the agricultural sectors. These 
include better management of existing systems during shortages and technological innovations 
such as drip irrigation systems. 
Tactical Short-Term Drought Response Plans 
The majority of the developed water supply systems in the state are operated with 
provisions for reducing water deliveries during periods of shortage. For example, the basis for 
the design and operation of most large surface storage reservoirs in Northern California is the 
1928-34 drought in the Sacramento River basin. The amount of water that could be delivered 
if the 1928-34 dry weather conditions were repeated is referred to as "firm yield" of the CVP 
and SWP. The actual operating criteria rely on a rule curve that balances the need for drought 
protection and the amount of water delivered in any given year. 
The onset of a drought is marked by public awareness campaigns and conservation 
programs to reduce water demand. Public awareness campaigns persuade consumers that they 
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should conserve water and provide consumers with information on how to conserve. Changing 
behaviors associated with high water use and promoting the use of water-saving devices are often 
viewed as the most effective means for achieving reduction in water use (Dziegielewski et al. 
1988). Technological devices usually are readily accepted by consumers. Retrofit campaigns 
also increase public awareness of drought and thus enhance the overall conservation effects. For 
example, mass mailings of conservation kits during the 1976-77 drought in California reduced 
indoor residential water use by 5 to 10 percent (California Department of Water Resources 
1978). As the magnitude and intensity of a drought increases, selected commercial uses such 
as car washes can be prohibited, and drought emergency prices and rationing programs are 
enforced. Restrictions on selected urban uses of water and water-rationing plans were reported 
to reduce water use by up to 65 percent for the targeted uses (Hoffman et al. 1979). 
Supply management techniques can include water system improvements such as 
modifications of the distribution system and emergency supply sources such as interdistrict 
transfers. Water banking is a resource management alternative that has proved effective in 
California. For example, the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (MWD) has 
two ongoing water-banking efforts. MWD has concluded negotiations with the Arvin-Edison 
Water Storage District for a program that would allow MWD to store SWP water during wet 
periods and receive in exchange a portion of Arvin-Edison's entitlement to water from the 
Central Valley Project (CVP) during dry periods. MWD also has a local banking program, the 
Seasonal Storage Program, that is a rebate program encouraging customers who have facilities 
to store water during high-flow months. Furthermore, the recent California drought led to the 
development of the Emergency State Water Bank during the fifth year of the drought. This 
alternative proved effective in generating water supplies by buying water from water rich areas 
and selling it to areas that needed it. However, much of the "generated" water was pumped in 
the areas of origin so that the long-term impacts of this alternative on ground water levels are 
a concern. 
The following sections describe the preexisting strategies and tactical measures that 
existed in California prior to the six-year drought of 1987-92. 
In general, the short-term drought response plan in the state consists of the following 
response actions: 
• Curtailment of surface-water deliveries to urban and agricultural users in order 
to maintain adequate carry-over storage for possible subsequent dry year 
• Relaxation of in-stream water quality standards 
• Increase in the use of groundwater in order to replace the surface-water supply 
shortages (or water left in storage) 
• Transfers of water within the state from sources with available water (e.g., 
Colorado River, Yuba River) to water-short areas (e.g., Santa Barbara County) 
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• Reduction of water use through conservation and rationing in urban areas and in 
agriculture to make up for the reduced deliveries and protect the remaining 
supplies 
• Activation of emergency supply alternatives such as reclamation of brackish or 
saline water and municipal wastewater, cloud seeding, and other alternatives 
The importance of these actions depends on actual drought conditions and the feasibility 
of each action. For some areas, the use of groundwater and emergency supplies are not feasible. 
Generally, large-scale transfers of water depend on the availability of interconnections to the 
major state distribution network and available water that can be transferred. Some options exist 
for significant intraregional transfers. The two short-term response options always available are 
protection of the remaining supplies and reduction in water use. This is actually a single option 
if viewed from the perspective of a local self-contained water supply system. At the state level, 
reduced deliveries of the CVP or SWP water can be met (replaced) using alternative sources, 
water conservation, or cessation of some uses. 
The success of the drought response plan is critically dependent on the timing of drought 
response actions. Normally, significant shortages in precipitation and runoff in the Sacramento 
River basin will not translate to automatic proportionate reductions in water deliveries. The 
large amount of water storage affords the operators of the projects some response lag time. 
However, two consecutive dry years will most likely trigger a response action. Once the 
drought conditions are in effect, the decisions on water deliveries and the amount of carry-over 
storage are made for one year in advance and can be changed from year to year. The following 
sections describe the operation of the supply sources during drought and the use of other drought 
response options. 
The SWP "Rule Curve" Criteria 
Water deliveries by the SWP are determined using the concept of "firm yield" operation, 
which is defined as the "dependable annual water supply that can be made available without 
exceeding specified allowable reductions in deliveries to agriculture during extended dry periods" 
(C-DWR 1987). Figure IDA shows the availability of the SWP water supply under conservative 
firm yield operating criteria with total annual demand set at 3.27 million acre-feet (MAF). 
The operating criteria are derived by examining the historical record of natural runoff 
as measured by the Sacramento River-Four Rivers Index. This index is the sum of unimpaired 
water year runoff from the Sacramento, Feather, Yuba, and American rivers. Figure ID.5 
shows the Sacramento River Index flows since 1906. The State Water Resources Control Board 
used the index to designate five hydrologic classes of water years in order to set the outflow 
requirements to meet the water quality standards in the Delta adopted in 1978 (Decision 1485). 
These operating criteria determine total water deliveries in a given hydrologic year. These 
criteria are based on the amount of water in storage at the beginning of the year and the required 
amount of carry-over storage, assuming that there is a seven-year drought in the Sacramento 
River basin like the one experienced during 1928-34. 
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The SWP contractors perceived that the firm yield operations are too conservative and 
therefore too restrictive in determining annual water deliveries. Figure rn.4 shows water 
availability under the 1986 rule curve operating criteria that relaxed the minimum reservoir 
carry-over storage requirements, thus permitting increased deliveries in all but the driest years. 
Under the 1986 rule curve, the average dry period deliveries during a repeat of the 1928-34 
drought would have been about the same as those obtained under the firm yield criteria. The 
actual operating criteria of the SWP are not fixed. They can be changed from year to year in 
response not only to the amount of water in storage but also to other circumstances such as 
contractual and legal limitations, hydropower requirements, Delta and upstream user's needs, 
and other considerations. For example, the rule curve for 1978 shown on Figure rn.6 shows 
that SWP expected that the delivery of full entitlement amounts of 1.8 MAF to SWP contractors 
would be made if the combined runoff of the four basins reached 10 MAF. Each water year's 
curve is distinct. A detailed discussion of the SWP's water delivery risk analysis and criteria 
for 1989 is presented in Appendix B (C-DWR 1988). 
The CVP Operations 
The surface-water storage reservoirs of the CVP are operated according to rules 
established by the United States Congress which authorized the project and its facilities. The 
specific operating criteria are similar to those used by the SWP. The project is operated to 
deliver the entitlement water to its contractors and to meet water quality standards in the Delta 
according to the Coordinated Operation Agreement with the SWP. The operating criteria 
include provisions for reduction of water deliveries during drought years. However, the CVP 
deficiency criteria vary from contract to contract and are therefore characterized by a number 
of different criteria rather than a single set of criteria. 
Groundwater Reserves 
The conjunctive use of groundwater and surface water is an important element of long-
term drought protection. The CVP, SWP, and other surface-water supply projects are capable 
of delivering significant quantities of surplus water during wet years. This water can be 
"banked" in groundwater basins for use during periods when surface-water deliveries are 
reduced. The actual banking can take a form of conjunctive use (i.e., surface water is used in 
place of groundwater, thus leaving water in the ground) or groundwater recharge (i.e., surface-
water is pumped into spreading basins or injected into deep wells for direct storage). 
The total storage capacity of all groundwater basins, which underlie about 40 percent of 
California, was at one time estimated to be some 1.3 billion acre-feet, with 143 MAF 
representing known usable storage (C-DWR 1975). The most recent estimates show only 850 
MAF of water stored, but a higher estimate of 250 MAF of usable groundwater. For example, 
6,400 square miles of the Sacramento Basin Hydrologic Study Area (HSA) is underlain by 24 
significant groundwater aquifers, of which the largest Sacramento Valley basin covers an area 
of 5,000 square miles and has usable storage capacity of 22 MAF. One of the largest 
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groundwater basins in California, located in San Joaquin Valley, contains more than 80 MAF 
and covers an area of 13,500 square miles. Finally, the Southern California region contains 42 
basins, of which 29 have the combined usable storage capacity of 10.4 MAF. 
During a normal year, about 40 percent (14.8 MAP in 1985) of California's applied 
water supply comes from groundwater basins. Groundwater pumping exceeds natural recharge 
in some basins, causing an estimated statewide overdraft of 2.2 MAF. During drought, the use 
of groundwater tends to increase to about 60 percent of all freshwater withdrawals, thus 
representing about an 8 MAF increase in the amount of groundwater pumped during normal 
years. Although this increase represents an overdraft, it provides an excellent option for 
mitigating surface-water shortages during drought. 
However, not all groundwater districts have access to abundant groundwater supplies or 
have groundwater rights. Fortunately, some recent court decisions have established rules 
facilitating conjunctive operation of groundwater basins with surface-water supplies. Agencies 
who import water into a basin have a right to recapture the imported water that percolates into 
the aquifer and can prevent the capture of that water by overlying landowners or appropriators. 
If recharge from natural sources is not sufficient to keep the basin full, the imported water may 
use the empty storage space not needed for natural recharge. Additionly, in adjudicated basins, 
an old court rule that limited groundwater withdrawals of overlying landowners and 
appropriators to the average annual natural recharge of the basin (Le., safe yield) has been 
modified to allow overdrafts as long as the basin is not adversely affected. 
The availability of groundwater storage and the existing groundwater laws make this 
drought response option very important. Significant amounts of water are artificially recharged 
into groundwater basins in Southern California and in Kern County for the purpose of banking 
the surplus water for droughts. 
Water Transfers 
Large-scale transfers of water are the main element of California's existing water 
management system. Many communities and farmlands use water imported by aqueducts to 
supplement local sources. The federal, state, and local aqueduct systems have been 
interconnected over the years to allow the sharing and exchange of water supplies. Such 
interconnections are invaluable during drought because they make it possible to move surplus 
water from distant areas to alleviate local shortages. 
The existence of interconnected aqueducts allowed the state to receive significant supplies 
of surplus water from the Colorado River. For example, during the 1976-77 drought, the 
Metropolitan Water District of Southern California released to SWP more than 300,000 acre-feet 
of water to be used in northern and central regions of the state. Metropolitan replaced the SWP 
water with imports of the surplus Colorado River water. 
Prior to the 1987-92 drought, there were a number of water-sharing and exchange 
agreements among water districts to alleviate potential water shortages. Some examples of these 
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agreements include the San Luis Dam Emergency (1981-82), the Kern River Intertie (1983), and 
the agreement for interim water supply for the city of Needles (1984). Many agreements are 
negotiated and implemented during periods when there is a need for them. Additional 
interconnections are built to make more exchanges and transfers possible. Also, between 1980 
and 1986, several laws were enacted to encourage voluntary transfers and facilitate such 
transfers by encouraging public agencies to allow other public agencies to make use of unused 
conveyance capacity. 
Water Conservation 
Temporary reduction of water demand plays an increasingly important role in coping with 
California droughts. During the 1976-77 drought, significant reductions in water use were 
achieved, thus demonstrating that people can cut back on water use if they have to because of 
a drought crisis. Many conservation measures implemented during a drought crisis are of a 
permanent nature (e.g., retrofit of showers and replacement of standard toilets with ultralow-
flush toilets), therefore they contribute to the long-term drought protection through permanent 
increases in water use efficiency. Although in extreme crisis conditions, some communities 
implemented rationing programs requiring close to 50 percent reduction in water use, moderate 
rationing calling for 10-20 percent reduction in use is more easily absorbed by water users and 
generally does not cause major economic impacts (if properly structured). However, as 
communities adopt and implement conservation practices, their ability to absorb reductions 
decreases. Generally, no significant business-related economic impacts occurred in urban areas 
other than employment losses within the "green industry. " 
Standby Water Supplies 
When water supplies become critically depleted, communities and water supply agencies 
usually consider a number of options for obtaining emergency supplies other than those discussed 
above. These may include (1) building dual distribution systems (although very limited) and 
reusing wastewater for urban irrigation and other nonpotable uses, (2) desalination of brackish 
and seawater to drinking-water quality levels, (3) importation of water by cisterns or hauling of 
icebergs, (4) cloud seeding to increase precipitation, and (5) many other possible options such 
as blending water of poor quality with good water. The first two options require substantial lead 
times in order to make them available. 
Some emergency options are also available to the state. For example, about a dozen 
different weather modification programs are conducted each year in the mountain watersheds in 
California. Although during a drought there are few cloud-seeding opportunities, there is a 
chance of up to 10 percent increase in runoff if all opportunities are used. It is estimated that 
a two-seeder aircraft should be able to generate 70,000 acre-feet of additional runoff during a 
single wet season at a cost of $10 per acre-foot or less. However, it should be noted that not 
all experts believe that cloud seeding can augment rainfall totals. 
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Emergency Measures 
The current drought and the previous 1976-77 drought in California revealed that major 
disaster declaration and relief assistance responsibilities fall upon state and federal governments. 
Government relief has come to the limelight as a high-priority issue since 1976, in response to 
increasing impacts of drought. 
Although the government has readily responded in creating relief programs, not all 
agencies affected by drought received emergency assistance. This was due mainly to a lack of 
awareness of what assistance is available. Federal programs approved in California as loans and 
grants in the 1976-77 drought made up about $222 million while state assistance contributed 
about $17 million. Federal and state drought assistance programs are available to an individual, 
or community, provided the entity meets the following criteria: 
• The entity is located in a county designated as a disaster or emergency area. 
• The entity is designated as an Emergency Drought Impact Area by an appropriate 
agency (C-DWR 1978). 
In the first case, designations are made by the President at the request of the Governor. 
In the second case, designations area made by the Interagency Drought Emergency Coordinating 
Committee (IDECC). This committee includes representatives of the Secretaries of Agriculture, 
Commerce, and Interior, and of the Administrator, U.S. Small Business Administration. These 
representatives are the administrators of the Farmers Home Administration (FmHA), Economic 
Development Administration (EDA), U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (USBR), and Small Business 
Administration (SBA). The secretary of this committee is the Administrator (or his designee) 
of the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration (FDAA) (C-DWR 1978). A summary of the 
major drought assistance programs approved in California by the end of the 1976-77 drought is 
provided in Table Ill. 1. Water shortage emergencies are governed by Sections 350-358 of the 
California Water Code (Appendix C). 
Summary of Emergency Measures and the Pre-1987 Statewide Drought Plan 
The pre-1987 statewide drought plan was characterized mainly by strategic and tactical 
drought response measures. Strategic or long-term drought protection is targeted toward 
providing extra storage in surface-water reservoirs, conjunctive use, developing the statewide 
water distribution system, and increasing the efficiency of water use. Short-term tactical 
response measures include reduction in water deliveries to urban and agricultural users, 
increased use of groundwater, increased transfer of water to areas of need, increased 
conservation in urban and agricultural areas, and implementation of emergency supply 
alternatives. The emergency measures primarily consist of declarations of disaster areas and 
provisions for relief measures. 
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TABLEm.l 
MAJOR DROUGHT ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 
Loans and Grants Approved in California 
(Amounts Approximate at End of November 1977) 
FEDERAL PROGRAMS 
U.S. De.partment of AGriculture 
Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) 
(Individuals and small communities; 
soil and water, emergency livestock loans) 
Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation 
Service (ASCS) (Individual farmers and ranchers) 
Emergency livestock feed and transportation programs 
U.S. DtaJ3.I1ment of the Interior 
Bureau of Reclamation (USBR) 
(Irrigators served by federal water projects) 
U.S. Department of Commerce 
Economic Development Administration (BDA) 
(Loans and grants to large communities) 
Small Business Administration (SBA) 
Physical loss loans 
Approvals 
$ 65.4 million 
22.3 million 
8.9 million 
19.5 million 
79.2 million 
7.4 million 
Economic injury loans 
Total federal assistance 
19.4 million 
$222.1 million 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA PROGRAMS 
California Safe Drinking Water Bond Act of 1976 
(Water companies serving at least 25 persons and 15 connections) 
California Davis-Gronsky Act 
(Communities under 200,000 population) 
Tax relief available 
SB 1033 (Vuich) for livestock ranchers (available) 
AB 776 (Fazio) for dry-land farmers (available) 
Total State Assistance 
Source: C-DWR 1978. 
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$ 4.2 million 
.7 million 
2.5 million 
10.0 million 
$ 17.4 million 
IV. RECOUNT OF THE 1987-1992 DROUGHT 
This chapter, recounting the 1987-92 drought in California, is based on a thorough 
literature review of available reports, documents, and newspaper coverage of the drought. The 
story of the drought begins with its onset, followed by the subsequent progress of drought events 
and response actions. The recount continues with an examination of precipitation and 
hydrological data during the drought, the resultant drought management outcomes, and the 
associated economic and environmental impacts of the drought. 
RECOGNITION OF THE ONSET OF DROUGHT 
The ongoing six-year drought in California began in water year 1987 (October 1, 1986, 
through September 30, 1987) and has continued for six consecutive years into 1992. It is 
important to think of drought in terms of water year, which begins three months earlier than a 
calendar year. 
It is also important to differentiate between the definition of the "drought phenomenon" 
and the definition of the "problem of drought." Typically, three types of drought are 
distinguished (Dracup 1980) with regard to the drought phenomenon. These include: 
• Meteorologic drought; defined based on the deficit of precipitation 
• Hydrologic drought; defined based on low streamflow 
• Agricultural drought; defmed based on soil moisture deficiency 
A major difficulty arises when one attempts to define the societal problem of drought. 
For example, the people of the state of California face the problem of the ongoing six-year 
drought not only because the precipitation in California has been less than normal, but because 
there is not, or will not be, enough water to satisfy all the established and new (in-stream and 
off-stream) uses of water in the state. Therefore the "problem of drought" must be defined from 
the perspective of adjustments to drought. With respect to off-stream uses, the real issue of the 
drought problem revolves around the social desirability of securing ample supply of water for 
all uses at all times. In more general terms, the need and level of drought mitigation (Le., 
reducing the adverse consequences of water supply shortages) may be determined by comparing 
the social, economic, and environmental impacts of drought with and without additional human 
intervention. 
Drought is measured in various ways in California, including total precipitation received, 
the volume of streamflow or runoff expected, reservoir storage, the Sacramento River Index, 
and the condition of soil moisture. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the California 
Department of Water Resources classified 1987 as a critically dry year, based on four drought 
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indicators: precipitation, runoff, reservoir storage, and the Sacramento River Index as set by 
the SWRCB. The first year of the drought was characterized by below-average precipitation (61 
percent of normal), water year runoff (48 percent), reservoir storage (84 percent), and the 
Sacramento River Index (50 percent). The Sacramento River Index refers to the sum of 
unimpaired water year runoff from the Sacramento River near Red Bluff, the Feather River 
inflow to Oroville, the Yuba River at Smartville, and the American River inflow to Folsom (C-
DWR 1991b). The Sacramento River Index is a standard index used to measure water supply 
conditions in California, and normal flow is reflected by the 50-year average (1941-90) of 18.4 
MAF. This index has been classified by C-DWR into five categories: wet, above normal, 
below normal, dry, and critically dry. 
Drought is a creeping phenomenon, and the current California drought really began after 
a wet 1986 water year. As a result of abundant water supplies in 1986, it was difficult to 
recognize the onset of drought in water year 1987. This year was critical; a drought year 
hydrologically, but carry-over was good, and therefore no hardship was experienced in 1987. 
However, the drought was visible in 1988, and this year marked the establishment of the 
Drought Information Center at C-DWR. 
RETROSPECTIVE DATA ON DROUGHT CONDITIONS 
Precipitation and Runoff 
Since the onset of drought in 1987, California has experienced at least one month of 
above-normal precipitation during each water year. For example, the Miracle March in 1991 
and a wet February in 1992 assisted in improving water conditions over the short term in the 
state. However, these precipitation "bursts" were not adequate to overcome water shortages in 
most parts of the state accumulated during the previous months of the respective water years. 
The Miracle March doubled the average statewide runoff and precipitation during the period 
March 1, 1991, to April 1, 1991. 
The current drought is extremely close to the severity of the 1929-34 drought experienced 
in the Sacramento River basin. However, the average annual runoff during the previous drought 
was lower. In the San Joaquin River drainage basin the 1987-92 drought is the worst six-year 
period on record. The 1987-92 drought period has been characterized by below-average 
precipitation varying from a lower limit of 61 percent in 1987 to an upper limit of 86 percent 
of average in 1989. Water year runoff has varied from 43 to 72 percent of average during the 
ongoing six-year drought. Reservoir storage has been below 100 percent over the drought 
period and has averaged 60 percent over the last three years. The Sacramento River Index has 
not risen above 9.2 MAF (Le., 50 percent of the 50-year average, 1941-90, of 18.4 MAF) for 
5 of the 6 years. These 5 years (1987, 1988, 1990, 1991, and 1992) have been classified as 
critically dry and the sixth year (1989) as dry. Table N.l provides a summary of the statewide 
precipitation and water year runoff since 1987. 
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TABLE IV.l 
SUMMARY OF STATEWIDE WATER YEAR DATA 
DURING WATER YEARS 1987-1992 AS OF OCTOBER 1 
(In Percent of Average) 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
Precipitation 61 82 86 69 76 
Water year runoff 48 47 72 45 43 
Reservoir storage 84 66 74 60 61 
Sacramento River Index (MAF)* 9.2 9.2 14.8 9.2 8.4 
Year type Critical Critical Dry Critical Critical 
1992 
87 
43 
56 
8.9 
Critical 
* The Sacramento River Index is the sum of unimpaired water year runoff from the Sacramento River above Bend Bridge near 
Red Bluff, Feather River inflow to Oroville, Yuba River at Smartville, and American River inflow to Folsom. The 50-year 
average, 1941-90, is 18.4 MAP. 
Source: C-DWR 1991b and personal communication 1992-93. 
With the exception of the North Lahontan region, all the hydrologic regions have 
experienced less-than-average precipitation (less than 100 percent) for at least five of the six 
drought years. Three of the regions, North Coast, San Francisco Bay, and the Central Coast 
have been characterized by less than average precipitation during the past six years. The 
average runoff for nine of the ten hydrologic regions, with the exception of the South Coast, has 
been below average (less than 100 percent) during the ongoing six-year drought. A description 
of average annual precipitation and annual runoff for the ten hydrologic regions in California 
during water years 1987-92 is provided in Figures IV. 1 and N.2. 
Surface-Water Storage 
California has built extensive reservoir storage facilities to provide sufficient water 
supplies for a variety of human uses, recreation, and flood prevention in winter. The 1920s and 
1930s saw the regional development of water projects followed by construction in the 1960s and 
1970s to meet the state's increasing need for power and water. Presently there are 155 major 
reservoirs in the state with a total storage capacity of almost 38 MAF of water. Table N.2 
shows the total storage for the past six years in California for the 155 major reservoirs including 
both the SWP and the CVP. A disaggregate breakdown of the surface-water storage according 
to the ten hydrologic regions in the state is presented in Table N.3. 
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Source: C-DWR 1991b and personal communication 1992-93. 
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Source: C-DWR 1991b and personal communication 1992-93. 
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TABLE !v.2 
STATEWIDE RESERVOIR STORAGE, 1987-1992 
(MAF) 
Year Storage 
155 major reservoirs 
October 1, 1987 18.9 
October 1, 1988 14.8 
October 1, 1989 16.7 
October 1, 1990 13.6 
October 1, 1991 13.8 
October 1, 1992 12.7 
Total capacity 
- 37.7 
Normal (average) storage 
- 22.5 
SWP reservoir storage 
October 1, 1987 3.22 
October 1, 1988 2.64 
October 1, 1989 3.07 
October 1, 1990 2.06 
October 1, 1991 2.59 
October 1, 1992 2.29 
Total capacity - 5.60 
Normal (average) storage - 3.81 
CVP reservoir storage 
October 1, 1987 6.3 
October 1, 1988 4.6 
October 1, 1989 5.1 
October 1, 1990 4.0 
October 1, 1991 3.3 
October 1, 1992 3.1 
Total capacity 
- 11.6 
Normal (average) storage 
- 6.3 
Source: C-DWR 1991b and personal communication 1992-93. 
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Percent 
of Normal 
84 
66 
74 
60 
61 
56 
85 
55 
81 
54 
68 
60 
100 
73 
81 
63 
52 
49 
TABLE IV.3 
REGIONAL SURFACE-WATER STORAGE IN MAJOR RESERVOIRS 
(In Thousands of Acre-Feet) 
No. of Total Historical Oct. 1 Oct. 1 Oct. 1 
Region Reservoirs Capacity Average 1989 1990 1991 
North Coast 7 3,148 2,076 1,684 1,479 1,004 
SF Bay 18 696 397 349 310 333 
Central Coast 6 947 551 121 93 164 
South Coast 29 1,978 1,119 1,141 1,201 1,342 
Sacramento 43 16,009 10,306 8,877 6,659 6,664 
San Joaquin 33 11,358 6,470 3,895 3,348 3,660 
Tulare Lake 6 2,045 699 243 170 291 
North Lahontan 5 1,072 585 221 106 98 
South Lahontan 8 402 298 200 206 228 
Colorado River· 
Oct. 1 
1992 
1,187 
355 
288 
1,322 
6,210 
2,798 
199 
91 
223 
Total 155 37,655 22,501 16,731 13,572 13,784 12,671 
Percent of average 74 60 61 56 
* No in-state reservoirs in this region. 
Source: C-DWR 1991b, 1992d and personal communication 1992-93. 
Groundwater Storage 
Groundwater generally contributes to about 40 percent of California's water supply, but 
during the current drought water shortages resulted in increased groundwater pumping. As a 
result, about 60 percent of the state's water during drought was obtained from groundwater. 
Groundwater basin levels in California vary, and these levels are affected by the rate of 
recharge, the total number of wells, and the amount of water pumped. 
The San Joaquin Valley, California's largest and most productive agricultural region, has 
been characterized by heavy utilization of groundwater during the ongoing drought. The decline 
in groundwater storage basin reflects the increased pumpage and inadequate recharge during the 
past six years. During the fifth year of the drought, it was estimated that groundwater storage 
in the San Joaquin Valley had been depleted by about 11 MAF (C-DWR 1991b). Groundwater 
levels in the southern Sacramento Valley had not declined significantly, although declining levels 
were evident in the northern Sacramento Valley. 
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A CHRONOLOGY OF DROUGHT EVENTS AND RESPONSE ACTIONS 
The background of the drought conditions in the state sets the stage for a discussion of 
drought events and response actions that occurred during the six-year period. In order to capture 
the progress of the drought, a chronology of events and actions has been designed. This task 
involved an intensive review of printed materials. Documentation of the most significant events 
and response actions has been recorded by exact dates as far as possible. The following is a list 
of some of the drought events arranged according to water years. 
First Year: Water Year 1987 (October 1, 1986-September 30, 1987) 
As described earlier, water year 1987 spelled the onset of the six-year drought in 
California but was not recognized as the first year of drought until 1988. 
Second Year: Water Year 1988 (October 1, 1987-September 30, 1988) 
Although the survey of public attitude in the state revealed that the adult community was 
aware of current water shortages, most of them (70 percent) believed that serious shortages 
would occur in the next decade. San Joaquin County was the first county in the state to declare 
a drought emergency 19 months after the onset of the hydrologic drought in the state. Around 
this period, California Governor George Deukmejian urged residents to take voluntary steps to 
cut water use. The first formal declaration that the state was in a drought was made during this 
period by David N. Kennedy, California Water Resources Department Director (April 19, 
1988). The second year of drought was characterized by conservation actions that included both 
voluntary (e.g., Metropolitan Water District and San Diego County Water Authority) and 
mandatory measures (city of Los Angeles). Other events and actions involved interconnections 
and the easing of federal legislation to facilitate water exchanges and transfers, trucking in 
water, and the State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB) hearings on the drought. 
January 1988. Fifty-four percent believe there is 
currently a serious water shortage in California, and 
70 percent believe that there will be a serious 
shortage in ten years. (Survey of California adult 
attitudes towards water use in the state) (Waterworks 
Southwest, FebnJary 1988) 
April S, 1988. As the snowpack and reservoir levels 
continue to stay below normal level, San Joaquin 
County declared a drought emergency. This was the 
first county in the state to do so. They immediately 
requested to get cattle feed to dirt brown ranches. 
(Bakersfield Californian, April 8, 1988) 
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April 16, 1988. California Governor, George 
Deukmejian, said that he has ordered the Department 
of Water Resources to draft contingency plans for a 
"drought emergency" immediately. He urged 
residents to take voluntary steps to cut water use. 
The Governor proposed to spend $10.3 million to 
boost the state's fire fighting forces needed during the 
current dry conditions. (Los Angeles Tunes, April 
17, 1988) 
April 19, 1988. California Water Resources 
Department Director, David N. Kennedy, formally 
declared a drought in California. This was the first 
admission by the state of the fact that California is in 
a drought. (Los Angeles Tunes, April 20, 1988) 
April 27, 1988. City of Los Angeles adopted an 
ordinance for imposing mandatory conservation 
measures that included prohibition on serving water 
in restaurants without customer's request, ban on 
hosing patio and driveways, immediate repair of 
leaky faucets. Also, the landlords and businesses 
were required to install water-saving devices for 
showers and toilets by October 13, 1988. (Los 
Angeles Times, April 20, 1988) 
May 2, 1988. The North Bay Aqueduct, a 24-mile 
long, $100 million pipeline started serving Solano and 
Napa Counties. This will provide 42,000 acre-feet to 
Solano County and 27,000 acre-feet to Napa County 
residents. (Vacaville Reporter, April 26, 1988) 
May 10, 1988. MWD of Southern California 
adopted a water conservation plan to conserve 10 
percent of water in response to a statewide drought. 
Also, for the first time, MWD notified its agricultural 
customers of likely water rationing if current drought 
continues through the winter 1988-89. (Pasadena 
Star-News, May 11, 1988) 
May 13, 1988. The Colleguas Municipal Water 
District and the Metropolitan Water District agreed to 
study a plan to use a pipeline to bring water from 
Lake Castaic to an underground storage area in 
mountains between Moorpark and Santa Paula. 
(Daily News, May 14, 1988) 
May 1988. Congressman Tony Coelho has 
introduced emergency legislation that empower the 
Secretary of Interior to determine if any of the 
reservoirs of the Bureau of Reclamation has surplus 
water. Also, the legislation authorizes the Secretary 
to sell any surplus water of such reservoirs. (San 
Francisco Chronicle, May 25, 1988) 
June 3, 1988. San Diego County Water Authority 
began a voluntary conservation program targeted at 
residents, government agencies, businesses, and 
private developers. The Authority will provide 
information about conservation and a conservation 
kit. (San Diego Union, June 4, 1988) 
June 13-14, 1988. State Water Resources Control 
Board is currently holding hearings on the drought. 
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There were different versions of the water problem in 
the state. For example, EI Dorado Irrigation District 
believed that the District was in trouble due to the 
drought, whereas, Coachella Valley Water District 
felt that they "are able to maintain without a negative 
impact on the rest of the state." (San Francisco 
Chronicle, June 14, 1988) 
June 14, 1988. During a hearing by the State Water 
Resources Control Board, Mr. Kenneth Roed, Vice 
President of the California Water Service Co. 
testified that, during this drought in the state, there 
has been no unified policy for saving water. Each 
agency has its own policy and problems. For 
example, San Francisco Water Department testified 
that voluntary conservation "was not successful." 
Therefore, the Department imposed mandatory 
rationing. However, MWD testified that voluntary 
conservation measures are effective and get results. 
(San Francisco Chronicle, June 15, 1988) 
June 1988. MWD of Southern California and the 
California Restaurant Association began distributing 
the water glass pictures. The card will suggest, "if 
you like a glass of water, just ask." (Los Angeles 
Times, June 16, 1988) 
August 11, 1988. Federal Disaster Assistance Act of 
1988 (Aid to Water Transfers) was signed into law. 
This Act authorizes the Secretary of Interior to assist 
water exchanges and transfers. It authorizes the 
Secretary "to assist willing buyers to purchase 
available water supplies from willing sellers, and to 
redistribute the exchanged water." (Drought 
Contingency Planning Guidelines for 1989) 
1988. City of Willits trucked in water and a 
temporary pipeline was used to transfer water from 
Scout Lake. (Drought Contingency Planning 
Guidelines for 1989) 
1988. SWP purchased 122,000 acre-feet from 
Bullards Bar Reservoir in a "trial transfer" approved 
by the State Water Resources Control Board. 
(Drought Contingency Planning Guidelines for 1989) 
1988. South San Joaquin Irrigation District (SSJID) 
purchased 28,000 acre-feet of groundwater produced 
by 70 wells located near SsnD canals. (Drought 
Contingency Planning Guidelines for 1989) 
Third Year: Water Year 1989 (October 1, 1988-September 30, 1989) 
The third year of drought brought Assembly Bill 982 (AB 982) into effect, which 
expedited procedures for temporary water transfers in California. The southern Sierra Nevada 
runoff estimates were quite low during the middle of the third year of drought, and the 
Governor's water awareness week (first week of May) was observed by about 300 public and 
private agencies in the state. The San Francisco Water Department ended its year-long 
mandatory water-rationing program, while Los Angeles activated its conservation package 
program to 100,000 single-family homes. The Los Angeles Department of Water and Power 
(LADWP) was ordered to temporarily suspend diversions from the environmentally sensitive 
Mono Lake basin, and CVP water was conveyed by C-DWR for usage at the Kern National 
Wildlife Refuge. 
January 1989. Assembly Bill 982 (AB 982) became 
effective in the state of California. This legislation 
establishes new, expedited procedures for temporary 
water transfers. AB 982 allows State Water 
Resources Control Board to exempt temporary 
transfers from the California Environmental Quality 
Act with a few minor exceptions. (California'S 
Continuing Drought, January 1991) 
May 1, 1989. A snow survey indicated that the 
southern Sierra Nevada runoff estimates are quite 
low. The Tule River drainage has the region's worst 
runoff situation with 36 percent of normal. The 
runoff estimates for the Kern, San Joaquin, and 
Kings Rivers are 50-60 percent, 54 percent, and 55 
percent, respectively. (Merced Sun Star, May 4, 
1989) 
May 1-7, 1989. Governor George Deukmejian 
proclaimed this week as Water Awareness Week. 
There are about 300 water agencies in California, 
both public and private, who will recognize and 
observe this week. This week is observed to focus 
everyone's attention on the need of conserving water. 
The city of Los Angeles unveiled a 28O-pound replica 
of a water faucet at the Music Center plaza during 
the kick off celebration of this week. (Los Angeles 
Herald Examiner, May 1, 1989) 
May 7, 1989. "The drought really isn't over," said 
Loron Hodge, manager of the Water Association of 
Kern County. There are no headlines of alarming 
drought, but nothing much has changed in Kern 
County as they are "still dependent on imported water 
supply." (Bakersfield Californian, May 7, 1989) 
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May 10, 1989. Mandatory water rationing imposed 
on 2.2 million customers of San Francisco and 
suburban communities about one year ago, officially 
ended today. The San Francisco Water Department 
declared that the drought "is over for us." Also the 
San Francisco Public Utilities Commission dropped 
the plans to purchase $2 million of water from Yuba 
County. (The Orange County Register, May 10, 
1989) 
Augmt 2, 1989. Los Angeles Mayor Tom Bradley 
announced a pilot program to deliver water 
conservation packages from door-to-door to 100,000 
single-family homes. (Los Angeles Herald Examiner, 
August 3, 1989) 
August 22, 1989. An EI Dorado County judge 
ordered the Department of Water and Power of the 
city of Los Angeles to halt all diversions from the 
environmentally sensitive Mono Lake Basin until 
March 30, 1990. It is important to note that 
environmentalists, led by Mono Lake Committee 
have campaigned against any diversion of water from 
the lake as it lowers the lake level threatening the 
survival of nesting and migratory birds and other 
wildlife. (Los Angeles TImes, August 23, 1989) 
Augmt 31, 1989. C-DWR conveyed 7,200 acre-feet 
of CVP water for the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. 
The water was conveyed to be used at the Kern 
National Wildlife Refuge. (Department of Water 
Resources Bulletin, 132-90) 
Fourth Year: Water Year 1990 (October 1, 1989-September 30,1990) 
In this year, there was a distinct emphasis on long-term water supply sources. MWD 
studied proposals for potential sites for a desalting unit. MWD also purchased 705 acres of land 
for a possible reservoir site. An increasing number of Canadian firms started competing with 
each other to supply water to the drought-stricken Santa Barbara and other locations. 
Meanwhile, Ventura City officials examined the feasibility of transporting icebergs from the 
polar caps. 
This period also saw instances of regional cooperation to supply water to the areas 
severely affected by drought. This was also a period of extreme distress for some areas, 
including Santa Barbara and Kern County. Governor Deukmejian proclaimed a state of drought 
emergency for the county of Santa Barbara. Additionally, Kern County Water Agency declared 
drought emergency. At the same time, however, Yuba County Water Agency was in a water 
surplus situation. 
Several urban entities in California adopted policies in the past that used constrained 
water supplies in order to slow down or prevent urban growth. The drought has revived an old 
controversy about the relationship between the availability of water supply and urban growth. 
Many respondents gave the example of Santa Barbara to demonstrate a failure of such policies. 
According to the city of Santa Barbara Public Works Department (personal communication 
1992), many inaccurate statements about the drought emergency in Santa Barbara have received 
wide circulation such that they are believed to be accurate. The Public Works Department 
indicated that the local community does not believe that constrained water supplies failed to slow 
down urban growth in the Santa Barbara-Goleta area. Constrained water supplies did not stop 
growth as some would have wished; but shortage contributed to slowing growth in the area. 
Additionally, the Public Works Department indicated that the city of Santa Barbara did not put 
constraints on the expansion of its water supply to sustain a less than 10 percent growth. In the 
early 1980s, the city adopted the Goleta Overlap Agreement that added 1,000 acre-feet per year 
of demand, and the environmental review of that agreement documented the need for additional 
supplies. The remainder of the 1980s was spent trying to add supplies, first by the enlargement 
of Gibraltar Reservoir and then by the enlargement of Cachuma Reservoir. The city does not 
share groundwater resources with Goleta Water District. 
The desalination alternative seemed to have gained strength in this year as a possible 
long-term solution to the water shortages. The city of Santa Barbara had examined several water 
supply proposals and finally decided in favor of building of a desalting plant. The Santa Barbara 
Public Works Department (personal communication 1992) states that the emergency situation had 
little to do with the cost of additional supplies. The emergency desalination facility has costs 
similar to the SWP supplies for the city. Due to the drought, the attitude toward paying for 
expensive supplies changed. The Public Works Department notes that the city's location makes 
these supplies expensive. The city of Santa Barbara voters never approved the "critical planning 
period approach"; it was adopted by the City Council. The city of Santa Barbara signed a 
contract with Ionics, Inc., for preliminary work on building a reverse-osmosis desalter. In fact, 
the consensus of a meeting of the Assembly Committee on Economic Development, International 
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Trade and Technologies favored desalination as an option during drought. Marin Municipal 
Water District also opened a pilot desalination plant during this year. 
The prolonged drought conditions resulted in overpumping of the groundwater in 
California. In the Central Coast, the farm-rich Salinas Valley faced serious seawater intrusion 
into its aquifers and the water table dropped an average of 15 feet below sea level during the 
past three years of dry weather. Also, the city of Los Angeles was blamed for destroying the 
Owens Valley vegetation due to overpumping of groundwater from its eastern Sierra Nevada 
properties. Los Angeles stopped pumping groundwater from this region due to the pressures 
from the Owens Valley ranchers and the Inyo County officials. 
The Delta smelt, a three-inch-Iong fish, attracted much attention when the Fish and Game 
Commission refused to list it as a threatened species. The Delta smelt remained a major issue 
between the environmentalists and the state water lobby. Also, in this year, the C-DWR 
released 30,000 acre-feet to aid outmigration of juvenile chinook salmon. 
October and November 1989. C-DWR conveyed 
30,000 acre-feet water through Banks Pumping Plant 
for the Department of Fish and Game. This water 
was released to aid the outmigration of juvenile 
chinook salmon. (Department of Water Resources 
Bulletin, 132-90) 
March 1990. SWRCB Division of Water Rights sent 
notices of curtailment of water use to 88 water right 
permit or license holders on the San Joaquin River. 
(California's Continuing Drought, January 1991) 
March 1990. Officials of Simi Valley, Thousand 
Oaks, Moorpark, Camarillo, and Oxnard in eastern 
Ventura County indicated that they will comply with 
the request from MWD of Southern California to 
prepare ordinances that would require reductions in 
water because of the worsening drought. (Los 
Angeles Times, Ventura County, March 13, 1990) 
March 14, 1990. The U.S. 9th Circuit Court of 
Appeals upheld revisions of the 1902 Reclamation 
Act that Congress enacted in 1982 providing that 
farmers could get federally subsidized water to 
irrigate up to 960 acres of land. The farmers will 
pay full cost of water on acreage above 960 acres. 
This decision was a significant blow to large 
corporate farms such as J.G. Boswell Co. and 
Southern Pacific Land Co. These corporate fanners 
got subsidized water even though they controlled land 
far in excess of the law's original 960 acre limit. 
(Los Angeles TImes, March 15, 1990) 
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March 1990. The State Lands Commission, a 
government watchdog over state landholdings, agreed 
to file a legal brief supporting efforts by the National 
Audubon Society and the Mono Lake Committee to 
keep in effect a preliminary injunction that has 
stopped the city of Los Angeles from diverting water 
from streams feeding the Eastern Sierra Lake since 
midsummer of 1989. (Los Angeles Times, March 29, 
1990) 
April 1990. City of San Luis Obispo imposed a 
rationing program to reduce residential use by 30 
percent. (Western Water, May/June 1990) 
April 1990. Under the pressure from Owens Valley 
ranchers and Jnyo County officials, the city of Los 
Angeles has agreed to stop pumping groundwater 
from its Eastern Sierra Nevada properties. This 
source is one of the city's three largest sources of 
water. This step has been taken in response to the 
prolonged drought and the toll it has taken on the 
Owens Valley vegetation. Jnyo County residents had 
blamed Los Angeles for pumping water and lowering 
the water levels in private wells and killing 
vegetation. Jnyo County and Los Angeles had battled 
in court over the pumping. (Los Angeles TImes, 
April 4, 1990) 
April 23, 1990. The Imperial Irrigation District 
(lID) approved a plan designed to save up to 70,000 
acre-feet of water per year. This plan was designed 
to ensure that lID does not exceed 3.85 million acre-
feet water consumption limit set by the Bureau of 
Reclamation. Last year, the county exceeded the 
limit by 100,000 acre-feet. If no exceeds its water 
allocation, the excess use will be deducted from 
future water allocations. (Imperial Valley Press, 
April 24, 1990) 
April 24, 1990. The General Manager of Hetch 
Hetchy water project, Mr. Andy Moran testified that 
it faces the worst drought in its seventy years of 
operating history. The testimony came at a meeting 
of the San Francisco Public Utilities Commission. 
(Placer County Journal, April 25, 1990) 
May 1, 1990. The Demonstration Semitropic Local 
Element Agreement executed to serve as a prototype 
for establishing local elements of the Kern Water 
Bank. (C-DWR Bulletin 132-90) 
May 1990. Reacting to Mayor Tom Bradley's 
proposal for mandatory water rationing for the city of 
Los Angeles, the Apartment Association of Greater 
Los Angeles has asked how they can get their tenants 
to cut back on water use when a vast majority of 
apartments are master-metered. (Los Angeles Tunes, 
May 13, 1990) 
May 1990. The farm-rich Salinas Valley in the 
Central Coast of California is facing serious seawater 
intrusion problems due to overpumping from the 
groundwater aquifers. The ocean water is reported 
to have seeped as far as five miles into these 
groundwater aquifers. The aquifers in the valley 
have dropped an average of 15 feet below sea level 
in the past three years of dry weather. (Sacramento 
Bee, May 13, 1990) 
May 1990. San Diego County voters rank 
California's water shortage as the number one issue 
facing the state; higher than crime and drugs, 
according to a poll conducted for the San Diego 
Union. The survey interviewed 400 registered voters 
and was conducted May 15-20. (San Diego Union, 
May 24, 1990) 
May 24, 1990. Kern County Water Agency directors 
declared a drought emergency. The declaration 
allows the agency to execute drought-relief projects 
without resorting to the time-consuming 
environmental study and competitive bidding 
procedures required by state law. (Bakersfield 
Californian, May 25, 1990) 
June 1990. Heavy structural losses resulted from a 
fire that swept down from San Marcos Pass towards 
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Goleta in Santa Barbara County. (California's 
Continuing Drought, January 1991) 
June 1990. Not all in California have been hit by 
drought. The Yuba County Water Agency has 
reaped a windfall of $15 million by helping less 
fortunate regions with its "phenomenal water 
surplus." This agency captures runoff from one of 
the most generous watersheds in the state-"a swath 
of the High Sierra between Donner Summit and the 
Sierra Buttes." The District has rights to about five 
times as much water as its irrigation customers use. 
(Sacramento Bee, June 3, 1990) 
June 4, 1990. Ventura city officials have decided to 
study the possibility of transporting icebergs from the 
polar caps and planting them off the county's shores. 
The iceberg idea is one focus of a $175,000 research 
project on possible long-term water supplies approved 
by the City Council of Ventura. (Los Angeles TImes, 
June 6, 1990) 
June 1990. A heavy rain in Marin County late in 
May allowed the directors of the Marin Municipal 
Water District to call off possible mandatory water 
rationing. Marin's seven reservoirs gained about 
2,300 acre-feet of water from these unexpected heavy 
rains. (San Francisco Chronicle, June 8, 1990) 
June 1990. A plan to use the San Gabriel Valley's 
vast underground water storage basin as a safety 
valve for the Southland's dry spells is being 
considered by the MWD of Southern California. 
(Star News, June 12, 1990) 
June 12, 1990. A Los Angeles City Council 
committee recommended a 10 percent mandatory 
water-rationing plan as water conservation efforts 
average 5 percent this year. However, the Los 
Angeles residents have saved an average of 11 
percent in the two months of April and May of this 
year. A full council will consider this proposal next 
month. (Daily News, June 13, 1990) 
June 14, 1990. MWD of Southern California 
approves a $628 million operating budget for fiscal 
year 1990-91 with key elements of large-scale water 
conservation programs and construction and 
expansion of needed water delivery systems for 
Southern California. The District is offering $10 
million worth of incentives to member agencies that 
are able to cut water use by more than 5 percent this 
summer. Overall, MWD's spending on conservation 
efforts will reach $18.7 million. (1he Californian 
and 1he Valley Press, June 15, 1990) 
June 1990. Four years of continuing drought have 
prompted some interesting water-saving classes and 
seminars for this summer. Examples include "Drip 
Irrigation for the Home Gardener" (one-day UCLA 
extension program) and "Xeriscape: Gardening for 
a Dry Climate" (meets five days at UCLA). (Los 
Angeles 1imes, June 24, 1990) 
July 13, 1990. The city of Santa Barbara lifted its 
ban on watering lawns during the drought. A 
wildfire that destroyed hundreds of homes near Santa 
Barbara led to lifting of the ban that was imposed last 
February. These fire-damaged areas had brown 
lawns and dry vegetation. (The Sacramento Bee, 
July 13, 1990) 
July 16, 1990. The City Council of Los Angeles 
defeated Mayor Tom Bradley's proposal to impose 
mandatory water rationing this summer. In the event 
of failure on the part of businesses and residents to 
voluntarily conserve water use by at least 10 percent 
any month, then the Council will reconsider imposing 
water rationing. (Los Angeles 1imes, July 14, 1990) 
July 17, 1990. Governor Deukmejian proclaimed a 
state of drought emergency for the city of Santa 
Barbara. 
August 1990. A Canadian company's proposal to 
export water by tanker to drought-stricken Santa 
Barbara is being challenged by an Indian tribe in 
British Columbia that claims that the plan could 
damage the environment near its reservation. As the 
drought in California intensifies, an increasing 
number of Canadian firms are competing with each 
other to export water. The city of Santa Barbara is 
expected to vote on whether to approve the tanker 
water from Canada or build a desalination plant to 
supply the city. (Los Angeles 1imes, August 3, 1990) 
August 9, 1990. The Assembly of California 
Legislature adopted Assembly Concurrent Resolution 
No. 180. It requests C-DWR to submit a report to 
the legislature by March 15, 1991, containing 
specified information regarding the availability of 
water for 1991. (California'S Continuing Drought, 
January 1991) 
August 30, 1990. The Fish and Game Commission 
denied the recommendation of the Department of Fish 
and Game to list the Delta Smelt as a threatened 
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species under the state's Endangered Species Act. 
The C-DWR and the water lobby had opposed the 
recommendation of the Department of Fish and 
Game. (Alameda Yodeler, October 1990) 
September 1990. MWD has approved a $500,000 
study to determine potential sites for a demonstrating 
desalting unit. "This planning program will 
determine the appropriate actions taken by 
Metropolitan to plan, design, construct, and operate 
a demonstration seawater desalination plant on the 
Southern California coastline." (U.S. Water News, 
September 1990) 
September 1990. MWD of Southern California 
purchased 705 acres of land for possible reservoir 
site. (Riverside Press-Enterprise, September 12, 
1990) 
September 15, 1990. The level of Lake Tahoe 
dropped below its natural rim jeopardizing water 
supplies for the downstream communities for the 
second time during the four-year drought. 
(California'S Continuing Drought, January 1991) 
September 18, 1990. City of Santa Barbara signed 
a contract with Ionics, Inc. for preliminary work on 
a proposed 2,500 to 10,000 acre-feet/year capacity 
reverse-osmosis desalter using seawater. 
(California'S Continuing Drought, January 1991) 
September 19, 1990. Imperial Irrigation District 
(lID) objected to a request from the U.S. Bureau of 
Reclamation to conserve about 85,000 acre-feet of 
water by the end of the year for the District. 
(Imperial Valley Press, September 19, 1990) 
September 1990. Archbishop Roger Mahoney urged 
all Catholics in Los Angeles Archdiocese to join in an 
effort aimed at alleviating the severe drought now 
plaguing California for the fourth straight year. 
"Conservation is a form of worship," Mahoney 
remarked. (Antelope Valley Press, September 21, 
1990) 
September 20, 1990. Desalination as an option 
during drought was the consensus expressed by 
scientists, engineers, businessmen, and lawmakers at 
meeting of the Assembly Committee on Economic 
Development, International Trade, and Technologies 
chaired by Assemblyman Richard Polanco. Mr. 
Polanco compared Southern California's dependence 
on imported water from the Sacramento Delta and the 
Colorado River to America's reliance on foreign 
energy supplies. (San Gabriel Valley Tribune, 
September 23, 1990) 
September 25, 1990. Marin Municipal Water 
District (MMWO) opened a pilot desalination plant 
that uses "reverse osmosis." This is the first time 
when the desalination technology is being used on 
Bay water. (Marin County News Pointer, September 
1990) 
Fifth Year: Water Year 1991 (October 1, 1990-September 30, 1991) 
During the fifth year of drought, Governor Deukmejian declared a state of drought 
emergency for the county of Santa Barbara. The Standard and Poors reviewed the impact of 
drought on the credit ratings of eight of the largest water system issuers of bonds. The review 
showed that the credit rating of at least one was likely to weaken due to the drought, as reduced 
water resulted in lower revenues. A preliminary report, submitted by Spectrum Economics to 
California Urban Water Agencies showed that aerospace, defense, computer, and food-
processing businesses are increasingly nervous about the expected water shortages in California 
in the coming decade. 
The October-February period of the 1991 water year was marked by an increase in 
precipitation deficit. This was followed by a very wet March that recorded precipitation up to 
three times the average for the month. The Miracle March turned a "desperate drought situation 
into a manageable one" (C-DWR 1991b). The March rains provided only a brief respite to the 
dry conditions, and 1991 turned out to be the driest of the 1987-91 period. 
As the drought intensified, there were instances of cooperation among the water users. 
Southern California Edison Company, Southern California Gas Company, Metropolitan Water 
District of Southern California (MWD), and Los Angeles Department of Water and Power 
formed a water-energy conservation partnership. At the same time, MWD and Imperial 
Irrigation District (lID) entered into an agreement that would allow 100,000 acre-feet of the lID 
water allotment to be transferred to MWD. Research, funded through MWD, investigated if 
alfalfa could be grown with less water in Imperial County. During this year, MWD also agreed 
to transfer 7,200 acre-feet of emergency water to the water districts in southern Santa Barbara 
County through Oxnard and Ventura. 
During this water year, the MWD started providing cash incentives to its member 
agencies to conserve water. By the end of the year, this conservation effort created an 
unexpected water surplus for the MWD. As MWD did not have sufficient storage capacity, they 
decided to sell the surplus water. 
Proposition 128, also known as "Big Green," was rejected by Californians. This 
proposition included sweeping environmental reforms by providing full protection to fish, 
shellfish, and their habitat. However, the environmental community rejoiced in the decision of 
a U.S. District Judge ordering Glenn-Colusa Irrigation District to cut back in river pumping to 
protect the chinook salmon population. By the end of the water year, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
had recommended to the U.S. Department of Interior to list the Delta smelt as a "threatened," 
rather than "endangered," species. 
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In this year, a controversial Katz Bill (Assembly Bill 2090) was initiated to allow farmers 
to sell water directly to the urban agencies. This bill was opposed by the agricultural sector, 
who contended that this measure would transform the California farm belt into barren land. 
Finally, the Senate Agriculture and Water Resource Committee voted against the bill. 
The drought seemed never-ending, and the three participants of the Three-Way Process 
struggled to survive. By the end of this water year, the environmental sector had secured its 
position as a major player in the water politics of California. 
October 1990. California Department of Fish and 
Game and federal fisheries agencies met with a 
number of water agencies to begin developing plans 
for 1990. Operations for minimum flows and 
temperature control were discussed. 
October 2, 1990. Southern California Edison Co., 
Southern California Gas Co., MWD of Southern 
California, and Los Angeles Department of Water 
and Power announced the formation of a water-
energy conservation partnership. As a first project, 
Edison workers will install 16,000 water-saving toilet 
tank flappers supplied by MWD in low-income homes 
in the electric utility service area. "Electricity, 
natural gas, and water have in common the need for 
conservation. In fact, they are interrelated," 
remarked John Bryson, CEO of the Edison Co. (San 
Gabriel Valley Tribune, October 3, 1990) 
October 1990. San Diegans cut their water use by 
10.7 percent for the months June through September. 
This was achieved through voluntary conservation 
measures. (San Diego Union, October 7, 1990) 
October 1990. MWD of Southern California has 
approved $150,000 to fund research in the Imperial 
County to see if alfalfa can be grown with less water. 
Alfalfa is a major crop in this county. The MWD 
and Imperial Irrigation District (liD) have entered 
into an agreement that will allow 100,000 acre-feet of 
water to be transferred from lID's allotment of 
Colorado River water to MWD. In return, MWD 
will pay for expensive improvements in the irrigation 
system, including lining of canals and new reservoir 
construction. (Imperial Valley Press, October 12, 
1990) 
October 10, 1990. The Metropolitan Water District 
of Southern California Board of Directors voted to 
support Proposition 148. This proposition would 
provide funding for water treatment facilities and 
supply development, flood control, drought relief, 
wastewater and contaminated groundwater 
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reclamation, and other such projects. (Paramount 
Journal, October 18, 1990) 
October 1990. Berrenda Mesa Water District has 
proposed selling some of its water from the 
California Aqueduct to a Southern California 
developer (Summit Valley Partners) in what could be 
the first transfer of SWP water out of Kern County. 
The developer has offered $20 million in exchange 
for permanent rights to 20,000 acre-feet of water per 
year. (Bakersfield Californian, October 21, 1990) 
October 25, 1990. Senator Pete Wilson, R-
California, moved to hold the water reclamation bill 
that would limit the size of farms to 960 acres for 
being eligible to receive subsidized water. Earlier in 
August, the Orange County Register had examined 
farm water policy and found that the CVP farmers 
are using billions of federally subsidized water to 
grow crops. Some water districts in the Sacramento 
River Valley pay $1.50/acre-foot of water, whereas 
MWD in Southern California pays $233/acre-foot of 
water drawn from the same river delta. (Orange 
County Register, October 26, 1990; San Diego 
Union, October 20, 1990) 
October 1990. Importing state water to Santa 
Barbara County was favored 4 to 1 by county 
residents surveyed in recent News-Press poll 
conducted by Richard Hertz consulting firm. (Santa 
Barbara News Press, October 22, 1990) 
October 1990. Fitch Investor Service reported on 
how drought was affecting four hydroelectric 
projects. Reduced water results in reduced 
generation and lower revenues that can affect timely 
payments of debt service on these projects' bonds. 
The eight large drought-affected issuers monitored by 
Standard & Poor's have a combined total of $3.6 
billion in bonds outstanding. Recently, Standard & 
Poor's also reviewed the effect of drought on these 
eight of the largest water-system issuers of bonds and 
concluded that the credit rating of at least one was 
likely to weaken due to the drought situation. 
(Sacramento Bee, November 2, 1990) 
October 30, 1990. Kern County Water Agency 
unveiled their "What if" drought contingency plans at 
a state Department of Water Resources. (Bakersfield 
Californian, October 31, 1990) 
November 1990. A proposed pipeline, called the 
Inland Feeder, connecting the SWP's east branch 
aqueduct in San Bernardino County with 
Metropolitan's Colorado River Aqueduct in Riverside 
County will be discussed in four community meetings 
in November 1990. (Moreno Valley Butteifield 
Express, October 21, 1990) 
November 1, 1990. The Department of Water and 
Power (DWP) in Los Angeles announced that its 
customers had cut down their water usage by only 
5.2 percent in October 1990, far short of the 10 
percent conservation goal. It was the first time in the 
six months that the DWP has been measuring 
conservation efforts that the city of Los Angeles 
failed to meet its 10 percent goal. At this time, the 
DWP officials do not see any mandatory rationing of 
water for the city any time soon. (Los Angeles 
TImes, November 2, 1990) 
November 13, 1990. Governor Deukmejian 
proclaimed a state of drought emergency for the 
county of Santa Barbara. 
November 1990. Eastern Municipal Water District 
is providing area school districts a combination of 
free information, teacher workshops, in-class 
presentations, plays, computer programs, and contests 
to teach students water awareness and conservation. 
(Riverside Press-Enterprise, November 6, 1990) 
November 6,1990. Voters rejected Proposition 128. 
This proposition included sweeping environmental 
reforms known as "Big Green." Section 5.7 of Big 
Green proposition provides a "full protection to and 
propagation of fish, shellfish, and their habitat in the 
state marine bay, estuarine, and ocean water.· The 
opponents of this provision believed that it would 
give priority to fish and game over people and 
agriculture for their water needs, particularly during 
this serious drought. (Los A.ngeles limes, November 
8, 1990) 
November 1990. MWD and Wells Fargo Bank 
teamed up to bring water conservation message to 
public through a special water-saving kit prepared by 
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the district. (San Marino 1Hbune & News, 
November 8, 1990) 
November 14, 1990. Sierra Club officials asked the 
city of Los Angeles to fill a wildlife lake with potable 
water despite the current drought. They claimed that 
thousands of migratory birds are passing Sepulveda 
Basin without stopping. The city officials show 
reluctance to use potable water as they had faced 
serious public criticism last year when they put 
drinking water in the 11 acre lake. The city officials 
plan to put only the reclaimed water when they 
receive it from the Tilman sewage treatment plant. 
(Orange County Register, November IS, 1990) 
November 16,1990. U.S. Deputy Regional Forester 
David M. Jay ruled that propane cannot be sprayed 
into the winter clouds over the middle fork of the 
Feather River until the federal agency has reviewed 
an appeal filed October 29 by a sport fishing 
organization. The California C-DWR had planned a 
five-year prototype $2-million project for cloud 
seeding with a potential increase of 10 percent of the 
snowpacks and adding 21,000 acre-feet of water to 
the annual spring runoff into Lake Oroville. 
(Bakersfield Californian, November 18, 1990) 
November 1990. Recently, the Association of 
California Water Agencies (ACW A) presented the 
vulnerability of the Sacramento-San Joaquin River 
Delta to a possible major earthquake and resulting 
disruption of water supply for the state. The 
opponents of the Peripheral Canal proposal accused 
ACW A for implicitly attempting to revive the 
Peripheral Canal proposal as a remedy to the 
situation. (Bakersfield Californian, November 20, 
1990) 
November 1990. The Association of California 
Water Agencies (ACW A) has sponsored an 18-month 
publicity campaign, called "Living on the Edge," to 
show the desperate situation of the California water 
supply problem. The cost of the campaign is 
estimated to be $350,000. (Bakersfield Californian, 
November 21, 1990) 
November 20, 1990. Modesto Irrigation District 
agreed to sell water to San Francisco. The San 
Francisco Public Utilities Commission still has to 
approve the offer. (Modesto Bee, November 21, 
1990) 
November 21, 1990. The state C-DWR released its 
620-page draft environmental report on its five-year, 
$290 million plan to enlarge watelWays in the 
northern Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta. (Bakersfield 
Californian, November 23, 1990) 
November 1990. MWD will provide cash incentives 
to its member agencies to conserve water. (Madera 
Tribune, November 21, 1990) 
November 1990. It has been planned to transfer 
7,200 acre-feet of emergency State Water Project 
water through the MWD to Oxnard to Ventura water 
main. Ventura would then exchange an equal amount 
of water to Santa Barbara from its supplies at Lake 
Casitas. (Ventura County and Coast Report, 
November 22, 1990) 
November 1990. As MWD faces a cutback in its 
supply of water of 300,000 acre-feet from the 
Colorado River next year, it is exploring the 
possibility to enter into some "temporary" 
arrangements with water districts such as Imperial 
Water District, Palo Verde Water District, and 
Coachella Water District. (Imperial Valley Press, 
November 27, 1990) 
December 1990. A 16-inch steel pipe became a part 
of a three-mile Oxnard-to-Ventura connection to 
initiate exchanges and transfer to move emergency 
state water to water districts in southern Santa 
Barbara County in 1991. 
December 11, 1990. The Board of Directors of 
Metropolitan Water District decided to impose a 
mandatory water-rationing plan beginning February 
1, 1991. This decision was taken in consideration of 
the impending fifth year of drought. (Simi Valley 
Enterprise, December 12, 1990) 
December 1990. The farmers in Ventura County are 
facing a 20 percent cut for the next year on use of 
imported water from the Metropolitan Water District. 
(Oxnard Press Courier, December 13, 1990) 
December 1990. 12,530 citations for water wasting 
have been issued since the last seven months when 
the Drought Buster (drought-coping) program first 
began. This $1 million-a-year program is part of the 
anti-drought response of the Los Angeles Department 
of Water and Power. (Daily News, December 23, 
1990) 
December 19, 1990. The state C-DWR shut off the 
California Aqueduct deliveries from the Edmonston 
pumping station to the Los Angeles basin for one 
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week. This action was prompted by the fact that lack 
of rains have caused the reservoir levels in the north 
to dip to low levels. (Press Enterprise, December 
28, 1990; Los Angeles TImes, December 24, 1990) 
December 1990. Governor-elect Pete Wilson named 
Douglas P. Wheeler, a former Sierra Club director as 
his Secretary of Resources. Mr. Wheeler pledged to 
aggressively mediate disputes between the 
environmental movement and the business 
community. (Los Angeles 1imes, December 27, 
1990) 
1990. The Central Valley of Fresno drilled six new 
wells and is exchanging reclaimed water for Kings 
River water. 
1990. City of Napa purchased 6,500 acre-feet of 
water from the Yuba County Water Agency's 
Bullards Bar Reservoir and had it delivered via the 
SWP North Bay Aqueduct. 
1990. Three units of C-DWR's largest power plant 
were shut down due to low reservoir levels at Lake 
Oroville requiring the purchase of replacement 
capacity and energy. 
1990. In 1990 alone, it is estimated that 5 billion 
board feet timber were killed by drought-related 
causes. 
1990. Cities supplied by the CVP were cut back 2S 
to 50 percent. (C-DWR, January 1991) 
1990. SWP cut deliveries to agricultural customers 
by 50 percent. (C-DWR, January 1991) 
1990. According to C-DWR economists, the direct 
economic cost to California agriculture of the 1990 
drought is forecasted to be $455 million (3 percent of 
1989 value of California's agricultural output.) 
February 15, 1991. Governor Pete Wilson 
established the Drought Water Bank as a part of a 
four-point drought plan. (A Retrospective 1991 
Emergency Drought Water Bank, March 1992) 
February 25,1991. The Water Districts in southern 
Santa Barbara County began receiving emergency 
SWP water deliveries. Emergency transfers were 
made from C-DWR through MWD to Oxnard to the 
City of Ventura. An equal amount of metered water 
is accounted for as "in-lieu" exchanges at Lake 
Casitas. Water is conveyed from Casitas via 
temporary pipelines through the Carpinteria County 
Water District. 
March 1, 1991. SWP deliveries were cut to 10 
percent of contractual entitlements for municipal 
users and were suspended for agricultural users. The 
First declaration of available CVP supplies was 25 
percent of entitlements for agricultural customers, 25 
to 50 percent for urban users, and 75 percent for 
water rights holders in the Sacramento River, and 
exchange contractors in the San Joaquin River. 
(Howitt, R, Moore, N, and Smithe R. T., 1992) 
March 1, 1991. The city of Los Angeles imposed 
water rationing requiring the residents to cut water 
use immediately by 10 percent from 1986 levels and 
an additional 5 percent by May 1. (Los Angeles 
Tlmes, March 1, 1991) 
March 1991. A bill proposing to renew research and 
development on seawater desalination was introduced 
in the u.S. Senate by Senator Paul Simon, D-IL. 
(Imperial Valley Press, March 3, 1991) 
March 1991. Despite the heavy March rainfall, 
California's rainfall, snowfall, and runoff for the year 
are still well below average. (Los Angeles TImes, 
March 30, 1991) 
March 1991. Heavy March rainfall raises Lake 
Cachuma (southern Santa Barbara County's principle 
surface water supply) from 12 percent to 40 percent 
of capacity thus avoiding drawing the lake down to 3 
percent of capacity (approximately 50 percent of the 
dead storage) during the 1991-92 water year. 
April ',1991. Santa Barbara city officials lifted a 
14-month ban on lawn watering after the March 
rains. (Los Angeles TImes, April 10, 1991) 
April 1991. Spectrum Economics, energy and 
natural resources consultants, submitted a preliminary 
report to California Urban Water Agencies indicating 
that aerospace, defense, computer, and food-
processing businesses are growing increasingly 
nervous about the expected water shortages in the 
coming decade that creates corporate bias against 
plant expansion and location in California. (Los 
Angeles TImes, April 23, 1991) 
June 4, 1991. California Assembly Committee 
passed legislation that would make it easier for 
farmers to sell water to drought-stricken cities. This 
bill is still a long way from passage. The opponents 
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of this bill charge that this would transform 
California's farm belt into "another Owens Valley." 
Owens Valley once a productive agricultural area, 
had turned into barren land as Los Angeles bought 
the land and pumped water to the city. (Los Angeles 
TImes, June 5, 1991) 
June 4, 1991. Santa Barbara County voters 
approved measures to import water through the State 
Water Project into the region. The voters also 
approved building of a desalination plant in an 
advisory election. (Los Angeles TImes, June 6, 1991) 
June 20, 1991. The House of Representatives 
overwhelmingly approved a bill that would bar 
delivery of subsidized water to farms larger than 960 
acres. This legislation is designed to plug the 
loopholes that allow corporate farmers such as J.O. 
Boswell, Co. to receive subsidized water. (Mercury 
News, San Jose, June 21, 1991) 
June 20, 1991. The House of Representatives passed 
a bill requiring the farmers who use federal irrigation 
water for growing subsidized crops to pay 100 
percent of the delivery costs of the water. (Star 
Tribune, June 22, 1991) 
June 26, 1991. The officials attending the California 
Association of Water Agencies Conference said that 
the state was still in drought despite heavy March 
rains. They believe that water rationing is likely to 
continue. (Daily News, June 27, 1991) 
July 2, 1991. The California State Assembly 
approved the legislation that allows more freedom to 
farmers to sell water rights to the drought-stricken 
cities. The bill was sent to the state senate after a 
46-25 vote. This bill was opposed by several rural 
legislators. (Imperial Valley Press, July 3, 1991) 
July 2, 1991. In a 46 to 25 vote, the California 
Assembly passed legislation that would allow farmers 
to sell their water without interference from their 
local irrigation districts. This was a clear victory of 
the urban interests over the rural in this battle for 
water. (Los Angeles TImes, July 3, 1991) 
July 1991. MWD of Southern California proposed 
to build a water bank in the Coachella Valley where 
it will deposit water in wet years and withdraw it in 
dry seasons. The Desert Water Agency directors fear 
a loss of water quality should MWD bank: water in 
the Coachella Valley. (Riverside Press-Enterprise, 
July 17, 1991) 
July 16, 1991. Gov. Pete Wilson temporarily 
withheld the controversial water-sales bill that allows 
individual farmers to directly sell water to cities. 
Water Resources Director David Kennedy expressed 
"serious concerns" with a number of provisions in the 
bill. (Los Angeles 1imes, July 17, 1991) 
July 23, 1991. Two Southern California officials 
asked the U.S. Senate panel to provide federal funds 
for desalination research. The Senate Committee is 
considering legislation that would authorize the 
Interior Department to fund at least $90 million worth 
of research during the next five years. (Los Angeles 
TImes, July 24, 1991) 
August 1991. Gov. Wilson signed legislation by 
Sen. Don Rogers to add nearly $2.3 million to 
California Conservation Corps (Ccq for drought-
related activities. This will provide extra help to the 
state C-DWR and local agencies in looking for water 
leaks, putting in drought-resistant plants and helping 
with fish and wildlife habitat preservation. 
(Bakersfield Californian, August 7, 1991) 
August 6, 1991. The King River Report was 
released. This indicated that there was a decline of 
3 million acre-feet in water beneath the King River 
Conservation District during the fall of 1986 through 
the fall of 1990. This drop in underground water has 
occurred due to the long drought. (Bakersfield 
Californian, August 7, 1981) 
August 1991. A congressional agency, Office of 
Technology Assessment (OTA) dismissed the idea of 
an undersea 2000-mile pipeline carrying water from 
Alaska to California. The agency considers this 
alternative as unnecessary and unfeasible based on its 
high projected cost and adverse environmental 
implications. This Alaskan pipeline proposal was 
earlier advanced by the Alaskan Governor, Walter J. 
Hickel, and L.A. County Supervisor, Kenneth Hahn. 
(Los Angeles TImes, August 13, 1991) 
August 1991. Huntington Beach has been tentatively 
selected as a site for a $60 million experimental 
ocean-desalting plant, owned by the MWD of 
Southern California. (The Orange County Register, 
August 13, 1991) 
August 16, 1991. A U.S. District Judge ordered the 
largest water diverter on the Sacramento River, 
Glenn-Colusa Irrigation District, to cut back in river 
pumping to protect the population of chinook salmon. 
Chinook salmon is listed as an endangered species 
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under the federal law. The irrigation district had 
contended that the cutback would result in a 
significant crop damage in its area. A temporary 
restraint order was requested by the National Marine 
Fisheries Service, an arm of the U.S. Dept. of 
Commerce. (Sacramento Bee, August 17, 1991) 
August 17, 1991. The MWD of Southern California 
board of directors agreed to sell up to SO,OOO acre-
feet of water to relieve an unexpected surplus of 
water in local reservoirs. The surplus of water 
during the drought was created as a result of 
successful conservation efforts in Southern California. 
(Daily News, August 21, 1991) 
August 20, 1991. The Senate Agriculture and Water 
Resources Committee voted against the Assembly Bill 
2090 (Katz Bill) after Governor Pete Wilson refused 
to support the measure. This bill would have allowed 
farmers sell water directly to the urban agencies. 
(Daily News, August 21, 1991) 
August 20, 1991. MWD of Southern California 
decided to abandon a multimillion dollar program of 
water conservation rewards. The MWD has paid out 
$26 million during the past five months as incentives 
to agencies for conserving water. These incentive 
payments will be eliminated as of October 1, 1991. 
The MWD also decided to reduce the price of some 
of its water. These steps were taken in view of 
surplus reservoirs. The MWD has more water than 
it can comfortably hold as a result of an unexpectedly 
successful conservation program that includes cash 
incentives to member agencies for using less water. 
(Los Angeles Times, August 21, 1991) 
August 1991. Scientists at the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration's Climate Analysis 
Center in Maryland are tracing a "weak EI Nino" in 
the Pacific Ocean. EI Nino, a powerful warm water 
ocean current, can bring "drought-busting" storms to 
Southern California this winter. (Daily News, August 
22, 1991) 
August 1991. San Juan Suburban Water District 
started installing water meters for its customers in 
northeast Sacramento, California. This is part of a 
program aimed at increasing water supplies up to SO 
percent through conservation. (Sacramento Bee, 
August 30, 1991) 
September 3, 1991. The U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency told the State Water Resources 
Control Board that their Water Quality Plan (May 
1991) for the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta is 
inadequate. The temperature and salt levels adopted 
in the plan were not sufficient to protect "the 
ecological health of the estuary." These variables are 
controlled by varying the release of water in the 
delta. (Los Angeles TImes, September 4, 1991) 
September 1991. The MWD of Southern California 
is planning to build a massive reservoir in Riverside 
County. The proposed Domenigoni Valley reservoir 
would hold 800,000 acre-feet of water. This will 
nearly double the existing storage capacity ofMWD. 
This project is being undertaken because during the 
drought, MWD had to sell water at a bargain price as 
it did not have enough storage capacity. (San 
Gabriel Valley Tribune, September 8, 1991) 
September 10, 1991. The East Bay Municipal 
Utility District Board voted not to participate in the 
statewide water pact which called for California cities 
and suburbs to adopt voluntary conservation measures 
that could save enough water to supply the residential 
needs of 2.5 to 5 million Californians. The 
opponents of this pact think that the District already 
conserves enough water and does not need any more 
conservation. (San Francisco Chronicle, September 
11, 1991) 
September 24, 1991. MWD of Southern California 
decided to break its traditional alliance with the 
agricultural interests and pursue a free-market policy 
of buying water wherever it can. Under the existing 
law, urban agencies are not allowed to buy water 
directly from farmers. The Katz Bill intended to do 
this, but was recently defeated. MWD plans to draft 
its own legislation to effect this change. MWD will 
need this new legislation to pursue its new strategy. 
(Los Angeles TImes, September 25, 1991) 
September 27, 1991. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service has proposed to list a three-inch long delta 
smelt of San Joaquin-Sacramento River Delta as a 
"threatened" rather than "endangered" species under 
the Endangered Species Act. "Threatened" status is 
less severe than the "endangered" one in terms of its 
implications on the curtailment of exports of water 
from the delta. This recommendation will later be 
considered by the U.S. Department of Interior for 
acceptance of the listing. (Los Angeles TImes, 
September 27, 1991) 
Sixth Year: Water Year 1992 (October 1, 1991-September 30, 1992) 
Despite higher rainfall than in previous years in the first half of this year, the drought 
conditions persisted, with the Sierra runoff staying at below its normal level. California was in 
a drought for the sixth year. The conservation efforts had paid off by reducing water use and, 
at the same time, lowering the revenue. The drought proved to be a financial drag for most of 
the water purveyors. This water year saw an effort by these purveyors to increase the water 
rates to cover the cost of drought. The Los Angeles Water and Power Commission attempted 
to increase the water rates, but the Los Angeles City Council rejected the idea. Many water 
consumers believed that it was a penalty imposed on them for conserving water during drought. 
The public becomes incensed by being required to pay more for less. 
October 1, 1991. The Los Angeles Water and 
Power Commission voted to seek an 11 percent 
increase in water rates and to double an emergency 
surcharge to cover part of a projected $98.8 million 
deficit caused by the five-year drought. (Los Angeles 
TImes, October 2, 1991) 
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October 15, 1991. Los Angeles Department of 
Water and Power signed an agreement with the Inyo 
County Board of Supervisors confirming the city's 
water rights in Owens Valley and regulating the 
amount of water that can be pumped out of the area. 
(Los Angeles Tunes, October 16, 1991) 
December 1991. The Los Angeles City Council 
rejected a proposed 11 percent water rate hike by the 
Department of Water and Power (DWP). The DWP 
argued that the rate hike was necessary due to 
reduced revenues as a result of the city's mandatory 
rationing. (Daily News, December 5, 1991) 
December 5, 1991. The Department of Water 
Resources announced that the farmers in Kern County 
will at least get 20 percent of their requested SWP 
water next year. (Bakersfield Californian, December 
6, 1991) 
December 17, 1991. The Sacramento City Council 
decided to require all new homes to install water 
meters. (Sacramento Bee, December 18, 1991) 
January 1992. A U.S. District Judge ordered 
Glenn-Colusa Irrigation District prohibiting diversion 
of water from the Sacramento River near Hamilton 
City from July 15 to November 30 each year. 
(Sacramento Bee, January 10, 1992) 
January 1992. The Walnut City Council narrowly 
rejected a proposal to ban the use of "greywater" to 
irrigate yards. (Los Angeles Tunes, January 26, 
1992) 
January 1992. The MWD of Southern California 
lost $129 million last year due to its aggressive 
conservation campaign that led to decline in sales 
revenue. (Orange County Register, April 19, 1992) 
February 6, 1992. Central Valley Project confirmed 
that water deliveries to some farmers would be totally 
cut-off this year. (Bakersfield Californian, February 
11, 1992) 
February 27, 1992. Governor Pete Wilson will seek 
negotiations with the Bush Administration for 
takeover of the Federal government's Central Valley 
Project irrigation system and merge it with the state's 
water system. (Los Angeles limes, February 28, 
1992) 
March 1992. A study conducted by the Northwest 
Economics Associates indicated that the San Joaquin 
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Valley's farm economy suffered $545 million loss 
last year. Nine thousand jobs in this sector were lost 
and 253,000 acres ~re left fallow as there was 
insufficient water available. (Tribune, March 20, 
1992) 
March 20, 1992. The Bureau of Reclamation 
announced that CVP agricultural contractors will 
receive 25 percent of their normal water allocations 
this year. At the same time, State Water Project also 
announced increase in deliveries to 45 percent of the 
amount requested by the water agencies. (California 
Farmer, April 1992) 
April 6, 1992. Governor Pete Wilson announced his 
new long-term water policy that emphasizes 
marketing and conservation of existing supplies, new 
storage facilities, and changes in to Sacramento-San 
Joaquin Delta. The plan for the Delta includes 
construction of flow control barriers, enlargement of 
channels and shifting of the pumping of water from 
the Delta to winter months through use of four new 
pumps. His plan attempts to appease all three of the 
participants in the water issue. (Sacramento Bee, 
April 7, 1992) 
April 18, 1992. The Chief Hydrologist for the State 
Department Water Resources confirmed that the state 
of California is still in the sixth year of drought 
despite recent high levels of rainfall. The Sierra 
runoff is below its normal level. (Bakersfield 
Californian, April 29, 1992) 
April 18, 1992. The U.S. Bureau of Reclamation 
opened a new center in Sacramento to teach farmers 
how to conserve water. (Fresno Bee, April 29, 
1992) 
May 20, 1992. The state's drought Water Bank 
announced allocation of 90,970 acre-feet to water-
short buyers. More than two-thirds of it (66,400 
acre-feet) going to agriculture in the San Joaquin 
Valley. Department of Fish and Game has received 
an allocation of 14,570 acre-feet. The rest of the 
allocation (i.e., 10,000 acre-feet) has been given to 
Contra Costa Water District. (C-DWR News 
Release, May 20, 1992) 
S~YOFDROUGHT~AGEMENTOUTCOMrnS 
Water Allocation and Deliveries 
The first three years of drought did not prompt any significant cutbacks to water 
allocation and deliveries in the SWP and CVP entitlements. These are two major projects that 
supply water to agricultural and municipal water uses, with the SWP accounting for 704 percent 
and the CVP providing 21.7 percent of California's supplies. The fourth year of drought, 
however, had taken its toll on the drawdown of water in project reservoirs and led to the first 
cutbacks in CVP and SWP supplies. Thus, in 1990, CVP cut most agricultural users by 50 
percent, and similar reductions were made by SWP on agricultural users. Drought conditions 
worsened in 1991, and by the end of February, statewide precipitation, runoff, and storage 
reached the lowest levels during the ongoing four-year period. The SWP stopped agricultural 
deliveries completely and cut municipal users to 35 percent of their contractual entitlements 
which was further cut in 1992. CVP cutbacks left agricultural customers receiving 25 percent 
of entitlements, urban users obtaining 25 to 50 percent deliveries, and Sacramento water rights 
holders and San Joaquin exchange contractors getting 75 percent of their entitlements. Although 
these statistics on water deliveries were available, it should be noted that statewide statistics on 
water use during this drought by various water use sectors and water districts were not available 
during the time of this study. These statistics are expected to be released in January 1995 when 
the water management plans by various entities will be submitted. 
In addition to these adjustments to water allocation and deliveries, the California 
Department of Water Resources allowed the use of its facilities for wheeling water and 
encouraged water exchanges. About 20 exchanges had been facilitated by November 1990 
involving about 300,000 acre-feet of water (Gleick and Nash 1991). C-DWR was instrumental 
in effecting transfers under the direction of state laws enacted during the 1980s. Table IVA 
illustrates the individual water transfers facilitated as of December 1, 1991, using the State 
Water Project (C-DWR 1991b). Many other transfers independent of the SWP also took place. 
For example, about 60,000 acre-feet of water from four different agencies were transferred to 
the Department of Fish and Game to help restore fish and wildlife habitat. 
SWP Deliveries 
State Water Project deliveries are divided into entitlement water and other deliveries 
(surplus and unscheduled water, other water, and Feather River diversions). Entitlement water 
to municipal and industrial users showed no significant cutback during the first four years of the 
drought. However, in 1991 more than 50 percent of the 1987 SWP entitlement was cut back. 
Deliveries of SWP entitlements to the agriCUltural sector remained normal for the fIrst 
three years of the drought. The fourth year (1990) showed a 32 percent reduction in 1987 
deliveries. However, SWP entitlements were drastically cut in 1991, and only 1 percent of the 
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TABLE IV.4 
1991 WATER BANK TRANSFERS 
(As of December 1, 1991) 
Title of Source Destination Amount of SWRCB SWP 
Transfer Agency Agency Tl'Bmfer (AF) Action? Wheeling? 
Dept. of Water 
Resources 350 Water 831,4032•3 Yes' Yes 
(C-DWR) contracts Bank 
Water Bank 
Placer County 
Water Agency PCWA SF 20,000'-·2 Yes Yes 
(pCWA)/San 
Francisco (SF) 
Placer County 
(pCW A)/Santa 
Clara Valley PCWA SCVWD 15,ooot.2 Yes Yes 
Water District 
(SCVWD) 
Kern County 
Water Agency 
(KCW A)lWest- KCWA WWD 45,000 Yes Yes 
lands Water 
District (WWD) 
Yuba County 
Water Agency YCWA N 7,5Q02 Yes Yes 
(YCW A)lFour 
Agencies (N) 
Yuba County 
Water Agency YCWA YC 30,® Yes No 
(YCWA)/DFG 
1 Approximately 20 percent allocated to Delta carriage water. 
2 Refill impacts. 
3 Approximately 15 percent allocated to Delta carriage water. 
Oroville CVP 
Storage? Wheeling? Status 
Approx. 
Yes Yes 99% of 
contracts 
approved 
Yes No SWRCB 
6,000 for Approved 
DFG 
No No SWRCB 
Approved 
No No SWRCB 
Approved 
No No SWRCB 
Approved 
Yes No SWRCB 
Approved 
4 137,200 acre-feet subject to State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB) jurisdiction (127,200 AF YWCA; 10,000 AF 
OWID). 
5 For supplemental Yuba River fish flows, if necessary. 
Source: C-DWR 1991h. 
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1987 entitlement was delivered to the agricultural sector. Total SWP deliveries (entitlement and 
other deliveries) in 1991 were 47 percent of the 1987 deliveries (Table IV.5). 
CVP Deliveries 
Central Valley Project water deliveries are divided into four categories: water rights water, 
project agricultural water, project municipal and industrial water, and waterfowl conservation 
water. The drought did not significantly affect deliveries to water rights holders. However, 
agricultural project water was cut by about 36 percent in 1990 and 58 percent in 1991, in 
comparison with 1987 deliveries. Municipal and industrial project water showed increased 
deliveries in 1988-90. However, in 1991 deliveries were reduced by about 30 percent from 
1987 deliveries. Waterfowl conservation deliveries during the drought showed an increase of 
1987 project water in order to reduce drought impacts on waterfowl populations (Table IV.6). 
A more detailed breakdown of CVP contractual entitlements and drought shortages (CVP 
Contracts 1992) is provided in Table IV. 7. Water rights holders are not permitted to receive 
more than 25 percent reductions in deliveries and therefore did not experience severe hardships 
during the drought. The total annual CVP contractual entitlements are 6.7 MAF. Project water 
makes up 55 percent, while water rights quantities make up 45 percent of the total. 
The State Drought Emergency Water Bank of 1991 
The fifth year of drought led to progressively greater water shortages, and on 
February 1, 1991, the Governor signed Executive Order No. W-3-91 that established the 
Drought Action Team. Besides representing the Governor, the team was to assist on a local and 
state level in handling the drought. On February 15, Governor Wilson announced a four-point 
drought plan. His plan can be summarized as follows: 
• Establish a State Drought Emergency Water Bank (Water Bank) to meet critical 
water needs. 
• Communities should adopt rationing plans with up to 50 percent cutbacks in water 
use. 
• The California Department of Fish and Game must work with the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service to protect natural habitat. 
• Establish a $100 million Drought Action Fund to assist with conservation, water 
supply augmentation, and other drought mitigation activities. (Howitt, Moore, 
and Smith 1992). 
C-DWR was responsible for operating the Water Bank, which was established to meet 
four critical needs: municipal and industrial uses, agricultural uses, protection of fish and 
93 
TABLEIV.S 
TOTAL AMOUNTS OF WATER DELIVERED BY 
STATE WATER PROJECT, 1962-1991 
Water Delivered (Acre-feet) 
Entitlement Ware.-- Other Deliveries 
Surplus and Unscheduled Recreation 
Municipal Municipal Feather Supported 
and Agri- and Agri- Other River Total (Recreation 
Year Industrial cultural Total Industrial cultural Water" DiversionsC Deliveriesd days)e 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
1962 18,289 18,289 30,000 
1963 22,456 22,456 105,000 
1964 32,507 32,507 331,600 
1965 44,105 44,105 449,800 
1966 67,928 67,928 482,700 
1967 5,747 5,791 11,538 0 0 53,605 65,143 455,200 
1968 46,472 125,237 171,709 10,000 111,534 14,777 866,926 1,174,946 931,300 
1969 34,434 158,586 193,020 0 72,397 18,829 794,374 1,078,620 1,554,800 
1970 47,996 185,997 233,993 0 133,024 38,080 759,759 1,164,856 1,804,800 
1971 85,286 272,054 357,340 2,400 293,619 44,127 778,362 1,475,848 2,085,900 
1972 181,066 430,735 611,801 22,205 401,759 73,127 817,398 1,926,290 1,971,200 
1973 293,824 400,564 694,388 3,161 293,255 43,666 800,743 1,835,213 2,502,000 
1974 418,521 455,556 874,077 4,753 412,923 48,342 911,613 2,251,708 4,073,600 
1975 641,621 582,369 1,223,990 21,043 601,859 67,170 862,218 2,776,280 4,189,300 
1976 818,588 554,414 1,373,002 32,488 547,622 116,962 946,440 3,016,514 4,239,600 
1977 280,919 293,236 574,155 0 0 390,176 581,994 1,546,325 3,951,900 
1978 742,385 710,314 1,452,699 3,566 13,348 122,916 786,517 2,379,046 5,773,700 
1979 690,659 969,237 1,659,896 66,081 582,308 189,396 882,549 3,380,230 5,298,700 
1980 730,545 799,204 1,529,749 19,722 384,835 48,590 875,045 2,857,941 5,701,900 
1981 1,057,273 852,289 1,909,562 12,000 896,428 283,849 838,557 3,940,396 6,017,800 
1982 928,721 821,303 1,750,024 0 215,873 159,528 776,330 2,901,755 6,187,700 
1983 483,499 701,370 1,184,869 0 13,019 189,302 602,905 1,990,095 5,838,200 
1984 725,925 862,694 1,588,619 3,663 259,254 388,064 832,332 3,071,932 6,273,100 
1985 992,538 1,002,915 1,995,453 9,638 298,034 408,875 870,008 3,582,008 6,639,800 
1986 998,611 997,025 1,995,636 2,595 34,025 197,471 791,737 3,021,464 6,966,039 
1987 1,096,368 1,033,718 2,130,086 6,949 107,958 385,264 831,947 3,462,204 7,228,815 
1988 1,316,820 1,068,302 2,385,122 0 0 521,370 794,834 3,701,326 6,854,300 
1989 1,602,454 1,251,293 2,853,747 f 0 0 495,702 809,250 4,158,699 6,738,300 
1990 1,876,072 706,079 2,582,151 0 90 466,578 851,247 3,900,066 6,060,100 
1991 536,672 12,444 549,116 3,521 0 538,987 546,931 1,638,555 N/A 
1992g 1,172,800 559,135 1,731,935 4,221 N/A N/A N/A 1,736,156 N/A 
a Entitlement and advance entitlement deliveries. 
b Includes amounts of preconsolidation repayment, emergency relief, and regulated delivery of local supply water; non-SWP water delivered 
to Napa County Flood Control and Water Conservation District and the city of San Francisco through SWP facilities; CVP water conveyed 
(mcluding Decision 1485 and recreation and fish and wildlife water); 1990 Ground Water Demonstration Program, recreation and exchange 
water; and water purchased from Yuba County Water District. 
c Feather River diversions to Joint Water Districts Board and Western Canal Water District. 
d Percent change in total deliveries relative to 1987: 1988 (+6.9); 1989 (+20.1); 1990 (12.6); 1991 (-52.7); 1992 (-49.9). 
e A recreation day is the visit of one person to a recreation area for any part of one day. 
f Includes SWP share of generation from Hyatt-Thermalito, Gianelli, Devil Canyon, Warne, Alamo, Castaic, Reid Gardner Unit No.4, and 
Bottle Rock power plants. 
g 1992 data are projected and preliminary for entitlement water only. 
Source: C-DWR, State Water Project 1992g. 
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TABLE IV.6 
CENTRAL VALLEY PROJECT WATER DELIVERIES 
(Historic 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, and Projected 1991) 
Historic 
1987 1988 1989 1990 
Water rights water 
Sacramento River 1,549,000 1,407,000 1,379,000 1,349,000 
Exchange Contractors 853,000 853,000 834,000 781,000 
American River! All others 172,000 138,000 148,000 l36,000 
Total water rights 2,574,000 2,398,000 2,361,000 2,266,000 
Percent change from 1987 -6.8 -8.3 -12.0 
Project agricultural water 
Sacramento River 370,000 385,000 341,000 277,000 
DMC!SLC 1,932,000 1,931,000 1,691,000 1,218,000 
Friant Division 843,000 697,000 716,000 538,000 
TCC!Corning! All others 662,000 610,000 614,000 422,000 
Total project agric. 3,807,000 3,623,000 3,362,000 2,455,000 
Percent change from 1987 -4.8 -11.7 -35.5 
Project M&I 
American River 80,000 109,000 90,000 79,000 
San Felipe Division 21,000 75,000 112,000 65,000 
Contra Costa 142,000 126,000 122,000 125,000 
All others 100,000 88,000 78,000 77,000 
TotalM&I 343,000 398,000 402,000 346,000 
Percent change from 1987 +16.0 +17.2 +0.9 
Waterfowl conservation 130,000 179,000 238,000 205,000 
Percent change from 1987 +37.7 +83.1 +57.7 
Grand totals 6.WI!!!!!! 6159§.~ §I~~.~ ~12721000 
Percent change from 1987 -3.7 -7.2 -23.1 
Note: Projected deliveries for 1992 are approximately same as 1991. 
Source: California Central Valley Project Operations Office 1992. 
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Projected 
75/100/25 
1991 
1,375,000 
658,000 
148,000 
2,181,000 
-15.3 
293,000 
436,000 
736,000 
143,000 
1,608,000 
-57.8 
14,000 
32,000 
97,000 
98,000 
241,000 
-29.7 
200,000 
+53.8 
41~0 •• 
-38.3 
TABLE IV.7 
CVP CONTRACTUAL ENTITLEMENTS AND DROUGHT SHORTAGES, 1992 
Contractual Quantities Shortage 
FacilitylDescription Water Rights Project Total 25% 50% 75% 
Sacramento River 
Settlement contracts 
Agriusers 1,800,335 371,651 2,171,986 1,628,990 1,628,990 1,628,990 
M&I 1,110 585 1,695 1,271 1,271 1,271 
City of West Sacto (W0187) 13,920 9,680 23,600 17,700 11,800 5,900 
City of Redding (5272A) 14,110 2,490 16,600 12,450 12,450 12,450 
Colusa Drain MWC (W0693) 57,637 57,637 43,228 28,819 14,409 
Sutter Butte MWC (W0862) 17,700 17,700 13,275 8,850 4,425 
\0 Butte Slough ID (W0863) 4,200 4,200 3,150 2,100 1,050 0'1 
Feather River 20,000 20,000 15,000 10,000 5,000 
Tehama-Colusa Canal 356,300 356,300 267,225 178,150 89,075 
Black Butte 430 3,165 3,595 2,696 1,798 900 
Corning Canal 43,800 43,800 32,850 21,900 10,950 
Shasta Lake 14,250 14,250 12,224 8,660 5,099 
Trinity River Division 40,800 40,800 30,600 20,400 10,200 
Sacramento River total 1,829,905 942,258 2,772,163 2,080,659 1,935,188 1,789,719 
American River 
Folsom Lake 59,000 50,750 109,750 97,063 84,375 71,688 
Folsom South Canal 25,000 210,000 235,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 
City of Sacramento 140,000 90,000 230,000 60,000 60,000 60,000 
Placer County 120,000 35,000 155,000 8,000 8,000 8,000 
American River total 344,000 385,750 729,750 195,063 182,375 169,688 
\0 
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TABLE IV.7 (Continued) 
CVP CONTRACTUAL ENTITLEMENTS AND DROUGHT SHORTAGES, 1992 
Facility/Description 
Delta 
Contra Costa Canal 
Delta total 
Delta export 
Cross Valley Canal 
Delta-Mendota Canal 
Delta-Mendota/San Luis 
San Luis Unit 
San Felipe 
Delta export total 
Grand CVP total 
Other not affecting CVP 
Friant Unit 
Class 1 
Class 2 
Sly Park 
Sugar Pine 
Contractual Quantities 
Water Rights 
887,277 
6,000 
893,277 
3.061.182 
Project 
195,000 
195,000 
128,300 
453,758 
279,160 
1,116,500 
196,300 
2,174,018 
3.697.026 
800,000 
1 ,400,000 
Total 
195,000 
195,000 
128,300 
1,341,035 
279,160 
1,122,500 
196,300 
3,067,295 
6. 764.2OS 
800,000 
1,400,000 
23,000 
4,400 
25% 
195,000 
195,000 
96,226 
1,026,862 
209,370 
845,750 
147,225 
2,325,433 
4.796.155 
680,000 
° 
Shortage 
50% 
146,250 
146,250 
64,150 
910,921 
139,580 
566,625 
98,150 
1,779,426 
4.043.239 
75% 
97,500 
97,500 
32,077 
793,586 
69,790 
287,500 
49,075 
1,232,028 
3.288.935 
Note: Water rights holders are not cut by more than 25 percent. Therefore figures for water rights holders in the last two columns do not reflect 50 percent and 75 percent 
shortages. 
Source: cVP Contracts 1992. 
wildlife, and carry-over storage for 1992 (C-DWR 1992a). C-DWR was to purchase water from 
willing sellers and sell it to users with critical needs. Water for the bank was acquired from 
three sources: 
• Fallowing or idling of farmland and utilizing conserved irrigation water in the 
Water Bank. 
• Using groundwater instead of surface water. 
• Transferring surplus surface water from local reservoirs to the Water Bank. 
Purchase agreements were activated in early April, and by early June, more than 300 contracts 
were developed. Table IV.8 summarizes the 351 contracts signed by the Water Bank. A 
statewide total of 820,805 acre-feet were purchased by the Water Bank, with fallowing 
contributing to 51 percent; groundwater, 32 percent; and surface water, 17 percent. A detailed 
list of crops fallowed, and those planted but not irrigated are provided in Table N.9. A large 
percentage of the Delta corn acreage was fallowed. About one-third of the acres fallowed took 
place in San Joaquin County, followed by Yolo County, which contributed to one-quarter of the 
acres fallowed for the Water Bank. 
The Water Bank paid $125 per acre-foot for water from all sellers. During more 
favorable water supply-and-demand conditions late in the year, SWP negotiated contracts at $30 
and $50 per acre-foot. Most of the Water Bank water was delivered through SWP facilities. 
Water from various sources was transferred and stored in the SWP-CVP system until the time 
of delivery. Water was sold at $175 per acre-foot, and this cost pertained to water delivered 
as far as the SWP Delta Pumping Plant. Additional costs were charged for conveying water to 
final destinations, and costs varied for SWP and non-SWP contractors purchasing water from 
the Water Bank. 
The Water Bank allocations as of October 10, 1991, are shown in Table IV. 10. MWD 
received the largest allocation (215,000 acre-feet), followed by Kern County Water Agency 
(53,979 acre-feet) and the city of San Francisco (50,000 acre-feet). A general critique of 1991 
Water Bank operations and processes (Howitt, Moore, and Smith 1992) revealed that the Water 
Bank was a success and a significant achievement in California water policy. The bank's 
operations were handled very efficiently, and this water trading was an economic boost for both 
agriculture and economy in the state. The Water Bank's operations, however, created potential 
effects on the local economics of water-exporting regions. Howitt, Moore, and Smith (1992) 
state that these effects were geographically diverse and small compared with overall gains. The 
Water Bank has been criticized, because it was less successful in addressing the negative 
environmental impacts of the ongoing drought. However, through an acquisition funded by 
Assembly Bill 12 (AB 12), signed into law by Governor Wilson in mid-October 1991, C-DWR 
acquired 28,000 acre-feet for the state Department of Fish and Game. In general, the direct 
environmental benefits of the bank were marginal compared to the benefits received by the 
buyers and sellers. 
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TABLE IV.8 
DROUGHT WATER BANK PURCHASE SUMMARY 
Percent of 
Region Category Acre-feet Total 
Delta Fallowing 333,723 40.7 
Groundwater 2,529 0.3 
Stored water 2,576 0.3 
Sacramento River Fallowing 36,652 4.5 
Groundwater 46,787 5.7 
Yolo Fallowing 34,463 4.2 
Groundwater 27,308 3.3 
Yuba/Feather/elsewhere Fallowing 15,226 1.9 
Groundwater 182,341 22.2 
Stored water 139,200 17.0 
820,805 
Statewide totals Fallowing 420,064 51.2 
Groundwater 258,965 31.5 
Stored water 141,776 17.3 
820,805 100 
Total number of contracts: 351 
Source: C-DWR 1992a. 
The State Drought Emergency Water Bank of 1992 
In March 1992, the C-DWR initiated the 1992 Water Bank when the ongoing drought 
entered its sixth consecutive year. The same guiding principles and objectives of the 1991 Water 
Bank were followed in establishing the 1992 effort. However, there were some significant 
modifications in the implementation of the Water Bank during the sixth year of drought. 
Prior to the rain in February 1992 that filled many of the reservoirs in Southern 
California, initial estimates of critical needs were about 500,000 acre-feet. However, in March 
1992, critical need demands were approximately 100,000 acre-feet. Allocations from the Water 
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TABLE IV.9 
DROUGHT WATER BANK CROP SUMMARY BY COUNTY 
(Acres Fallowed) 
Contra 
Butte Colusa Costa Sacramento San Joaquin Shasta Solano Stanislaus Sutter 
Crops County County County County County County County County County 
Alfalfa· 678.0 996.5 3,795.2 521.9 913.8 
Asparagus 1,277.4 
Barley· 175.6 412.6 79.2 
Corn 6,500.0 9,014.3 24,958.3 5,471.7 136.0 1,589.4 
Dichondra'" 
Dry beans 458.5 243.9 959.1 387.5 
Grapes • 198.0 
Melons 167.0 
Milo 40.0 188.9 
Misc. truck 18.0 58.9 462.7 
Pasture'" 1,482.0 1,783.9 591.7 3,258.1 3,208.5 
Rice 1,158.0 2,231.0 798.0 577.6 2,557.8 
Safflower· 1,034.8 24.6 325.7 
Seed grass '" 74.4 
Sudan· 131.6 
Sugar beets 92.2 1,323.7 3,699.0 1,206.5 923.8 
Sunflowers 518.0 862.1 383.7 572.4 166.1 
Tomatoes 125.6 1,216.4 451.6 
Turnips 35.4 
Wheat· 1,455.7 1,344.2 11,927.1 14,288.5 50.5 5,859.9 55.0 
Subtotal 3,072.2 2,323.2 10,580.2 28,674.0 52,258.1 4,443.5 18,551.2 136.0 5,459.1 
Several contracts were negotiated in which the method of conserving water was left to the discretion of the water district. 
These contracts may represent some additional fallowing; however, the amounts cannot be quantified. 
·Crops noted were planted but not irrigated, rather than fallowed. 
Source: C-DWR 1992a. 
Tehama Yolo 
County County Total 
3,313.6 10,219.0 
1,277.4 
53.9 721.3 
11,606.6 59,276.3 
27.4 27.4 
1,187.1 3,236.1 
56.2 254.2 
167.0 
228.9 
539.6 
390.0 5,473.3 16,187.5 
857.8 8,180.2 
3,013.2 4,398.3 
488.1 526.5 
131.6 
2,705.4 9,950.6 
267.1 2,769.4 
2,553.4 4,347.0 
35.4 
8,602.9 43,583.8 
390.0 40,206.0 166,093.5 
Agency 
Alameda Co. Water District 
Alameda County - Zone 7 
American Canyon Co. 
Water District 
Contra Costa Water District 
Crestline-Lake Arrowhead 
Dudley Ridge Water District 
Kern Co. Water District 
Metropolitan Water District 
of Southern California 
Oak Flat Water District 
San Francisco 
TABLE IV.I0 
WATER BANK ALWCATIONS 
(As of October 10, 1991) 
Acre-feet 
14,800 
500 
370 
6,717 
236 
13,805 
53,979 
215,000 
975 
50,000 
Santa Clara Valley Water District 19,750 
Westlands Water District 13,820 
Total 389,952 
Source: Department of Water Resources in Howitt, Moore, and Smith 1992. 
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Cost 
$ 2,590,000 
87,500 
64,750 
1,175,475 
41,300 
2,415,875 
9,446,325 
37,625,000 
170,625 
8,750,000 
3,456,250 
2,418,500 
$68,241,600 
Bank, as of October 23, totaled 154,250 acre-feet (C-DWR 1992a). Agricultural purchases 
represented about 62 percent of total Water Bank allocations. Although twelve agricultural water 
districts participated in the 1992 Water Bank, about 87 percent of all agricultural purchases was 
made up of Tulare Lake Basin Water Service District and Westlands Water District. The 
remaining purchases were made up of municipal and industrial demands (25 percent) and the 
state Department of Fish and Game (13 percent). 
Groundwater and conservation represented about 150,000 acre-feet of the water purchased 
by the Water Bank as of October 23, 1992. The balance came from direct surface water 
contracts (C-DWR 1992a). About 31,000 acre-feet had to be reserved to meet Delta water 
quality requirements. The 1992 Water Bank sellers and purchasers are presented in Table 
IV.11. The C-DWR purchased water from the 1992 Water Bank at $50/acre-foot. The selling 
price was $72/acre-foot, including the additional costs for administration purposes and Delta 
requirements. 
The 1992 Water Bank differed from the 1991 Water Bank in several key aspects. The 
major modifications to the 1992 Water Bank were: 
• It was substantially smaller in volume and less costly to buy and sell than the 
1991 Water Bank. 
• It was primarily an agricultural water supply bank. 
• The Water Bank was completely underwritten by buyers. 
• The fallowing of land as a source was not permitted in the 1992 Water Bank. 
• The Water Bank instituted a system of pools for allocating supplies. 
• It used Option and Purchase Deposits for water. 
• Water needs for wildlife interests were a key purpose of the 1992 Water Bank 
LEGISLATION CONCERNING DROUGHT AND WATER CONSERVATION 
Drought Legislation 
During the drought, a number of agencies identified drought legislation that would assist 
in managing the water shortage. An informative description of the 23 bills considered in both 
the California legislature and the u.S. Congress addressing drought issues as of December 1, 
1991, was prepared by C-DWR (1991b) and is contained in Appendix A. A listing of state and 
federal drought legislation incorporating strategic and tactical measures as of December 1991 
is provided in Table IV .12. 
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TABLE IV.ll 
1992 DROUGHT WATER BANK: SELLERS AND PURCHASERS 
(In Acre-Feet as of October 23, 1992) 
Contractor/Purchaser Amount Percent 
Sellers to the Water Bank 
Alhambra Pacific Joint Venture 5,000 2.8 
Browns Valley Irrigation District 4,600 2.6 
Conaway Conservancy 17,500 9.9 
Davis Ranches 4,000 2.3 
East Contra Costa ID 2,500 1.4 
Los Rios Farms 15,000 8.4 
Merced Irrigation District 15,000 8.4 
Oakdale ID/South San Joaquin ID 50,000 28.2 
Oroville-Wyandotte ID 10,000 5.6 
Pelger Mutual Water Co. 1,500 0.8 
Upper Swanston 995 0.6 
West Sact.lRD 900 1,500 0.8 
Western Canal Water District 50,000 28.2 
Total 177,595 100.0 
Purchasers from the Water Bank 
Allocation to agricultural demands 
Broadview Water District 255 0.2 
Del Puerto Water District 300 0.2 
Foothill Water District 900 0.6 
Hospital Water District 200 0.1 
Kern County Water Agency 8,170 5.3 
Orestimba Water District 75 0.05 
Panoche Water District 2,000 1.3 
Quinto Water District 100 0.05 
Solado Water District 300 0.2 
Sunflower Water District 400 0.3 
Tulare Lake Basin Water Service District 31,550 20.4 
Westlands Water District 51,000 33.0 
Total agricultural uses 95,250 61.7 
Allocation to nsh and wildlife demands 
Department of Fish and Game 20,000 13.0 
Allocation to urban demands 
City and County of San Francisco 19,000 12.3 
Contra Costa Water District 10,000 6.5 
Metropolitan Water District of Southern California 10,000 6.5 
Total urban uses 39,000 25.3 
Total allocations for all uses 154.250 100.0 
Source: C-DWR 1992f. 
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TABLE IV.12 
1~IDROUGHTLEG~LATION 
(Refer Also to Appendix A) 
Issues Number of bills 
State legislation 
Water transfers 
Urban water management plan 
Fish and game protection 
Forestry and fire protection 
Water reclamation projects 
Drought emergencies and drought assistance 
Agriculture 
Water appropriation 
Water supply development projects 
Safe drinking water and drought relief bonds 
Total 
Federal legislation 
Drought relief 
Drought emergency 
Drought management and assistance 
Drought response 
Total 
Water Conservation Legislation Memorandum of Understanding 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
6 
3 
1 
1 
..l 
19 
1 
1 
1 
1 
4 
A Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Urban Water Conservation in California 
(MOU) was signed on December 11, 1991. Its signers now number 150, of which 105 are 
urban water suppliers who serve over 80 percent of the state population. The MOU (1991) 
states a commitment by water agencies to implement 16 conservation measures known as Best 
Management Practices (BMPs) over the next 10 years. The MOU also created the California 
Urban Water Conservation Council which is charged with oversight and annual reporting on 
implementation progress of the BMPs. This MOU focused on urban water conservation in 
California and was an agreement among urban water suppliers, public advocacy organizations, 
and other interested groups. The BMPs (listed in Table IV. 13) were intended to reduce long-
term urban demands from what they would have been without the implementation of these urban 
water conservation practices. These BMPs are in addition to short-term tactical programs that 
may be instituted during water supply shortages. 
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TABLE IV.13 
BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES (BMPs) 
1. Interior and exterior water audits and incentive programs for single-family residential, 
multifamily residential, and governmental/institutional customers 
2. Plumbing, new and retrofit 
a. Enforcement of water-conserving plumbing fixture standards including requirement for 
ultralow-flush (ULF) toilets in all new construction beginning January 1, 1992 
b. Support of state and federal legislation prohibiting sale of toilets using more than 1.6 
gallons per flush 
c. Plumbing retrofit 
3. Distribution system water audits, leak detection, and repair 
4. Metering with commodity rates for all new connections and retrofit of existing connections 
5. Large landscape water audits and incentives 
6. Landscape water conservation requirements for new and existing commercial, industrial 
institutional, governmental, and multifamily development 
7. Public information 
8. School education 
9. Commercial and industrial water conservation 
10. New commercial and industrial water use review 
11. Conserving pricing 
12. Landscape water conservation for new and existing single-family homes 
13. Water waste prohibition 
14. Water conservation coordinator 
15. Financial incentives 
16. IDtralow-flush toilet replacement 
Source: Adapted from Memorandum of Understanding 1991. 
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WATER CONSERVATION DURING THE ONGOING DROUGHT 
The discussion on water conservation for the state of California is based on information 
gathered from newspaper articles and available publications covering the current drought. The 
discussion focuses mainly on demand management measures adopted by some agencies in 
California during the 1987-92 drought. 
First Year (Water Year 1987) 
Even before the onset of drought in 1987, the MWD sponsored ongoing annual education 
programs in 1983 based on various water issues, particularly conservation targeted at fourth and 
sixth grades in schools. The cost of the program was predicted to average $300,000 per year. 
Second Year (Water Year 1988) 
During the second year of drought, the state urged wholesalers of state-supplied water 
to cut back consumption by 10 to 15 percent. According to the Sacramento Bee (April 21, 
1989), reaction to the state's appeal was mixed. Urban wholesalers such as the MWD agreed 
to cooperate with the request. The Director of Kern County Water Agency (KCW A) described 
the request as "impractical." He contended that farmers were using water very efficiently in the 
San Joaquin Valley, and a large savings in water use could not be achieved in a short period of 
time without the loss of crops and money. 
Examples of conservation efforts in the state among some agencies (Table IV .14) can be 
summarized as follows: 
• San Francisco Water Department (SFWD) imposed 25 percent mandatory 
conservation on its 2.1 million customers in the city and suburban areas. 
• MWD requested a 10 percent voluntary conservation and launched a $12 million 
public information campaign featuring celebrities to get its message across to its 
14 million customers. 
• San Diego Water Authority (SDWA) launched its conservation program called 
"Water Conservation, a San Diego Way of Life" (San Diego Union, May 20, 
1988). The agency also instituted a public information campaign of $180,000 
(funded by both MWD and the city of San Diego) on conservation tips and water-
saving equipment. 
• The Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (LADWP) introduced a 9.9 
percent water rate increase with a new policy that required special low-flow 
devices to be fitted to all the city's showers and toilets. Mandatory conservation 
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TABLE IV.14 
EXAMPLES OF CONSERVATION DURING THE SECOND YEAR OF DROUGHT 
San Francisco Water 
Department (SFWD) 
Metropolitan Water 
District (MWD) 
Los Altos Hills (San 
Francisco Peninsula) 
San Diego Water 
Authority (SOW A) 
Los Angeles Department 
of Water and Power 
(LADWP) 
East Bay Municipal 
Utilities Department 
(EBMUD) 
City of Haywood 
Santa Clara Valley 
Water District 
Purisima Hills District 
A Education 
B Voluntary Conservation 
A 
C Extreme Voluntary Conservation 
D Mandatory Conservation 
E = Mandatory Metered Rationing 
F Increasing Rates or Surcharges 
B c D E 
X (10) 
X (15) X (25) 
X (10) 
X 
X (25) 
X 
X 
X (25) 
X (45) 
X (25) 
F G 
X 
G Direct Economic Incentives 
H 
x 
X 
H Distribution of Water-Saving Devices 
I = Public Information Campaign 
J = Waste Patrols and Citations 
K = Enforce by Fines and Meter Discs 
I J K 
Sources: Los Angeles Tunes, April 28, 1988; San Francisco Chronicle, June 2 and June 15,1988; San Diego Union, May 20, 
1988. 
Note: Figures in parentheses denote percent voluntary/mandatory conservation. 
107 
was instituted, covering restaurants, cleaning driveways, and shutting down some 
fountains. 
• East Bay Municipal Utilities District (EBMUD) imposed 25 percent mandatory 
conservation and increased water rates for residents using more than 400 gallons 
of water a day. 
• Other examples of mandatory conservation included Los Altos Hills (25 percent), 
the city of Hayward, Santa Clara Valley Water District (25 percent), and 
Purisima Hills District (45 percent). 
Third Year (Water Year 1989) 
The third year proved to be a wetter year than the first two years, but this did not spell 
the end of the drought. Some examples of conservation efforts in the third year (fable N .15) 
were as follows. 
• The Tri-Cities Municipal Water District asked construction crews to cut its water 
use by 50 percent and residents and businesses by 20 percent. 
• SFWD replaced mandatory conservation with appeals for voluntary conservation. 
• MWD and Santa Clara Valley Water District continued with mandatory 
conservation measures. 
• LADWP ended its mandatory conservation. 
• EBMUD reduced its mandatory conservation from 25 percent to 15 percent. 
• Marin Municipal Water District imposed water rationing on March 1 and ended 
it after the spring rains. 
• Kern County Water Agency urged its residents to practice water conservation by 
watering their lawns only 3 times a week. 
Fourth Year (Water Year 1990) 
Water conservation was firmly embedded on a statewide basis during the fourth year of 
drought. Efforts were made by some local governments in Southern California in furthering 
conservation and preparing for water shortages. Water conservation efforts and other programs 
to cope with water shortages among local governments in Southern California were identified 
based on the results of a survey of local governments in Southern California, conducted by the 
Los Angeles Times (April I, 1990). Voluntary conservation programs were identified among 
108 
TABLE IV.tS 
EXAMPLES OF CONSERVATION DURING THE TIIIRD YEAR OF DROUGHT 
A B C D E F G B 
Tri-Cities Municipal 
Water District X 
San Francisco Water 
Department (SFWD) X 
Metropolitan Water 
District (MWD) X 
Los Angeles Department 
of Water and Power X 
(LADWP) X X 
East Bay Municipal 
Utilities Department 
(EBMUD) X (15) 
Santa Clara Valley 
Water District X (25) 
Marin Municipal Water 
District X 
Kern County Water 
Agency (KCWA) X 
A = Education G = Direct Economic Incentives 
B = Voluntary Conservation H = Distribution of Water-Saving Devices 
C = Extreme Voluntary Conservation I = Public Information Campaign 
D = Mandatory Conservation J = Waste Patrols and Citations 
E Mandatory Metered Rationing K Enforce by Fines and Meter Discs 
F = Increasing Rates or Surcharges 
Sources: Orange Co. Register, August 16, 1989; Balcersjield Californian, May 7, 1989. 
Note: Figures in parentheses denote percent voluntary/mandatory conservation. 
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I J K 
45 local communities in the sample survey in Southern California. Mandatory conservation was 
active among 17 communities in the Southern California area. Other conservation programs and 
steps toward preparing for water shortages include: 
• Direct economic incentives 
• Distribution of water-saving devices 
• Waste patrols and citations 
• Water monitoring 
• Installing meters 
• Water reclamation 
• Conservation in public uses 
• Drought-tolerant landscaping 
• Supply augmentation 
The following extract compiled by the Los Angeles Times from the Public Affairs 
Clipsheet, Metropolitan Water District, March 14, 1991 (Vol. 5), illustrates the "Los Angeles 
March to Water Rationing" during the fourth year of drought. 
• March 21 The Metropolitan Water District warns Southland water agencies, 
including the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (LADWP), to restrict 
water use. 
• March 23 Mayor Tom Bradley asks the LADWP to draw up a blueprint with 
tough penalties. 
• March 31 Bradley vows to seek mandatory water rationing within 60 days if 
consumption is not voluntarily reduced by 10 percent during the next month. 
• April 4 Los Angeles agrees to stop pumping groundwater for a year from Owens 
Valley, one of the city's three largest sources of water. 
• April 17 A MWD committee recommends paying millions of dollars in rebates 
to water agencies that get customers to cut use by more than 5 percent between 
June and September. 
• April 27 LADWP announces programs that include a team of roving "drought 
busters" looking for water waste. 
• April 30 At a news conference, Bradley challenges Los Angeles to voluntarily cut 
water use by 10 percent or face water rationing within 60 days. 
• May 3 Mayor unveils mandatory water-rationing plan. 
• May 30 The council's Commerce, Energy, and Natural Resources Committee 
gives conditional approval to the mayor's plan while calling for a report on the 
effectiveness of ongoing voluntary conservation. 
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• June 28 Council tentatively approves mandatory rationing plan but throws in 
amendments that will delay final vote for several weeks. 
• July 10 MWD reports that water use in many Southern California cities dropped 
from 8 to 16 percent under voluntary programs. 
• July 11 New figures showing a strong conservation effort by residents prompt 
some lawmakers to change their minds about backing the mayor's proposed 
mandatory water-rationing plan. 
• July 14 By a 10-2 vote, council votes down mandatory water cuts. 
• July 25 Council approves voluntary water rationing and includes the city's first 
fines for flagrant water wasters. 
• August 3 Los Angeles residents cut water use by only 9.8 percent in July and are 
warned that mandatory water rationing may be imposed. 
• September 5 Los Angeles residents cut water use by 13 percent in August and 
push back the possibility of rationing at least until October. 
Source: Public Affairs Clipsheet, Metropolitan Water District, March 14, 1991 (vol. 5). 
Fifth Year (Water Year 1991) 
As the drought progressed into the fifth year, the Miracle March rains and the success 
of the Water Bank assisted most communities in coping with their water shortages. As a result, 
some communities reduced their conservation goals from more than 45 percent to 25 percent and 
lower. However, communities in Southern California, for example, those served by the MWD, 
continued to pursue an aggressive conservation program. In May 1991, a survey was conducted 
to provide California Urban Water Agencies (CUW A) with updated information on what its 
eleven member agencies were doing to deal with urban water demands of the summer and fall 
during the fifth year. The results of this survey are presented in Table IV .16. The conservation 
programs undertaken by the member agencies vary both in terms of water use reduction goals 
and measures adopted. Water use reduction goals varied from a low of 10 percent for LADWP 
to a high of 31 percent for MWD. The conservation measures adopted are similar to the 
demand management measures described in the earlier years of the drought. 
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TABLE IV.16 
1991 CONSERVATION MEASURFS TAKEN BY CUWA MEMBER AGENCIES 
TO MEET URBAN WATER DEMANDS 
Percent 
Reduction 
Goals A B C D E F G H I 
Alameda Co. WD 18 X X X X X 
Contra Costa WD 26 X X X X X X 
East Bay MUD 15 X X X X X X X 
LA Dept. of W&P 10 X X X X X X X X 
MWD of Southern CA 31 X X X 
MWD of Orange Co. 20 X X X X X X X X 
Orange Co. WD 20 X X X X 
San Diego Co. 
Water Auth. 20 X X X X X X X X X 
City of San Diego WUD 20 X X X X X 
San Francisco PUC 25 X X X X X X 
Santa Clara Valley WD 25 X X X X X X 
A = Mandatory Metered Rationing F = Distribution of Water-Saving Devices 
B = Mandatory Conservation G Media Public Information 
C = Extreme Voluntary Conservation H = Mailed Public Information 
D Increasing Rate or Surcharges I = Waste Patrols and Citations 
E = Direct Economic Incentives J = Enforcement by Fines or Meter Disks 
Source: California Urban Water Agencies (CUWA), June 1991. 
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X 
X 
X 
X 
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Sixth Year (Water Year 1992) 
The progress of the drought into the sixth year was accompanied by continued water 
conservation programs. A survey of the CUW A member agencies was completed in May 1992 
in order to update the 1991 survey. The survey demonstrated that all agencies recognize the 
importance of demand management measures. Southern California had above-normal local 
supplies in 1992, allowing relaxation of water restrictions. Drought continued, however, in the 
major Northern California import sources, thus impacting availability of supply. Accordingly, 
the demand management programs pursued by the CUW A member agencies and their goals 
differed according to their water supply situation. However, all eleven member agencies 
continued with their mailing of public information. More than 80 percent of the agencies 
pursued their media public information programs and the distribution of water-saving devices 
(Table IV. 17). One important development at the end of the fifth year of drought (September 
1991) was the signing of the Best Management Practices (BMPs) statewide agreement monitored 
by the California Urban Water Conservation Council. The conservation program followed by 
the water agencies in the sixth year included some of the 16 BMPs advocated in the 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) agreement. For example, MWD designed its 
commercial and industrial program according to the BMP requirements for those sectors. 
Components of this program include publications, technical workshops, business conferences, 
training courses, water use surveys, water management studies, and a telephone hotline. 
ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF THE DROUGHT 
The economic effects of the drought were not felt immediately, but the environment was 
impacted since the first dry weather in 1987. Quantitative assessments of economic losses of 
the six-year drought are difficult to ascertain because limited data are available regarding the 
analysis of drought impacts. The discussion that follows describes the impacts of the drought 
on agriculture, industry, other economic sectors, and the environment. 
Economic Losses in Agriculture 
Irrigated agriculture was little impacted during the first three years of the drought, as the 
use of stored water was allowed. There were local water project shortages in 1988, although 
water deliveries to agricultural users were not reduced until 1990. In 1990 the overall impacts 
to agriculture were minimal (Cannon 1990; CDOC 1990; Gleick and Nash 1991). In contrast 
to minimal impacts of irrigated agriculture early in the drought, dry-farm agriculture and native 
produce were impacted the first year of the drought - 1987. Despite the onset of the drought 
in 1987, cash receipts from farm marketings in California reached a record of $18.3 billion in 
1990, reflecting a $0.8 billion increase from 1989 (C-DWR 1991b, Gleick and Nash 1991.) 
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TABLE IV.17 
1992 CONSERVATION MEASURES TAKEN BY CUWA MEMBER AGENCIES 
TO MEET URBAN WATER DEMANDS 
Percent 
Reduction 
Goals A B C D E F G H I 
Alameda Co. WD 15 X X X X X 
Contra Costa WD 15 X X X 
East Bay MUD 15 X X X X X X 
LA Dept. of W&P 10 X X X X X X 
MWD of Southern CA 10 X X X X X 
MWD of Orange Co. 20 X X X X 
Orange Co. WD 10 X X X X 
San Diego Co. 
Water Auth. 10 X X X X 
City of San Diego WUD 20 X X X X X 
San Francisco PUC 2S X X X X X X 
Santa Clara Valley WD 15 X X X X X X 
A = Mandatory Metered Rationing F = Distribution of Water-Saving Devices 
B = Mandatory Conservation G = Media Public Information 
C = Extreme Voluntary Conservation H = Mailed Public Information 
D = Increasing Rate or Surcbarges I = Waste Patrols and Citations 
E Direct Economic Incentives J = Enforcement by Fines or Meter Disks 
Source: California Urban Water Agencies (CUWA), May 1992. 
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Agriculture was impacted during the fifth year of drought (1991), but the Water Bank 
had a significant effect on the agricultural sector. According to Howitt et al. (1992), the Water 
Bank allocations generated economic gains in the regions importing water in 1991. Howitt et 
al. (1992) indicate that the importing agricultural regions gained in employment by 1,153 jobs, 
and this increase exceeded the 162 estimated job losses experienced in exporting regions. 
Agriculture in importing regions enjoyed an increase of $45 million in income, surpassing the 
estimated loss of county income in exporting regions ($13 million). 
Statewide economic impacts on agriculture during the fifth year of drought were 
estimated by C-DWR (C-DWR 1992c). C-DWR estimated that the drought idled about 347,000 
"net" acres with a loss of gross receipts of about $252 million in 1991. Net acres reflect not 
only the decrease in acres caused by the drought, but also the increase in some crops related to 
crop-shifting in response to the drought. Another estimate of drought indicated that irrigation 
costs to growers in the San Joaquin Valley alone were estimated to have increased by about $160 
million (Northwest Economic Associates 1992). 
Agricultural impacts were concentrated in a few regions, especially the southern San 
Joaquin Valley and the Central Coast region. Scarce groundwater supplies impacted the 
southern San Joaquin Valley, while extensive dry land pasture and a high dependence on 
groundwater made conditions difficult in the Central Coast. Irrigation districts that predicted 
agricultural impacts during the fifth year include Kern County Water Agency (KCWA) and 
Westlands Water District (in San Joaquin Valley) and Glenn-Colusa Irrigation District (in the 
Sacramento Valley). 
For example, KCW A funded a study in early 1991 to estimate economic impacts of 
proposed water delivery cutbacks on five water districts depending solely on SWP entitlements. 
The study estimated that gross output would decline by $221 million if no water was available 
to produce annual crops (Northwest Economic Associates 1991). Furthermore, lost wages and 
salaries, both direct and indirect, would amount to $113 million. 
Reduced surface supplies and increased groundwater pumpage impacted planted acreage 
in the Westlands Water District during the drought. The district forecast decreases of 
approximately 140,000 acres in planted acreage in 1991. Subsequently, based on available data, 
the district forecast a decline in income of $1400 per acre, for a total predicted income loss of 
about $200 million (Westlands Water District 1991). 
A summary of the estimates and forecasts (both local and statewide) of economic impacts 
on the agricultural sector is shown in Table IV.18. Some farmers faced increasing costs and 
declining revenues, and some local communities suffered from reduced activity (Gleick and Nash 
1991). 
Any prediction of drought impacts obviously reflects assumptions of surface water 
supply, groundwater use, water costs, and water distribution. The 1987-1992 drought 
demonstrated that the ability to shift among water users is crucial (Howitt 1991): Howitt pointed 
out that if irrigation water can be readily moved from low values to high value uses within 
agriculture, the total impacts on farmers, urban areas, and food consumers will be greatly 
reduced. 
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TABLE IV.IS 
SUMMARY OF ESTIMATES OF ECONOMIC IMPACTS 
ON THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR IN 1991 
Study 
Statewide 
C-DWR 1992 
Regional 
Northwest Economic 
Associates 1991 
Westlands Water 
District 1991 
Northwest Economic 
Associates 1992 
Loss Comments 
Estimated Loss 
$252 million (gross receipts) Drought idled about 347,000 "net" acres. 
Estimated or Predicted Loss 
$221 million (gross) predicted Assumed no production of annual crops and 
for Kern County alone in 1991 permanent destruction of some tree crops. 
(now appears an overly harsh scenario). 
$200 million (gross) predicted Overestimate of fallowing and 
within the Westlands Water Overestimates of per acre value. 
District for 1991 
$160 million estimated cost in Increases in irrigation costs to growers only 
San Joaquin Valley 
Economic Losses in Industry and Manufacturing 
The California economy was worth more than $760 billion in 1992. Other than 
agriculture and recreation, industries dependent on reliable water supplies in California include 
refining, food processing, semiconductor manufacturing, and services. According to Spectrum 
Economics (1991), seven of California's major industrial sectors increased production during 
drought, although they reduced their water use by 3 to 1 ° percent annually. These seven 
industrial sectors include fruit and vegetable processing, paperboard and box production, 
refining, concrete, communications, and motor vehicle production (Gleick and Nash 1991). 
The industries dependent on reliable water supplies have taken steps to reduce their water 
requirements during the drought. The petroleum refineries that used nearly 230,000 acre-feet 
in the early 1980s (C-DWR 1982) have been planning to recycle and reuse refinery process 
water. The food industry, utilizing over 100,000 acre-feet of water per year (C-DWR 1982), 
has also reduced its water requirements through recycling, improved equipment, and changes 
in operations. As a result of this proactive planning for drought and flexible rationing programs 
(exemptions granted for businesses facing serious consequences), these industries have not 
suffered much economic losses during the drought. The semiconductor industry has 
implemented conservation measures, but Yamane et al. (1991) predicted that increasing industrial 
cutbacks during the ongoing drought might lead to increased costs or force companies to rely 
more heavily on out-of-state production facilities. A survey of 836 executives in the state, 
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conducted for the California business round table, revealed that two-thirds of companies favored 
increasing the state's water supply (Riverside Press-Enterprise, February 5, 1991). The housing 
and construction industry has been impacted by the drought, and some communities in California 
imposed interim regulations on new development. This measure required developers to apply 
for a building permit for any new development, and the applicant would have to ensure that new 
projects would mitigate and offset water usage. In this way existing community water resources, 
already impacted by the drought, would be safeguarded from additional impacts by new users. 
One positive outcome of this restriction on new development has been an increase in the use of 
water-saving devices during the construction process (Gleick and Nash 1991). Other industries 
have also benefited from the drought, and these include well drillers, who have prospered during 
this six-year period. 
Economic Impacts on Other Sectors 
The impacts of the drought affected other economic sectors including municipalities, 
energy, and the "green industry." The discussion of impacts on the first two sectors is based 
largely on material presented by Gleick and Nash (1991). The impact on municipalities in the 
state led to five counties declaring emergency drought conditions in 1990: Santa Barbara, San 
Benito, Kings, Madera, and San Luis Obispo. Five other counties, Mendocino, Tulare, Sutter, 
Glenn, and Colusa, declared drought emergency in the spring of 1991. Most districts, such as 
MWD and Marin County, announced plans to invest capital in ongoing water conservation 
programs. For example, MWD planned to spend $30 million per year for water conservation 
programs and $378 million to line irrigation canals and improve aqueduct control systems. This 
was in return for about 200,000 acre-feet of water from Imperial Valley irrigation projects and 
the All American Canal. Residential conservation programs were widely implemented in the 
state, and reductions varying from 15 to 50 percent in water use were achieved, especially 
during the fourth and fifth years of the drought. For instance, Santa Clara County achieved 20 
percent voluntary reduction in 1989 and 1990, and per capita use dropped 24 percent. 
In addition to conservation techniques such as voluntary and mandatory rationing and 
retrofit programs, the use of reclaimed water has increased in the state. During the drought, the 
city of Irvine became the fIrst in the nation to use reclaimed water for toilet flushing in 
commercial buildings (C-DWR 1991b). Furthermore, the cities of Santa Barbara and Montecito 
used reclaimed water for public landscaping. 
Another sector impacted by the drought is hydroelectric generation, which normally 
provides about 20 percent of the state's total electrical energy supply and represents more than 
30 percent of electricity produced by California utilities. Hydroelectric generation declined to 
about 12 percent of total generation and 18 percent of in-state generation during the first four 
years of the drought (Gleick and Nash 1991). This decline has been made up mainly by burning 
more costly natural gas and importing power from out-of-state sources. Gleick and Nash (1991) 
claim that the decline in hydroelectric generation has cost California rate payers $2.4 billion 
during this period. 
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There are widely varying estimates of the impact to the "green industry," owing to the 
problems of defining and knowing the baseline conditions and extracting other factors. 
Preliminary estimates indicate that the California "green industry" experienced drought-induced 
direct losses of equivalent full-time jobs totalling about 5,630 (C-DWR 1992e). This figure 
excludes job losses in the "green industry" due to recession. Additionally, drought impacts 
forced some "green industry" employees to work fewer hours in 1991. Declines in revenues 
suffered by the "green industry" due solely to drought were about 7 percent in 1990 (C-DWR 
1992e). It should be noted that the "green industry" suffered an even greater decline in business 
in 1991 due to other factors such as recession and increased water costs. 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS 
Fish and Wildlife 
According to C-DWR (1991b), it is possible that the most severe impacts of the drought 
have been on the environment and the fish and wildlife that depend on the rivers for their 
sustenance. The environment was impacted immediately with the onset of drought in 1987. 
Impacts were pronounced on fisheries and aquatic resources, particularly species such as salmon, 
which shows a good correlation to flow (USFWS 1987; Gleick and Nash 1991). This 
relationship has since been rermed to show that water temperature, Delta exports, and percent 
river flow diverted at the Delta Cross Channel and Georgianna Slough explain the relationship 
better. The following discussion on impacts of the drought to fish is based on information 
contained in C-DWR (1991b) and the Pacific Fishery Management Council publication, Review 
of 1991 Ocean Salmon Fisheries (pFMC 1992). However, the extent that the environment has 
been impacted by drought and low flows has not been established. There are several major 
factors in addition to flow, such as toxics, introduced species, and overfishing that have 
impacted the environmental resources, but these losses have not been assessed. Other important 
environmental impacts include increases in upstream temperature, winter-run chinook salmon 
habitat, cumulative impacts, longfin smelt, Sacramento splittail, April 1991 Delta operations, 
violation of Delta standards in 1991 and 1992, and unmitigated water transfer impacts. 
The fall-run chinook salmon represents the major facet of California's commercial and 
sport fisheries. Figure N.3 reveals that the population of the fall-run chinook salmon had 
declined to its lowest numbers in the last two decades despite consistent hatchery production. 
Counts of adult salmon show a consistent decline from about 232,000 in 1986 to about 96,000 
in 1990. The counts of two-year-old immature jack salmon showed a continued decline since 
the outset of the drought in 1987 (from about 70 jacks in 1987 to about 11 jacks in 1990). 
According to C-DWR (1991b), several generations may be needed to restore these populations 
once precipitation returns to normal. 
The drought also impacted the striped bass and adult populations declines to an estimated 
all-time low of 515,000 in 1990 (C-DWR 1991b). Figure IV.4 illustrates the California Central 
Valley striped bass young-of-the-year index, which demonstrates that the spawning success 
decreased substantially during the drought. In 1986 the population level index of the 1.5-inch 
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FIGURE IV.3 
CALIFORNIA CENTRAL VALLEY NATURAL FALL-RUN 
CEUNOOKSPA~GSAUMON 
(In Thousands of Fish, 1970-1991)1 
Source: C-DWR 1991b. 
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FIGURE IV.4 
CALIFORNIA CENTRAL V ALLEY STRIPED BASS YOUNG-OF· THE-YEAR INDEX1 
Source: C-DWR 1991b. 
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FIGURE IV.S 
INDEX OF FALL ABUNDANCE OF DELTA SMELT BY YEAR! 
Source: C-DWR 1991b. 
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striped bass was about 65, decreasing to about 12 in 1987 and to about 6 in 1991 (C-DWR 
1991b). Besides the salmon and the striped bass, other species were also impacted, including 
the Delta smelt. Figure IV.5 deficits the annual index of fall abundance of Delta smelt from 
1967 to 1991. The Delta smelt index was lowest during the mid-1980s, and although it has been 
increasing since 1989, the annual index was well below 1,000 in 1991 (C-DWR 1991b). 
However, 1992 trends reveal that this promising increasing trend has largely reversed. 
Wildlife has been impacted by the ongoing drought, as shown by drastic declines in the 
wintering waterfowl in the Central Valley of California during the last decade. Most waterfowl 
do not breed in California. During the 1980s, the waterfowl suffered from drought experienced 
in the north. Drought affected the winter habitat and the condition of birds returning north to 
breed. The 1990 population was estimated at about 2 million as compared with about 10-12 
million in 1980 (testimony of Iohn Turner, Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife, noted in Gleick 
and Nash 1991). The authors maintained that although waterfowl populations are affected by 
several factors, the water shortage has intensified these losses by reducing the quantity and 
quality of wetlands habitat in the Central Valley. 
Forestry 
The current drought has impacted California's forests. The California Department of 
Forestry and Fire Protection (CDF) is responsible for the largest area of forest, about 34 million 
acres, in California (Gleick and Nash 1991). The impacts of the drought on the CDF and the 
citizens of California are long-term and are predicted to continue into the next generation (C-
DWR 1991b). By the fifth year, the drought intensified the buildup of dead fuels on 25 percent 
of the lands that the CDF protects. Three years of the current drought (1987, 1988, and 1990) 
were among the worst fire seasons experienced in the state. Based on acreage burned in the 
1986 season, there was a six-fold increase in 1987, and acreage burned almost doubled during 
the 1988 and 1990 fire seasons. Yosemite National Park for the first time in its history closed 
down in 1990 (Gleick and Nash 1991). Additionally, the death rate of timber has continued to 
increase during the drought. Since its onset in 1987, the drought has destroyed 18 billion board 
feet of the state's merchantable timber. This is equivalent to building about 1.8 million homes 
(C-DWR 1991b). 
Other Sectors 
Environmental impacts also impacted the recreation and tourist sector. The water 
shortage led to increased operating costs in many of the state's parks. These increased costs are 
due to several factors that include (C-DWR 1991b): 
• Need for new wells or deeper wells 
• Trucking of water supplies in severe cases 
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• Installation of water conservation equipment such as drip irrigation and self-
closing faucets 
• Construction of boat ramp extensions to reach lower water levels 
By the fifth year of the drought, water use at state parks was about 10 gallons per capita per day 
(gpcd) in comparison with 14 gallons gpcd during the 1976-77 drought (C-DWR 1991b). 
In the tourist sector, the ski resort business in the state declined as the drought progressed 
and snow conditions deteriorated in the mountains. Estimates from the California ski industry 
indicated that "skier visits" had declined from 7.1 million in the 1988-89 season to 6.1 million 
in 1989-90 and 4.1 million in 1990-91 (Gleick and Nash 1991). The authors estimated that the 
ski resort industry lost about $85 million during the 1990-91 winter season, and employment 
levels fell to about 50 percent of normal during this time. 
SUMMARY 
This chapter described the progress of the drought from its onset in 1987 to its present-
day status. The story of the drought has been described in detail so as to give the reader a 
summary of the precipitation and hydrological conditions during the six-year period, the actions 
taken during drought, and the economic and environmental impacts of the drought. 
With this established knowledge base, the research team proceeded to search for learned 
lessons through interviews with representatives of agencies and organizations that control or 
influence water management. The reaction of these participants to what happened during the 
drought was expected to uncover prescriptive insights about what to do and what not to do 
during future drought episodes. The next chapter presents the interview findings. 
123 
v. SURVEY RESULTS: GENERAL PERCEPTIONS 
This chapter summarizes the contents of the interviews pertaining to four general aspects 
of the drought: (1) critical drought impacts; (2) communication and cooperation; (3) the role 
and responsibilities of the media; and (4) response of the general public and water users to the 
drought. 
The following opinions were presented during the interviews. They are not intended to 
represent the views of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers or the authors of this report. The 
views have not been modified by the report authors. Participants interviewed in the study were 
given the opportunity to review draft versions of this report in order to both comment on the 
overall results of the study as well as to comment on perceptions specific to them. Two 
workshops were also held to review the document in a communal setting. We encourage reading 
of this section in the spirit of identifying a wide spectrum of varying perceptions that comprise 
water and drought management philosophy in California. 
PERCEPTIONS OF DROUGHT IMPACTS 
Major droughts, such as the 1987-92 drought in California, may have substantial adverse 
impacts on the economy, political system, environment, and society as a whole. Because less 
water is available during drought, some human activities become constrained, and the objectives 
possible with a plentiful water supply cannot be achieved. Also, the competition for water 
among various economic activities may leave the environmental uses of water at a disadvantage 
causing significant environmental impacts. 
Investigations of drought usually concentrate on its adverse consequences. However, 
droughts also have positive impacts as well. One such effect is the subject of this study, 
namely, the lessons for water management. 
The survey respondents named a large number of negative impacts of the drought but 
generally were able to quantify very few. Table V.1 shows a roster of the impacts of the 1987-
92 drought in California that were mentioned by the survey participants. These impacts are 
grouped under four broad categories: environment, agriculture, urban economies, and other. 
The following sections describe the most critical impacts in each category. 
Environmental Impacts 
Almost all survey respondents agreed that the greatest impact of the 1987-92 drought fell 
on the state's environmental resources. The environmental community pointed out that the 
natural ecosystems in California have been diminished and weakened because of population 
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TABLE V.1 
IMPACTS OF THE 1987-1992 DROUGHT IN CALIFORNIA 
AS CITED BY INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS 
I. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS 
• Reduced abundance and harvest of freshwater and anadromous fish 
• Penetration of salt water into the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta 
• Forest damage from pests and fire 
• Decline in the quality of wildlife habitat due to reduced water deliveries to 
California's wetlands 
• Decline in populations of threatened and endangered species of plants and animals 
• Increase of fossil fuel generation impacted air quality 
ll. IMPACTS ON AGRICULTURE 
• Drought-related idling of farmland (especially in the acreage of rice, wheat, and 
cotton) 
• Reduced agricultural income 
• Increased agricultural cost 
• Reduced herd sizes in some parts of the state 
• Erosion of grazing areas due to overgrazing 
• Increased capital investment by farmers on pumps and wells 
• Overdrafting of groundwater aquifers 
• Impacted industries producing goods to farmers 
• Crop shift impact has been detrimental to the vegetable industry 
• Demonstrated ingenuity of the farmers 
ill. IMPACTS ON URBAN ECONOMIES 
• Increased expenditures on emergency water conservation programs 
• Losses of plant materials on urban landscapes 
• Increased costs of water treatment due to lower water quality 
• Positive and negative criticism from customers 
• Increased volume of work in urban water agencies 
N. OTHER IMPACTS 
• Increased costs for fossil fuel energy to replace lost hydropower 
• Income losses of the ski industry due to bad snow conditions 
• Reduced houseboating activity due to low reservoir levels 
• Increased emissions of carbon dioxide due to the burning of extra fossil fuels 
• Increased expenditures for fire protection, fire control, staffing, and operational 
expenses 
• Reduced visitor attendance at parks and facilities 
• Social hardships 
• Consumer inconvenience and lifestyle changes 
• Industrial production and wage-earning-hours reduction 
• Devaluation of California as a desirable industrial location 
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pressures and that their continued survival requires careful management and control. The 
drought has exacerbated the existing environmental problems. 
Some environmental impacts of the drought occurred outside the water management 
systems in the sense that no human actions could prevent the damages. For example, the 
shortage of precipitation has caused very high tree mortality due to increased vulnerabilities to 
insect infestations and other forest diseases. At the end of 1991 as mentioned earlier, the 
damage assessment by the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection estimated that 
since 1987, the drought has killed 18 billion board feet of merchantable timber (Le., enough 
timber to build 1.8 million normal-size homes). Only a fraction of the dead timber can be 
recovered. 
The impacts of drought on aquatic and riparian resources were evident throughout the 
water management system of the state. Respondents representing the state and federal natural 
resources agencies were aware of the drought-related problems. They expressed some 
frustration with the lack of understanding of the environmental needs by the public and the off-
stream users of water. Many of them thought that society has to decide whether environmental 
uses should have priority. Some respondents suggested that there should be a referendum (or 
a popular vote) on this issue. They indicated that once the society "makes up its mind" and puts 
high priority on protecting ecological resources of the state, they will "gladly oblige." The 
environmental managers know what needs to be done and how to do it. Actually, the society 
did force water managers to give high priority to protecting the threatened and endangered 
species. The protection of species in the Sacramento River has resulted in forcing the operations 
of the water projects for environmental enhancement. 
The participants from the environmental community believed that the operators of the 
water projects are clearly to blame for some environmental impacts. Aquatic resources were 
stressed because of the cumulative impact caused by minimum flows that persisted since 1987. 
Agriculture and urban areas received full allocations of the stored water during the fIrst three 
or even four years at the expense of carry-over storage. Then when the drought continued, the 
projects wanted to have more carry-over storage by cutting down the minimum-flow 
requirements for protecting the aquatic resources. (It should be noted, however, that according 
to C-DWR, in 1989 it was not possible to carry over more water at Folsom and Oroville 
reservoirs, as this would encroach into flood use storage.) If the cutbacks were introduced 
earlier, then the SWP and CVP would be in a better position to protect the ecological resources. 
There would be more water to enhance flows and mitigate high water temperature impacts. 
Impacts on Agriculture 
Respondents from agricultural water districts gave many examples of negative impacts 
of the drought on agriculture. Because the major projects reduced water deliveries to 
agriculture, the respondents seemed compelled to let everyone know that these cutbacks caused 
major hardships. SignifIcant amounts of agricultural land were left idle, and the cost of water 
went up. Many respondents acknowledged that the economic impacts were not great because 
of the availability of groundwater, changes in cropping patterns, and on-farm water conservation 
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practices. The impact of greater concern to them was the change in attitudes of the general 
public toward the agricultural sector. They resented the "farmer bashing" that was present in 
the media, especially during the fifth year of the drought. Some respondents viewed "farmer 
bashing" as a sign of future problems for agriculture in the state. Because of the change in 
public attitudes, next time it will be more difficult for agriculture to obtain water supplies or 
even maintain their current supplies. On the positive side, some respondents believed that the 
impacts of the drought had been mitigated tremendously on the farms by the farmers. They said 
that there were a million acres of farmland surviving with only a 25 percent water supply, and 
due to the ingenuity of the farmers, agriculture was not greatly impacted economically. 
A majority of all other survey participants sympathized with farmers but were concerned 
more with the social impacts of water shortages on the rural communities than with the statewide 
impact of drought on income of the agribusiness sector of the state economy. The estimated 
losses in farm sales of $0.5 billion were often viewed by the other respondents as important but 
not as critical as the environmental impacts. This view was influenced, at least in part, by the 
realization that total farm sales represent a very small fraction of the state gross regional product 
(approximately $20 billion out of $700 billion or less than 3 percent) and that the highest farm 
sales year of 1990 was the third year of drought. 
Respondents from the environmental community viewed the impacts on California's 
agriculture as being greatly softened because of the existing water management system, which 
protected off-stream uses of water against drought. Some statements seemed to imply that this 
protection comes at the expense of the environment. 
Impacts on Urban Economies 
The impact urban water users most frequently mentioned was conserving water and 
adjusting their lifestyles in order to do it. Although all survey participants praised the 
conservation effort of urban water users, their views on the level of hardship and the economic 
consequences of water-rationing programs were often deeply divided. 
The participants whose responsibilities involve the development and administration of 
urban water demand management programs, both long-term and short-term, tended to view the 
negative impacts of rationing programs as negligible or minimal. They praised the consumers 
for great cooperation and quoted the achieved water savings as evidence of the success of the 
rationing programs. Because these participants work diligently to promote water conservation 
at all times, they viewed the drought as an opportunity to increase the public awareness of water 
use and achieve significant improvements in the efficiency of water use. Consumer 
inconvenience or economic hardship of businesses and industries was less of a concern. 
The participants who deal with operations of water supply systems and those who 
perform long-term planning activities were concerned about the consequences of water rationing. 
As one respondent put it: "When you propose a rationing plan at 45 percent of what people are 
used to having, you must deal with a lot of angry people because this has a serious impact on 
people's lives and businesses." Another respondent called the conservation programs "irrational 
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rationing," indicating that because of strict water-rationing provisions, some electronics firms 
in Silicon Valley had to spend a lot of money on water conservation to avoid large employee 
layoffs. They paid up to $30,000 per acre-foot for water conserved, while farmers were very 
willing to give up much of their water at $125 per acre-foot or less. However, this comparison 
has to be interpreted cautiously, since the $30,000 per acre-foot is for a permanent effect (not 
one-time, like the $125 per acre-foot), and was primarily expended to avoid extremely high 
effluent discharge costs. Other respondents in the group often mentioned the difficulties 
involved in designing, implementing, and enforcing rationing programs, as well as their negative 
impacts on water utility revenue. Some saw the revenue losses caused by the rationing to be 
setbacks for their long-term conservation programs. In order to balance revenues, many retail 
water agencies had to increase water rates. The Los Angeles Times ran the headline "No Good 
Deed Goes Unpunished" in response to the proposed rate hike in Los Angeles. 
The participants representing the urban "green industry" of landscapers and nurseries 
voiced numerous complaints against water-rationing programs, especially against total bans on 
outdoor watering. They lost a number of business accounts for landscape maintenance, because 
the owners had to let the landscapes die. Outright bans on landscaping use "until the drought 
is over" often paralyzed landscape businesses in many communities. Landscapers can work with 
very little water to beautify and maintain urban landscapes, but they cannot work without water. 
The landscape contractors pointed out that they represent a major industry in California, with 
the value of products and services that they estimate between $10 and $12 billion annually, 
almost two-thirds of the total value of farm product sales in the state. 
Other Impacts of the Drought 
Although environment, agriculture, and urban economies account for the majority of 
adverse impacts of drought, other sectors and activities also had their share of negative effects 
of drought. These other impacts are characterized here under the categories of water quality, 
recreation, energy, administration, and water policy. 
Impacts on Water Quality 
The six-year drought has impacted the state of the California water resources in terms 
of both their quantity and quality. Groundwater reserves have been depleted in many areas, 
causing accelerated seawater intrusion in coastal regions and subsidence in the San Joaquin 
Valley. The survey respondents voiced some concerns about the impacts on water quality. The 
availability of water to dilute the pollutants continues to be an important element of water quality 
protection. For example, higher salinity of water in the Delta combined with higher organic 
content of inflowing freshwater causes elevated levels of THMs (tribalomethanes) in public water 
supplies using the Delta water. 
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Impacts on Recreation and Tourism 
Nearly $50 billion is spent annually in California on recreation and tourism activities 
(Gleick and Nash 1991). The drought had major impacts on tourist activities such as skiing in 
the Sierra Nevada, houseboating on reservoirs, and fishing for salmon and striped bass. For 
example, the number of recreation days on the State Water Project lakes has dropped from 7.2 
million in 1987 to about 6 million in 1990, a 17 percent decrease. Visits to urban areas also 
dropped. The city of Santa Barbara estimated that they lost $30 million in tourism in 1990 due 
to publicity about drought and fires (Reinhold 1991). 
The respondents who mentioned the impacts of drought on tourism often acknowledged 
the difficulty in estimating such impacts. Some decline in tourism and recreation was attributed 
to the economic recession. Others felt that the importance of these impacts easily fades away 
in comparison with the potentially irreversible impacts on the state's ecological resources. 
Impacts on Energy Production 
Hydroelectric power provides approximately 20 percent of the California'S total electric 
energy supply and represents about one-third of the electricity produced by utilities located 
within the state. Because the amount of hydroelectricity produced is directly related to the 
amount of water in storage, the production of hydropower dropped to about two-thirds of normal 
during the drought. The representatives of the energy industry reported that the first four years 
of the drought have cost ratepayers an extra $2.4 billion because of the extra oil and natural gas 
burned to replace hydroelectricity. This has also caused an estimated 25 percent increase in the 
emissions of carbon dioxide. 
The respondents from the energy industry voiced few complaints about the loss of 
hydropower. They tended to believe that during drought, water has more important uses than 
the production of hydropower. Some simply acknowledged the current situation in which their 
generating stations are operated according to an "environmental dispatch," instead of the 
traditional "economic dispatch." The advantages of hydropower as an inexpensive and flexible 
source of power are not sufficient to give it high priority during drought. 
Impacts on Administrative Management 
Almost all respondents from government agencies indicated that the drought has 
significantly increased their workloads as well as the level of difficulty in discharging their 
responsibilities. The SWRCB had to investigate an unusually high number of complaints. Also, 
there were a large number of permit applications filed by water users with critical needs for 
water who waited until the last moment to make requests. In other agencies, the respondents 
had to attend meetings more frequently than normal, and some had to devote considerable 
amounts of time to dealing with the media. 
130 
Impacts on Water Policy 
One of the most significant impacts of the drought occurred in the state's political arena. 
The declining reservoir storage, drawdown, groundwater overdrafting, and water conservation 
execution allowed the state, regional, and local water agencies to delay hard choices in shaping 
new water policy. In 1991, the situation became very difficult. As one respondent stated: 
"Things got too bad and politicians stepped in. For politicians everything is very simple, [they] 
do not understand the complexity of the system." Thus water management moved up to the 
political agenda of Governor Pete Wilson. On February 1, 1991, the Governor signed Executive 
Order No. W-3-91 which established the Drought Action Team. In two weeks, the team 
recommended the creation of an emergency drought Water Bank. The 1991 Drought Water 
Bank was viewed by many respondents as a very positive outcome of the drought. Some praised 
the leadership of Governor Wilson, stating that before he stepped in, the state's drought policy 
could be characterized as mostly "doing very little and praying for rain. " 
A majority of respondents indicated that the Water Bank represented an important 
milestone in formulating an effective water management policy in California. The bank allowed 
water to move to high-value uses simply because of the raw power of market forces in allocating 
scarce resources. 
Relative Importance of Drought Impacts 
The information on impacts and economic costs of the drought is of critical importance 
to the formulation of adequate drought response plans. By comparing the various impacts, 
policymakers should be able to adjust the allocation of dwindling water resources so that the 
most severe impacts are minimized. The survey respondents were well aware of the implications 
of quantified impacts on water policy. Those whose water supplies were curtailed gave a 
detailed description of all impacts and attached a dollar value of losses wherever possible. At 
the same time, they were careful not to minimize or discount hardships and economic losses 
suffered by others. 
In general, the respondents were fully cognizant of the difficulties in measuring drought 
impacts as well as the dangers involved in comparing the economic losses suffered by various 
economic sectors. They recognized the tendency of impact evaluation studies to be focused on 
impacts that can easily be quantified in dollar terms while undercounting those impacts that 
cannot be easily assessed in dollar terms. Many respondents agreed that the quantifiable 
economic impacts have occurred but were not critical because there was enough water to get by. 
Greater economic impacts would very likely occur if the drought continued or deepened. 
Although the economic impacts were of more immediate concern to people, because they often 
translate into lost jobs, there was almost a common opinion that the most severe effects of the 
drought fell on the ecological resources of the state. Objections to this view were raised by 
representatives of the agricultural sector. Some members of the agricultural community held the 
opinion that the environmental damages were exaggerated by the resources management agencies 
and the environmental community in order to take away water from agriculture. 
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Conclusions Concerning Drought Impacts 
The results of the interviews lend support to two general conclusions pertaining to the 
impacts of drought. These conclusions can be summarized as follows: 
• Measurement and valuation of drought impacts is very diffICult. Attributing 
changes in economic performance and environmental resources to drought is not 
a simple task. Attaching dollar values to these changes is even more difficult and 
almost impossible in the case of impacts on the environment. Because of these 
difficulties, there is a tendency to focus only on impacts that can be measured and 
valued in monetary terms (e.g., loss of production of hydroelectricity). Many 
other impacts with potentially higher economic losses are usually described in 
qualitative terms only. 
• Anecdotal evidence and speculations about drought impacts influence drought 
response decisions. During drought there is insufficient time to study the 
impacts carefully and make accurate predictions of potential impacts. As a result, 
qualitative statements about the impacts influence drought response decisions of 
water agencies. The mass media play a large role in disseminating anecdotal 
evidence about various impacts, often focusing on some impacts and overlooking 
others. 
COOPERATION AND COMMUNICATION 
The survey participants were almost unanimous in their opinion that the drought brought 
about a great improvement in cooperation among the agencies at various governmental levels as 
well as across the functional agencies at the same level. Also, the controllers and influencers 
of water management in the state were willing to communicate and compromise for the common 
purpose of coping with the drought. The drought seemed to have brought at least a partial and 
temporary peace among normally opposing interests. The following are some examples of good 
faith, cooperation, and communication that developed in the water management arena during 
drought. 
The Memorandum of Understanding 
As part of the ongoing proceedings on the allocation of water rights in the San Francisco 
Bay/Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta Estuary, the Department of Water Resources and the State 
Water Conservation Coalition (a cooperative project of the Northern California-based Committee 
for Water Policy Consensus and the Southern California Water Committee) brought interested 
parties together to develop a consensus on reasonable long-term conservation measures and 
achievable savings for urban areas. These measures became known as Urban Water 
Conservation Best Management Practices (BMPs). On December 11, 1991, the parties signed 
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a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that described the BMPs and set forth the obligations 
of all signatories. The participating urban water agencies agreed to aggressively implement the 
BMPs and monitor the success of implementation programs through an organization called 
California Urban Water Conservation Council. In return, they received assurances from the 
environmental community that they would accept the projected water-savings estimates of the 
BMPs and support the need to develop more reliable urban water supplies in the state. 
The drought provided an impetus for signing the MOU. Some respondents pointed to 
the MOU as an example of good cooperation during drought. The significance of MOU, 
however, goes beyond the Bay/Delta issues. For the first time, the urban and environmental 
interests in California reached a consensus and influenced the balance of power among the 
urban, agricultural, and environmental sectors. The existence of such an imbalance brought 
agricultural sector to the negotiating table as well. 
The Three-Way Process 
Some respondents pointed out the Three-Way Process as an example of good cooperation 
and communication during the drought. In December 1990, representatives of the agricultural, 
urban, and environmental sectors began discussion on resolving the critical issues in the existing 
water management system in California to advance their common interests. 
An opinion expressed during the interviews was that before the Tbree-Way Process 
began, some thought that anyone of the three interest groups (Le., agricultural, urban, and 
environmental) had enough political power to block any solutions to California water problems 
that were seen as mostly benefiting one or both of the other two sectors. This balance of power 
("veto power") created a stalemate in water development for a period of more than 20 years. 
The Three-Way Process aimed at achieving a consensus in which all three sides 
recognized that each sector has legitimate water needs. They sought to develop a phased 
approach to solving water problems that would be linked to simultaneous benefits for all sectors. 
They also agreed that the state needs an integrated package of water supply solutions to meet the 
most important needs of all three sectors. The Three-Way group was composed mainly of water 
professionals and activists who had a good understanding of water issues and of the views and 
positions of their constituencies. The Three-Way group saw itself as a resource whose 
conclusions and consensus views would be offered to the policymakers and politicians for their 
actions. However, at the end of the sixth year of drought, the expectations of success of the 
Three-Way Process had been lowered significantly. Apparently the willingness of the 
participating parties to compromise had diminished. Several participants of the workshops held 
in December 1992 expressed some doubts about the possibility of reaching a consensus. 
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Other Examples of Cooperation 
The spirit of cooperation is not new to Californians. During the drought crisis of 1977, 
the communities in need could count on the help of not only their neighbors but also all other 
entities in the state. Long-standing animosities were put aside in order to help. For example, 
Metropolitan Water District of Southern California cooperated with the SWP and several other 
agencies in order to get water to Marin County and other districts in Northern and Central 
California. During the 1987-92 drought, water was provided to Santa Barbara using a sequence 
of exchanges and arrangements to transfer water from the north. Many other exchanges between 
neighboring districts also took place. 
Another example was the public and private cooperation in implementing water 
conservation programs. In Southern California, Metropolitan Water District discovered a new 
marketing tool for the distribution of water conservation devices whereby the local fast food 
chains and grocery stores volunteered to set up device pickup points and distribute conservation 
kits to their patrons. This method of device distribution saved Metropolitan a lot of money 
while allowing the participating businesses to demonstrate their concern for the community and 
benefit by drawing more customers to their places of business. 
There were many more examples of good cooperation and communication during the 
drought. One or more examples were given during each interview. Members of the 
environmental community indicated they had access and could talk to anybody in the state. State 
agencies could get cooperation of other agencies without any delays. Individual urban water 
users were more than willing to avert the crisis and readily responded to requests for 
conservation. 
Conclusions Concerning Cooperation and Communication 
The observations pertaining to cooperation and communication during drought are not 
new. Research on natural hazards has shown that disasters bring people together. Old 
animosities are abandoned in order to unite against the external forces. Water planners have 
known from previous experiences with droughts that during a drought they can accomplish more 
because there is more "readiness to help." 
The C-DWR Drought Information Center has provided the hub of communication 
regarding the current drought since its establishment in 1988. The center is staffed by a team 
of public information officers and drought specialists, and it serves as the Department's 
clearinghouse for all inquiries regarding the drought's statewide impact. The personnel at the 
Drought Information Center responds to numerous calls and correspondence on a daily basis 
from news reporters, water agencies, lawmakers, and the general public. 
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Three conclusions can be drawn from the experiences of the survey participants: 
• Plans for improvements in infrastructure and efficiency of water use are 
easier to sell during drought. Because the public attention is focused on water 
problems during drought, it is easier to communicate to the public the needs for 
long-term water conservation or improvements in reliability of supply and gain 
the public approval for proposed solutions. 
• Bureaucracies give high priority to cooperation during drought. For many 
water institutions the drought is a real test of their performance. Officials and 
administration make extra efforts to perform well and are willing to cut "red 
tape" in order to speed up the administrative process wherever possible. 
• The C-DWR Drought Information Center has stimulated communication. 
The Center has stimulated communication during the drought by arranging media 
interviews with various Department experts, preparing news releases and reports, 
assisting water agencies with financial and technical expertise, briefing local and 
foreign dignitaries, and replying to letters suggesting solutions to water shortages 
or requesting information on various topics. 
ROLE OF THE MEDIA 
The California drought of 1987-92 has been a continuing major news story. The 
newsworthiness of the drought created an opportunity to focus public attention on California'S 
water issues. A majority of the survey participants recognized the importance of the mass media 
in influencing the drought management decisions. Many respondents criticized the media for 
not being very helpful. We summarize the views on the role of the media from the perspectives 
of the media, water controllers, and water influencers. 
The Media Perspective 
The media saw their role during the drought as informing the public on how supply 
allocations were made and on the consequences of the allocations and related decisions. In the 
media's view, people care about water when it does not come out of their tap or when it comes 
under their front door, that is, only during the periods of drought or flood. Although the 
primary objective was to cover the breaking news on drought, some media, especially the major 
newspapers, tried to bring into the picture water supply issues from a broader statewide 
perspective. Reporters asked, "Why are we in this crisis?" And the answer often required an 
extended inquiry and a role of a watchdog. Reporters tend to dig up reports on lessons learned 
and recommendations from previous droughts and find out whether the recommendations were 
implemented. They also want to see where the rhetoric is not matching reality, and whether any 
laws are broken. To them newsworthiness is present "when somebody is falling down on a 
job." When actions are done well and everything works as expected, there is no news. 
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The media, in their inquiries, want answers to the questions of the general public. 
During drought, what people want to know is, how much water is it prudent to use? Or how 
much water is it prudent to save? The public also wants to make sure that water agencies are 
not asking them for unnecessary sacrifices. 
The Perspective of Water Controllers 
Survey participants who represented water agencies generally gave the media good marks 
for their performance during the drought. They recognized that the press is probably the most 
important influence on public opinion. Various respondents gave one or more examples of 
things that the media should do in order to help. Accordingly, the media should: 
• Inform the public about the trade-offs between various purposes of water use 
• Play a bigger role in educating the public on water issues 
• Pay more attention to the drought impacts on agriculture 
• Give more credit to state and federal agencies for their role in the drought 
• Expose the full spectrum of impacts and not focus exclusively on environmental 
impacts 
• Maintain public responsibility and objectivity 
Some water managers, however, were more critical of the media than other respondents. 
Most of them had to learn, on the job, how to deal with the press. Some believed that the media 
are completely "out of control" and all too often "make a mountain out of a molehill. " 
The Perspective of Water Influencers 
Environmental community and regulatory agencies had more favorable opinion of the 
media's performance than water managers. One respondent believed that the great success of 
urban water conservation was primarily a result of the media constantly harping on the drought 
problem. The newsworthiness of drought resulted in an unusually large amount of print space 
and air time devoted to the drought. The public had no reason to doubt that they are in a 
drought crisis. Also, thanks to the mass media the public now has a better overall picture of 
water management than before the drought. The newspapers have good and vigorous writers 
of the water subject, even though they are not always complimentary of the operations and 
decisions of water management institutions. The influencers tended to agree that the criticism 
of the media by water managers is mostly unjustified because the media's primary role is to 
report on events and not to manage water resources. In cases where there were problems, the 
blame for poor communication has to be put on water agencies themselves. 
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Conclusions Concerning the Mass Media 
The results of the interviews point to the following conclusions about the role of the 
media during drought: 
• The role of the media is not well understood by water managers. The media 
are governed by their own rules of objective reporting, newsworthiness, and their 
perceptions of what the public wants to know. They cannot be managed by water 
agencies. If they were they would not be able to sell news. The questions like, 
Are we in a drought? or Is the drought over? are not silly questions from the 
media's point of view. Reporters understand the thinking modes and perceptions 
of the general public much better than water professionals. For them, once the 
water supply situation is called a drought, it automatically implies that behavior 
has to be changed from normal behavior to crisis behavior. Such a change is 
newsworthy. 
• Media cannot improve on imprecise and ambiguous messages. Media 
reporters cannot improve on the clarity of the messages that they receive from 
water managers. More likely the statements will become even more confusing 
after they are reported in the press. Only unambiguous and complete answers to 
questions that are asked by the press can be communicated clearly to the public. 
• Media cannot explain complex water management issues. What is very 
interesting to water professionals is usually "too dry" for newspapers, radio, and 
television. Long feature articles on water issues do not sell newspapers, but 
timely, well-written articles during a drought emergency will be read by 
concerned people. 
RESPONSE OF THE PUBLIC 
Survey respondents were unanimously in agreement that the public response to drought, 
in terms of cutting back on their water use, was very good. There were some differences of 
opinion with respect to the reasons for such a good response, as well as the problem of unfair 
treatment of those who conserved water by raising rates to make up for the lost revenue. 
Reasons behind Public Cooperation 
Some respondents expressed the view that urban users of water are the only group with 
significant potential for exercising water conservation. On a short notice they can change their 
water use behavior (by watering their yards less, flushing toilets less frequently, not cleaning 
their sidewalks with hoses) or use water-saving technology (such as toilet inserts, low-flow 
showers, and other devices). Farmers, on the other hand, have very few options for an 
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instantaneous adjustment in their water use. They use water for only one purpose, which is 
watering crops. Water needs are determined by weather, type of crop, and the growth stage. 
Once the seeds are in the soil, the only short-term option the farmers has is to let the crop die. 
Only some farmers can turn to pumping groundwater or reduce the use of water for leaching out 
salt buildup. Finally, environmental uses have no options at all. Water in the stream for fish 
or dilution has no substitutes. Although this reasoning had some simple appeal, the opinion that 
urban dwellers should save water simply because they can was not shared by all respondents. 
The cooperative public response was partially summarized by one respondent as "people 
do the right thing if they have to do it." Another respondent expanded upon this statement 
indicating that people will conserve water if they are convinced that the drought is serious and 
when they believe that their actions matter and that what they are asked to do is fair. The public 
responded so well to the appeals for water conservation because these seemingly prerequisite 
conditions were present. Media's constant attention to drought convinced people that the drought 
was real. Mandatory rationing with enforcement further impressed the public about the 
seriousness of the situation. Rationing plans were designed with a purpose of making the 
required reductions in water use fair to all residents. Finally, information on changes (Le., 
reductions) in water use provided the necessary feedback to water users to convince them that 
their efforts made a difference. 
The survey respondents believed that water conservation efforts tended to be uniform 
throughout the state. Because the majority of urban residents share the same ultimate water 
supply sources, there is a reason for distant communities to share in the conservation effort. 
People in Southern California saved significant amounts of water even though one of their 
sources, the Colorado River water, was not affected by the drought. In some isolated areas with 
ample local supplies people did not reduce water use because they did not have to. In other 
areas reductions were more than was necessary. 
Response to Fiscal Problems 
The success of rationing programs often translated into fiscal problems for urban water 
utilities. In most water agencies, almost 80 percent of water supply cost is fixed (overhead, debt 
service, etc.). Reduced water use resulted in revenue shortfalls because water rates were usually 
not adjusted before rationing programs were put in place. Those customers who conserved had 
their water bills reduced. Approximately 80 percent of the combined reductions in water bills 
resulted in a shortfall of the agency's revenue, because of the prevailing cost structure. 
Agencies with substantial revenue shortfalls caused by reduced water use as well as 
increased cost of operations during drought had to increase water rates. From the public's point 
of view, this was unfair. It seemed their reward for good behavior in conserving water was 
higher water rates. Rate hikes meet strong public objections during periods without drought, 
and there is no reason to expect public support for rate increases during or shortly after a 
drought. The press was not supportive either and, as in most rate hikes they were likely to 
blame the mismanagement of water utilities for cost increases. The outcome of this dilemma 
is undermined confidence of the public in their water agencies and possible reluctance to 
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conserve water in the future. The survey respondents described several cases of fiscal problems. 
Some blamed the media and the public for not understanding their cost structure and rate setting 
procedures. 
Public Support for Long-Tenn Solutions 
Survey participants had some difficulty in interpreting the implications of the excellent 
cooperation of the residents of California during the drought, with regards to public support for 
alternative solutions to the California's water supply problems. Generally, two opposing views 
were present during the interviews: an optimistic proconservation view and a pessimistic 
conservation outlook. 
The optimistic proconservation view interpreted the public response to demand reduction 
programs as demonstrated readiness to conserve during future droughts. Those who shared this 
view maintained that the drought demonstrated a significant potential for water conservation in 
urban areas. People can and will save water during future droughts, and urban water suppliers 
can build in firm drought contingency savings of 20 percent or more into their long-term water 
supply plans. Furthermore, during the drought, people learned how to conserve water and 
changed their old wasteful habits to permanently use less water. 
The pessimistic conservation outlook employed a very cautious interpretation of the 
public behavior during the drought. Those who shared this view maintained that if the urban 
public assumed the behaviors that are appropriate for crisis conditions and helped water agencies 
to get out of the crisis by making the necessary sacrifices, most water savings (except those 
resulting from installation of UL V toilets and low-flow showerheads) will disappear once the 
crisis is over. People are not likely to look forward to having to suffer the same hardships 
during future droughts. They will find out why they got into the crisis in the first place. If 
there is anything they can do to avoid a similar crisis in the future, they will pursue it. In other 
words, people will support additional water development and other permanent solutions. Several 
examples were given to support the pessimistic conservation outlook. First, some respondents 
maintained that if Californians had to vote on Proposition 9 (the construction of the Peripheral 
Canal in the Delta) in 1992 as opposed to the actual vote in 1982, the proposition would pass 
by a wide margin. Other respondents used the example of actions taken by the city of Santa 
Barbara. According to them, the hardships suffered by water users in Santa Barbara swayed the 
public's vote to approve the extension of the State Water Project Coastal Branch and the 
desalination plant. There was not enough time to look for least-cost solutions. Now Santa 
Barbara has the most costly source of water in the state, although SWP supplies and desalination 
were the least -cost feasible supply options for the South Coast. The cost of water from the 
desalting plant is about $2,000 per acre-foot if the plant operates full-time, but higher if it 
generates only during water shortage periods as is likely. The cost of water from SWP Coastal 
Branch will be between $1,200 and $1,300 per acre foot. In comparison, before the drought 
the city of San Diego used to be mentioned as paying the highest cost for water supply in the 
state. That cost was about $600 per acre-foot. The higher cost of water supply and other 
drought-related expenses more than doubled normal water rates in Santa Barbara. 
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Conclusions Concerning Public Response 
The current drought demonstrated that urban water users can cut back on water use, and 
this confirms the experiences of the 1976-77 drought. Residential and commercial users in 
urban areas are willing to curtail their normal water use during a crisis. They have a number 
of options for achieving water conservation because water is used for many purposes, some of 
which are less essential than others and can be stopped or reduced. The following conclusions 
can be drawn from the results of the interviews: 
• People are willing to conserve if certain conditions exist. The fact that urban 
dwellers gm conserve water does not automatically mean that they will. Urban 
households and businesses took actions to conserve water because they believed 
that (1) there was a severe drought, (2) their conservation efforts helped mitigate 
the adverse consequences of the drought, (3) all members of their community 
were asked to conserve and made sincere conservation efforts, (4) their personal 
actions furthering group welfare rather than self-interest would have desirable 
long-term consequences for their community, and (5) their efforts involved only 
a reasonable level of personal cost and inconvenience. 
• Drought focused public attention on water supply. When there is no drought, 
people tend to get involved in water management only when there is a rate 
increase. During the drought they focused on other issues related to water supply 
and were more willing to support solutions and investments in improvements of 
water use efficiency and water supply reliability. 
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VI. SURVEY RESULTS: WATER MANAGEMENT ISSUES 
This chapter summarizes the results of the interviews that pertain to four major aspects 
of water management during drought: (1) new developments and innovative approaches; (2) 
critical legislation; (3) timing of drought response actions; and (4) performance of water 
institutions. 
NEW DEVEWPMENTS AND INNOVATIVE APPROACHES 
The 1987-92 drought forced Californians to look for innovative solutions to both the 
immediate and long-term water supply problems. A number of new developments and 
innovative approaches surfaced during the interviews. Probably the most important development 
of the drought was the creation of the Water Bank. Other important developments mentioned 
by the respondents included: (1) the Three-Way Process negotiations; (2) signing of 
Memorandum of Understanding; (3) rescheduling of annual deliveries by CVP; (4) purchase of 
water for in-stream purposes by the Department of Fish and Game; and (5) new knowledge 
about the needs of aquatic life. In addition, several innovative approaches were tried in the 
following areas: (1) urban water conservation; (2) agricultural water conservation; (3) 
ricelands/wetlands conjunctive water use project; (4) groundwater management; and (5) 
unconventional supply alternatives (desalination and off-stream storage). 
The Three-Way Process and Memorandum of Understanding were described in 
Chapter V under the heading of Cooperation and Communication. The opinions of the survey 
participants regarding the Water Bank, rescheduling of water deliveries, purchase of water for 
in-stream purposes, and new knowledge about aquatic life are described below. 
Views on the 1991 Drought Water Bank 
Many respondents indicated that the creation of the Water Bank during the drought was 
a new development with very important implications for future water policy in the state. The 
success of the bank was so great that many institutions sought to take at least partial credit for 
its conception. Actually, the bank was masterminded by no more than a dozen professionals 
under the direction of the Director of C-DWR, David N. Kennedy, and Deputy Director Robert 
G. Potter. The impetus for bringing the bank to existence on short notice was provided by the 
Governor of California, Pete Wilson. 
Water transfers and banking are not necessarily new ideas in California. Some exchanges 
and banks existed before the drought, and there has been a lot of discussion about the need for 
a statewide Water Bank. The 1991 bank can be considered a new development, because, as one 
respondent put it, "they (C-DWR) actually did it." The creators of the bank had to cut through 
considerable red tape to make it happen. The C-DWR submitted to the SWRCB an operations 
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plan for the Water Bank that defined the legal boundaries of water transfers. The Board gave 
a tentative approval to the plan so that if the proposed transfers were within the legal permissible 
boundaries, then it was fairly easy to proceed with timely approval of the Water Bank transfers. 
According to the SWRCB, the transfers were well thought out and executed to meet the critical 
needs of the buyers and provide extra environmental benefits. 
The praises for the Water Bank and interpretation of its implications for future water 
management took several forms. One respondent stated that the success of the bank exploded 
the old "farmers will never sell" myth. In reality, farmers were very willing to sell, and bank 
purchases had to be halted after buying 850,000 acre-feet of water from willing sellers. Other 
respondents expressed similar opinions, stating that the bank taught the California's water 
community that water markets, however limited by geographies and constrained by laws and 
regulations, can work. It demonstrated the "raw power of market forces." Although mostly 
serving as a clearinghouse for water transfers, the bank was very quick to respond to the needs 
of water supply agencies. Many respondents believed that the 1991 Water Bank should also be 
reinstated in 1992. 
A significant fraction of California's future water needs can be met by letting water move 
from lower- to higher-value uses, especially during future droughts. This is the major 
implication of the success of the bank for future water policy in the state. As long as there are 
adequate facilities to store and move water throughout the state, urban water agencies as well 
as agricultural districts can plan for future droughts while counting on the availability of water 
for purchase from a future Water Bank. Because of this option there will be less pressure by 
off-stream users to develop more water. Continued use of the Water Bank is very much 
dependent on available groundwater in the transferring areas. Further, it is largely a conjunctive 
use program (if the necessary recharge is achieved), otherwise it is a "mining" program. 
Some respondents said that to establish a properly functioning Water Bank, it would be 
necessary to make improvements in water storage and transmission facilities and to change the 
existing water laws in order to protect water rights of willing sellers and better deal with the 
issues of third-party effects. The first requirement is mainly related to the Delta problems. The 
Delta is a focal point for California plumbing. Most water exports (and exchanges) either go 
through or affect the conditions in the Delta. Improvements have to be made to move water 
across the Delta in a way that satisfies water purveyors and environmental groups while 
protecting resources in the Delta. Additional storage for making more efficient use of the 
existing canals and aqueducts will also be needed. At the receiving end, water districts will have 
to build interconnections to the major distribution systems of SWP, CVP, and other aqueducts. 
With respect to the legal requirements, those who sell water have to be assured that they 
will not lose their water rights. For example, Yuba County Water Agency, which had supported 
transfers during the drought, was sued and challenged about its water rights during hearings by 
the State Board. Note that efforts to ensure in-stream flow on the Yuba River preceded the 
drought. The California Department of Fish and Game has not opposed Yuba County's sales, 
but has recommended mitigation. The SWRCB has not threatened their rights. Also, in case 
of riparian rights, "sales" of water by one riparian may affect the rights of others. Technically, 
the riparians did not "sell" their water to the Water Bank. They were paid not to use it. The 
SWP was able to pick it up in the Delta by "virtue" of its obligation to meet water quality 
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standards by reservoir releases during controlled flow conditions. Some participants from the 
agricultural sector expressed concerns about the effects of large-scale water transfers on the 
state's agriculture. Also, they were concerned that water shortages to off-stream users may be 
created by allocating more water for environmental purposes and forcing the SWP contractors 
to pay for water purchased through the bank in order to replace cutbacks in normal deliveries. 
To make it fair, water for the bank should be bought with public funds and released for 
environmental uses, while protecting the existing contracts for water delivery. As it stands now, 
SWP contractors have to pay the fixed cost (some 80 percent or normal cost for water delivered) 
without receiving any contract water. They pay extra for water purchased from the Water Bank. 
One additional economic effect of water transfers was that farmers actually made money 
by selling water and forfeiting agricultural production. Some respondents indicated that this 
procedure may have long-term impacts on the food production industry and the consumer: 
potential unemployment and higher prices. The extent of these losses depends upon the 
frequency and magnitude of water sales. 
In summary, the Water Bank was seen by survey participants as the most important new 
development of the drought. Many hoped that the bank would continue until the drought ends 
and would be organized again during future droughts. The economic impacts must be studied 
to determine future operating rules so that the bank can avoid or minimize undesired economic 
repercussions. 
Other New Developments 
Under California water law, one cannot hold water rights for in-stream use. During the 
drought, the California Department of Fish and Game (DFG) was given permission to engage 
in purchasing water for wetlands and for supplementing river flows to protect fisheries. DFG 
owns a considerable amount of land. Some land has pre-1914 water rights. The Department 
also has rights to develop groundwater, engage in conjunctive use of water, and generate water 
credits in storage. In 1992, DFG set a precedent by purchasing water rights for in-stream use 
purposes. The (Bradley) Reclamation Drought Act of 1991 and the (Seymour) Drought 
Response Bill address the mitigation of drought effects and financing drought relief activities. 
More will be said about these bills in the next section on critical legislation. 
Another new development was welcomed by agricultural water districts. The CVP 
changed its water-contracting and delivery procedures to allow "rescheduling" of water deliveries 
from one year to another. This new policy introduced the element of flexibility in deliveries and 
allowed users to keep water in storage to prepare for future upcoming shortages. 
Finally, some new developments have altered CVP procedure to safeguard salmon 
numbers, In 1992, almost 300,000 acre-feet of irrigation water were stored behind Shasta Dam 
to lower the upper-river water temperature after the winter run had spawned. Salmon need cool 
water, not exceeding 56°F, to spawn. A 6°F increase to 62°F represents 100 percent mortality 
of incubating salmon eggs. 
143 
Innovative Approaches 
The survey participants had some difficulty deciding which approaches were innovative 
in coping with drought. Most methods, devices, and practices have been known and used during 
past droughts. This drought has brought about increased use of these approaches. Below are 
brief summaries of new techniques used in several areas. 
Urban Water Conservation 
Urban water suppliers set percent water use reduction goals for each year of drought. 
For 1991, these goals ranged from 15 percent in East Bay MWD to 31 percent in the 
Metropolitan Water District of Southern California. Note, however, that with reference to 
MWD's delivery cuts (which had to match supplies), the local agencies had other supplies. The 
real deficiency seems to have been 15 to 20 percent and was helped a great deal by a very mild 
(cool) summer. For example, between June and August 1992, usage of surface water was 38 
percent greater than the same time in 1991. Goals ranging from 10 to 25 percent were set for 
1992. To achieve these goals water agencies implemented one or more water demand 
management programs. These included mandatory metered rationing, steeply inclined 
(increasing) commodity rates, distribution of water-saving devices, and enforcement by water-
waste patrols and citations or by meter disks and fines. 
Although almost all conservation techniques have been used before, some innovative 
implementation methods appeared during the drought. At the retail level, water purveyors used 
direct payments to customers for installing retrofit UL V toilets that would not have been 
installed otherwise. For distributing and installing retrofit kits (Le., showerheads and toilet 
inserts), water agencies usually had to spend large sums of money to hire contractors to conduct 
home visits and deliver the devices. An innovative approach used during the drought succeeded 
in Southern California, where kits were distributed free by grocery and fast food chains. 
At the regional level, joint multiagency advertising campaigns took advantage of the 
"news shed" phenomenon. These campaigns were designed to advise water users about 
conservation and covered a large region rather than merely local entities. The campaigns 
resulted in cost savings to individual agencies and resolved water users' confusion as to the 
applicability of conservation requests to their service area. 
Some innovative implementation methods were used by wholesale water agencies to 
encourage demand reduction by retail agencies. For example, Metropolitan Water District 
devised the Incremental Interruption and Conservation Plan consisting of stages of severity 
reaching 90 percent of "nonfirm deliveries" and 30 percent of "fmn deliveries." The program 
had incentives and penalties linked to the level of compliance. Agencies using less than their 
target quantity received an incentive payment of $99 per acre-foot of extra conservation. Any 
agency that did not meet its target quantity had to pay a penalty charge of $394 per acre-foot 
of the excess use. 
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Agricultural Water Conservation 
Survey participants representing agricultural water districts gave many examples of water 
conservation efforts taken both by water districts and by individual farmers. They stated that 
because of drought there is more drip irrigation, more sprinkler irrigation, and more laser 
leveling of fields than there used to be. 
Some participants interviewed in the agricultural sector referred to irrigation efficiency 
techniques and other quantitative scientific methods used in agriculture to promote water 
conservation. One agricultural District (Westlands Water District) indicated that it had practiced 
the Water Conservation and Drainage Reduction Program during the first two years of the 
current drought. This program provided funding to advise farmers on how to improve on-farm 
irrigation efficiency. To attain irrigation efficiency, the farmers were advised to improve their 
existing irrigation systems and their irrigation practices (Robb and Slavin 1990). 
One group of participants commented that agriculture has to communicate to the public 
and policymakers the methods of water utilization on the farm. As a result of poor 
communication regarding agricultural water use methods, the following criticism has been 
levelled at agriculture: 
• Farmers put water on the wrong crops. 
• Agriculturalists are not good stewards of the resource. 
• Farmers do not practice good irrigation techniques. 
• Farmers could easily conserve and transfer 10 percent of their normal supplies 
(the "10 percent solution"). 
The drought had created a greater awareness among the farming community of the need 
to educate the public and policymakers about water-saving techniques used on the farm. 
Ricelands/Wetiands Conjunctive Use Project 
Survey respondents representing the environmental community as well as other sectors 
often referred to the declining water levels in California's wetlands, particularly in the Central 
Valley. The impacts of reduced deliveries of developed water to agriculture revealed that in 
many areas, environmental resources are critically dependent on water deliveries to the state's 
irrigated agriculture. Many wetlands in the Central Valley are maintained by return flows from 
irrigation. These wetlands received very little water as farmers reduced water application rates 
and irrigated acreage. The drought also highlighted to resource managers, the fact that the 
flooded rice paddies in the Sacramento Valley provide a critical support to waterfowl. The 
Central Valley provides winter habitat for 20 percent of all ducks counted in the United States 
and 50 percent of all mid-winter water fowl in the Pacific Flyway (California Rice Industry 
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Association [CRIAl 1992). Because almost 90 percent of the valley's original wetlands have 
been lost, only 60,000 acres of protected wetlands support waterfowl. Additional habitat is 
provided by some 600,000 acres of rice paddies that in 1991 were reduced to 300,000 acres due 
to low water supplies. Therefore, the reduced rice production had an adverse effect on wildlife 
habitat. 
The new knowledge about the interdependence between rice production and waterfowl 
habitat led the Nature Conservancy of California (established by CRIA) to the development of 
a "ricelandslwetlands conjunctive use project." The project would: 
• Create upward of 100,000 acres of winter wetland habitat by flooding rice 
paddies in winter 
• Provide nearly 300,000 acre-feet of off-stream storage capacity 
• Provide for aquatic biodegradation of rice stubble (rather than burning stubble 
which creates air pollution problems 
• Sustain the communities and economies that have become dependent on rice 
production 
The proposed conjunctive use concept plans to set aside eventually possibly hundreds of 
thousands of acres of winter-fallow rice grounds for managed wetlands and off-stream storage 
purposes (CRIA 1992). The flooded acreage (up to a depth of six to eighteen inches) would 
begin in October or early November. The project would provide abundant high quality wetland 
food and habitat for migratory species of ducks and geese and also nongame wetland birds. 
When waterfowl populations begin to migrate back north by mid-February, the project would 
have the option of raising water levels from two to five feet on some lands for the additional 
purpose of off-stream storage. The SWP, CVP, and local water districts may be interested in 
utilizing this storage facility. Carry-over capacity of existing reservoirs can also be increased 
by using off-stream storage. If significant off-stream capacity is made available by the project, 
big mainstream reservoirs such as Shasta and Oroville could be relieved of some of their flood 
control responsibilities. In other words, the project would provide an alternative means of 
storing flood water which may allow for greater carry-over capacity in Shasta Dam. This would 
also keep Shasta water colder for a longer period of time because the water depth would be 
greater. Additionally, greater capacity and lower temperatures at Shasta would benefit spawning 
and out-migrating salmon. The ricelands/wet1ands conjunctive use project represents an 
innovative strategy in water resource management in California, triggered by the 1987-92 
drought. 
Wastewater Reclamation and Groundwater Recharge 
The drought has brought increased attention to wastewater reclamation. In Southern 
California there were 43 existing and/or under construction reclamation projects as of 1988. 
These projects will deliver about 200,000 acre-feet/year of reclaimed water to more than 100 
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sites. Some respondents have indicated that water reclamation is increasing, because the drought 
created more demand for reclaimed water. A major reclamation project is being considered for 
the wastewater produced in the San Francisco Bay area and its recharge into the overdrafted 
aquifer in the San Jose area. 
Unconventional Supply Alternatives 
Desalination is the extraction of potable water from seawater or brackish groundwater. 
Desalination of seawater became a more viable alternative during the drought. The city of Santa 
Barbara has completed the first half of a 7.5 mgd reverse osmosis (RO) plant. The city of Moro 
Bay completed the construction of a 300,000 gpd plant in 1991. Several cities and water 
districts actively pursue desalination projects. Because the cost of desalinated seawater is very 
high (up to $2,500 per acre-foot for base supply operation), in most cases this water cannot be 
used as a base urban water supply or agricultural supply. The desalination plants are likely to 
be used as insurance against water shortages and operated intermittently. Costs for brackish 
groundwater desalination are dependent on the capacity of the extraction system as well as the 
feedwater quality (range of total dissolved solids [TDS] level in saline brackish groundwater). 
Systems can be designed for individual wells or combined flows from several wells. Generally, 
desalination of brackish groundwater is a very reliable source of water supply unless the 
feedwater contains specific constituents causing problems in the desalination process. There was 
also an increase in weather modification projects operating in the state. Finally, unconventional 
water development, such as off-stream storage, received support from the environmental 
community. 
Overall, the survey participants seemed to pay very little attention to unconventional 
supply alternatives. A better management of the existing supply and water allocation issues 
seemed by far more important to them than technological innovations. 
Conclusions Concerning New Developments 
The drought forced water agencies and water professionals to seek creative solutions to 
water shortage problems. However, very few radical solutions were implemented. Instead, 
there was a greater diffusion of known technologies, and only solutions that were judged to have 
a fair chance of succeeding have been implemented. The Water Bank is a good example of the 
latter. Water transfers had been tried before, and there was a very good chance that the bank 
would work. Untried solutions, such as bringing water by tankers to Santa Barbara, were less 
likely to be implemented. Therefore, the conclusions pertaining to new developments and 
innovative approaches can be summarized as follows: 
147 
• Known and tried solutions prevailed over innovative but untested approaches. 
Development of technological innovations takes time, and more innovations are 
likely to be developed in the wake of the California drought. However, known 
and tried technologies and solutions were likely to be implemented by more water 
users and agencies during drought. 
• New approaches to water management were more important than 
technological innovations. The Water Bank and water transfers were at the 
forefront of new developments during the drought. New knowledge about 
physical systems and environmental response was gained because of the transfers. 
Also, new knowledge about the linkages between some agricultural water uses 
(e.g., rice production) and environmental resources revealed opportunities for 
improved management of environmental resources. 
CRITICAL LEGISLATION 
The present drought in California revealed various inadequacies of the existing legal 
system and stimulated more activity in the legal process. During the interviews, participants 
voiced their opinions on existing legislation, invariably expressing the critical need for legislation 
to open up the water management process in the state. Critical legislation pertaining to water 
management had been introduced during the drought at federal and state levels of government. 
The environmental sector influenced additional legislative action. The drought also brought 
issues such as water reclamation and groundwater management into focus. 
Federal Legislation 
Many interviewed water professionals indicated a need for flexibility in the water 
management process. The infamous Warren Act was referred to by many interviewees when 
they commented on the restrictive nature of certain federal legislation. As a result of the Warren 
Act, the Bureau of Reclamation could not transfer nonproject water through their facilities. In 
a time when the Water Bank had made its mark in meeting the water needs of the state, it 
seemed ironic that the Warren Act was still in existence. One respondent described it as a 
"shameful hypocrisy." The restrictions of the Warren Act were clearly demonstrated by its 
effect on the San Francisco Water Department (SFWD). A respondent indicated that almost all 
the water bought from the Water Bank gets stored in the San Luis Reservoir, and conditions in 
the Delta determine the releases from the San Luis Reservoir. The Santa Clara Water District 
could take its state project water through the federal aqueduct directly from San Luis. Then the 
South Bay would have extra capacity, and water coming in from the Delta could be diverted to 
San Francisco, thus facilitating the exchange. At the time of the interview, there were 
restrictions on making these transfers viable. Recently the Warren Act has been repealed 
bringing operational compatibility to the SWP and CVP. 
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The drought also spurred some flexibility in the USBR policy concerning CVP deliveries 
to water districts. At the beginning of the drought, the "use it or lose it" policy prevailed. 
According to this old policy, the district had to use the water within 12 months. Participants 
from one agricultural district stated that the USBR has allowed rescheduling of water since 1989. 
This policy allows the district to use water that was stored from the previous year. During times 
of drought this "extra" water becomes most useful especially during times of excessive shortage. 
Most respondents referred to the Miller, Seymour (S. 711) and Bradley (S. 586) bills as 
critical legislation. These bills were initiated because of the present drought and had been 
referred to the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. The Seymour Bill would 
provide the Secretary of the Interior with authorization to respond to the drought. For example, 
the Secretary would be able to make loans to water users for drought response activities--to 
study measures for water conservation, augmentation and efficient use and to prepare cooperative 
drought contingency plans. Additionally, this bill would authorize the Secretary of the Interior 
to establish a $10 million "Reclamation Drought Response Fund" to finance drought relief 
activities authorized by the act. With regard to the (Bradley) Reclamation Drought Act of 1991, 
the USBR, after consulting with governors of affected states, would be authorized: 
• To alleviate temporary drought conditions through management and conservation 
activities 
• To provide assistance to willing buyers and sellers of water 
• To prepare drought contingency plans for federal reclamation projects 
• To contract for storage and conveyance of project and nonproject water 
There was much negotiation and consolidation of these parallel pieces of legislation, 
which were eventually incorporated into the Miller-Bradley Bill. This bill, previously referred 
to as H.R. 429, contains 40 separate titles providing for water resource projects throughout the 
West. It is known as the Central Valley Project Improvement Act (Title 34 of Public Law 102-
575) and was signed by the President on October 30, 1992. This bill protects, restores, and 
enhances fish, wildlife, and associated habitats in the Central Valley and Trinity River basins 
of California. The provisions of this bill are summarized in Appendix A (p. A-8). 
State Legislation 
The drought provided a stimulus for a number of state legislative proposals dealing with 
water management. One respondent stated that during the sixth year of the drought, there were 
about 60 or more proposed state laws that were "out of control." More specifically, by the fifth 
year (December 1, 1991), there were 19 state bills introduced dealing with drought. These bills 
focused on issues such as drought contingency plans, drought management activities affecting 
the environment, water appropriation, development projects, safe drinking water, and drought 
relief and assistance. 
149 
Assembly Bill llx (AB llx) was a most significant piece of drought legislation 
introduced in the California State Legislature on March 21, 1991. It required all urban agencies 
in California (serving more than 3,000 customers or 3,000 acre-feet) to submit drought 
contingency plans to C-DWR by January 31, 1992. Some respondents stated that AB llx should 
have been implemented earlier, by the second year of the drought and not during the sixth year. 
Drought contingency planning should be introduced at all levels in California and should 
become a part of the state and federal system. Some respondents perceived that AB 797 (Urban 
Water Management Planning Act of 1983) and AB llx had increased the ability for public 
participation. They stated that agricultural communities have to do this too, since some water 
agencies in rural areas were unprepared to cope with the drought. However, in 1986, the 
legislature passed the Agricultural Water Management Planning Act. It requires "every 
agricultural water retailer supplying more than 50,000 acre-feet of water, if not covered by water 
conservation requirements of state and federal agencies, to report to C-DWR by December 31, 
1989, how its water is managed" (C-DWR 1987). 
The most critical form of state legislation involved water transfers and marketing that 
helped facilitate the operation of the Water Bank. Although there were differing points of view 
regarding "emergency legislation," most respondents agreed that new legislation and cooperation 
were essential ingredients to facilitate water transfers and marketing. Although none of the 
Water Bank transfers were disapproved, the drought revealed that there are too many 
institutional barriers to water transfers. Others stated that the normal process of water transfers 
is hindered by the impact of bureaucracy, which has too many agencies administratively involved 
in anyone transfer and this makes the transfer process difficult. Most respondents complained 
about the amount of "red tape" involved in transfers. Various pieces of legislation were 
referenced by interviewees pertaining to water transfers: Katz Bill, Seymour Bill, Johnston Bill, 
and the Bradley Bill. Some respondents stated that the Katz Bill was good for the sale and 
transfer of water, and in terms of economics future legislative action should pass this bill. 
Others commented that the Katz Bill authorized the transfer of riparian water rights, and that it 
was progressive, since it allowed an individual to transfer water. 
One respondent believed that the normal process of water transfers will not work and 
added that the Water Bank worked by going around the system. It was stated that the ability to 
transfer water was limited by the Delta, since there are restraints placed by the California 
Environmental Protection Act. Reference was made to the Yuba County Water Agency, which 
had supported transfers during the drought, and was sued and challenged about its water rights 
at State Board hearings. This county was not going to sell anymore water in the future. One 
respondent stated that there is a 60 percent tax on the transfer per acre-foot of water delivered 
from Northern to Southern California. This 60 percent was made up of 30 percent of carriage 
water loss in the Delta and 30 percent extortion loss to operate the river in local basins. 
Therefore, water marketing is not a solution for the future. Further comments indicated that this 
process ignores water infrastructure and third-party problems, exposes the seller to great risks, 
makes it expensive for the buyer, and is not a realistic policy. It was added that if water 
marketing was going to work, many institutional barriers would have to be removed. However, 
it was pointed out that these barriers were necessary to protect interests, to protect water rights, 
to protect third parties, and to protect competitors. 
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A number of respondents referred to the question of water rights and stated that if the 
Water Bank was going to continue, then someone had to have more control over it. Other 
respondents referred to the disputes that occurred during the drought over water rights issues and 
control of water. For example, certain agricultural users contested the rights that the district has 
over the water apportioned to farmers. 
Environmental Legislation 
The drought highlighted the fact that California needs a more equitable system for 
recognizing beneficial uses of water. In the view of the environmental community, while 
protracted debates over water transfers took place during the period, no environmental legislation 
(or other executive or administrative action for environmental protection) was implemented in 
California in response to the drought. Indeed, this is a very significant lesson of the 
drought-the impacts of the drought have fallen most heavily on the environment. These 
impacts are largely a function of water management policies and actions before and during the 
drought as opposed to the drought itself. The dramatic declines in water-dependent ecosystems 
and species during the drought graphically demonstrate the need for fundamental policy and 
management reforms to improve both equity and efficiency among all water use sectors, 
including the environment. 
The perceptions and insights shared by environmental groups interviewed, regarding the 
need for critical environmental legislation, are summarized in the discussion that follows. They 
stressed that the environment does not have a fallback position, and that baseline standards were 
inadequate to mitigate environmental impacts. The environmental sector was always low in 
allocation priorities, and the environmentalists wanted equity and fairness. Some participants 
stated that the drought proved to be a refreshing change, because the bureaucratic top-down 
approach for sharing water among in-stream and off-stream users was being reexamined. 
Water law should allow in-stream water rights that are not present now. One can work 
within the existing system of laws, but they are not sufficient, because the laws were developed 
as the western frontier developed for the use of water out of the river. In-stream water uses (in 
the river) were never part of this development, and this bias cannot be justified. It would help 
to develop the proposed water fund to purchase water for the environment and also help to have 
water rights associated with it. Furthermore, there is a need for new water laws. Changes in 
existing laws were critical because there is a need to fix the institutions in the long term. 
Otherwise, the benefits of improvement in the water management system, structural and 
non structural , may not be realized. The Department of Fish and Game was most enthusiastic 
about the legislation that would recognize in-stream water rights, thus allowing the department 
to become a participant in water allocation and management of water for fish and wildlife. One 
of the stated keynotes for the 199Os, in addition to goodwill and professionalism, was supportive 
legislation to enhance environmental quality. As mentioned, important pending legislation 
related to fish and wildlife during the drought included the Seymour Bill, the Bradley Bill, the 
Miller Bill, and the Dooley Bill. These were consolidated into the Central Valley Project 
Improvement Act. 
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The Endangered Species Act (ESA) evoked varying points of view among respondents 
interviewed. Some stated that the ESA was instituted to protect the endangered aquatic and 
other species. On the other hand, most respondents echoed frustration when referring to the 
ESA. Some perceived the ESA as the "most significant problem that the state faces, It one that 
has to be modified. The act approaches the problem species by species. It needs to look at the 
environment as a whole. Some participants believed that the ESA will magnify and extend the 
current drought. Through the ESA, some agriculturalists stated that not only were fisheries 
equated to farmers, but agriculturalists were told how to control their operations, whether or not 
it benefits the fish. They felt that certain amendments and changes were needed in the ESA to 
allow for better management for water supplies. Some questioned why fishing was being 
permitted off the coast and in the Sacramento River when the numbers of fish were so greatly 
diminished. It was also mentioned that environmental acts such as ESA, the Wild and Scenic 
Act, and forestry acts inhibit water development in mountain areas where the good water is. 
This water needed to be utilized in order to build up reliable supplies. 
Groundwater Management 
The drought had increased groundwater pumpage in the state, and it was generally 
perceived that groundwater had to be managed carefully. Some respondents indicated that within 
the CVP service area, groundwater overdrafts of 1.5 MAF took place during the fifth year of 
the drought. They stated that it was difficult to control water use in the San Joaquin Valley, 
since the situation differs from one region to another. Some have surface supply, others have 
groundwater supply, and effects fall unevenly on various areas. The respondents said that state 
legislation has been proposed to construct a plan that affects only critically overdrafted areas. 
Another group stated that there was a need for the large groundwater basins in the San Joaquin 
Valley to have mandatory groundwater management plans, with water use being monitored. The 
group indicated that only political action could avoid lengthy adjudication. Respondents 
generally perceived that statewide groundwater management was not a viable solution. At that 
time, water rights holders were permitted to pump water out of the basin for beneficial use. 
However, groundwater mining and degradation of groundwater quality could not continue 
indefinitely. One group indicated that the Katz Bill and Bill 486 had put restrictions on waste 
disposal. The legislation process would have to consider a groundwater protection policy that 
will include such programs as groundwater mapping, groundwater recharge, and conjunctive use. 
Other Legislative Issues 
The interviews also identified legislation addressing other issues. Many respondents 
stated that water reclamation projects were increasing in California. The legislative process had 
introduced AB 15x (Kelley) reclamation projects appropriating emergency state financial 
assistance of $10 million from the General Fund to the SWRCB. These loans and grants were 
to assist local water suppliers for water reclamation projects that could be completed and provide 
reclaimed water by June 30, 1992. Besides reclamation, respondents also mentioned other 
legislation related to various plumbing codes (e.g., BMPs) and water quality. 
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Conclusions Concerning Critical Legislation 
• Drought provided a test of the adequacy of existing laws and regulations. 
The drought has demonstrated how the existing laws and regulations really work. 
Inadequacies were revealed, especially those pertaining to the legality of certain 
drought response actions. The drought precipitated the resolution of longstanding 
efforts to pass environmental legislation. 
• Drought brought a danger for passing bad laws. Although drought emergency 
legislation was critical to the ability of water agencies and individuals to cope 
with water shortages, some permanent laws can be passed without sufficient 
public debate. Hearings on new laws also can be very contentious and can 
polarize major sectors of users, thus adversely affecting their cooperation in 
dealing with the crisis at hand. 
TIMING OF DROUGHT RESPONSE ACTIONS 
The success of coping with drought is critically dependent on the timing of drought 
response actions. Water controllers do not want to make unwarranted changes in normal 
operations of water supplies. At the same time, they may take some risks and postpone the 
declaration of shortages and thus the hardships of water rationing as far into the future as 
possible. 
The survey participants were asked their opinions about the timing of actions taken in 
response to the drought. The participants' views indicate that the timing of response actions of 
the majority of water agencies throughout the state is geared to the declarations and 
announcements made by the Department of Water Resources and the Central Valley Project. 
The first important decision involves the answer to the question, Are we in a drought? The 
answer is important to the public because they will eventually carry the burden and costs of 
dealing with water shortages. 
During the second year of drought, Director Kennedy of C-DWR stated that if there are 
two consecutive critically dry years in the Sacramento River basin (as measured by Sacramento 
River Index), then one may call the situation a drought. Both 1987 and 1988 water years were 
critical, and the drought became official. This criterion for declaring drought suggests that SWP 
is confident about its ability to withstand two consecutive critically dry years. This drought 
indicator is derived from the experience of the 1976-77 drought, which represented two 
consecutive critically dry water years. 
Calling a given weather anomaly a drought is not as difficult as determining whether the 
drought is over. The response actions must rely more on the expectation about the continuation 
of the drought during the next water year (as well as subsequent years) than on the water in 
storage and the severity of drought during previous years. In hindsight, the Director's prediction 
153 
was accurate in the sense that the two dry years signaled a sustained multiyear drought in the 
state. 
Once a drought is recognized, the response actions are tied to the February 15 report on 
water supply outlook. Around the first of February SWP and CVP take first snow surveys and 
prepare estimates of water supply in the coming year. The estimate of water supply is the 
trigger for deciding whether any reductions in water delivery will be made. Actually, it takes 
more than one estimate to make final decisions. Again, what is known is the amount of water 
at hand. Expectations about precipitation in the following year must be taken into account as 
well. However, once the announcement about reductions in water deliveries is made, it triggers 
actions for all affected districts and greatly influences the decisions of suppliers outside the SWP 
and CVP systems. 
The survey participants devoted significant amount of time to criticizing or supporting 
the timing of the actions made by the major water agencies. In the following sections we 
summarize the views on timing under the headings "too late," "too soon," and "right timing." 
Criticism of Actions Being Too Late 
Environmental groups criticized the actions of C-DWR to curtail deliveries as being too 
late. They maintained that while ecological resources began suffering during the first year of 
drought, SWP made full deliveries during the first three years of drought. The major cuts in 
water deliveries came too late. The SWP elected taking a higher risk decision to lower the 
reservoirs to take out water for urban and agriCUltural users. By doing so, it exacerbated the 
environmental impacts of the drought. By the fifth year, there was not much water left for 
agricultural and urban users and not enough to protect aquatic resources. 
Another type of complaint about the actions of SWP and CVP being too late was voiced 
by agricultural users. Farmers need to know well in advance how much water they will have 
next year. A large number of farmers are "farm operators" who lease land to grow crops. 
They have to make leasing arrangements and secure bank loans for seed, fertilizer, water and 
other costs no later than in December of the previous calendar year. Announcements about 
water availability made in March are too late for them. Also, increases beyond planned 
deliveries made in May only increase their frustration, because they may not have more use for 
that water. 
Very few participants representing urban water suppliers criticized SWP for delays in 
instituting cutbacks in deliveries. The late arrival of the Water Bank was more likely the subject 
of their criticism. 
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Criticism of Response Actions Being Too Soon 
No criticisms of drought response actions taken too soon were brought up during the 
interviews. The timing of the actions taken clearly indicates that the California water controllers 
did not plan for a dry water year in 1989 to follow the previous two critically dry years. 
Remember, however, that C-DWR did anticipate the possibility since the Drought Center opened 
in 1988. Also, reports and public meetings were held in the fall of 1989 to examine the status 
of supplies and develop plans for handling drought needs. 
Support for Right Timing 
In terms of the right timing of response actions, urban agencies clearly won. Both 
controllers and influencers praised urban water districts for their timely response to drought. 
The majority of urban areas called for voluntary conservation or introduced rationing programs 
as early as the spring of 1988. Most of the districts maintained restrictions throughout the entire 
period of drought, adjusting their conservation targets to fit the conditions in local and external 
supply sources. It seems that urban agencies worried very little about prematurely calling the 
situation a drought. They knew they had to declare drought in order to get the cooperation of 
their customers, and they also seemed to remember well the lessons of the 1976-77 drought. 
While there was universal support for the timing of urban response actions, the SWP 
decisions were supported only by participants from the state agencies (both controllers and 
influencers). In their opinion C-DWR Director Kennedy "did what he had to do and when he 
had to do it." He should be commended for being able to maintain full deliveries during the 
first three years of the drought and using the Water Bank to make up for deficits during the 
latter years. Some participants resented the interference in C-DWR decisions by the politicians. 
Monitoring of Drought Conditions 
Many survey participants praised C-DWR for their monitoring and timely dissemination 
of information on drought conditions. Publication of bimonthly reports on the status of water 
supply conditions and forecast updates was seen as very useful. Local water districts could 
supplement this information with data on their local conditions and make informed decisions 
about the need for action. 
Conclusions Regarding Timing of Response Actions 
Several conclusions can be drawn from the discussions on the timing of drought response 
actions. These can be summarized as follows: 
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• Early actions were justified. The 1987-92 drought demonstrated that droughts 
in California are truly unpredictable. In hindsight, taking earlier actions would 
have been warranted during both California droughts. The lesson of the 1976-77 
drought was not lost on urban water providers. They made no bets on the 
drought to be over soon. 
• Timing of cutbacks in water exports affected user sectors differently. No 
timing of cutbacks would satisfy all users of the CVP and SWP water at the same 
time. Early cutbacks to agriculture translate to certain economic impacts. Late 
cutbacks increase the risks to urban areas and preempt future options for 
protecting against environmental damages. Farmers want maximum delivery 
during a given drought year, and some are willing to receive no supplies next 
year. Urban areas would like to leave more water in storage to prevent deep 
cutbacks in deliveries at later, more critical, stages of drought. 
• Timely information on water supply conditions was invaluable to aU. Timely 
publication of the California Cooperative Snow Surveys Bulletin 120-91 was one 
of the best investments among all drought-coping measures. It allowed water 
districts to use their own discretion in making the timely and necessary 
adjustments. 
PERFORMANCE OF WATER INSTITUTIONS 
The institutions who control and influence water management in California are the main 
component of the state's water management system. During the interviews, opinions were 
collected from the respondents on the performance of federal, state, regional, and local 
institutions--both those who control water supplies and those who influence the decisions of 
controllers. Again, the aim was to identify lessons of the drought regarding the institutions. 
Below are summaries of the views of survey participants directed at specific organizations. 
California Department of Water Resources 
C-DWR criticisms came primarily from the environmental community. The criticisms 
pertaining to the delayed cutbacks in water deliveries were described in the previous section. 
Additional critical comments pertaining to the C-DWR decision making process came from the 
media and the SWP contractors. 
Decision-Making Process 
C-DWR (together with other mammoth agencies like CVP) was accused of "playing God" 
in deciding on who will suffer and how much. The Department was perceived to have a lot of 
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autonomy because it does not have to consult with the public in making important decisions. 
Such decisions are made behind closed doors, and only a filtered version of the debate and 
ultimate decisions are given to the public. One respondent wondered how it could be that if an 
individual wants to put a grocery store in a lot, his/her permit application is subject to public 
debate, but when decisions of the superagencies are affecting most of the state population, they 
are made behind closed doors. By the fifth year of drought, the public was beginning to 
understand the role and the power of the superagencies. 
State Water Project contractors also criticized C-DWR for excluding them from the 
debate about the allocation of deficiencies and many other decisions that affected them. They 
would like to have some say in establishing charges for water reallocated for environmental 
purposes and other decisions. 
Organizational Structure 
Another criticism of C-DWR pertained to its mission as the steward of the state's water 
resources. Environmental community criticized C-DWR for having confusing and contradictory 
roles. They maintained that the State Water Project overwhelmed the functions of C-DWR, 
pulling more staff and fmancial resources to SWP operations at the expense of taking care of all 
water resources in California. It is difficult to understand how good stewards of the state's 
water resources can have their loyalties with the SWP contractors and be astute water 
developers. The SWP operations take care of the contractors first, and the function of C-DWR 
in the area of managing water resources for all purposes (including protection of in-stream uses) 
is lost. 
Several participants suggested that SWP should be managed separately. At least the C-
DWR should be divided into two subagencies (or two parts): one would be a water supply 
agency overlooking operations of the State Water Project, the other would be a state water 
resources agency planning and managing water resources allover California. Some suggested 
that SWP should be separated from the state government altogether and transformed into a quasi-
governmental agency (or a corporation) to clarify its water policy and achieve more efficient 
management of the SWP water. If SWP were an independent agency, the state budget problems 
would not affect water delivery. Also, the state's lengthy procurement process would go away, 
and the necessary work could be done much faster. 
C-DWR Perspective 
Participants representing C-DWR tended to have a balanced view of their performance 
during drought. Some conveyed an impression that their hands were tied, and some decisions 
were taken away by politicians. Others felt that given that their long-term plans have not been 
fully implemented (Le., the SWP facilities are not completed), they had to perform miracles to 
keep the state economy afloat during the drought. The C-DWR provided a liaison or a vital link 
in the water management hierarchy and among controllers and influencers of water in California. 
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The C-DWR could only perform this task by adopting an objective and independent stance in 
handling water shortages. The C-DWR was the controlling factor in the successful operation 
of the Water Bank, although the process of water transfer had to go through the SWRCB. 
Conclusions Regarding the Performance of C-DWR 
Given the complexity of the decision-making process faced by C-DWR, it is difficult to 
sort out any management errors. Many of the criticisms described above could be expected and 
in all likelihood must have been expected by the Department. Yet the drought experience clearly 
offers some suggestions for improvement: 
• A clearly defined mission during the drought would have been very helpful 
for C-DWR. The Department cannot resolve all water conflicts in California. 
During a drought C-DWR has to make more controversial decisions and must be 
prepared for criticism. Californians, and especially the state's environmental 
community, expect the C-DWR to be much more than a body representing the 
interest of SWP contractors. 
• C-DWR expertise proved invaluable. Judging from the quality of C-DWR 
publications and the high professional quality of its staff, there is not a single 
other organization in the country that would have more expertise in hydrology, 
planning, water conservation, engineering, and other areas of water resource 
management than C-DWR. However, the role of the Department in assisting 
water districts and other governmental bodies in coping with the drought was not 
appreciated. Some changes are needed to rectify and clarify the situation. 
• More control, more means, and more openness would strengthen C-DWR 
performance. More control over the state's water resources, and adequate 
facilities to meet the state's water needs seem to be prerequisites for improving 
the C-DWR to do more. However, some controversial decisions can be defused 
by opening them to a public debate and obtaining a clear mandate to meet the 
state's water management objectives. 
Bureau of Reclamation and CVP 
The criticism of superagency behavior was also meant to apply to the Bureau of 
Reclamation and its operation of the Central Valley Project. The CVP controls more than twice 
as much storage as SWP and can deliver three times as much water. In addition, the Bureau 
controls the deliveries of the California's basic apportionment of 4.4 MAF of Colorado River 
supplies plus any surplus water. In fact, the presence of federal control in California's water 
management by far surpasses the role of SWP, MWD/SC, and other large agencies. Several 
issues related to CVP surfaced during the interviews. They are summarized below. 
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Takeover of CVP by the State 
Many respondents thought that the California water management system cannot be 
optimized to balance all important water needs in the state, because there is not a single agency 
controlling all developed water. Some even suggested that the Governor should appoint a water 
czar to coordinate all water operations. There were also proposals that the C-DWR assume 
operational control of the CVP, thus moving the CVP from federal to state control. 
The agricultural users of CVP water did not object to the contemplated takeover. They 
would support it as long as they would have a say in how the project would be operated and 
maintained. One respondent feared that CVP could become a state environmental project. The 
CVP is the most complex project among all the Bureau of Reclamation Projects in the nation, 
and its transfer would have to be thought out very well. The existing uses, including 
environmental and recreational benefits, would have to be preserved. 
At the time of the interviews, the Bureau of Reclamation and the State Resources Agency 
were working diligently on the feasibility of the takeover. The CVP takeover was a key point 
in the Governor's April 6 water plan. During the time of the interviews, participants indicated 
that negotiations were actively proceeding in designing an MOU by the end of the calendar year. 
Representatives of the CVP water contractors believed that in the final analysis the C-DWR and 
the Bureau will spend a lot of time and money only to find out that there is not much to be 
gained in the long run by the takeover. One respondent remembered that during the past 40 
years, this is either the third or fourth attempt by the state to take over the CVP, so chances are 
it will fail like all previous attempts. 
Environmental groups were not sure if a takeover would further their objectives. 
Although all CVP supplies affect water flows in the Delta, an environmentally sound operation 
of both projects would be required to benefit the resources in the Delta. Currently the CVP and 
SWP operations in the Delta are coordinated according to the Coordinated Operation Agreement 
COA) between the two projects. 
Departures from &tablisbed Rule Curves 
Respondents from the agricultural sector complained that the CVP did not really have a 
good concept of what would happen during a drought. During its existence, the project 
experienced only one year of drought, in 1977. The operating rule set during the 1960s defined 
firm supply as the amount of water that would be delivered (through a period like the 1928-34 
drought), with a maximum of 25 percent reduction in four out of seven years. Furthermore, 
there was to be not more than 100 percent deficiency in water deliveries in any ten-year period. 
These firm yield provisions of the CVP contracts were not followed during the fourth and fifth 
years of drought. For example, prior to the Miracle March rains in 1991, the depleted reservoir 
storage in the fifth year of the drought led to the announcement of cutbacks in CVP entitlements. 
The reduction in deliveries included: 
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• 25 percent supply to agricultural contractors 
• 75 percent supply for Sacramento River water rights holders and San Joaquin 
River exchange contractors 
• 25 to 50 percent supply to urban contractors, depending on their contracts (C-
DWR 1991b) 
Thus, the cutbacks in agriculture during the fourth and fifth years of the drought were about 50-
75 percent of normal deliveries. 
Some respondents maintained that the departure from the old rules was a result of shifting 
the CVP operations to a greater protection of urban and environmental uses. In 1977, the CVP 
storage was drawn down to 1 MAF. For 1992, CVP plans to retain 2 MAF in storage. They 
pointed out that 2 MAF of carry-over storage would support irrigation needs on 600,000 acres, 
generating in San Joaquin Valley $4 billion worth of economic activity. 
Warren Act Controversy 
Water districts not served by CVP and districts receiving both CVP and SWP water were 
very critical of the provision of the federal legislation, known as the Warren Act, which 
prohibits the use of the Bureau facilities to move nonproject water. One respondent 
characterized the act as a "shameful hypocrisy." The act was revoked in 1991 under the 
Reclamation States Drought Relief Act (H.R. 355). 
Rescheduling of Annual Deliveries 
The CVP was praised by some participants from the agriCUltural sector for changing its 
rules for making contract deliveries. Before 1991, the districts and farmers had to take all 
contract deliveries in one year or lose the unused amounts. The balance did not carry over to 
the next year. The Bureau changed the rules during the critical period of the drought and 
allowed "rescheduling" of deliveries by keeping the balance in carry-over storage. This added 
flexibility greatly assisted farmers in crop planning. 
Conclusions Regarding the Performance of CVP and USBR 
In comparison with SWP, the Bureau of Reclamation and CVP seemed to have kept a 
"low profile" during the drought, but they maintained that posture only because of overriding 
law. They accommodated water needs in the state, if possible, but were not very forthcoming. 
The criticisms of CVP, which emerged during the interviews, could be summarized as follows: 
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• Authorizing federal legislation has to be reviewed to give CVP more 
flexibility. All reclamation projects are operated according to authorized project 
purposes. Those purposes constrain the options for managing the projects to meet 
critical water needs during a major drought. 
• Environmental pressures may diminish the protection of CVP supplies offered 
by senior water rights. New developments in the environmental sector, such as 
the ESA, equates members of the agricultural and fishing community with regard 
to water allocation. This added dimension could place constraints on future 
deliveries of CVP supplies to agriculture. 
ENVIRONMENTAL AND REGULATORY ORGANIZATIONS 
State Water Resources Control Board 
The SWRC played an important role during the drought by acting on requests for water 
transfers and by monitoring compliance with, and enforcement of, water laws. The survey 
results testified to the difficult role of SWRCB. Survey participants representing various sectors 
were critical of the Board's performance. 
Critical Comments 
The Board was criticized for its "lack of role" and its constant lamenting about what its 
role was. That role could not be determined to the satisfaction of all interested parties. The 
Board held hearings in order to put together a plan on how and when water management 
institutions should change their operations and make allocation decisions. However, the plan 
that was developed as a result of those hearings was very controversial and was not 
implemented. 
Both urban and agricultural users of water become very nervous when their water rights 
are under review. The Board was under pressure by the environmental community to look at 
water rights in order to determine whether the public trust values are being preserved. During 
the ongoing process of developing interim standards for the Delta, the Board asked the water 
users to explain how they are putting water to beneficial use. They also wanted to know what 
can be done to improve declining public trust values. Agricultural water rights holders suspected 
that the Board was actually trying to improve the reliability of urban water supplies and satisfy 
environmental needs at the expense of agricultural supplies. 
Finally, the Board was also characterized as an "impediment" to water transfers because 
current staffing could not handle the amount of requests for transfers and the work associated 
with facilitating them. It should be noted that no transfer proposals failed. 
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The SWRCB View 
The SWRCB is well aware of its difficult role in administering water rights in California. 
Water transfers are one tool used in dealing with the effects of the drought. However, by no 
means are they the answer to water management. During the drought, all transfers that came 
before the SWRCB were approved, and with very minor exceptions, all of the water approved 
was actually transferred and put to beneficial use. As expected, not everyone was happy with 
the provisions of all the transfer approvals. The SWRCB must balance the competing needs for 
limited water supplies and act on transfers in a way that protects holders of water rights as well 
as in-stream beneficial uses. 
Conclusions Concerning the Criticism of SWRCB 
It seems fair to say that the drought and especially the large number of water transfers 
created extreme demands for Board decisions. Ensuring the compliance with the complex 
system of water laws to allow water transfers is not an easy matter. One conclusion is: 
• The Review Process has to be accelerated without compromising the 
requirements of the law. Some improvements have already been accomplished 
by passing state legislation (AB lOx) in 1991 that declares that no temporary 
transfer of water under any provision of law for drought relief in 1991 or 1992 
will affect any water rights. The drought focused attention on the Board's 
difficult role of the protector of public trust values, thus increasing the sensitivity 
of the Board's decision-making process. 
Environmental Community 
A considerable amount of time during the interviews was given to allow participants to 
voice concerns and anxieties pertaining to the environmental community and environmental laws 
and regulations. The intensity of the discussions was the highest among the participants 
representing agricultural interests. Urban suppliers seemed to have moderated their initial 
reactions and no criticisms were made by governmental resources agencies (both state and 
federal). 
Complaints against the Environmental Community 
Many participants made statements that environmental interests and environmental 
institutions stopped or slowed down a number of water projects throughout the state. The 
drought crisis is a direct result of not being able to build enough water storage and conveyance 
facilities because of that opposition. 
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One respondent representing agriculture stated that environmental groups can generally 
be separated into a "reasonable" faction and the "unreasonable" faction. While the reasonable 
faction seems to understand the needs of agriculture, the unreasonable component aims at 
shutting down the California agriculture at any cost. The unreasonable faction holds the farmers 
hostage and gradually puts them out of business, resulting in more water and land for the 
environment. The respondent noted that the unreasonable faction in the environmental 
community is making a stand against the farmers although the environmentalists have no relevant 
constituency and no economic accountability. 
Some respondents complained that the environmentalists advocating water transfers were 
putting constraints on pumping and on the export systems. They stated that the 
environmentalists express the need for more outflows through the San Francisco Bay facilities 
for fisheries. This can be achieved by putting constraints on the export pumping from the Delta 
on both the SWP and the CVP. However, some respondents believed limited water amounts 
could be transferred from north to south with current restrictions put on the Delta and the export 
systems by Interim Standards Decision for the Delta by SWRCB. 
Complaints against Environmental Legislation 
The federal Endangered Species Act and the state Threatened and Endangered Species 
Act received complaints and criticisms coming primarily from the agricultural sector. Several 
respondents stated that these laws had been enforced in a piecemeal manner, with the result that 
water development in California was stopped. Furthermore, they viewed these laws as being 
flawed because they provided no balance; one species can be preserved at the expense of others. 
The law should consider all species at the same time. 
The Point of View of the Environmental Community 
One of the main objectives of the environmental community in California is to reform 
water laws and water institutions so that there is no discrimination against environmental uses 
of water. The existing water law requirements were developed, along with the development of 
the western frontier, for the use of water out of the streams and rivers. In-stream water uses 
were never a part of this development. This neglect cannot be justified, and a water law reform 
will be needed to allow in-stream water rights. 
There is a need for equity and fairness in water allocation. Environmental respondents 
agreed that this drought provided a long-awaited opportunity for the environmental sector to 
become part of the allocation process. 
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Conclusions Regarding the Criticism of the Environmental Community 
During the drought, the environmental community seemed to have gained significantly 
more attention and a greater degree of consultation on water management issues. Environmental 
interest groups are now an active player at the negotiating table and have a profound influence 
on water management in California. The influence of the environmental group has already 
impacted the agricultural and urban sectors through the Three-Way Process. Therefore the 
conclusions are: 
• The drought permitted the environmental community to influence water 
management decisions in the state. Although the environmental community has 
demonstrated its ability to block water development projects before the 1987-92 
drought, they were able to enter into negotiations and consensus building with the 
urban and agricultural sectors during the drought. 
For example, Mono Lake Committee has been actively involved in the protection 
of environmental interests related to water issues during the drought. In addition, 
this organization is involved with water-marketing proposals and public 
conservation education. During the fifth year of the drought, Mono Lake 
Committee was active in helping to execute the replacement of 15,000 acre-feet 
of water from the Los Angeles groundwater basin with water purchased from 
MWD at seasonal rates. This water, which would help create a park, was to be 
injected into the ground as part of the conjunctive management scheme. The 
group stated that this will be a recreation and flood control project for the city of 
Pasadena. This example illustrates the spirit of consensus between the 
environmental and urban communities in the transfer of water. 
Aside from drought-related developments, the environmental community will 
likely continue to have an active and powerful role in California water 
management. 
• Governmental agencies responsible for environmental resources played an 
important role in water management. The California Department of Fish and 
Game (DFG) played a pivotal role in leading the state efforts to preserve the 
state's aquatic resources. DFG played an important advisory role to water 
agencies (including SWRCB, C-DWR, USBR, Department of Energy [DOE], the 
Department of Parks and Recreation, and the u.s. Army Corps of Engineers) 
pertaining to the movement of water and need for releases to protect aquatic life. 
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Vll. INITIATIVES AND REFORMS 
This chapter summarizes the views of the survey participants on actions that should be 
taken to enhance the ability of the state's water management system to cope with future 
droughts. We asked the interviewees and group interview participants for their opinions on what 
should be done to improve water management in California. We counted more than 170 
suggestions of initiatives and reforms that need to be considered. A listing of various 
suggestions is included in Appendix D. A majority of them stem directly from the experiences 
of participants (and others) during the 1987-92 drought. 
The suggestions for changes are presented under four broad categories: (1) water policy 
initiatives at the state level (including federal involvement); (2) agriCUltural initiatives and needs; 
(3) urban water management; and (4) environmental protection. Each category addresses the 
needed changes to those who are expected to implement them. 
SUGGESTED STATE POLICIES AND INITIATIVES 
For the most part, the suggestions were directed at the Department of Water Resources, 
the state government, and the u.s. Bureau of Reclamation. The suggested changes and 
improvements revolve around several key issues which are described below. 
Solving the Delta Problem 
In almost every interview, the respondents indicated that some of the issues surrounding 
the Delta must be resolved. Generally, respondents agreed that physical improvements in the 
Delta are needed to achieve more efficiency in moving water stored in the Sacramento-San 
Joaquin basin to the south. During low flows, only a portion of water released from the 
upstream reservoirs can be pumped out for exports because the pumping operations cause 
migration of salt water from the San Francisco Bay toward the pumps. This reverse flow results 
in the increase in salinity of the exported water and affects the freshwater supplies for most off-
stream users in the Delta and water quality for urban uses and for aquatic life. 
Generally, the survey participants agreed that the Delta problem has to be resolved using 
a balanced approach in which the additional facilities are built and operated. The facilities 
would not only allow more exports to the south, but also enhance and maintain water quality in 
the Delta. There is a need for a "socially accepted" water quality control plan for the estuary. 
The hydrology of the Delta is very complex, and the current operations are not supported by any 
scientific models. Instead, they are based on experience with reverse flows. Interviews revealed 
that water professionals (engineers, hydrologists, biologists, and others) know how to solve the 
problem on the technical level, but political will is needed to approve the necessary construction. 
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There were many other suggestions on how to approach the planning. Several 
respondents also suggested that the long-term planning for drought protection cannot be isolated 
from policies aimed at controlling population growth in the state, especially the policies aimed 
at in-migration. As one respondent put it, "there should be some way for the federal 
government to realize that unlimited immigration into the United States is playing havoc with 
California because 75 percent of foreign immigrants wind up in California or Florida." By 
2010, the state population is projected to increase by approximately 8 million people. This is 
a critical concern in preparing long-term water supply plans. 
Water Management and Allocations 
Many suggestions of survey participants pertained to the allocation of the state water 
resources for various uses and for various activities. Selected suggestions within the 
management category are listed below: 
• A holistic approach to the management of state water resources is needed to 
increase the availability of water through all possible means. This includes 
weather modification, reclamation, groundwater recharge and conjunctive use, 
desalination, and optimization of all operations. 
• Water management should combine resource values with economic principles to 
satisfy water needs in the state by following the example of the electric energy 
industry. A rigorous analytical process should be employed in water management 
decisions. 
• The state should cut down on the amount of firm hydroelectricity production 
during drought to make water available for environmental uses. Investments 
should be made in bulk energy transfer facilities to take advantage of imported 
power. 
• The state should look into groundwater regulation. Large groundwater basins in 
San Joaquin Valley should be managed possibly by self-regulation of users. More 
work on groundwater storage and mapping of aquifers is needed. 
• Water management in the state should be centrally coordinated. At the minimum, 
the communication and cooperation between state and federal agencies should be 
improved. More preferable would be a transfer of CVP operational 
responsibilities to the state. The Governor should appoint a water czar to manage 
resources with enough power to cut through unproductive water politics. 
• General policy reform and consensual solutions should be emphasized in trying 
to change water management in the state. The Governor needs to "twist some 
arms" in the agricultural sector in order to make the Three-Way Process more 
productive. 
168 
• A massive public information and education program is needed to educate 
Californians about water issues and drought in order to gain public support for 
the proposed reforms in water management. 
• The state should develop a computerized data bank containing comprehensive 
water-planning and management information. The database should be continually 
updated and made available to water agencies. 
In addition to these management approaches, the respondents made numerous comments 
pertaining to water allocation in the state. Most of these suggested that more water should be 
allocated to environmental uses and that allocation should be fair (or equitable) to all sectors. 
Some respondents advocated prioritizing water uses in the state and using the system of priorities 
in allocation decisions. Environmental resources agencies want water allocation on "more 
equitable basis" so that in-stream flows for fisheries, water deliveries to wetlands, and other 
environmental purposes are brought into the allocation process. They want to be given the same 
consideration as the urban and agricultural users of developed water. 
Institutional Change 
The environmental community called for institutional change, including the reform of 
existing agencies as well as water laws and regulations. Their major points pertaining to the 
reform of water institutions can be summarized as follows: 
• Water law in California should be revised to allow for in-stream water rights. 
One participant who represented environmental interest believed that above-the-
minimum natural flows in many California rivers will exist only as long as the 
urban or agricultural users do not need them. They will develop more storage 
and perfect water rights to capture these flows. In-stream water rights would 
protect some natural flows. The existing system of water law protects off-stream 
uses. 
• Water quality and minimum-flow standards established by EPA and SWRCB are 
not adequate for restoring and protecting environmental resources. The 
environmental community proposes that the existing standards be considered as 
"baseline" only and should be supplemented by mitigation of impacts on aquatic 
resources with water set aside for that purpose. 
• It concerns the environmental community a great deal that the existing water 
management institutions such as SWP and CVP are loyal simply to their clients 
(Le., water districts with contracts) and not to protecting public trust values. 
Because of this loyalty, these institutions will discriminate against environmental 
uses of water because the latter impede their ability to serve their clients. State 
water management institutions should be given a clear mandate to manage all 
water resources in the state in a well-balanced way without discriminating against 
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specific uses. A greater role of these institutions in protecting public trust values 
is needed. 
Participants representing the state and federal agencies shared some suggestions for 
institutional change but were less demanding with respect to "equal treatment" of all uses. 
However, they also would like to have a clear mandate from California voters to protect public 
trust values. As one respondent put it, "more good will, professionalism, and supportive 
legislation could go a long way toward enhancing environmental quality in the state." 
On December 9, 1992, the SWRCB released a draft Interim Water Rights Decision, 
"Decision 1630, Water Quality Objectives and Flow Requirements" (0-1630), for public review, 
to complement their 1991 Salinity Control plan. In many respects, this proposed action is the 
epitome of a lesson learned because it addresses the many environmental concerns heretofore 
not addressed. The Bureau of Reclamation (USBR) and the C-DWR shall maintain water quality 
conditions and flow rates in the channels of the Delta and Suisun Marsh equal to or better than 
the standards set forth in D-1630. This task may be accomplished by: 
• Reduction of diversion at the pumps in the southern Delta 
• Release of natural flow or water in storage 
• Operation of the Delta Cross Channel gates 
• Other measures or combinations of the above and other measures 
The USBR shall maintain the standards set in Decision 1630 for pulse flows in the San Joaquin 
River at Vernallis. 
The draft Interim Decision 1630 laid down guidelines governing water use. These 
include: 
• Diversion and use of water from the watershed of the San Joaquin River by 
specified water rights holders 
• Reservoir releases by water rights holders on the Mokelumne and Calveras rivers 
and their tributaries 
• Repayment for pulse flows on the Sacramento and San Joaquin rivers 
• Diversion and use of water for urban uses by specified water rights holders 
• Using runoff forecasts with no less than 9O-percent and 95-percent probabilities 
of exceedence by C-DWR and USBR, respectively, for determining initial water 
delivery commitments 
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• Establishment of the Bay/Delta Estuary Water Project Mitigation Fund for the 
purpose of improving fish and wildlife conditions in the Bay/Delta Estuary and 
in its watershed 
• Monitoring in the Bay/Delta Estuary to be conducted by the C-DWR and USBR 
• Role of Executive Director in determining additional information requirements 
from specified water rights holders 
• Granting of variances by the Executive Director to the C-DWR and USBR 
regarding fishery standards laid down in D-1630 
• Ensuring the continuous real-time monitoring (from February through June) by 
C-DWR and USBR to detect the presence of salmon smolts and striped bass eggs 
and larvae in the Sacramento River upstream of the Delta Cross Channel gates 
• Terms and conditions in Decision 1485 that are rescinded or shall remain in effect 
Since the release of D-1630, several natural and regulatory events have occurred which 
diminish the urgency of adopting an interim water rights decision. Additionally, the SWRCB 
has received feedback and comments on D-1630 which it has carefully considered. Many of the 
comments recommended changes and also that the SWRCB prepare an Environmental Impact 
Report (EIR) and conduct further hearings before adopting a decision. "The comments include 
a letter from Governor Wilson asking the State Water Board to return to the effort of 
establishing permanent standards for protection of the Delta. Consequently, the State Water 
Board will not consider adopting D-1630 as an interim measure, nor will it consider any 
alternative water right decision until it has prepared environmental documentation under Public 
Resources Code Section 21000 et seq. and has conducted further hearings" (SWRCB 1993). 
Generally, many respondents called for more state action in reforming the existing water 
management system in California. Greater attention to environmental issues, management of 
groundwater resources, and more state control over the developed water were among the most 
important needs for change. 
AGRICULTURAL INITIATIVFS 
Many suggestions for improvements in water management were directed specifically 
toward the agricultural sector. The suggestions that came from governmental institutions and 
statewide associations representing agricultural interest are listed below. The suggestions 
furnished by governmental institutions focused on drought impacts on the district financial 
situations and the hardships suffered by farmers. 
• More conservation know-how and technology should be infused into California 
agriculture. Research and development in improving the efficiency of irrigation 
water use should be continued. Farmers should be advised and educated on how 
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to use less water, what kinds of machinery to use, and how to manage labor in 
order to produce efficiently. 
• Agricultural water districts should be more flexible and should adjust their water 
delivery schedules (frequency and duration) according to the requirements for 
optimal water application on the irrigated crops. They should also improve their 
public relations by clearly communicating the purposes for which water is used 
in their districts and the degree of efficiency they were able to achieve (in water 
distribution and crop application). 
• Other agriCUltural water districts should learn from Westlands Water District how 
to manage water supplies efficiently. All water should be metered and the 
districts should pursue conjunctive use and groundwater recharge programs to 
eliminate groundwater overdraft. 
• The state or other governmental entities should develop a system of adequate 
economic incentives to encourage more farmers to adopt innovative and efficient 
irrigation technologies. 
The agricultural organizations interviewed praised the farmers and certain agricultural 
districts for their ingenuity and initiative demonstrated during the drought. Some of the 
innovative efforts demonstrated by Westlands Water District included the following: 
• All canals were lined. 
• District utilized underground piped delivery. 
• Deliveries are through allotment. 
• Water was metered. 
• District utilized sophisticated computer systems to maximize water use in the 
district. 
• District had analogous practices to BMPs in urban areas. 
• District has co-funded farmers to do studies on irrigation and water efficiency 
techniques. 
URBAN WATER MANAGEMENT 
A number of general and specific suggestions were made regarding the management of 
water in urban areas. We grouped these suggestions under the general categories: (1) reliability 
of urban water supplies and long-term planning; (2) design, implementation, and enforcement 
of demand reduction programs; and (3) growth control. 
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Long-Tenn Planning and Reliability 
Respondents who represented urban water controllers often emphasized the need for long-
term planning for drought protection and the need for overall improvement of reliability of urban 
water supplies. The term reliability is used in California to describe the continuity of water 
supply at adequate levels during periods of drought and other situations such as an earthquake. 
Urban areas do not want to risk large shortages in their water supplies that would paralyze urban 
economies. In practice, the reliability means that if SWP contracted with a district for a certain 
quantity of water to be delivered on a firm basis, then SWP should deliver this amount during 
drought years. If the deliveries are not reliable, then urban water suppliers do not know where 
they stand and how much effort and money they should devote to fmding and developing local 
sources and other supply- and demand-side alternatives. 
Several other suggestions of the participants for better planning for protection against 
future droughts include: 
• Water agencies should develop very clearly defined carry-over storage goals and 
adhere to them. They should utilize emergency supplies, for example, if the 
projected storage falls below the goal. 
• Water districts should build interconnections with neighboring districts and tie 
into the California "plumbing system. " 
• Preparations should be made for an extreme-drought scenario, and standby 
supplies such as desalination should be considered as a part of such preparations. 
Also, a resiliency to drought should be built into long-term plans to prepare for 
a sustained drought lasting more than seven years. 
• Long-term plans should be more sophisticated and should place more emphasis 
on alternatives with supply flexibility such as water marketing and water transfer 
agreements. 
• Urban water providers should adopt criteria for the allowable levels of shortage 
during droughts and then plan and conduct their water resources programs to 
meet the adopted reliability criteria. 
• Some degree of political involvement is needed in formulating water supply 
policies at the county and city levels and local water district boards. 
These suggestions can simply be summarized by saying that urban water suppliers should 
do significantly more planning for dealing with future droughts and enhance their preparedness 
to respond to water shortages. Environmental community is calling for including "planned 
shortages" into urban long-term water supply plans. Urban suppliers are reluctant to agree to 
this concept because an "arbitrary level" of supply deficit may not be optimal in terms of the 
long-term cost of coping with droughts. The deficit planning also nullifies the "extra cushion" 
always present in supply plans that may be seen as part of supply reliability. 
173 
Significant progress toward better planning has already been made in California, thanks 
to state legislation that requires many urban water providers to prepare and submit urban water 
management plans every five years to C-DWR (AB 797). This legislation has been amended 
by AB llx to include a detailed drought contingency plan for meeting various deficit levels up 
to 50 percent. 
Demand Reduction Programs 
Urban water supply agencies have learned many valuable lessons from their efforts to 
reduce water demands during the drought. Two examples: 
• Water rationing should be done through pricing because it is the best way of 
achieving reductions in demands without causing revenue shortfalls. Rationing 
without price increases undermines customer confidence when rates have to be 
increased to balance revenues. 
• Local agencies should join in sponsoring mass media public information 
programs. The messages and announcements of rationing requirements should 
be made jointly, using common definitions so that the confusion of water users 
is minimized. Such cooperation will also save money on purchasing "air time." 
The respondents offered a number of suggestions on "how to do it right." Selected suggestions 
of demand reduction programs are listed below: 
• Water district representatives should improve methods to communicate water 
supply situations in the district to the media. They should communicate clearly 
what their water needs are, how much supply is available, what the expected 
shortages are, and what they want to accomplish through their demand reduction 
program. They should also specifically inform civic leaders, their large 
customers, and all customers as often as possible. 
• The general public should be educated to stop believing that unlimited water is 
their God-given right, and also that a drought is not a sufficient excuse for water 
shortages affecting their lifestyles. 
Several participants were very critical of the demand reduction programs used by water 
supply agencies. One respondent believed that urban suppliers should free themselves from the 
"psychosis of irrational rationing." Urban users could afford, and should be able to buy, all 
water they needed at prices much below the cost of severe mandatory rationing in urban areas. 
The "green industry" was also very critical of the inability of urban water supply agencies 
to design rationing programs that would not automatically put all landscape contractors out of 
business. The participants from the "green industry" suggested that rationing plans should be 
based on an allocation of reasonable water amounts in combination with inverted block rate 
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structures to force urban users to use water very efficiently. They were strongly opposed to 
outright bans on landscaping or irrigation through overhead watering "until the drought is over. " 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
The 1987-92 drought pushed already degraded ecosystems and populations to the brink 
of collapse in California. Actions taken to ameliorate these conditions were transfers by the 
Department of Fish and Game via the Water Bank and much discussion of environmental 
problems. A simple message that "water is not free because it has tremendous value in the 
stream or river" seems to have been accepted by the majority of Californians. The interviews 
revealed great support for allocation of water supplies for environmental protection. Urban and 
agricultural interests recognized environmental needs for water supplies. However, the most 
important development during the drought was that the three sides were willing to talk and 
compromise using the Three-Way Process. The three major water-user groups in California 
(agriculture, urban, and environment) formed the Three-Way Process to address the issue of 
water shortage in the state. All three groups have recognized the need to work together in 
meeting their own water needs as well as satisfying common interests of all major groups. 
The Three-Way Process 
Several suggestions were made during the interviews on how the Three-Way Process 
should be expedited and on what is causing holdups in the negotiations. 
• People who sit at the negotiating table and make decisions should devote more 
energy to convincing their constituencies to accept their decisions. 
• The three sides should make an extra effort to reach a consensus and stop 
blocking the actions of each other (which, as history shows, they can do very 
effectively). 
• Urban and agricultural sides should address environmental problems and improve 
the conditions of aquatic resources, because it will serve their interests. 
• Agricultural negotiators have to convince the farmers to deal with environmental 
and urban sectors through consensual ways. 
• All three sectors should make more efficient use of water resources that they 
currently have. 
• The Three-Way Process is important to all sides for finding solutions to the Delta 
problem and other issues, because the political process has failed in this task. 
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The Governor's proposed Delta decision-making process can lead to a recommendation which 
can be politically salable. 
Completion of SWP 
The current users of SWP water and the SWP operators indicated that the ability of SWP 
to satisfy water needs is dependent on the completion of SWP facilities as planned, including 
more water development in the Sacramento-San Joaquin basin. The solutions in the Delta will 
increase fmn SWP supplies, but additional storage will be needed to reach the planned firm 
supply of 4.2 MAF. The present dependable supplies of SWP are 2.3 MAF. 
Some participants representing agricultural users of SWP water indicated that the 
completion of SWP facilities may not be possible. This is because they do not have the funds 
and would be unwilling to invest in SWP. During the drought, the users found that SWP 
supplies were not reliable and were unlikely to become more reliable for them in the future. 
They maintained that SWP water is becoming too expensive to be used by agriculture. 
Although, in part, this is political rhetoric and resentment caused by the deep cutbacks of 
deliveries to agriculture, the fiscal difficulties of agricultural water districts are real. 
Water Bank and Transfers 
Almost all respondents considered the Water Bank an important and very useful 
development of the drought. The following suggestions pertaining to the Water Bank and water 
transfers were made by the participants: 
• A state Water Bank should be institutionalized and become a permanent part of 
the water management system, including normal supply year operations. 
• All institutional barriers to water transfers should be removed during drought 
(such as the issue of water rights held by water districts or users, federal 
subsidies, restrictions on movement of water through federal facilities) except for 
those that protect against third-party impacts and negative environmental 
externalities. 
• A Water Bank office should be established as a broker for water transfers 
independent of the C-DWR and SWP. 
• A streamlined approval process for all water transfers should be developed. 
• Water marketing and transfers should be developed as a viable alternative through 
new legislation and more institutional cooperation. 
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Some respondents representing agricultural districts were concerned about losing their 
water supplies to the environment and urban areas because of the Water Bank. However, others 
believed that if "enough money is put on the table," agriculture can find significant amounts of 
water for sale. As long as the effects of water transfers on water rights holders are safeguarded 
or compensated and the transfers are not made at the expense of environmental degradation, the 
Water Bank is a viable alternative for many water shortage problems in the state. However, it 
must be noted that the frequency and duration of bank operations will affect the amount of water 
it can make available. 
Long-Term Drought Planning 
Many respondents expressed the opinion that water management in California should 
move away from crisis management to long-term planning. Various suggestions on the 
important elements of the planning process were made. Selected suggestions are listed below: 
• Californians should establish priorities for alternative uses of water during 
droughts and be prepared to sacrifice some uses during times of water supply 
shortages. 
• The state should look at pricing of developed water and eliminate the existing 
large differences in the cost of water in order to create greater conservation 
incentives for all users. Marginal cost pricing should be incorporated into long-
term water plans. 
• The cost of water supplies for environmental resources has to be determined, and 
these supplies have to be acquired at taxpayer expense. 
• The state should develop a mechanism that triggers drought response actions 
automatically without a lengthy and contentious legislative process. 
• Long-term planning should focus on alternatives such as water banking and 
marketing, off-stream storage, conjunctive use of surface water and groundwater, 
water reclamation and desalination, and long-term water conservation in 
agriculture and urban uses. 
• Equitable long-term ways of protecting environmental resources in the state must 
be found. 
• Long-term water supply plans should have an optimal level of drought protection 
(supply reliability) built into them. 
• The Three-Way Process and other such consensus processes should be relied upon 
in building a consensus behind the long-term plan. 
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• The Three-Way Process should use professional leadership and seek help in 
employing the techniques of alternative dispute resolution (ADR). 
It is difficult to predict whether the Three-Way Process will be successful. At the time 
when the interviews were conducted, the environmental and urban sides tended to be optimistic 
about the process, while the agricultural side was somewhat reluctant and often frustrated. 
Environmental Needs 
Participants affiliated with the environmental community offered suggestions for an 
improved water management system and environmental qUality. These are: 
• A flexible system of water management is needed with more fairness toward 
environmental uses of water so that the environment does not suffer the most 
during future droughts. 
• Environmental impacts need greater public recognition and some equitable ways 
of protecting the environment must be found. 
• Environmental quality standards must be revised in order to better protect aquatic 
resources during periods of extended drought. 
• The quality of water in tributaries in the upstream portions of major rivers needs 
to be improved. 
• Firm supplies of water are needed for the existing wetlands. 
• A water fund should be established to purchase water for environmental purposes. 
• Water institutions should not discriminate against the environment. 
• In the Delta, along with the improved reliability of urban supplies, environment 
should be brought along, and all water use purposes should be optimized. 
In summary, the environmental community would like to achieve a better position for 
negotiating environmental needs for water. The environmental interests coupled with existing 
environmental regulations were able to effectively stop almost all water development in the state. 
Apparently the drought has convinced all sides that future stalemates in solving water problems 
will hurt all sides. 
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SUMMARY OF NEEDS AND SOLUTIONS: THE GOVERNOR'S THREE-YEAR PLAN 
The most important and immediate need is, according to one respondent, that "the state 
of California needs to talk, do some thinking ahead, and look at water issues collectively." 
Once the three sides reach a consensus on future water policy in the state, most problems can 
be solved quickly. On April 6, 1992, the Governor unveiled a plan for "Ending California 
Water Wars." The following is a summary of the major points of the Governor's plan. 
The Governor envisioned a comprehensive, balanced, long-term water policy supported 
by interim short-term measures. The drought demonstrated that creative solutions are possible 
to handle water shortages, and these solutions should be continued and enhanced in the future. 
Examples of these developments include the following: 
• The Governor was confident that mutual cooperation among the urban, 
agricultural, and environmental groups through the Three-Way Process would 
help meet the following objectives by 2010: (1) safe and reliable water supplies 
for municipal and industrial uses in urban areas, (2) sufficient long-term water 
supplies at a reasonable cost for agricultural areas, with dry-year groundwater 
reserves where feasible, and (3) protection of threatened and endangered species 
in the environmental sector as well as the restoration and protection of fish and 
wildlife resources and aquatic habitat. 
• There is an urgent need to fix the Delta. The Governor indicated that a council 
comprising members from the urban, agricultural, and environmental sectors 
would be responsible for providing guidance to the planning and decision making 
in future water management. This committee would be assisted by a separate 
technical advisory panel to ensure that equity and fairness prevail in meeting the 
needs of the urban, agricultural, and environmental sectors. The overall intention 
was the development of a scientific long-term solution to ensure the protection for 
the Bay-Delta Estuary. Certain immediate short-term actions were necessary in 
the south Delta for restoration of the environment and improvement of water 
supply. The Governor called for the California Environmental Protection Agency 
(CAL-EPA) and the SWRCB to continue working in coordination with the federal 
EPA in developing interim water quality standards by the end of 1992. These 
interim actions included (1) construction offlow-control barriers, (2) enlargement 
of some channels, and (3) utilizing new pumps to shift pumping to winter months. 
The SWRCB held hearings and studies during the summer and fall and issued a 
draft Interim Standards decision on November 24, 1992. 
• Off-stream storage should be pursued, since it does not conflict with the 
environmental goals and offers a more viable proposition than conventional dams. 
Additionally, other forms of storage were being evaluated. These include using 
rice fields for storage in wetlands in the Sacramento Valley and using islands as 
storage reservoirs and possible waterfowl habitat in the Sacramento-San Joaquin 
Delta. 
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• The CVP should come under state control, and the Governor identified a 
negotiating team to work out a transfer plan over six months. 
• The Water Bank: demonstrated the power of market forces. Water marketing 
should be expanded in future water management. However, water transfers 
should not adversely affect groundwater resources, fish and wildlife, and rural 
communities. The Water Bank concept should be extended on a regional role to 
develop an interstate Water Bank. The Governor pledged his support of 
legislation regarding water transfers provided it met the following criteria: (1) 
water transfers must be voluntary; (2) water transfers must not be harmful to fish 
and wildlife resources and their habitats; (3) water transfers must not cause 
overdraft or degradation of groundwater basins; (4) entities receiving transferred 
water should prove that they are using water efficiently such as, carrying out 
BMPs and water efficiency practices; and (5) water rights holders of contracted 
water should play a decisive role in determining what is done. 
• Water recycling and reclamation should be increasingly utilized in the future, 
since it provides reliable supplies for agriculture, greenbelts, recreation, and 
industrial uses. 
• Desalination of brackish groundwater is cost-effective in certain parts of the state, 
including some areas in the San Joaquin Valley and Southern California. 
The Governor's plan confirms most of the points of view expressed by the survey 
participants on actions that should be taken to cope with future droughts. The Governor's plan 
focuses on a long-term comprehensive water policy supported by interim short-term measures. 
The Governor also emphasized mutual cooperation through the Tbree-Way Process and the need 
to fix the Delta. His plan addressed off-stream storage, the future controlling body of the CVP 
and expanding water transfers in the future. Finally, his plan emphasized other viable 
alternatives for increasing future water supply, and including water recycling and reclamation 
and desalination of brackish water. 
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vm. SYNTHESIS OF LESSONS LEARNED 
The first part of this report provided background information on the economy and water 
resources of California and a detailed description of the events of the 1987-92 drought. The 
views of survey participants on drought management were summarized in the preceding three 
chapters. This chapter presents the conclusions of this study together with relevant background 
information. It also includes a description of the management and decision-making environment 
for drought planning and policy in California prior to the drought. Important lessons for water 
management and planning stem from relevant experiences of individuals who control or influence 
water management in the state. These experiences and lessons were identified by analyzing the 
contents of 34 field interviews with 101 individuals representing 57 organizations. Our synthesis 
of lessons learned includes information from the previous chapters as well as additional 
observations of survey participants on the relevant lessons of the drought. 
DEFINITION OF LESSONS LEARNED 
The study was designed with a broad definition of "lesson learned" in mind. We 
encouraged study participants to look retrospectively on their experiences during the drought and 
provide us with answers to such questions as "What worked and what did not work?" and "What 
needs to be changed, preserved, or done in the future?" We also asked the participants to focus 
on several aspects of the drought including critical impacts, performance of water institutions, 
public response, communication and cooperation, role of the media, critical legislation, timing 
of response actions and innovative drought management approaches. Background information 
was located and examined in order to place the information gathered by the interviews within 
the context of documented drought actions and to compare expectations to the reality of drought. 
The new knowledge that has been brought forth by the drought represents the important 
lessons learned. In general, such incremental knowledge would be identified by (1) contrasting 
"expectations" and "what actually happened, II (2) analyzing the basis for decision making during 
the various stages of the drought, and (3) examining the overall performance of the California 
water management system. However, the existing system of water management consists of 
complex physical and institutional arrangements. It cannot easily be addressed by a unified and 
comprehensive statewide management plan consisting of strategic, tactical, and emergency 
measures. This means that a formal statewide drought response plan does not exist. There is 
no sequence of predetermined actions for all eventualities that would constitute an official 
statewide drought contingency plan. Federal, state, and local water institutions share the 
responsibility of coping with adverse impacts of drought. For example, during a drought, the 
state formulates a plan for dealing with another dry or critically dry year. However, the lack 
of a formal drought contingency plan does not indicate that California is unprepared for 
droughts. Major water providers have provisions for curtailing water deliveries during dry and 
critically dry years. Local and regional water supply agencies also have plans for dealing with 
water shortages. An unwritten plan for water management during drought emerged from the 
experiences of the 1976-77 drought in California. We characterized this plan in order to provide 
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the reader with a baseline (Le., pre-1987) approach to drought management in the state. This 
plan is described below. In the sections that follow, the performance of this plan and other 
outcomes of the 1987-92 drought are summarized in terms of lessons learned. We view these 
lessons as useful pieces of practical wisdom acquired by drought experience. We invite the 
readers to examine the evidence and opinions presented in this report in order to draw their own 
conclusions and identify other relevant lessons for water management during drought. 
PRE-1987 CALIFORNIA'S DROUGHT MANAGEMENT PLAN 
The Institute for Water Resources of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has devised a 
planning framework for studying the performance of water management systems and developing 
a better way to manage water during drought. According to this framework, responses to water 
shortages can be categorized as strategic, tactical, or emergency. Strategic (or long-term) 
measures involve modification of existing infrastructure, laws, and institutional arrangements to 
achieve an optimal level of protection against droughts in the long term. Tactical (or short-term) 
measures can be implemented within the framework of existing laws, institutional arrangements, 
and infrastructure. Such measures constitute a drought contingency plan and must be set into 
place before drought occurs. Finally, emergency measures are those that are necessary when 
the long-term protection involving strategic preparations and short-term tactical measures prove 
to be insufficient because of low-probability events or unexpected outcomes. Sections that 
follow summarize the strategies and tactical measures that existed prior to the 1987-92 drought. 
An expanded discussion of these measures together with a description of strategic, tactical and 
emergency measures in drought management are presented in Chapter ill. 
Pre-1987 Strategic (Long-Term) Measures 
The water management system in California has been established in order to provide 
"dependable supplies" to the major population centers and agricultural areas in the state. The 
dependability of supplies relates to drought. Therefore, the major water development projects, 
such as the Central Valley Project and the State Water Project, were designed and operated to 
provide adequate protection to water users against periodic droughts. The degree of drought 
protection is a function of the amount of "carry-over" storage in the major reservoirs. In 
addition to surface-water storage, the drought management plan that existed in California prior 
to the six-year drought of 1987-92 included other features. The overall strategic drought 
protection features found at all levels of water management (L e., local, state, regional, and 
federal) included: 
• Provision of extra storage in surface-water reservoirs and maintenance of the 
stored water as carry-over water to be used during dry years 
• Conjunctive use of surface water and groundwater to maximize the quantity of 
groundwater in storage by relying on plentiful surface water during wet years 
180 
• Development of a statewide water distribution system to move water from supply 
surplus areas to areas with inadequate local supplies or drought-affected areas 
• Permanent improvements in the balance of supply and demand (statewide and 
locally) and supply reliability by increases in efficiency of water use and 
development of additional supplies 
The above features of the existing water management system do not "drought proof" 
California. As the experience of the 1976-77 drought demonstrated, tactical restrictions on 
water use must be used if there are two critically dry years in order to reduce the risk of 
experiencing severe environmental and economic impacts. Unlike the severe drought events in 
other parts of the country, the California drought of 1976-77 did not result in major additions 
to the supply base (i.e., developed water). Between 1977 and 1986, only four major reservoirs 
were completed. Subsequently there was less supply-side surplus, since growth in supply did 
not keep up with growth in demand. Also, the success of water conservation efforts during the 
1976-77 drought was publicized worldwide. As a result, the emphasis in drought management 
was shifted from water development to a greater reliance on temporary reductions of water 
demand. 
Tactical (Short-Term) Measures 
In general, the short-term drought response measures used in the state prior to the 1987-
1992 drought included the following tactical actions: 
• Curtailment of surface-water deliveries by SWP and CVP to urban and 
agricultural users in order to maintain adequate carry-over storage for possible 
subsequent dry years 
• Curtailment of water flows and deliveries for environmental uses including 
relaxation of minimum flows and water quality standards 
• Temporary increases in the use of groundwater in order to replace the surface-
water supply shortages or to replace the water retained in carry-over storage 
• Transfers of water within the state from sources with surplus supplies (e.g., 
Colorado River) to water-short areas (e.g., North Marin County) 
• Reduction of water use through voluntary conservation and rationing in urban 
areas and by agriculture through crop shifting and land fallowing to make up for 
the reduced deliveries and protect to the remaining supplies 
• Activation of standby supply alternatives such as reclamation of brackish or saline 
water and municipal wastewater, cloud seeding, and other emergency supplies. 
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The use of these measures depends on actual drought conditions and the local feasibility 
of each action. For some areas, the use of groundwater or standby supplies is not feasible. 
Large-scale transfers of water depend on the availability of interconnections to the major state 
distribution network and the availability of water that can be transferred. Some options also 
exist for transfers of water within individual regions. The two short-term response options that 
are always available are protection of the remaining supplies and reduction in water use. This 
is actually a single option if viewed from the perspective of a local self-contained water supply 
system. At the local level, reduced deliveries of the CVP or SWP water can be met (Le., 
replaced) using local sources, water conservation, or cessation of some uses. The success of 
the drought response plan is critically dependent on the timing of drought response actions. 
Normally, significant shortages in precipitation and runoff in the Sacramento River basin will 
not translate to automatic proportionate reductions in water deliveries. The large amount of 
water storage affords the operators of the SWP and CVP and some local projects some response 
lag time. However, generally speaking, two consecutive critically dry years will most likely 
trigger tactical response actions. Once the drought conditions are in effect, the decisions on 
water deliveries and the amount of carry-over storage are made for one water year in advance 
and can be changed from year to year. 
Emergency Measures 
Federal, state, and local water supply agencies use emergency measures primarily to deal 
with the interruptions of water deliveries caused by earthquakes. However, a state of emergency 
can also be declared by the governor in cases where drought-related water shortages require 
extraordinary actions. Federal and state drought assistance programs are available to an 
individual or community, provided the entity meets the following criteria: 
• The entity is located in a county designated as a disaster or emergency area. 
• The entity is designated as an Emergency Drought Impact Area by an appropriate 
agency (C-DWR 1978). 
In the first case, designations are made by the President at the request of the Governor. In the 
second case, designations are made by the Interagency Drought Emergency Coordinating 
Committee (lDECC). Water shortage emergencies are governed by Sections 350-58 of the 
California Water Code, and these appear in Appendix C. 
LESSONS OF THE 1987-1992 DROUGHT 
The 1987-92 drought put long-term strategies of drought protection and short-term 
drought management approaches to a severe test. During six years of drought, state water 
controllers implemented a number of drought measures in order to maintain about 60 percent 
of the statewide reservoir storage. This level of carry-over storage has been maintained since 
1990 for three consecutive water years which have been designated as critical, based on the 
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Sacramento River Index. For comparison, during the 1976-77 drought, with two consecutive 
critically dry years, the statewide reservoir storage was depleted to 35 percent. This suggests 
that the experience of the 1976-77 drought resulted in a more conservative operation of the 
major water supply projects. However, this security of held-back water reserves was not free. 
There were some economic, social, and environmental costs of coping with shortages. 
Nevertheless, one should not overlook the fact that California was in a better posture in 1993 
following six years of drought than it was entering 1978 after only two years of drought. 
Although it is easy to criticize water management for not reacting to the drought fast enough or 
allowing certain environmental and economic impacts to occur, those impacts could have been 
much greater and the current situation much worse if the operations mirrored those of the 1976-
77 period. 
These and other outcomes of the drought point to several lessons both for long-term 
planning for drought protection and for tactical preparedness to respond to future droughts. In 
this section, we present those lessons of the drought which stem directly from the experiences 
of the 1987-92 drought. The factual information on the outcomes of the drought is presented 
in Chapter N. The views of survey participants on the issues of drought planning and response 
are described in Chapters VI and VII. After stating each lesson, we explain its meaning and 
support it with relevant background information. 
1. The nature of social, environmental, and economic impacts of a sustained drought 
points to a need for careful and more realistic drought planning. 
The 1987-92 drought has revealed more about the nature of the adverse impacts of 
drought than any previous drought. It showed that the impacts of drought can go beyond the 
"fIrst order" consequences of not having enough water to support the established off-stream and 
in-stream uses. Some social, environmental, and economic impacts of this multiyear drought 
have exhibited some unexpected cumulative and propagating effects. 
First, some impacts of the drought propagated and intensified because the affected 
systems are complex and interrelated in the process. For example, because of drought, less 
hydroelectricity was produced. This had a direct economic impact because a higher cost 
replacement energy had to be produced to meet the demands. Furthermore, the demand for 
electricity increased significantly during the drought (because of more cooling and more 
groundwater pumping), so that the economic impacts were further intensified. 
A parallel path of impacts stemming from reduced hydropower production rippled 
through the environment. Because most releases of water for hydropower are not diverted to 
off-stream uses they serve to maintain minimum streamflow and water quality. Additional 
environmental effects occurred as replacement thermopower was produced. Large thermal plants 
are located in urban areas of Southern California and San Francisco Bay area. These plants 
increased air pollution in places where air quality is already low. At the same time, more 
production of thermal power also contributed to deterioration of water quality. Some thermal 
plants are located in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta and use the Delta water for cooling. 
Because of higher generation, more thermal pollution entered the Delta and caused further 
deterioration of water quality. 
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A similar tracing of environmental and economic impacts can be made for reduced water 
deliveries to agricultural users. Less irrigation water translated into less return flows that 
support wetlands. Reduced agricultural water deliveries also meant that irrigation districts 
received less revenue, but they had to pay a fixed cost to SWP (or CVP), regional agricultural 
agencies and others selling water regardless of whether they received contracted amounts or not. 
This means that they had to spread more or less the same cost (or debt) over a smaller volume 
of water sold and fewer farmers. As reduced water deliveries persist from year to year, the 
price of water continues to go up, so that fewer farmers can afford it, and more land goes out 
of production and farmers out of business. A continuing drought could lead to an acceleration 
of this "debt spiral" effect. 
Furthermore, some impacts occurred because of the length of the drought. For example, 
during the drought, minimum-level streamflows persisted year after year for six years. As a 
result, their impacts on fish populations accumulated, threatening to destroy entire populations 
because of the short life-cycle time of anadromous species. The cumulative effects became 
clearly visible during the 1987-92 drought. They were not so apparent during the 1976-77 
drought. The winter-run chinook salmon, which is already classified as a threatened species, 
had dropped to very small numbers. Similar cumulative impacts could be found in other areas 
as well. However, identifying and quantifying impacts, cumulative or otherwise, is difficult. 
Other factors besides the long drought could have impacted the number of returning spawners. 
For example, the salmon catch off the coast of California was higher during the 1987-92 period 
than during the wetter years of 1983-85. How much of the response of salmon population is 
owed to drought? How much to the increased catches? 
The drought impacts can be moderated by temporarily reducing water demands. 
However, one of the greatest difficulties in employing the demand-side options arises from the 
issue of equity. Almost any rationing scheme (either ad hoc or through contractual conditions) 
will introduce unfair distribution of the burden. Equity effects probably are the most important 
social impact of drought. The impacts may become exaggerated when we try to flX them by 
laws and regulations. Water managers trained in civil engineering or hydrology may have little 
experience and understanding of social behaviors. Poorly designed rationing schemes will 
quickly polarize society into interest groups and destroy the sense of community in local areas 
as well as in the entire state. Some water users will be treated, or will feel they are treated, 
unfairly. For example, farmers may ask "Why should irrigation districts be cut 75 percent when 
urban areas are cut only 25 percent?" Farmers feel that they need water to grow food, while 
urban areas "waste" it on lawns. Urban dwellers may wonder why farmers should "grow 
subsidized crops with subsidized water, H while they have to risk losing their jobs because of 
strict rationing provisions. Furthermore, unfair distribution of burdens will also crop up within 
the farming community. Some farmers have wells on their land, others do not. Also, those 
who invested in high-efficiency irrigation systems may receive no water while others who 
continue to "waste" water receive their full deliveries. Irrigation districts experience fiscal 
impacts since they are exposed to greater costs and emergency programs and in return they are 
faced with less revenue and the fiscal "lag" effects of conservation. 
The above recognition of the nature of drought impacts demonstrates the complexity of 
the relationship between water availability and the functioning of human and environmental 
systems. The long-term planning for drought protection and preparedness must more 
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realistically reflect this complexity. For example, the cumulative environmental impacts of a 
sustained drought revealed the need to reexamine our current approaches to the protection of 
environmental resources. The long-standing practice of developing ambient water quality 
standards to protect the aquatic resources may not be adequate. The impacts of the ongoing 
drought brought the "environmental standards" approach into question. The aquatic ecology is 
very complex, and the drought has demonstrated that just maintaining water quality standards 
for several years did not prevent devastating effects on some aquatic populations. Monitoring 
the conditions of aquatic life and taking appropriate preplanned measures to protect their survival 
during a sustained drought may be necessary. There is a definite need to understand the aquatic 
ecology better. On December 9, 1992, the State Water Resources Control Board published a 
draft of Water Rights Decision (D-1630) which would require the SWP and CVP to maintain 
stricter water quality standards in the channels of the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta and Suisun 
Marsh. However, the adoption of this decision has been delayed until the Board prepares an 
Environmental Impact Report (EIR) and conducts further hearings. Another important 
development related to the protection of environmental resources is the current ongoing process 
of establishing a new federal agency, the United States Biological Survey within the Department 
of Interior. 
2. Severe drought can change longstanding relationships and balances of power in the 
competition for water. 
The drought crisis and grim outlooks for the future brought about some changes in 
California's water politics. These included: (1) realignment of alliances, (2) attempts at 
negotiation, (3) public relations, and (4) new environmental legislation. 
ReaIi&J1lllent of alliances. In the past, the divisions in California's water politics ran 
between those who diverted water (agriculture and urban water providers) and those who wanted 
to keep water in the streams (environmental community). The urban community was further 
divided between north and south. The debates were fueled by entrenched beliefs often having 
very little relationship to reality. The drought focused public opinion on water issues and shifted 
the division lines among the warring factions. Urban users began to gravitate away from 
agriculture to reach some agreements with the environmental community even before the 
drought. The Memorandum of Understanding on urban water conservation Best Management 
Practices was signed in December 1991, and it brought together the northern and southern urban 
users with the environmental community. About the same time, the media began "farmer 
bashing," which added to the strength of the urban-environmental alliance and pushed the 
agricultural sector into a losing position. 
Public relations lap. Farmers and irrigation districts have also learned to recognize the 
importance of communicating their needs, conditions, and irrigation techniques to the urban 
public and environmental community. The farmers have been actively involved during the 
drought in critically examining water use and water efficiency techniques in farms, talking about 
the timing of deliveries, looking at transfers, and promoting conservation. However, agriCUltural 
districts have to identify an appropriate forum to communicate to the public and the 
policy makers about water utilization and problems experienced on the farm. Participants 
indicated that it was this lack of communication that has resulted in adverse public opinion 
regarding agriculture and its efforts to use water efficiently. 
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Attempts at ne&otiation. The drought crisis created a need for negotiations involving 
all three sectors. The Three-Way Process was established to work toward a consensus on water 
policy among the urban, agricultural, and environmental interests. Although the drought was 
not a major factor in the origins of the process, the drought crisis helped to bring the sides 
together in developing short-term emergency measures. The state government, while not being 
a party during the earlier stages of the negotiations, embraced the Three-Way Process. The 
Governor used some of the initial agreements of the Three-Way Process to formulate a new 
water plan for California. However, the situation is still volatile, and more work on reaching 
the consensus is needed. 
The negotiations of the Three-Way Process showed that consensual approaches to solving 
the most urgent environmental problems offer some hope for the future, but reaching a 
compromise is very difficult. The difficulties encountered lend support to one of the axioms of 
negotiations theory which states that a party will not engage in negotiations if it perceives that 
it will lose regardless of the outcome (Le., it is better for a dominant party not to begin 
negotiation). The Three-Way Process became bogged down at the end of the drought and had 
little effect on the new legislation which imparted some fundamental changes into California's 
water management. 
Newenvironmentailecisiation. The Central Valley Project Improvement Act of 1992 
has been called one of the most important pieces of environmental legislation ever passed. It 
reallocates an estimated 800,000 acre-feet of California's developed water from off-stream to 
in-stream uses. Had the long drought not engaged the media and the public in debate on the 
equity of California water allocations, it is unlikely that the bill would have passed, since it was 
vigorously opposed by the agricultural community. The law changes the longstanding balance 
of power in California water politics, and raises an important thought for water experts 
elsewhere in the U. S. The passage of the CVP act after six years of drought headlines suggests 
that dominant parties should reconsider the premise that no negotiation means no loss. 
3. Irrigation can provide complementary environmental benefits. 
The impacts of the reduced agricultural deliveries of developed water to agriculture 
revealed that in many areas environmental resources are critically dependent on water deliveries 
to the state's irrigated agriculture. Many wetlands in the Central Valley are maintained by 
return flows from irrigation. These wetlands received very little water during the drought as 
farmers reduced water application rates and irrigated acreage. The drought also brought to the 
attention of resource managers the fact that the flooded rice paddies in the Sacramento Valley 
provided a critical support to waterfowl. The Central Valley provides winter habitat for 20 
percent of all ducks counted in the United States and 50 percent of all mid-winter waterfowl in 
the Pacific Flyway (California Rice Industry Association, 1992). Because almost 90 percent of 
the Valley's original wetlands have been lost, only 60,000 acres of protected wetlands support 
waterfowl. Additional habitat is provided by some 600,000 acres of ricelands, which in 1991 
were reduced to 300,000 acres due to low water supplies. Therefore, the reduced rice 
production during the drought had an adverse effect on wildlife habitat. 
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The new knowledge about the interdependence between rice production and waterfowl 
habitat led the Nature Conservancy of California (established by the California Rice Industry 
Association) to the development of a ricelands/wetlands multipurpose use project. The project 
would: (1) create upward of 100,000 acres of winter wetland habitat by flooding rice paddies 
in winter, (2) provide nearly 300,000 acre-feet of off-stream storage capacity, (3) provide for 
aquatic biodegradation of the rice stubble (rather than burning stubble that creates air pollution 
problems), and (4) sustain the communities and economies that have become dependent on rice 
production. This project demonstrates that the irrigated agriculture in California can avoid the 
loss of its water supplies to satisfy environmental needs by expanding its water management into 
multipurpose uses. California's 30 million acres of farmland (of which almost one-third is 
irrigated) not only produce agricultural products but also serve as an important wildlife habitat 
in agricultural regions. Farmers and irrigation districts have opportunities for enhancing the 
environmental benefits of their lands and become a leader in the stewardship of environmental 
resources. Agriculturalists are in a position to recognize the environmental needs for water and 
adjust their operations to satisfy such needs. Flood protection and groundwater recharge are 
examples of other purposes that can be satisfied in conjunction with irrigation. 
4. Land use regulation must be the mechanism for urban growth management policies 
which accept Umited water supply. 
The drought provided some new evidence for a longstanding debate on whether or not 
constrained water supplies fail to prevent or slow down growth in urban areas. The city of 
Santa Barbara has been viewed by many survey respondents as an example of an urban entity 
which put constraints on the expansion of water supply sources in order to slow down urban 
growth. However, the urban area continued to grow, although a major portion of new growth 
occurred outside Santa Barbara in the Goleta area. The city of Santa Barbara sought to expand 
its storage in the Gibraltar and Cachuma reservoirs prior to the drought, but its efforts failed. 
Because increases in water supplies did not keep pace with the growing water demand, the area 
suffered severe shortages during drought. Severe rationing of water had to be imposed, reaching 
a cutback of 45 percent during the most critical year. The rationing imposed significant 
hardships on the residents for an extended period of time. As part of the rationing plan, the city 
implemented a total ban of overhead watering of urban landscapes of any kind, thus causing 
brownouts and some loss of landscaping. The damaged landscapes and related loss of income 
from tourism were considered by survey respondents as significant economic impacts on the 
Santa Barbara area. 
The drought-related water shortages and the hardships suffered by the residents seem to 
have turned the policy of constrained supplies around. The area had to scramble for water and 
acquire very expensive supplies. The voters approved two expensive alternatives: the 
connection to the Coastal Branch of the State Water Project and a desalting plant. The cost of 
water from these sources was 2 to 3 times higher than the cost of most expensive water 
elsewhere in the state. The Santa Barbara City Council also approved a "critical period planning 
approach," according to which the city will have enough water to survive the worst drought on 
record (Le., 1946-51 period) and in addition will have a 10 percent extra supply as a safety 
margin. 
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The experiences in the Santa Barbara area during the earlier years of the drought and in 
other urban areas of the state are interpreted by the water professionals in California as proof 
that water supply (or more specifically, restricting the planning for water supply) cannot be used 
to control urban growth. Limited capacity of local water supply sources can be used as a 
legitimate reason to constrain urban growth, but land use decisions must be the vehicle and 
mechanism for growth control. Water supply planning must keep pace with projected increases 
in consumptive use which may occur under any growth scenario. This is so that it will not 
cause the development of a supply/demand imbalance. Such imbalances have occurred locally 
due to "slow" demand growth with no corresponding augmentation of water supplies or long-
term management of demand. The practical effect is to cut into prudent supply reserves, thus 
assuring recurrent drought emergencies. 
s. The success of drought response plans should be measured in terms of the 
minimization and equitable redistribution of actual impacts (as opposed to water 
shortages), but there is much to be learned about the best ways of accomplishing it. 
Information on environmental and economic impacts of the drought is of critical 
importance to the formulation and implementation of adequate drought response measures. By 
comparing the various impacts, water controllers should be able to adjust the allocation of 
dwindling water supplies so that the most severe impacts are minimized. However, the short-
term mitigation of environmental and economic impacts during the 1987-92 drought often relied 
on judgment and anecdotal evidence. Measurement and valuation of drought impacts for 
selecting water management options must be enhanced. 
The survey participants were well aware of the implications of quantified impacts on 
water management decisions. Those whose water supplies were curtailed gave a detailed 
description of all impacts and attached a dollar value of losses wherever possible. They were 
fully cognizant of the difficulties in measuring drought impacts, as well as the dangers involved 
in comparing the economic losses suffered by various economic sectors. They recognized the 
tendency of impact evaluation studies to be focused on impacts that can easily be quantified in 
dollar terms, while under counting those impacts that cannot be easily assigned dollar values. 
Although the economic impacts are of immediate concern to people because they often translate 
into lost jobs, there was almost a unanimous opinion that the most severe effects of the drought 
fell on the ecological resources of the state. Objections to this view were raised by 
representatives of the agricultural sector. Some agriculturists felt that the environmental 
damages were exaggerated by the resources management agencies and the environmental 
community in order to take away water from agriculture. 
Attributing changes in economic performance and environmental resources to drought is 
not a simple task. Attaching dollar values to these changes is even more difficult and almost 
impossible in the case of impacts on the environment. Because of these difficulties, there is a 
tendency to focus only on impacts that can be measured and valued in monetary terms (e.g., loss 
of production of hydroelectricity). Many other impacts with potentially higher economic losses 
(e.g., degradation of fisheries or urban lifestyles) are usually described in qualitative terms only. 
Anecdotal evidence and speculations about drought impacts have to be used in making drought 
response decisions. During drought there is insufficient time to study the impacts carefully and 
make accurate predictions of potential consequences. As a result, qualitative statements about 
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the impacts influence drought response decisions of water agencies. The mass media play a 
large role in disseminating anecdotal evidence about various impacts, often focusing on some 
impacts and overlooking others. The lesson here is that the assessment of potential impacts of 
water shortages must be conducted prior to drought. This allows selection of the best strategic 
and tactical measures for coping with drought through a systematic drought planning process. 
6. Severe droughts can expose some inadequacies in the performance and role of state 
and federal water institutions. 
The state government regulates the use of natural water resources in California. In 
addition, SWP and CVP, the state and federal water agencies, respectively, also control a major 
portion of developed water. Therefore, the success of coping with the shortages of precipitation 
and runoff depends on how well the SWP and CVP systems are operated. The drought revealed 
some inadequacies in the state and federal water institutions which pertain to their roles and 
responsibilities in drought management. 
Many survey respondents said the drought showed that California water needs one water 
boss to manage all water resources in order to meet the state's water needs and to protect public 
trust values. Although there were many positive opinions about the performance of California 
Department of Water Resources (its expertise compares well to any agency in the country, and 
it proved invaluable during the drought), respondents had three types of suggestions about the 
current state organization. 
First, they complained that there is insufficient differentiation between C-DWR and the 
State Water Project (SWP). Although its mission is much broader, during the first four years 
of the drought, the role of the C-DWR was mainly limited to the operation of the SWP. During 
those years, SWP tried to satisfy the demands of its customers for water within the limits of its 
rules, as one would expect of a water supplier. C-DWR did have to provide for greater 
protection of environmental resources, a water use in competition with SWP deliveries, but only 
when the evidence of cumulative impacts on fisheries came to public attention around the fourth 
year of the drought. Some respondents called for an organizational division that would reflect 
the fact that the interests of SWP customers are narrower than the interests of California 
generally. 
Second, respondents believed that the State Water Resources Control Board (the Board) 
was asked to do too much. The Board was created to allocate surface water rights and to 
regulate water qUality. During the drought, the Board had to assure that the available water 
supply was allocated according to established water rights; the rush of water transfers created 
an unprecedented load. In 1991, emergency legislation (referred to as AB 16x) was passed to 
remove statutory time limits for Board actions on water rights applications and petitions during 
droughts. The law also authorized the Board to adopt drought emergency regulations (effective 
for 270 days), without review or approval by the Office of Administrative Law. The state 
legislature also charged the Board with administering state financial assistance for water 
reclamation projects (AB 15x). 
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Finally, some respondents said the C-DWR should do more to share the benefits of their 
expertise. Several respondents indicated that timely information on water supply conditions 
should be given high priority because it is invaluable to all water providers and resource 
agencies (timely publication of the California Cooperative Snow Surveys Bulletin 120-91 was 
regarded as one of the best investments among all drought-coping mechanisms). 
The CVP of the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation's ability to respond to California's needs 
was severely hampered until Federal law was changed in 1991. While the SWP was scrambling 
for water and needed federal conveyance facilities to move water around, it could not do so in 
several instances. This was due to the Warren Act, which prohibited the use of CVP facilities 
for moving nonproject water while allowing to use them for bringing nonproject water for its 
own uses. This law was repealed during the fifth year of drought by Reclamation States 
Drought Relief Act of 1991 (H.R. 355). Because the CVP "sits on the biggest chunk" of 
developed water in the state, the Bureau is a likely target for often unfair accusations stating that 
the federal projects "sit back and let the state suffer while they take care of their own." Because 
differences in deliveries put some neighboring farmers under very different water supply 
conditions on their farms, the curtailments in water deliveries imposed by SWP and CVP should 
be agreed upon and made more uniform. The Coordinated Operation Agreement of 1986 made 
great progress in the direction of increased cooperation in maintaining water quality in the Delta, 
but it did not cover all the contentious issues. The Bureau has also learned the value of being 
more flexible in their operations with their own customers. During the last three years of the 
drought, CVP allowed farmers to leave water in storage for the next year water deliveries, thus 
changing the previous "use it or lose it" policy. This allowed the farmers to plan ahead better 
and maximize the benefits from available deliveries. This makes the operations of CVP more 
difficult, but pays off in terms improved relations and water conservation. These experiences 
indicate that resolution of the federal-state institutional issues would enhance the effective 
management of water supplies during drought. 
In general the state and federal bureaucracies can be expected to give high priority to 
cooperation during drought. For many water institutions, the drought is a real test of their 
performance. Officials and administration make an extra effort to perform well and are willing 
to cut "red tape" in order to speed up the administrative process wherever possible. This 
behavior of water institutions and other entities should not be overlooked in resolving some long-
standing contentious issues and setting forth a framework for better cooperation during future 
droughts. 
Recently, the State of California and the U.S. Department of the Interior have signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding which outlines the conditions for a possible takeover of CVP 
by the State. However, the memorandum is neither specific or binding. 
7. The overall success of water rationing plans depends on their design and reliance on 
increases in water rates. 
By the second year of drought, most residents of California had no doubt that the state 
was experiencing a major drought. The media were constantly reporting on the drought 
problem, which focused public attention on water. When there is no drought, most people 
become interested in water management only when there is a rate increase. As the drought 
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continued the public focused on other issues related to water supply. Some areas were ready 
to support solutions and investments in long-term water conservation and improvements of water 
supply reliability. The publicity of the impacts of drought on fish populations convinced urban 
users that their conservation efforts were important for saving the environment. Survey 
participants unanimously agreed that the public response to drought (Le., cutting back on their 
water use) was very good. There were some differences of opinion among respondents on the 
reasons for such a good response and the apparent unfairness of raising water rates of users who 
had reduced water use. 
The 1987-1992 drought confirmed the lesson of previous droughts that urban households 
and businesses will cut back on water use. It also enhanced understanding that certain conditions 
that must exist in order to achieve cooperation. Urban users gn conserve water on a short-term 
basis; however, the more important lesson is that people will conserve if they are convinced that: 
(1) there is a real crisis; (2) water conservation plan is fair; (3) hardships are manageable; and 
(4) their conservation efforts really matter. In communities where all these conditions were 
present, the customers proved extremely cooperative and exceeded rationing goals. In those 
communities where some conditions were not met, the response of water users was not so good, 
and the number of complaints was often unmanageable. 
During the 1987-92 drought, several water agencies were reminded that water-rationing 
plans can be very controversial. Some rationing plans can be worse than others. Sometimes, 
while achieving the same intended water savings, the plans may hurt more people, cause greater 
burdens on some groups of users than others, and cause greater economic losses in the urban 
economy. All plans are unfair to some users, but those that rely solely on fixed allotments, 
percent cutbacks, or total bans on certain uses may be perceived as unfair to a significant portion 
of urban water users. 
An important new lesson of the 1987-92 drought is that increases in water rates should 
precede or accompany rationing plans. When rationing plans are not accompanied by an 
increase in water rates on account of drought, it causes problems for the water agency, in 
addition to imposing burdens on water customers. These problems occur, because they lead to 
revenue shortfalls when the drought continues for several years. To balance the revenue, usually 
water rates are increased after the crisis is over, which may be viewed by customers as a sign 
of inefficient management of the district. Pure price rationing was not used during the drought; 
however, those water districts that raised rates and instituted rationing plans fared very well, 
both in terms of achieving conservation targets and balancing their revenues during the rationing 
period. However, not all water districts and local governments are convinced that pure price 
rationing is the best and least costly form of rationing. Pure price rationing involves raising the 
price of water to the level where the customer response to the price increase will achieve the 
desired conservation target. Prices would be decreased if conditions improve or increased if the 
drought intensified. The pure price rationing could also be used at the most critical stages of 
the drought crisis, where the level of prices would be linked to the amount of the remaining 
supply. Water suppliers who experienced revenue shortfalls became strong supporters of the 
price rationing. The Los Angeles Department of Water and Power was trying to convince the 
City Council to allow the Department to impose a drought surcharge before the rationing 
program was called for. However, many agencies consider pure price rationing as impractical 
because of problems in identifying the water price/demand relationships. 
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8. Mass media can playa positive role in drought response, especially if some 
guidelines are followed. 
The California drought of 1987-92 was a major news story. The newsworthiness of the 
drought created an opportunity to focus public attention on California's water issues. The media 
saw their role during the drought as informing the public on how supply allocations are made 
and what the consequences of the allocations and related decisions are. Although the primary 
objective was to cover the breaking news on drought, some media, especially the major 
newspapers, tried to look at water supply issues from a broader statewide perspective. 
Reporters, in their inquiries, usually wanted answers to the questions of the general public. 
During drought, what people wanted to know is "How much water is it prudent to use']" or 
"How much water is it prudent to save']" The public also wanted to make sure that water 
agencies were not asking them for unnecessary sacrifices. 
The media are governed by the rules of objective reporting, newsworthiness, and their 
perceptions of what the public wants to know. They cannot be managed by water agencies. If 
they were, they would not be able to sell news fairly. The questions "Are we in a drought']" 
or "Is the drought over']" are not silly questions from the media's point of view. Reporters 
understand the thinking modes and perceptions of the general public much better than water 
professionals. For them, once the water supply situation is called a drought, it automatically 
implies that behavior has to be changed from normal behavior to crisis behavior. Such a change 
is newsworthy. In general, the media can be very useful in promoting water conservation, 
especially if water agencies follow some guidelines. 
Many participants in this study agreed that press releases must be very precise and 
complete in order to avoid confusing the media. Water managers must be prepared to give 
straightforward answers to questions asked by the press. Media reporters cannot improve on 
the clarity of the message. More likely the statements will become even more confusing after 
they are repeated in the press. Media cannot explain complex water management issues. What 
is very interesting to water professionals is usually "too dry" for newspapers, radio, and 
television. Long feature articles on water issues do not sell newspapers and, if included, are 
read by very few. However, those who read them may become well informed. 
It is difficult for water agencies to publicly admit that they are in trouble. The drought 
showed that if they did not fear a negative response from their customers and were candid in 
their public remarks, they could always count on public cooperation without losing their jobs. 
Some conditions, however, have to be met. First, the managers must make sure that their 
response actions are easily defendable so that the public knows what they are trying to achieve 
and why. They must have some rules, or tactical response measures, established. Second, the 
water shortage situation, the response decisions, and objectives have to be clearly communicated 
to the media, civic leaders, and the public. Media cannot be expected to develop explanations 
of difficult decisions for the public. They have to get a clear message from the source of those 
decisions. 
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9. Market forces are an effective way of reallocating restricted water suppUes. 
The drought forced water agencies and water professionals to seek creative solutions to 
water shortage problems. However, very few radical solutions were implemented. Rather, 
there was a greater diffusion of known technologies. Development of technological innovations 
takes time and more innovations are likely to be developed in the wake of the California 
drought. 
The six-year California drought did provide an opportunity for water controllers to test 
one idea they had toyed with for a long time. The drought helped them to cut the red tape and 
they actually did it. It even worked much better than expected. This successful experiment was 
the 1991 Drought Emergency Water Bank. The Water Bank offered California a way of 
obtaining "more water, It even after four years of drought, at a price that was readily paid by 
urban users, some farmers, as well as environmental resources agencies. The bank worked 
exceptionally well to the satisfaction of most interests although some counties expressed serious 
concern over possible depletion of local groundwater. The difficulties encountered offered 
additional lessons on how to organize the bank to work even better in the future. 
The 1991 Emergency Water Bank demonstrated a number of important lessons: (1) water 
markets, even when severely controlled and constrained, will work; (2) water has high value for 
many buyers, and there are willing sellers; (3) very significant amounts of water can be found 
if money is put on the table; and (4) third-party interests in market transactions can be protected. 
The respondents voiced concerns regarding restrictions in the Water Bank rules, especially those 
pertaining to the conditions imposed on water buyers. 
The Water Bank and other water transfer mechanisms were at the forefront of new 
developments during the drought. New knowledge about physical systems and environmental 
response was gained because of the transfers. The experiences with the Water Bank and other 
transfer mechanisms are likely to have profound implications on California's future water policy. 
Although water transfers may not obviate the need for more water development, the new 
development likely will proceed with water transfers in mind. In other words, more water 
storage and transmission facilities may have to be built to facilitate water transfers throughout 
the state. Some additional water development may also be needed to increase the ability of 
water supply agencies to capture high flows for recharging groundwater. 
CONFIRMED LFSSONS OF PREVIOUS DROUGHTS 
In addition to the new knowledge in the form of "useful pieces of practical wisdom," 
described in the previous section, the 1987-92 California drought also has confirmed several 
important lessons of previous droughts. These confirmed lessons are presented below. 
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1. Water in the aquifers continues to be the most effective strategic weapon against 
drought. 
While short-term water conservation, temporary water transfers, and Miracle March rains 
in 1991 helped California water users get through the six years of drought, the state's urban and 
agricultural economies were really saved from a disaster by the availability of groundwater 
reserves. This can easily be verified using some crude numbers. Total water withdrawals in 
the state during a normal year are approximately 40 MAF of which 24 MAF come from surface 
water and the balance of 16 MAF comes from groundwater. In the 1991 water year, water 
rationing in urban areas saved about 1 MAF. The 1991 Water Bank shifted 0.8 MAP from 
agriculture to urban and environmental uses (many of the temporary transfers in 1991 depended 
upon groundwater and at least one-third of the 0.8 MAP was substituted through increased 
groundwater withdrawals). The March rains added 10 percent to the statewide reservoir storage, 
or about 4 MAP. Estimates of increased groundwater pumping indicate that some additional 8 
MAF were pumped from groundwater aquifers. Because the statewide carry-over storage did 
not change between 1990 and 1991, the conservation and groundwater pumpage made up the 
shortfall caused by the estimated 57 percent deficit in statewide water year runoff. Total SWP 
deliveries (entitlement and other deliveries) were 47 percent of 1987 deliveries. Additionally, 
CVP deliveries in 1991 were 38 percent of 1987 deliveries. 
Therefore, if we were to "give credit" for saving California's economy from a disaster, 
we need to acknowledge that, statewide, increased groundwater pumping was eight times as 
important as urban water conservation or water transfers. It was even twice as important as the 
Miracle March rains. This is not to say that water managers had very little to do with keeping 
the state out of a total disaster. Groundwater supplies would have been depleted had it not been 
for the large amounts of developed surface water that, during wet years, substitute surface water 
for groundwater use by farmers. Without CVP and SWP, a majority of the state's groundwater 
basins would likely be mined and the groundwater storage would be greatly diminished due to 
subsidence. At the same time, much of the remaining water in storage would be too deep or 
too saline to be recovered usefully or economically. 
The realization of the role of groundwater reserves in drought protection is an old but 
nevertheless very important lesson. Almost 60 years ago, White (1935) had documented the 
value of groundwater supplies during the drought of 1928-1934. Overdrafting the aquifers 
during droughts is effective in the short-term, as long as they are recharged when surface-water 
supply becomes available. According to this lesson, the state should put more emphasis on 
groundwater management in its long-term (strategic) water plan. During this drought, 
groundwater storage in the San Joaquin Valley was depleted by some 11 MAP. This depletion 
has to be replaced as soon as surface supplies become available; until the aquifers are refilled, 
the state remains much more vulnerable. The same must be done with all other aquifers for 
California to survive similar droughts in the future. Increased reliance of off-stream uses on 
groundwater should also enhance the protection of environmental uses against droughts by 
preserving in-stream flows. 
California is blessed with many groundwater aquifers holding some 250 MAF of usable 
water. These aquifers are a great asset for drought protection, but only if their long-term 
overdrafting can be controlled. There is a need for more coordinated management of 
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groundwater on the regional level. Southern California has long recognized the value of 
groundwater supplies, and several major groundwater basins in that region have been 
adjudicated. The state can help in passing laws to expedite the adoption of groundwater 
management plans or other forms of self-regulation by local and regional entities. The local 
regulation of groundwater might reduce overdrafting in the future, since people are getting 
concerned about exporting groundwater. Even more important, the state agencies can help with 
hydrogeologic research to identify groundwater basins in terms of total and usable storage, safe 
yields, recharge areas, water quality problems, and other necessary data for groundwater 
management. Finally, more groundwater recharge and conjunctive use of surface water and 
groundwater are among the best ways of keeping the groundwater reserves viable. Natural 
recharge proceeds almost at capacity during wet years, and it will not significantly increase 
because of lowering of groundwater tables. Artificial recharge and conjunctive use of surface 
water and groundwater will help maintain adequate banks of groundwater. California has plenty 
of overdrafted aquifers to provide very large storage for future droughts. 
2. The surest way to mitigate the adverse social, environmental, and economic impacts 
of a sustained drought is to obtain more water. 
What we learned about the cumulative and propagating nature of impacts from the 1987-
92 drought suggests that the surest way of mitigating them is to provide more water from 
groundwater basins or surface storage reservoirs and use it to replace the deficiencies of 
precipitation and runoff. Both environmental and economic impacts of a sustained drought could 
be greatly moderated if more water could be found and delivered. 
Obtaining more water includes long-term programs aimed at reducing demand by 
improving efficiency of water use. Demand management can produce "inore water" and thus 
make a significant difference in urban and agricultural sectors. Obviously, the environment does 
not have such an option. There is little delay in impacts on environmental resources. They 
began with the first year of drought and accumulated as the drought continued. Agriculture is 
in a somewhat better position to modify water demand than environment, but quick gains in 
efficiency can only be made at a cost. The costs stem from managing irrigation more 
intensively, moving away from marginal soils, and postponing the leaching of salt accumulations 
in the soil. Finally, urban water-rationing programs also carry a price tag, but urban households 
and businesses use water for diverse purposes and, if given justification, can cut back on some 
less essential uses. However, their ability to reduce water use may be somewhat preempted by 
long-term efficiency improvement programs. 
The "more water" option eliminates the need to distribute the burden of shortages among 
off-stream water users. It may also benefit the environment if the additional water can be 
obtained without high environmental costs (e.g., those often associated with the construction of 
large-scale in-stream water storage reservoirs). The drought has shown that environmental 
quality standards are necessary but not sufficient to protect fish and wildlife from cumulative 
impacts of a sustained drought. Again, more water is the only remedy for protecting some 
species from extinction. However, if there is no water held behind dams or in the ground, more 
water for one sector must come from another sector. Water controllers who operate major 
storage reservoirs must face the difficult task of taking water from one sector and giving it to 
another and be accused of "playing God." Water institutions are well aware of these problems 
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and see the development of adequate supplies to keep pace with growth of consumptive use as 
their most important option. However, they believe this option has been taken away from them 
during the last two or three decades because of two factors: (1) a belief that limiting water 
supply could control growth and (2) environmental laws and regulations that made it possible 
for environmental interests to stop water development projects. 
The drought has shown, however, that water management in California does not have to 
be a "zero sum game," where gains of one sector are achieved at the expense of other sectors. 
There are other options for obtaining more water. More water can come not only from new 
storage but also from reallocation of existing supplies and voluntary transfers among off-stream 
users as well as from long-term improvements in the efficiency of water use. The results of our 
survey indicate that the urban, agricultural, and environmental interests are not strongly 
polarized with respect to all these "more water" options. All three sectors support further 
improvements in water use efficiency. Irrigators are not opposed to voluntary transfers on a 
temporary basis if their long-term interests are protected. Finally, the environmental community 
would support the development of new water storage, especially off-stream storage, if the 
agencies who operate the storage facilities do not discriminate against environmental uses of 
water. Their main objective is not to stop all water development but to reform the existing 
water institutions (both bureaucracies and water law) so that environmental uses of water are 
given equal standing with urban and agricultural sectors in water management decisions. 
3. Early drought response actions and proper timing of tactical measures are essential 
in short-term management of droughts. 
The 1987-92 drought has confirmed an earlier belief that droughts in California are truly 
unpredictable. In hindsight, taking earlier actions would have been warranted during both 
California droughts. The lesson of the 1976-77 drought was not lost on urban water providers. 
They made no bets on the drought to be over soon and maintained aggressive demand reduction 
programs through the most critical year of 1991. The 1987-1992 drought confirmed the earlier 
lesson on the importance of early drought response. 
The timing of cutbacks in water deliveries from the major projects must be examined 
carefully because it affects user sectors differently. No timing of cutbacks would satisfy all 
users of the CVP and SWP water at the same time. Early cutbacks to agriculture translate to 
economic impacts that become certain. Late cutbacks increase the risks to urban areas and also 
preempt future options for protecting against environmental damages. Generally speaking, urban 
areas would like to leave more water in storage to prevent deep cutbacks in deliveries at later, 
more critical stages of drought. The drought experiences indicate that farmers want maximum 
delivery during a given drought year and are willing to receive no supplies next year. However, 
in testimony at the SWRCB's Interim Water Rights Hearing, an agricultural economist testified 
that some studies show farmers can achieve greater profits with slightly reduced quantities of 
supply but increased certainty of supply. 
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4. Local and regional interconnections among water supply systems proved to be a 
good insurance policy against severe water shortages. 
Historically, urban and rural communities throughout the U.S. made strong efforts to 
develop their own water supplies and have control over their own fate. The desire for such local 
autonomy is also present in California. The 1987-92 drought demonstrated in several California 
communities that the self-reliance and self-sufficiency in terms of their "owned and operated" 
sources of water supply may not be an effective strategy for protection against multiyear 
droughts in the future. Actually, this strategy of local "self-sufficiency" in water supply can 
have disastrous consequences during drought. Examples of difficulties caused by guarded self-
sufficiency were found in the San Francisco Bay area and in Santa Barbara. Santa Barbara is 
a good example of a closed system. The city did not have any connections to other neighboring 
systems, and it was very difficult to bring water to them. The only short-term alternative 
available to them was a tanker bringing water through the sea. Later, a complex system of 
transfers and exchange arrangements by a number of districts was devised and implemented to 
bring some supplies to Santa Barbara. 
The confrrmed lesson here is that water districts should be encouraged to share their 
supplies with their neighbors and may also have to learn to rely more on external sources of 
supply over which they will have very limited control. This lesson does not apply to all water 
suppliers in the state. Some communities have abundant sources of supply and do not have to 
tum to water imports for many years. However, the number of districts that have to hook up 
to the statewide "plumbing system" is increasing. Unfortunately, this lesson may be lost on both 
the districts relying on the SWP water as well as some districts using the CVP water. Their 
experience is that the project supplies are not reliable, because they have been cut back. They 
feel they cannot count on SWP (or CVP) to keep their supplies uninterrupted and must develop 
more local or independent supplies, even if costs of such development are very high. Although 
a lesson on the importance of interconnections has been recognized during previous drought 
experiences, it has not been acted upon by many local providers of water. 
SUGGESTED WATER MANAGEMENT INITIATIVES AND REFORMS 
The experiences and lessons of the 1987-92 drought were translated by survey 
participants into specific actions that should be taken in order to enhance the capability of 
California's water management system to cope with future droughts. Below we present some 
of the participants' suggestions under the categories of strategic (long-term) and tactical (short-
term) measures. The sequence of these suggestions does not follow any particular order and the 
specific suggestions were not selected to form a coherent set of recommendations. Rather they 
represent our reporting of those suggestions which were voiced by survey respondents most 
frequently. Complete listings of these suggestions are included in Appendix D. 
197 
Strategic Measures Suggested by Survey Participants 
The strategic (long-term) measures listed below represent the views, perceptions, and 
opinions which were offered by survey participants. 
1. The Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta problem has to be resolved. Physical improvements in 
the Delta are needed to improve the efficiency of moving water stored in the upriver reservoirs 
to the south and to enhance and maintain water quality in the Delta. 
2. Swp facilities have to be completed. The present dependable supplies of SWP are 2.3 MAF 
per year. The improvements in the Delta will increase fmn SWP supplies, but additional storage 
will be needed to reach the originally planned firm supply of 4.2 MAF per year. 
3. A permanent Water Bank should be established. A Water Bank Office should be established 
as a broker of water transfers at any time. The office should be independent of C-DWR and 
SWP. The institutional barriers to water transfers should be removed except for those that 
protect against third-party impacts and negative environmental externalities. 
4. The state should move away from "crisis management" and focus more on "long-term 
planning." Long-term planning for drought protection should focus on alternatives such as water 
banking and marketing, conjunctive use of surface water and groundwater, water reclamation 
and desalination, as well as water conservation in agriculture and urban uses. 
5. Marginal cost pricing should be incorporated into long-term water plans. Pricing of 
developed water should be revised in order to eliminate the existing large differences in the 
prices paid per acre-foot of water, thus creating greater incentives to use water efficiently. 
6. Groundwater management should be improved. The state should look into groundwater 
regulation. More work on groundwater storage and mapping of aquifers is needed. Large 
groundwater basins in the Central Valley should be managed, possibly, by self-regulation of 
users. 
7. Water management should be centralJy coordinated. The operations of CVP should be 
transferred to the state, and the Governor should appoint a water czar to manage all State Water 
Projects. 
8. The state should develQP a computerized data bank. The bank should contain regularly 
updated comprehensive water-planning and management information and should be made readily 
accessible to all water agencies. 
9. California water law should be revised to allow for in-stream water rights. The existing 
system of water law protects off-stream uses. In-stream water rights would afford some 
protection of natural flows. 
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10. Enforced mitigation of impacts on 3.Qllatic resources should be undertaken in order to 
enhance water quality and minimum-flow standards. The standards established by EPA and 
SWRCB are not adequate for restoring and protecting environmental resources. 
11. More conservation technology and know-how should be infused into California's 
agriculture. Farmers should be educated on how to use less water, what kind of machinery to 
use, and how to manage labor in order to increase water use efficiency. A system of economic 
incentives should be developed to encourage more farmers to adopt innovative and efficient 
irrigation technologies. 
12. Improved reliability of urban water stmplies is needed. Water districts should develop more 
sophisticated long-term water plans with adequate protection against a sustained drought lasting 
10 to 15 years. The districts that are isolated and face supply limitations should also build 
interconnections with neighboring districts and tie into the California system of aqueducts where 
feasible. 
13. Long-term water management plan should take environmental needs into account. 
Environment should be brought along, and all water use purposes should be optimized by 
combining resource values with economic principles. 
14. Environmental needs for water should be met. A water fund should be established to 
purchase water for environmental purposes. Firm supplies of water for existing wetlands should 
be obtained. 
15. A better management of fish and wildlife under normal conditions is needed. The impacts 
of drought on fish and wildlife depend on the overall health of these environmental resources 
prior to drought. Better normal and wet year protection for fish and wildlife is needed in order 
to provide some additional elasticity during drought. 
Tactical Measures Suggested by Survey Participants 
The tactical (short-term) measures provided below represent the views suggested by 
survey participants. 
1. State should develop and adopt clear triggering mechanisms for drought remonse. State 
drought response actions should be triggered automatically without a lengthy and contentious 
process of passing drought emergency legislation. 
2. Californians should establish water use priorities. During periods of shortage, priorities in 
water use should be invoked and low-priority uses should be sacrificed if necessary. 
3. A streamlined approval process for all water transfers should be deyelqped. Drought Water 
Bank should be expanded, and exchanges and transfers outside the state bank should be 
facilitated. 
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4. A massive public information and education program is needed. Californians need to be 
better educated about water issues and droughts in order to gain public support for reforming 
the existing water management system. 
5. The state should cut down on the amount of frrm hydroelectricity production during drought. 
Stored water should be made available for environmental uses. Investments should be made in 
bulk energy transfer facilities to enhance the capability for importing power during droughts. 
6. Agricultural water districts should be more flexible. They should adjust their water delivery 
schedules (frequency and duration) according to the requirements for optimal water application 
on the irrigated crops. 
7. A better accountability in 3,&ricultural water use must be achieved. All irrigation water 
should be metered, and the districts should communicate to the public the degree of efficiency 
they were able to achieve. 
8. Urban water suppliers should develQP very clearly defined carry-over stQrage goals and 
adhere to them during drQught. Tactical short-term measures should be implemented whenever 
the carry-over storage goals are not expected to be maintained by the end of the water year. 
9. Urban water agencies should plan for water deficits. They should lessen the pressure on 
water development by planning for a 25 percent shortage during droughts and then only develop 
or obtain firm supplies to meet 75 percent of normal water demand. 
10. Water rationing should be done through pricing. Increasing the price of water during 
drought is the best way of achieving reductions in demand without causing revenue shortfalls. 
11. Water agenc.y rmresentatives should improve the communication of their water sypply 
situation. They should clearly communicate to the media, civic leaders, and customers what 
their water needs are, how much supply is available, what the expected shortages are, and what 
they want to accomplish through their demand reduction program. 
12. Environmental impacts must be given greater attention. Some equitable ways of protecting 
the environment must be found. Water institutions should not discriminate against environmental 
uses of water. 
CONCLUSION 
The six-year California drought of 1987-92 focused the attention of the public as well as 
water controllers and influencers on the shortcomings of the existing water management system 
in the state as defined by its water infrastructure, institutional arrangements, and the system of 
water rights. This management system is becoming increasingly inadequate in protecting the 
established in-stream and off-stream water uses against multiyear droughts. 
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Some of the lessons contained in this report point to specific changes that Californians 
should consider. More generally, however, the drought experiences merely demonstrated the 
shortcomings of the system, and water managers and citizens must now begin the work of 
designing new systems that will perform better in future droughts. 
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APPENDIX A 
WATER POLICY LEGISLATION, LITIGATION, AGREEMENTS AND 
DROUGHT LEGISLATION SINCE 1991 
WATER POlley LEGISLATION, 1980-1987 
Water Transfer 
AD 178 (N. Waters), Chap. 16S5 of 1984: Extends 
the law protecting areas of water origin to all future 
exporters from a number of Northern California 
watersheds. 
AD 2010 (Isenberg), Chap. 1384 of 1986: 
Authorizes Director, C-DWR, to negotiate with the 
Bureau of Reclamation for State to own or operate 
part or all of federal CVP. 
AD 2746 (Katz), Chap. 918 of 1986: Requires a 
State or local agency owning a water conveyance 
facility to let another local agency transfer water to a 
purchaser by unused capacity; transferor must pay 
fair compensation. 
AD 3427 (Kelley), Chap. 364 of 1986: Permits a 
water transfer agreement to exist more that 7 years, 
if mutually agreed to by agency and transferee. 
AD 3722 (Costa), Chap. 970 of 1986: Requires C-
DWR to set up a program to facilitate the voluntary 
exchange or transfer of water. 
SD 1700 (Torres), Chap. 1241 of 1986: Requires 
C-DWR to negotiate with the Bureau of Reclamation 
for purchase and transfer of water. 
Wa~Co~atioD 
Executive Order D-62-80 of 1980: This executive 
order directed all state agencies, department, boards, 
and commissions to continue to seek ways to 
implement water conservation practices in connection 
with their programs and activities. 
Executive Order D-68-80 of 1980: This executive 
order directed (1) C-DWR to prepare a plan of water 
conservation, reclamation, and management for the 
State Water Project to recommend actions that could 
be taken by the State and its water contractors to 
reduce demand for water and, (2) C-DWR to 
implement a program of recycling agricultural 
A-l 
drainage and brackish water with the objective of 
desalting 400,000 acre-feet by the year 2000. The 
Executive Order also urged the SWRCB to require 
water conservation plans in exercising its authority on 
water rights. 
Wa~ Code SecOOD; 375-377: These sections allow 
public retail water suppliers to, by ordinance or 
resolution, adopt a water conservation program, and 
require the installation of water-saving devices, 
except for agricultural users. 
Wa~ Code SectiOD; 10610-10656: These sections 
require every urban water supplier providing water 
for municipal purposes to more than 3,000 customers 
or supplying more than 3,000 acre-feet of water 
annually to prepare and adopt, in accordance with 
prescribed requirements, an urban water management 
plan containing prescribed elements. 
Wa~ Code SecOOD 1009 and 71610.5: These 
sections authorize municipal private water companies 
to prepare water conservation plans to reduce water 
use which can require water conservation retrofit 
devices. 
Public Utilities Code SectiOD 761 and 770: These 
sections give the California Public Utilities 
Commission board authority over water utilities it 
regulates (private) which would allow it to require 
water utilities to adopt programs for water 
conservation. 
AD 797 (Klehs), Chap. 1009 of 1983: Establishes 
the Urban Water Management Planning Act to 
require water conservation and management plans by 
urban water suppliers. 
AD 1732 (Costa), Chap. 377 of 1984: Authorizes 
sale of general obligation bonds to cover the State's 
share of waste water projects; for waste water 
reclamation projects and water conservation loans. 
AD 2542 (peace), Chap. 429 of 1984: Provides that 
use of Colorado River water reduced by water 
conservation measures will not cause the loss of 
water rights. 
AB 1029 (Kelley), Chap. 938 of 1985: Authorizes 
any water supplier or water user to finance water 
conservation or reclamation and sell the conserved or 
reclaimed water to another water supplier or water 
user. 
AB 1658 (Isenberg), Chap. 954 of 1986: Requires 
agricultural water suppliers to determine whether they 
have significant opportunities to save water. 
Existence of such opportunity requires that supplier 
prepare and adopt an Agricultural Water Management 
Plan. 
AB 1982 (Costa), Chap. 6 of 1986: Provides $150 
million in low-interest loans to local agencies for 
water conservation, groundwater recharge, and 
agricultural drainage projects. (Approved by voters 
in June 1986.) 
AB 325, Chap. 1145 of 1990: Requires California 
cities and counties to adopt a water-efficient 
landscape ordinance by January I, 1993 (unless they 
can prove that such ordinance is unnecessary). AB 
325 also directed C-DWR to draft a Model Water-
Efficient Landscape Ordinance, recently completed. 
Cities and counties must adopt this Model Ordinance 
by January I, if they have not adopted their own by 
then. 
Off-stream Storage 
AB 3792 (Isenberg), Chap. 1656 of 1984: 
Authorizes the Los Banos Grandes Reservoir, south 
of the Delta, as part of the SWP. 
Ground Water and Water Quality 
AB 1362 (Sher), Chap. 1046 of 1983: Establishes 
regulatory provisions to prevent groundwater 
contamination from hazardous substances stored in 
underground tanks. 
AB 1803 (Connolly), Chap. 881 of 1983 and 
AB 1803 (Connolly), Chap. 818 of 1985: Requires 
A-2 
the Department of Health Services and local health 
departments to evaluate public water systems for 
potential contamination. 
AB 2013 (Cortese), Chap. 1045 of 1983: Requires 
persons storing hazardous substances in underground 
containers to file a hazardous substance statement 
withSWRCB. 
AB 2183 (O'Connell), Chap. 378 of 1984: 
Authorized an additional $75 million for the Safe 
Drinking Water Program. 
AB 3566 (Katz), Chap. 1543 of 1984: Requires 
regulation of toxic pits in order to prevent 
contamination of groundwater. 
AB 3781 (Sher), Chap. 1584 of 1984: Requires 
testing of underground tanks before and after 
installation to protect groundwater from leaks. 
AB 1156 (Areias), Chap. 1034 of 1985: Enacts the 
Groundwater Recharge Facilities Financing Act, 
authorizing C-DWR to make grants to local agencies 
for groundwater recharge facilities. 
SB 187 (Ayala), Chap. 268 of 1985: Confirms 
authority of C-DWR to build groundwater storage 
facilities south of the Delta as part of SWP; requires 
C-DWR to contract with local agencies in such 
programs. 
AB 2668 (O'Connell), Chap. 410 of 1986: 
Authorized an additional $100 million for the Safe 
Drinking Water Program. 
AB 3127 (Areias), Chap. 1152 of 1986: Requires 
counties and cities to adopt water well abandonment 
ordinances that meet or exceed standards in C-DWR 
Bulletin 74-81. 
Fish and Wildlife (State) 
SB 512 (Hart), Chap. 6 of 1984: Enacts the Fish 
and Wildlife Habitat Enhancement Act of 1984, 
authorizing issuance of $85 million in bonds for fish 
and wildlife habitat enhancement. (Approved by 
voters in June 1984.) 
AD 723 (Campbell), Chap. 1259 of 1985: 
Authorizes SWRCB to consider streamflow 
requirements in applications to appropriate water. 
SB 400 (Keene), Chap. 1236 of 1985: Enacts the 
Fisheries Restoration Act of 1985 for restoration of 
fishery resources and habitat damaged by water 
diversions and projects. 
SB 1086 (Nielsen), Chap. 88S of 1986: Requires 
the Wildlife Conservation Board, by January 1, 1988, 
to inventory land along the upper Sacramento River 
and determine priority of land valuable to fish and 
wildlife. Creates an Upper Sacramento River 
Fisheries and Riparian Habitat Council to develop, 
for submission to the Legislature, the Upper 
Sacramento River Fisheries and Riparian Habitat 
Management Plan to provide for the protection, 
restoration, and enhancement of fish and riparian and 
associated wildlife for the area between the Feather 
River and Keswick Dam. 
Fish and Wildlife (Federal) 
DR 1438 (Chappie, Bosco, Shumway), PL 98-541: 
Establishes the Trinity River Basin Fish and Wildlife 
Management Program to restore and maintain fish 
and wildlife populations in the basin. 
DR 3113 (Miller, Coelho, Lehman), PL 99-546: 
Authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to enter into 
agreements for coordinated operation of the federal 
CVP and SWP and to preserve Suisun Marsh. 
DR 4712 (Bosco), PL 99-552: Establishes the 
Klamath River Basin Conservation Area Restoration 
Program to restore anadromous fishery in the river. 
Delta Levees 
AD 955 (Peace), Chap. 1271 of 1985: Requires C-
DWR to plan for continued water exports, should 
Delta levees fail. 
AB 3473 (Johnston), Chap. 824 of 1986: Requires 
C-DWR to inspect local agencies' nonproject levees 
to ascertain degree of compliance with maintenance 
standards. 
SB 2224 (Garamendi) , Chap. 1357 of 1986: 
Authorizes C-DWR and The Reclamation Board to 
determine the need for State financial aid to Delta 
reclamation and levee districts to maintain levees that 
protect State highways. 
SIGNIFICANT WATER POLICY LmGATION 
U.S. Supreme Court Cases 
California v. United States (1978) 
The U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, in operating New 
Melones Reservoir, must comply with State water 
rights law, unless it is inconsistent with congressional 
directives to do so. This is the leading Supreme 
Court decision requiring the United States, in most 
instances, to comply with the substance and 
procedures of State water rights law. The Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeal later held that the conditions 
imposed by the State Water Resources Control Board 
(SWRCB) on New Melones were consistent with 
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congressional directives (United States v. State of 
California, State Water Resources Control Board, 
694 F.2d 1171 (1982»). 
(438 U.S. 645, 98 S.CT. 2985) 
United States v. New Mexico (1978) 
This case limited the amount of water the U.S. Forest 
Service could claim under the "reserved rights 
doctrine" to water necessary for the primary purposes 
for which the National Forests were reserved; that is, 
preservation of timber and securing favorable flows 
for private and public uses under state law. Water 
for secondary purposes -- for example, stock 
watering and environmental, recreational, or scenic 
purposes -- could be acquired only in the same 
manner as any other public or private appropriator 
under state law. The California v. United States and 
the New Mexico cases both emphasize Congress' 
historic deference to state water law. 
(438 U.S. 696, 98 S.Ct. 3012) 
California Cases 
National Audubon Society v. Superior Court 
(1983) 
The public trust doctrine applies to the City of Los 
Angeles' rights to divert water from streams tributary 
to Mono Lake. The State retains supervisory control 
over its navigable waters under the public trust to 
protect such uses as navigation, fisheries, commerce, 
recreation, and scenic and environmental values. 
This prevents any person from obtaining a vested 
right to appropriate water in a manner harmful to the 
public trust. As a matter of necessity, SWRCB may 
grant rights to take water needed in distant parts of 
the State, even if public trust uses are harmed, but it 
must take public trust into account and protect public 
trust values wherever feasible. SWRCB retains 
continuing supervision and may reconsider allocation 
decisions, even if the decisions were made after 
consideration of public trust values. SWRCB and 
California courts have concurrent jurisdiction to 
consider and protect public trust values. 
(33 Cal.3d 419, 189 Cal.Rptr. 346) 
Imperial Irrigation District v. State Water 
Resources Control Board (1986) 
After an adjudicatory hearing, SWRCB found that 
failure to undertake additional water conservation 
measures was unreasonable under Article X, Section 
2, of the California Constitution. The Court affirmed 
SWRCB's authority under the Constitution and Water 
Code Section 275 to conduct such a hearing and to 
enforce its order. 
(186 Cal.App.3d 1160, 231 Cal.Rptr. 283) 
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United States v. State Water Resources Control 
Board (1986) 
[The Consolidated Delta Cases] 
This decision (Racanelli) covers eight cases 
challenging SWRCB's Decision No. 1485, issued in 
1978, and its Water Quality Control Plan for the 
Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta and Suisun Marsh. 
The decision recognizes SWRCB's broad authority 
and discretion over water rights and water quality 
issues, including jurisdiction over the federal CVP. 
(182 Cal.App.3d 82, 227 Cal.Rptr. 161) 
Fullerton v. State Water Resources Control Board 
(1979) 
(90 Cal.App.3d 590, 153 Cal.Rptr. 518) 
California Trout, Inc. v. State Water Resources 
Control Board (1979) 
(90 Ca1.App.3d 816, 153 Cal.Rptr. 672) 
These two cases hold that an appropriation of water 
cannot be made for in-stream flows because some 
physical control over the water is a necessary element 
of the doctrine of appropriation. 
1991 DROUGHT LEGISLATION 
State Legislation 
The following bills were introduced in Extraordinary 
Session. 
AB9x (Cortese) Water transfers: This bill gives the 
governing body of a water supplier explicit authority 
to enter into contracts, either with the Department of 
Water Resources' water bank or with other water 
suppliers, for transfer of water outside the service 
area of the water supplier. An urgency measure. 
STATUS: This bill has been signed by the 
Governor (Extraordinary Session Chapter 1-
91). 
AD lOx (Costa) Water transfers: This bill 
explicitly declares that no temporary transfer of water 
under any provision of law for drought relief in 1991 
or 1992 will affect any water rights. An urgency 
measures. 
STATUS: This bill has been signed by the 
Governor (Extraordinary Session Chapter 2-
91). 
AD 11x (Filante) Urban Water Management Plans: 
This bill requires every urban water supplier to 
prepare an urban water shortage contingency plan. 
It requires the plan to include data on water usage, an 
estimate of water supply at yearly intervals (assuming 
worst-case shortages), stages of action to respond to 
possible water supply shortages of up to 50 percent, 
mandatory prohibitions on wasteful practices, 
consumption limits that would apply in the more 
restrictive stages of shortages, penalties for excessive 
use, an analysis of the financial effect of the plan on 
the supplier, a draft resolution or ordinance to 
implement the plan, and a mechanism to determine 
actual reduction in water use pursuant to the plan. 
This bill requires suppliers to include these 
contingency plans in their urban water management 
plans, and it requires suppliers to forward their plans 
to C-DWR by January 31, 1992. The bill requires 
water suppliers providing water indirectly to retail 
customers to prepare plans, and it requires suppliers 
to coordinate with other suppliers in their area in 
preparation of shortage contingency plans. The bill 
exempts implementation of water shortage 
contingency plans from the California Environmental 
Quality Act (CEQA), provided the project would not 
significantly affect water supplies for fish and 
wildlife. After January 31, 1992, the bill disqualifies 
noncomplying urban water suppliers from State 
drought assistance until the suppliers submit water 
shortage contingency plans. 
STATUS: This bill became law without the 
Governor's signature (Extraordinary Session 
Chapter 13-91). 
AD 12x (Costa) Department or Fish and Game: 
drought management activities: This bill 
appropriates $15.277 million from the General Fund 
to the Department of Fish and Game to minimi~ the 
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effects of the drought on fish and wildlife trust 
resources and protect populations of fish and wildlife. 
An urgency measure. 
STATUS: This bill has been signed by the 
Governor (Extraordinary Session Chapter 
11-91). 
AD 14x (Jones) Department of Forestry and Fire 
Protection: funding: This bill would appropriate 
$20.4 million from the General Fund to the 
Department of Forestry and Fire Protection for Fiscal 
year 1991-92 for increased fire protection activities 
and for capital outlay involving installation or 
rehabilitation of wells and installation of pipelines as 
needed to restore adequate water supplies to fire 
stations and conservation camps. An urgency 
measure. 
STATUS: This bill was passed by the 
Assembly. It failed passage in the Senate 
Committee on Budget and Fiscal Review. 
AD 15x (Kelley) Reclamation projects: emergency 
assistance: This bill would appropriate $10 million 
from the General Fund to the State Water Resources 
Control Board for State financial assistance (loans 
and grants) to local water suppliers for water 
reclamation projects that can be completed and 
provide reclaimed water by June 30, 1992. An 
urgency measure. 
STATUS: This bill is before the full 
Assembly. 
AD 16x (Mays) Water resources: This bill removes 
statutory maximum time limits for action by the State 
Water Resources Control Board on water rights 
applications and petitions during drought emergencies 
or critically dry years. It autho~ the State Water 
Resources Control Board to adopt drought-response 
emergency regulations, effective for 270 days, 
without review and approval by the Office of 
Administrative Law. An urgency measure 
STATUS: This bill has been signed by the 
Governor (Extraordinary Session Chapter 
12-91). 
AB 18K (Areias) Property taxation: deferral: This 
bill would authorize counties to permit owners of 
agricultural land to defer payment of fiscal year 
1991-92 property taxes, but it would restrict their 
deferral to owners whose land has been damaged as 
a result of drought. An urgency measure. 
STATUS: This bill has been passed by the 
Assembly and the Senate; it has been 
returned to the Assembly for concurrence in 
Senate amendments. 
SD 9x (Bergeson) Water appropriation: water 
suppliers: This bill explicitly authorizes water 
suppliers to contract with customers for water when 
customers voluntarily reduce or eliminates use of 
water. An urgency measure. 
STATUS: This bill has been signed by the 
Governor (Extraordinary Session Chapter 
SB 12x (Ayala) Drought relief and assistance: This 
bill secures legislative approval for projects 
potentially eligible for funding under the 1988 Water 
Conservation Bond Law and the 1986 Water 
Conservation and Water Quality Bond Law. An 
urgency measure. 
STATUS: This bill has been signed by the 
Governor (Extraordinary Session Chapter 
10-91). 
The following legislation was introduced during the 
Regular Session. 
AB 455 (Cortese) Development projects: water 
supply: In response to drought conditions, this bill 
would require each urban water supplier to submit a 
copy of its urban water management plan and a copy 
of its capital improvement plan to each city and 
county within its service area and would require lead 
agencies under CEQA to consult with water suppliers 
on the aVailability of a "long-term, reliable supply of 
water" for proposed development projects. The bill 
would require water suppliers to make written 
determinations on the aVailability of this water supply 
and would require lead agencies, relying on the water 
suppliers' written determinations, to make written 
findings on the availability of water supply for the 
proposed development project. The bill would define 
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"long-term, reliable supply of water" to mean water 
availability consistent with water purveyor plans, 
programs, and policies, and it would declare that the 
existence of a long-term, reliable supply of water 
does not create entitlement to or a permanent right to 
water and does not include a guarantee concerning 
the ability of a water retailer to serve its customers. 
The bill would authorize public agencies to charge 
fees to cover costs of services required by the bill. 
The bill would limit its requirements to projects of 
sufficient statewide, regional, or areawide 
environmental significance. 
STATUS: This bill is before the full 
Assembly. 
AD 1357 (Cortese) water shortage emergencies: 
This bill would enact the Drought Response Act of 
1991 and would authorize the Governor to declare a 
drought emergency if, by February IS the current 
year is dry or critically dry and if the two previous 
years have been dry or critically dry. The bill would 
require the director of the Department of Water 
Resources, prior to the Governor's declaration, to 
prepare and submit to the Legislature a report on the 
geographic extent of the water shortage and on 
drought mitigation measures that could be 
implemented on an emergency basis. The bill would 
authorize the director, prior to issuing the report, to 
begin planning and developing facilities and 
technology to assist in the mitigation of the effects of 
the drought, and it would authorize the director to 
undertake specified actions to provide water supplies 
to water-short areas. The bill would create a 
Drought Response Account in the Reserve for 
Economic Uncertainties and would express legislative 
intent that this account have a balance of $1 million 
at the beginning of each fiscal year. An urgency 
measure. 
STATUS: This bill has been referred to the 
Assembly Committee on Water, Parks and 
Wildlife. 
AD 1387 (O'Connell) Safe drinking water and 
drought relief bonds: This bill would place a $200 
million General Obligation bond act (the California 
Safe Drinking Water and Drought Relief Bond Law 
of 1992) on the June 1992 primary election ballot and 
would use bond revenues to finance a safe drinking 
water program ($150 million) and drought relief 
program ($50 million). This bill would revise the 
method of calculating the rate of interest on loans 
under the California Safe Drinking Water Bond Law 
of 1976. An urgency measure. (The substance of 
this bill has been amended into AD 2112, Polanco). 
STATUS: This bill is being held in 
Assembly Committee on Banking, Finance 
and Bonded Indebtedness. 
AD 1580 (Cortese) Water resources: urban water 
management: This bill would require each urban 
water supplier to amend its urban water management 
plan to include an estimate of agricultural water use, 
to identify and evaluate wastewater recycling 
activities currently adopted, and to describe water-
saving fixtures and appliances for industrial, 
residential. commercial, agricultural, and 
governmental uses and the strategies proposed to 
meet short-term and long-term supply deficiencies in 
time of drought and emergency. 
STATUS: This bill has been passed by the 
Assembly and by the Senate; it has been 
returned to the Assembly for concurrence in 
Senate amendments, then placed in the 
Assembly Inactive file. 
AD 1972 (Wyman) Agriculture: low-interest loans: 
This bill would require the Director of the 
Department of Food and Agriculture to establish a 
program of low-interest loans to agricultural 
producers who suffer drought damage to orchards, 
vineyards, or other perennial agricultural plants. 
STATUS: This bill has been referred to the 
Assembly Committee on Agriculture. 
AD 2247 (Areias) Loans: linked deposits: 
agricultural operators and small businesses: This 
bill would make legislative findings that the State's 
recent economic downturn, drought, and freeze have 
created great economic hardship on small farms and 
businesses. The bill would create the California 
Treasurer's low Cost Loan Program for Small 
Business and Agriculture, a linked deposit program 
(an agreement between the State Treasurer and 
lending institutions where the Treasurer deposits state 
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funds in the lending institution at reduced interest 
rates for deposits and the lending institutions agrees 
to lend the equivalent amount of money to eligible 
borrowers at reduced interest rates for loans). The 
bill would authorize the Treasurer to allocate up to 3 
percent of the Pooled Money Investment Account to 
this program. An urgency measure, 
STATUS: This bill has been referred to the 
Assembly Committee on Ways and Means. 
SD 436 (Davis) Drought emergencies: liability for 
precipitation: This bill would create an exemption 
for public entities from civil liability for ordinary 
negligence based on occurrence or quantity of 
precipitation. The bill would include in the 
exemption any liability based on precipitation 
allegedly caused by cloud seeding, but it would limit 
this exemption to those places and time periods 
covered by a Governor's proclamation of emergency 
under Government Code Section 8625 due to 
drought. The bill would exclude from this exemption 
any liability resulting from failure to properly design, 
install, operate, or maintain flood control facilities. 
STATUS: This bill has been referred to the 
Senate Committee on Judiciary. 
SD 1168 (Marks) Water: drought relief: vessels 
and water meters: This bill would increase vessel 
registration fees and would appropriate revenues from 
these increased fees to the Department of Boating and 
Waterways for drought relief, with a priority of 
maintaining or increasing water levels in lakes used 
for recreational boating. The bill would require, 
effective January 1, 1992, that all new service be 
metered and, effective January 1, 1994, that all water 
service be metered, 
STATUS: This bill failed passage in the 
Senate Committee on Transportation. 
Federal Legislation 
B.R. 355 (LeIunan) Reclamation States Drought 
Relief Act of 1991: This bill would authorize the 
Secretary of the Interior to construct temporary 
facilities and drill new wells to mitigate drought 
losses; to assist willing buyers in the purchase of 
water from willing sellers; to purchase water for 
delivery under temporary federal contracts; to 
participate in State-established water banks; to make 
projects and non-project water available, within and 
outside an authorized project service area,using 
federal storage and conveyance facilities, for 
agricultural, municipal, and industrial, and fish and 
wildlife purposes; to make loans to water users for 
drought response activities; to study measures for 
water conservation, augmentation and efficient use; 
to prepare cooperative drought contingency plans; 
and to study the need for a Reclamation Drought 
Response Fund. 
STATUS: This bill has passed the House 
and the Senate. It has been returned to the 
House for concurrence in Senate 
amendments. 
H.R. 1281 (Whitten) Dire emergency supplemental 
appropriations: Among other appropriations, this 
bill appropriates $25 million to the Department of the 
Interior for the construction program of the Bureau of 
Reclamation to meet the emergency needs of areas 
affected by the continuing drought in the western 
United States. 
STATUS: This bill has been signed by the 
President (Public Law 102-27, April 10, 
1991). 
s. 586 (Bradley) Reclamation Drought Act of 
1991: This bill would permanently authorize the 
Bureau of Reclamation, after consulting with 
governors of affected states, to undertake 
management and conservation activities to alleviate 
temporary drought conditions, to provide information 
and technical assistance to willing buyers and sellers 
of water, to prepare drought contingency plans for 
federal reclamation projects, and to contract for 
storage and conveyance of project and non-project 
water for use within and outside of authorized project 
service areas. 
STATUS: This bill has been referred to the 
Senate Committee on Energy and Natural 
Resources. 
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S. 711 (Seymour) Drought response: This bill 
would provide the Secretary of the Interior with 
authorizations similar to those proposed in H.R. 355. 
Additionally, this bill would authorize loans for the 
purchase of interim supplies of water and for 
structural and non-structural activities to mitigate 
drought effects, and it would authorize the Secretary 
on the Interior to establish a $10 million 
"Reclamation Drought Response Fund" to finance 
drought-relief activities authorized by the act. 
STATUS: This bill has been referred to the 
Senate Committee on Energy and Natural 
Resources. 
Public Law 102-575, Title 34 Central Valley 
Project Improvement Act of 1992: The key 
legislated purposes of this title are: 
(a) to protect, restore, and enhance fish, wildlife, 
and associated habitats in the Central Valley and 
Trinity River basins of California; 
(b) to address impacts of the CVP on fish, wildlife, 
and associated habitats; 
(c) to improve the operational flexibility of the CVP; 
(d) to increase water-related benefits provided by the 
CVP to the State of California through expanded use 
of voluntary water transfers and improved water 
conservation; 
(e) to contribute to the State of California's interim 
and long-term efforts to protect the San Francisco 
Bay/Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta Estuary; and 
(t) to achieve a reasonable balance among competing 
demands for use of CVP water, including the 
requirements of fish and wildlife, agricultural, 
municipal and industrial power contractors. 
Title 34 mandated ten major areas of change 
in the management of the CVP: 
• 800,000 acre-feet of water dedicated to 
fish and wildlife annually; 
• tiered water pricing applicable to new and 
renewed contracts; 
• water transfers provisions, including sale 
of water to users outside the CVP service 
area; 
• special efforts to restore anadromous fish 
population by 2002; 
• Restoration Fund financed by water and 
power users for habitat restoration and 
improvement and water and land 
acquisitions; 
• no new water contracts until fish and 
wildlife goals achieved; no contract 
renewals until completion of an 
Environmental Impact Statement (BIS); 
terms reduced from 40 to 25 years with 
renewal at the discretion of the Secretary 
of the Interior; 
• installation of the temperature control 
device at Shasta Dam; 
• implementation of fish passage measures 
at Red Bluff Diversion Dam; 
• firm water supplies for Central Valley 
refuges; and 
• development of a plan to increase CVP 
yield. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This report discusses the Water Delivery Risk Analysisl for 1989 and its associated criteria and 
implementation procedures. Risk Analysis is used to estimate the level of State Water Project 
(SWP) water deliveries that can be met during a year while maintaining prudent storage reserves 
for supporting deliveries in subsequent years. The estimated delivery capability is intended to 
be conservatively low to assure the water contractors of a base supply to plan their annual 
operations. Implementation procedures define the method for periodically updating that estimate 
as the winter and spring water supply develops. 
The Risk Analysis Curve is a graphical presentation of the relationship between the forecasted 
Sacramento River Index2 (SRI) for the water year and SWP water delivery capability for the 
calendar year. The SRI is used as an indicator of the available water supply. It is also the 
parameter used in State Water Resources Control Board Decision 1485 (0-1485) for classifying 
types of water years and establishing the corresponding level of protection for the Sacramento-
San Joaquin Delta. Those classifications are shown in Table A which has been extracted from 
D-1485. It should be pointed out that D-1485 uses median forecasts for establishing the year 
classification but the Risk Analysis application uses the more conservative forecasts defined in 
this report for determining water delivery capability. 
Tables which show historical SRI data by water years, both chronologically and in ascending 
order, are included as Tables D and E. These tables show the high variability of the historical 
water supply. 
SWP WATER DELIVERY RISK ANALYSIS FOR 1989 
The 1989 Risk Analysis used the same operating and decision-making criteria to develop the 
curve as were used in the 1988 Rule Curve procedure. The values of these criteria for 1989 are: 
• Storage threshold for scheduled surplus water deliveries is 3.0 million acre-feet 
(MAF). 
• Average Annual Critical Period Supply (AACPS) is 2.26 MAF. 
lIn 1988 and prior years the Water Delivery Risk Analysis was identified as the Rule Curve procedure. 
2Jn 1988 and prior years the Sacramento River Index was identified as the Four Basin Index. It consists of the 
forecasted or computed unimpaired flows of the Sacramento River near Red Bluff, the Feather River at Oroville 
Reservoir, the Yuba River at Smartville, and the American River at Folsom Reservoir. 
3 A water year begins on October 1 and ends the following September 30. 
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TABLE A. 4/ 
NATER YEl\R ClASSIFlCATICX~ 
VEAR TVPE Y 
Year classification shall be determined by the forecast 
of Sacramento Valley unimpaired runoff fOI the current wate, 
yea, (October 1 of the preceding calendar year through 
Septembel 30 of the cUllent calenda, year) as published in 
California Department of Water Resources Bulletin 120 for 
the sum of the following locations: Sacramento River above 
Bend Bridge. near Red Bluff; Feather River. total inflow to 
Oroville Reservoir: Yuba River at Smartville; American 
River. total inflow to Folsom Reservoir. Preliminary 
determinations of year classification shall be made in 
February, March and April with final determination in May. 
These preliminary determinations shall be based on hydro-
logiC conditions to date plus forecasts of future runoff 
assuming normal precipitation for the remainder of the 
water year. 
All vea~rs for Vear Following 
All Standards Critical Vear tJ 
Except 
YEAR TYPE 
Wet 11 
Above Norma I !J 
Below Normal !I 
Dry 
Critical 
RUNOFF, MILLlO!jS OF ACRE·FEET 
equal to or greater than 19.6 (except 
equal to or greater than 22.5 in a year 
following a critical year). V 
greater than 15 .. 7 and less than 19.6 
(except greater than 15.7 and less than 
22.S in a yea, following a critical year).Y 
equat to 0' les!> than 15. i and greater 
than 12.5 (except in a year following a 
critical y~ar),V-
_ equal to or less than 12.5 and greater 
than 10.2 (except equal to or less than 
15.7 and greater than 12.5 in a year 
following a critical year).U 
equal to or less than 10.2 (except equal 
to or less than 12.5 in a year following 
a critical year).V 
19.6 
i 
~ 
z 
I 
< 
15.7 
i 
~ 
z 
I 
i 
12.5 • 
>-
cS 
10.2 
ii 
~ 
c:s 
-
" 
" 
"" • e 
CJ 
..: 
.... 
0 
lit 
II 
0 
-
-
-=-:: 
0 
II 
::t 
Q: 
~ 
e 
-I 
& 
-II: :::» 
Y Any otherwise wet, above normal. or below normal year may be designated a subnormal 
snowmelt year whenever the forecast of April through July unimpaired runoff reported in 
the May issue of Bulletin 720 is less than 5.9 million acre-teet. 
Y The year type lor the preceding water year will remain in effect until the initial forecast 
of unimpaired runoff lor the cUllent water year is available. 
15.7 
12.5 
V-
o. Year lol/owing critical yea," classification does not apply to Agricultural, MuniCipal an
d 
Industrial standards. 
Y Fran footnote 2 of Table D, page 41 of rr148S. 
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• Carryover storage4 for 1989 (on October 1, 1988) included 1.93 MAF storage 
in Lake Oroville and San Luis Reservoir (State share) and 0.06 MAF water owed 
to the SWP from the Central Valley Project in accordance with Article 6(e) of the 
Coordinated Operating Agreement, for a total of 1.99 MAF. 
• Target storageS is based on the equation developed in 1988, which is applied to 
carryover storage. The equation6 for determination of target storage is: 
TS 
Where 
TS 
BS 
1. 0 + 112 (BS-1. 0) 
Target storage for the end of the water year in MAF 
Carryover storage for the beginning of the water year in MAF 
Target storage for October 1, 1989 is therefore: 
TS 1.0 + 112 (1.99-1.0) 
1.5 MAF 
The procedure for determining delivery approvals has been changed somewhat for 1989 in two 
respects: 
• The initial delivery approval is based on a probability of exceedence of 
approximately 91 percent as determined from the 1906-1985 historical values of 
the SRI. Last year's initial approval was based on the December 7, 1987 
estimate of the SRI at 99 percent exceedence probability, provided by the DWR 
Division of Flood Management. Monthly approval updates will be based on 99 
percent probability of exceedence as in 1988. 
• The change in exceedence probability for the initial approval increases the 
likelihood that a lower value of water delivery capability will occur in subsequent 
months. For that reason, it may be necessary to partially rescind approved 
deliveries beginning in March. 
This Risk Analysis procedure is again being implemented on a one-year trial basis. 
"The amount of combined storage in Lake Oroville and San Luis Reservoir (State share), together with other 
water available for Project export, at the beginning of a water year. 
SJ'he amount of combined storage in Lake Oroville and San Luis Reservoir (State share) to be reserved at the 
end of a water year for supporting Project water deliveries during subsequent years. 
6o'fhe equation expresses the strategy of allowing storage to decrease halfway from carryover storage to minimum 
conservation storage of 1.0 MAP, which is dead storage of State share of San Luis Reservoir plus minimum power 
pool in Lake Oroville plus a small allowance for excess of October deliveries over expected inflow. 
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DevelQPment of Risk Analysis Curve 
The 1989 Water Delivery Risk Analysis Curve (Figure 1) was developed by performing three 
series of 57 one-year operation studies using historic water year hydrology from 1922 through 
1978. In all three series of studies, the beginning storage in SWP reservoirs was the actual 
carryover storage (1.99 MAF). 
The end-of-water year storage (Oroville plus State share of San Luis) in the first series of 57 
one-year studies was set to 1.0 MAF. That storage is slightly above minimum power pool 
which allows for a small amount of continued drawdown during the following October. The 
results of these studies indicate the maximum delivery capability using the water supply and all 
available water in storage. These results are plotted as the curve segment from 0 to the AACPS 
(2.26 MAF). The horizontal offset at 2.26 MAF water delivery capability represents the 
additional water supply needed before further entitlement deliveries can be approved. 
In the second series of these studies, the ending storage was allowed to be no less than the target 
storage, 1.5 MAF. Regressing the delivery points from this series of 57 one-year studies 
provides a curvilinear relationship of potential deliveries versus SRI forecasts. This is shown 
in Figure 1 as the solid line between the AACPS and the requested entitlement deliveries. 
The third series of 57 one-year studies required an end-of-year storage of 3.0 MAF, which is 
the surplus water delivery threshold used in the Risk Analysis. The delivery points for this 
series of studies were regressed to develop the curve for determination of the SRI necessary for 
various levels of surplus water delivery. This is shown as the solid line above the requested 
entitlement deliveries. 
The horizontal offset of these two lines at the requested entitlements level represents a gross 
estimate of the additional SRI water supply which must be available to recharge end-of-year 
storage in Lake Oroville and San Luis Reservoir (State share) from the target storage for 
entitlement water deliveries (1.5 MAF( to the threshold storage for surplus water deliveries (3.0 
MAF). 
Also shown on Figure 1 are the AACPS and the levels of requested entitlement and surplus 
water delivery for 1989. 
Reinstatement of applied reductions begins when the projected SRI runoff exceeds the amount 
indicated by the Risk Analysis to meet further increases if verified by operation studies. 
Figure 2, "Frequency of Sacramento River Index, " is included to provide a method of estimating 
the probability of receiving any specific SRI runoff volume. For example, the probability of 
receiving a SRI runoff of at least 9.2 MAF (the amount which occurred in water year 1988) is 
90.6 percent. 
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Monthly Awroval Updates 
Shortly after the first of each month, January through May, DWR's forecast of the unimpaired 
runoff of the four stations which make up the SRI, at the 99 percent probability of exceedence 
level, will be used in conjunction with the 1989 Risk Analysis to provide a gross solution of the 
annual amount of water available for delivery. This solution must be considered "gross" since 
the annual index by itself is not indicative of the effect of monthly runoff distributions on annual 
supply-a wet fall season is not overly beneficial if much of the water must be released to 
maintain flood control reservation. 
The gross solution of the amount of water available for delivery is then allocated to individual 
contractors for input to an operations study, which is then made in order to verify that the 
deliveries can be met while maintaining the target storages. That operations study utilizes actual 
Oroville and San Luis storage at the beginning of the then current month, the forecasted water 
supplies for the remainder of the water year at the 99 percent exceedence level and approved 
facility outage schedules. The study also accounts for any special outstanding obligations upon 
Lake Oroville storage (such as for share of Delta outflow owed to the USBR under coordinated 
operations or 1988 Yuba County Water Agency purchase, or special entitlement carryover 
agreements) . 
1989 WATER DELIVERIES 
Delivery requests submitted by the water contractors for 1989 total about 3.02 MAF for 
entitlement and entitlement-related uses. In addition to that water, requests have also been 
submitted for about 0.26 MAF of surplus water. A detailed breakdown of the 1989 requests is 
given in Table B. These requested deliveries have not been approved. 
Approved deliveries for 1989 are shown in Table C. These approved deliveries total 2.51 
MAF. Approvals have been based on an estimate of 9.0 for the SRI, which is at a probability 
of exceedence of approximately 91 percent. The 1989 Risk Analysis and operations study 
support this level of delivery, which requires a 40 percent reduction in agricultural requests. 
Subsequent approvals will be determined from the SRI forecasts at the 99 percent level of 
exceedence and the 1989 Water Delivery Risk Analysis Curve (Figure 1), and verified by 
operation studies. Entitlement requests in excess of the initial 2.51 MAF will be approved to 
the extent allowed with increased SRI while maintaining the September 30, 1989 carryover target 
storage of 1.5 MAF. If the Risk Analysis and operations study for January or February indicate 
reduced water delivery capability, no reduction in approved deliveries will be made. If the 
March approval update indicates less water delivery capability than previously approved, 
approvals will be reduced accordingly. If the April or May approval update indicates less water 
delivery capability, no reductions will be made, unless projected conservation storage falls below 
1.0 MAF. 
Surplus water deliveries will not be approved unless SWP operation studies show that the 
carryover storage (Lake Oroville plus State share of San Luis Reservoir) on September 30, 1989 
will be at least 3.0 MAF and then only to the extent that such deliveries are in excess of that 
needed to maintain the 3.0 MAF surplus water threshold. 
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TABLED 
1989 REQUESTED WATER. DELIVEIUES 
State 01 Califoruia 
(Acre-Feet) De=eat 01 Water Resources TheR~~ State ater Project ~sis Oftiee File ID: F1989 Date: U/05188 
Jan Feb Mar Api' May J- Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
Page: 1 
Total 
County of Butte 50 50 120 70 70 90 170 200 170 90 60 60 1200 
Plumas Co FCWCD 25 30 41 75 99 144 159 159 159 40 35 34 1000 
Yuba Citki 0 0 0 0 0 0 500 600 300 100 0 0 1500 
Feather ·ver 5 75 80 161 145 169 234 829 959 629 230 95 94 3700 
N;raa Co FCWCD 508 501 549 574 517 410 442 444 556 633 519 513 6166 
So ano Co FCWCD 1399 1226 1413 1545 1671 1580 1735 1725 1620 1592 1520 1394 18420 
North Bay Serri 1907 1727 1962 2119 2188 1990 2177 2169 2176 2115 2039 1907 24586 
Alameda Co WD 2977 2757 2977 3180 3287 3180 3287 3287 3180 2977 2290 2321 35700 
Santa Clara VWD 5200 3900 6000 6500 7500 8500 9000 9500 9400 8700 8000 7800 90000 
Zone-7 Alameda 1607 1537 1826 2384 3402 3841 4216 3986 2782 2288 1560 1571 31000 Entitlement 
South Bay Serri 9784 8194 10803 11064 14189 15521 16503 16773 15362 13965 11850 11692 156700 
Water '!/Pes 
County of Ki{W, 400 400 400 400 0 400 400 400 400 400 0 400 4000 Includ 
Devil's Den 254 381 762 1016 1270 2032 2286 2286 1143 508 381 381 12700 
Dudley Ridge WD 0 0 3675 2937 6499 10613 12990 11415 2560· 2548 1020 1343 55600 101MCI ENT WTIO 
~ireWSID 60 90 180 240 300 480 540 540 270 120 90 90 3000 lllMGWFNI'WT08 
KernC~WA 15428 21493 66470 85344 143026 203269 200792 196348 89039 34376 25545 31170 1112300 131BYPS ENT wr59 
Oak Flat 0 168 336 616 672 896 1008 1008 504 224 168 0 5600 151AGRENTWTOI 
Tulare Lk BWSD 625 2271 1500 1800 5954 19442 19m 19782 12167 1300 5500 19782 109900 161AGWENTWI'22 
San Joaquin Val 16767 24803 73323 92353 157721 237132 237793 231779 106083 39476 32704 53166 1303100 181BEN ENT WT46 
191VALENTWT47 
AvekWA 1672 1993 3895 5530 6250 6735 7495 7720 5425 4070 2483 1732 55000 
Castaic Lake WA 1415 1415 1650 1986 2458 2458 2930 2930 2222 1986 1515 1515 24480 
Coachella ValIel 1822 1822 1822 1822 1822 1822 1822 1822 1822 1822 1822 1831 21873 
Crestline-La W 227 133 133 137 184 207 265 362 265 192 192 168 2465 
DesertWA 3041 3041 3041 3041 3041 3041 3041 3041 3041 3041 3041 3049 36500 
Littlerock CR 0 0 230 230 230 230 230 230 230 230 230 0 2070 
Metropolitan WD 65137 120137 101137 115137 115137 115137 125137 125137 125137 119137 116257 70000 1312627 
MojaveWA 0 0 0 0 0 0 60 60 60 60 60 60 360 
PaIindale WD 0 0 910 910 910 910 910 910 910 910 910 0 8190 
San Bernardino 2000 2000 2000 2000 3800 3800 3800 3800 3800 4800 3000 0 34800 
San Gabnel 0 0 0 1000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 0 0 13000 
Ventura Co FCD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Southern Calif 75314 130541 114818 131793 135832 136340 147690 1480U 1449U 138248 U9510 78355 1511365 
Total State 103847 165345 201067 238474 310099 391217 404992 399692 269162 194144 176198 145214 2999451 
DudieC Ridge WD 4089 5478 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9567 1988 Carryover Kern ou:tWA 30880 58510 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 89390 
Oak Flat 250 250 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 500 Water ~es 
Tulare Lk BWSD 10800 10800 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 21600 Include 
San Jo!lClUin Val 46019 75038 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 UI057 
Total State 46019 75038 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 UI657 291CYDV FNI' Wf69 
Wet Weather 
Tulare Lk BWSD 26 2681 3000 595 0 0 537 328 0 0 1433 0 8600 Water '!/Pes 
San JOJlqUin Val 26 2681 3000 595 0 0 537 328 0 0 1433 0 8600 Includ 
Total State 26 2681 3000 595 0 0 537 328 0 0 1433 0 8600 lSIWEI' WIHR Wf(Jl 
ReclFish&WddLf 34 30 34 33 34 33 34 34 33 34 33 34 400 
South Bay Serri 34 30 34 33 34 33 34 34 33 34 33 34 400 
Fish & Game 20 20 30 80 90 190 240 230 210 50 20 20 1200 Entitlement Related 
Parks & Recreat 3 3 5 6 11 26 26 26 26 20 8 3 163 
ReclFish&Wlldlf 5 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 50 Water '!/Pes 
San Joaquin Val 28 27 40 90 105 no 270 260 240 74 32 27 1413 Includ 
ReclFish&Wildif 349 349 349 690 690 690 927 888 690 690 349 349 7010 601RecIF&WL WI'02 
Southern Calif 349 349 349 690 690 690 927 888 690 690 349 349 7010 
Total State 411 406 423 813 829 943 U31 1182 963 798 414 410 8823 
Devil'. Den WD 1496 1349 1438 364 0 0 774 674 0 0 0 1205 7300 Surplus 
txireWSID 390 160 320 60 0 320 460 460 330 80 260 160 3000 
Ke COU:tWA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 o Water '!/Pes 
Oak Flat 0 57 211 400 600 300 332 0 0 0 0 0 1900 Includ 
Tulare Lk BWSD 35300 31000 18800 9300 5700 27300 26300 26600 11200 10400 4800 26800 233500 s:J0JlqUin Val 37186 32566 20769 10124 6300 27920 27866 27734 11530 10480 5060 28165 245700 331AGR SUR WT04 
T State 37186 32566 20769 10124 6300 27920 27866 27734 11530 10480 5060 28165 245700 
10 Boswell 0 1000 0 1000 1750 1750 2500 0 0 0 0 0 8000 Surplus Related 
Shell Cal Prod 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 370 982 982 982 982 4298 Water ~8 
San JOJlqUin Val 0 1000 0 1000 1750 1750 2500 370 981 981 981 981 U298 Includ 
Total State 0 1000 0 1000 1750 1750 2500 370 981 981 981 981 11298 401Repaymt WT09 
Solano Co FCWCD 275 275 275 785 1125 1270 1525 1525 1160 820 405 375 9815 Local 
North ~ Serri 275 275 275 785 IllS 1270 1525 1525 1160 820 405 375 9815 Water ~es 
Total State 275 275 275 785 1125 1270 1525 1525 1160 820 405 375 9815 Include 
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TABLEC 
1989 INITIAL APPROVED WATER DELIVERlES 
State of Ca6fornia 
(Acre-Feet) DeC_ 01 Water lteso1Jm!s 
The RfBOurees flf!fJ£y State ater Project ~sis Office 
File ID: F1989 Date: 12/05/88 
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jan JuI Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
P!IIe: 1 
Total 
County of Butte 50 50 120 70 70 90 170 200 170 90 60 60 1200 
Plumas Co FCWCD 25 30 41 75 99 144 159 159 159 40 35 34 1000 
Yuba Citki 0 0 0 0 0 0 500 600 300 100 0 0 1500 Feather ·ver 5 75 80 161 145 169 234 829 959 629 230 95 94 3700 
Na~CoFCWCD 508 501 549 574 517 410 442 444 556 633 519 513 6166 
So oCoFCWCD 1399 1226 1413 1545 1671 1580 1735 1725 1620 1592 1520 1394 18420 
North Bay Servi 1907 1727 1962 2119 2188 1990 2177 2169 2176 2225 2039 1907 24586 
Alameda Co WD 2977 2757 2977 3100 3207 3100 3207 3207 3100 2897 2230 2321 35080 
Santa Clara VWD 5200 3900 6000 6500 7500 8500 9000 9500 9400 8700 8000 7800 90000 
Zone-7 Alameda 1607 1537 1793 2291 3220 3658 4018 3817 2775 2241 1560 1571 30088 Entitlement 
South Bay Servi 97S4 8194 10770 11891 13917 15258 16225 16524 15275 13838 11790 11691 155168 
Water~es 
COUJltyof~ 400 400 400 400 0 400 400 400 400 400 0 400 4000 Include Devil's Den 152 229 457 610 762 1219 1371 1371 686 305 229 229 7620 
Dudley Rid~ WD 0 0 2205 1762 3899 6368 7794 6849 1536 1529 612 806 33360 101MCI ENT WTIO 
~ireWSID 36 54 108 144 180 288 324 324 162 72 54 54 1800 111M GW ENI' wros 
KemCou~WA 10280 14279 42472 54165 90280 131 008 128884 125191 57178 22249 16615 20059 712660 131BYPS ENTwrs9 
Oak Flat 0 101 202 370 403 538 605 604 302 134 101 0 3360 151AGRENTWTOI 
Tulare Lk BWSD 375 1363 900 1080 3572 11666 11866 11869 7300 780 3300 11869 65940 161AGWENTWI22 
San Joaquin Val 11243 16426 46744 58531 990% 151487 151244 146608 67564 25469 20911 33417 828740 181BEN ENT WT46 191VALENTWT47 
AvekWA 1661 1862 3099 4316 4950 5389 6021 6246 4501 3454 2340 1717 45556 
Castaic Lake WA 1415 1415 1650 1986 2458 2458 2930 2930 2222 1986 1515 1515 24480 
Coachella ValleI 1822 1822 1822 1822 1822 1822 1822 1822 1822 1822 1822 1831 21873 
Crestline-La W 227 133 133 137 184 207 265 362 265 192 192 168 2465 
DesertWA 3041 3041 3041 3041 3041 3041 3041 3041 3041 3041 3041 3049 36500 
littlerock CR 0 0 230 230 230 230 230 230 230 230 230 0 2070 
Metropolitan WD 65137 120137 101137 115137 115137 115137 125137 125137 125137 119137 116257 70000 1312627 
MojaveWA 0 0 0 0 0 0 60 60 60 60 60 60 360 
Palindale WD 0 0 910 910 910 910 910 910 910 910 910 0 8190 
San Bernardino 2000 2000 2000 2000 3800 3800 3800 3800 3800 4800 3000 0 34800 
San Gabriel 0 0 0 1000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 0 0 13000 
Ventura Co FCD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Southern Ca6f 75303 130410 114022 130579 134532 134994 146216 146538 143988 137632 129367 78340 1501921 
Total State 98312 156837 173659 203265 249912 303963 316691 312798 229632 179394 164202 125450 2514115 
Dudle~geWD 4089 5478 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9567 1988 Carryover 
Kem ;r,WA 30880 58510 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 89390 
Oak Flat 250 250 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 500 Wate~es 
Tulare Lk BWSD 10800 10800 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 21600 Inclu 
San Joaquin Val 46019 75038 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 121057 
Total State 46019 75038 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 121057 291CYDV ENI' Wf69 
ReclFish&WddLf 34 30 34 33 34 33 34 34 33 34 33 34 400 
South Bay Sem 34 30 34 33 34 33 34 34 33 34 33 34 400 
Ytsh & Game 20 20 30 80 90 190 240 230 210 50 20 20 1200 Entitlement Related 
Parks & Recreat 3 3 5 6 11 26 26 26 26 20 8 3 163 
ReclFish&Wddlf 5 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 50 Water~es 
San Joaquin Val 28 27 40 90 165 220 170 260 240 74 32 17 1413 Includ 
ReclFish&Wddlf 349 349 349 690 690 690 927 888 690 690 349 349 7010 601RecIF&WL Wf02 
Southern Ca6f 349 349 349 690 690 690 927 888 690 690 349 349 7010 
Total State 411 406 413 813 829 943 1231 1182 963 798 414 410 8823 
Solano Co FCWCD 275 275 275 785 1125 1270 1525 1525 1160 820 405 375 9815 Local 
North Bay Servi 275 275 275 785 1125 1270 1525 1525 1160 820 405 375 9815 Water ~s 
Total State 275 275 275 785 1125 1270 1525 1525 1160 820 405 375 9815 Include 681VALPMTWT71 
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Unscheduled water deliveries will be allowed when available by direct diversion from the Delta: 
• If such water is in excess of approved delivery amounts, 
• If electrical energy and excess pumping capacity are available, 
• If delivery of unscheduled water will not adversely affect other deliveries or 
carryover storage, and 
• If SWP reservoirs south of the Delta are projected to be fully recharged by the 
end of April. (This requirement does not apply to unscheduled water deliveries 
from the North Bay Aqueduct.) 
Requests for Additional Entitlement Deliveries 
Approvals of additional entitlement deliveries will not affect previously approved entitlement 
deliveries. Requests and approval of additional entitlement water may, however, cause one or 
more of the following: 
• Reduced September 30, 1989 carryover storages in SWP reservoirs, which may 
require a higher SRI runoff in 1990 to provide a comparable level of deliver 
• Delayed reinstatement of entitlement reductions 
• Reduction of previously approved surplus water deliveries pursuant to provisions 
of the annual surplus water contracts 
• Delayed approval of requests for additional surplus water deliveries 
• Reduction of unscheduled water that otherwise would be available 
Carryover Water 
Requests have been made to defer until early 1989 the delivery of approximately 0.12 MAP of 
entitlement water which would have been delivered in October-December 1988. Because the 
Risk Analysis curve development procedure uses the October 1 through September 30 water 
year, the determination of water delivery capability for the corresponding calendar year is not 
significantly affected by this carryover of water. The carryover can be delivered in addition to 
the 2.51 MAP delivery approval. Carryover quantities are not shown on the 1989 Water 
Delivery Risk Analysis Curve (Figure 1). 
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TABLED 
SACRAMENTO RIVER INDEX FOR ENTIRE WATER YEAR 
(Millions of Acre-Feet) 
Year Sacramento Feather Yuba American SRI 
1993- 9.7 5.8 3.0 3.4 21.9 
1992 5.2 1.9 0.9 0.9 8.9 
1991 4.0 2.1 1.2 1.2 8.4 
1990 4.8 2.1 1.2 1.1 9.2 
1989 6.6 3.7 2.2 2.3 14.8 
1988 5.4 2.0 0.9 0.9 9.2 
1987 5.3 2.1 0.9 0.9 9.1 
1986 10.9 6.7 3.5 4.6 25.7 
1985 5.5 2.6 1.3 1.6 11.0 
1984 9.5 5.8 3.2 3.9 22.4 
1983 17.2 9.4 4.7 6.4 37.7 
1982 13.3 9.0 4.9 6.1 33.3 
1981 6.4 2.5 1.1 1.1 11.1 
1980 9.7 5.5 3.2 3.9 22.3 
1979 5.6 3.0 1.7 2.0 12.4 
1978 12.0 5.7 3.0 3.2 23.9 
1977 3.4 1.0 0.4 0.3 5.1 
1976 4.8 1.8 0.7 0.8 8.1 
1975 9.4 4.9 2.4 2.6 19.2 
1974 15.9 8.4 4.0 4.3 32.5 
1973 9.6 4.7 2.7 3.0 20.0 
1972 6.6 3.2 1.7 1.9 13.4' 
1971 10.8 6.0 2.9 3.0 22.6 
1970 11.7 6.3 2.9 3.2 24.1 
1969 11.8 7.1 3.7 4.4 27.0 
1968 6.9 3.5 1.6 1.7 13.6 
1967 10.5 6.3 3.3 4.0 24.1 
1966 7.3 2.9 1.4 1.4 12.9 
1965 10.4 6.9 3.9 4.5 25.7 
1964 5.2 2.6 1.5 1.6 10.9 
1963 9.9 6.3 3.3 3.6 23.0 
1962 7.5 3.7 1.9 2.1 15.1 
1961 7.2 2.6 1.1 1.0 12.0 
1960 6.5 3.2 1.7 1.7 13.1 
1959 6.7 2.9 1.2 1.2 12.0 
1958 15.1 7.0 3.5 4.1 29.7 
1957 7.2 3.6 2.0 2.1 14.9 
1956 13.3 8.0 4.0 4.6 29.9 
1955 5.7 2.5 1.3 1.6 11.0 
1954 9.3 4.2 1.9 2.0 17.4 
1953 9.7 5.2 2.6 2.7 20.1 
1952 11.5 8.0 4.1 5.0 28.6 
1951 9.1 5.7 3.5 4.6 22.9 
1950 5.7 3.8 2.2 2.7 14.4 
1949 6.0 2.6 1.5 1.9 12.0 
1948 7.7 3.9 2.0 2.2 15.8 
1947 5.1 2.5 1.4 1.4 10.4 
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TABLE D (Continued) 
SACRAMENTO RIVER INDEX FOR ENTIRE WATER YEAR 
(Millions or Acre-Feet) 
Year Sacramento Feather Yuba American SRI 
1946 8.2 4.2 2.4 2.9 17.6 
1945 6.7 3.7 2.1 2.5 15.1 
1944 4.7 2.9 1.4 1.5 10.4 
1943 8.5 5.6 3.1 3.9 21.1 
1942 11.3 6.7 3.4 3.9 25.2 
1941 14.3 6.5 3.1 3.1 27.1 
1940 10.5 5.7 2.9 3.4 22.4 
1939 4.4 1.9 0.9 1.0 8.2 
1938 14.7 8.6 4.0 4.5 31.8 
1937 6.0 3.2 1.9 2.3 13.3 
1936 7.1 4.3 2.6 3.4 17.4 
1935 7.5 4.3 2.2 2.6 16.6 
1934 4.5 2.0 1.0 1.1 8.6 
1933 4.6 2.0 1.1 1.3 8.9 
1932 5.1 3.3 2.1 2.6 13.1 
1931 3.3 1.4 0.6 0.7 6.1 
1930 6.1 4.0 1.8 1.7 13.5 
1929 4.4 1.8 1.0 1.1 8.4 
1928 7.6 4.2 2.4 2.5 16.8 
1927 11.0 5.7 3.5 3.7 23.8 
1926 5.7 3.1 1.6 1.4 11.8 
1925 8.1 3.1 2.1 2.7 16.0 
1924 3.3 1.3 0.6 0.5 5.7 
1923 5.3 3.1 2.1 2.8 13.2 
1922 6.7 5.1 3.0 3.3 18.0 
1921 11.5 6.0 3.2 3.2 23.8 
1920 4.2 2.2 1.3 1.5 9.2 
1919 7.8 3.6 2.0 2.2 15.7 
1918 5.4 2.7 1.3 1.5 11.0 
1917 7.1 4.7 2.5 2.9 17.3 
1916 10.7 6.2 3.3 3.9 24.1 
1915 12.6 5.4 2.7 3.2 23.9 
1914 13.7 7.0 3.1 4.0 27.8 
1913 7.0 2.8 1.5 1.5 12.8 
1912 6.6 2.3 1.2 1.3 11.4 
1911 10.1 7.1 3.6 5.6 26.4 
1910 9.1 4.6 2.8 3.6 20.1 
1909 14.6 7.5 4.0 4.6 30.7 
1908 7.9 3.6 1.7 1.5 14.8 
1907 13.9 9.5 4.5 5.8 33.7 
1906 11.3 6.9 3.7 4.8 26.7 
Notes: • Refers to 1993 forecut for SRI, C-DWR May 1, 1993. 
1. California cooperative mow surveys full Datursl flows. 
2. Data 1986 aad later are pre1imilllU)'. 
3. Stations are as follows: Sacramento River above Bend Bridge, near Red Bluff; Inflow to Oroville Reservoir; Yuba River at Smartville; 
Inflow to Folsom Reservoir. 
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TABLEE 
SACRAMENTO RIVER INDEX FOR ENTIRE WATER YEAR 
Listed in Ascending Order 
(Millions of Acre-Feet) 
Year Sacramento Feather Yuba American SRI 
1977 3.4 1.0 0.4 0.3 5.1 
1924 3.3 1.3 0.6 0.5 5.7 
1931 3.3 1.4 0.6 0.7 6.1 
1976 4.8 1.8 0.7 0.8 8.1 
1939 4.4 1.9 0.9 1.0 8.2 
1991 4.0 2.1 1.2 1.2 8.4 
1929 4.4 1.8 1.0 1.1 8.4 
1934 4.5 2.0 1.0 1.1 8.6 
1992 5.2 1.9 0.9 0.9 8.9 
1933 4.6 2.0 1.1 1.3 8.9 
1987 5.3 2.1 0.9 0.9 9.1 
1990 4.8 2.1 1.2 1.1 9.2 
1988 5.4 2.0 0.9 0.9 9.2 
1920 4.2 2.2 1.3 1.5 9.2 
1947 5.1 2.5 1.4 1.4 10.4 
1944 4.7 2.9 1.4 1.5 10.4 
1964 5.2 2.6 1.5 1.6 10.9 
1955 5.7 2.5 1.3 1.6 11.0 
1918 5.4 2.7 1.3 1.5 11.0 
1985 5.5 2.6 1.3 1.6 11.0 
1981 6.4 2.5 1.1 1.1 11.1 
1912 6.6 2.3 1.2 1.3 11.4 
1926 5.7 3.1 1.6 1.4 11.8 
1949 6.0 2.6 1.5 1.9 12.0 
1961 7.2 2.6 1.1 1.0 12.0 
1959 6.7 2.9 1.2 1.2 12.0 
1979 5.6 3.0 1.7 2.0 12.4 
1913 7.0 2.8 1.5 1.5 12.8 
1966 7.3 2.9 1.4 1.4 12.9 
1960 6.5 3.2 1.7 1.7 13.1 
1932 5.1 3.3 2.1 2.6 13.1 
1923 5.3 3.1 2.1 2.8 13.2 
1937 6.0 3.2 1.9 2.3 13.3 
1972 6.6 3.2 1.7 1.9 13.4 
1930 6.1 4.0 1.8 1.7 13.5 
1968 6.9 3.5 1.6 1.7 13.6 
1950 5.7 3.8 2.2 2.7 14.4 
1989 6.6 3.7 2.2 2.3 14.8 
1908 7.9 3.6 1.7 1.5 14.8 
1957 7.2 3.6 2.0 2.1 14.9 
1945 6.7 3.7 2.1 2.5 15.1 
1962 7.5 3.7 1.9 2.1 15.1 
1919 7.8 3.6 2.0 2.2 15.7 
1948 7.7 3.9 2.0 2.2 15.8 
1925 8.1 3.1 2.1 2.7 16.0 
1935 7.5 4.3 2.2 2.6 16.6 
1928 7.6 4.2 2.4 2.5 16.8 
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TABLE E (Continued) 
SACRAMENTO RIVER INDEX FOR ENTIRE WATER YEAR 
Listed in Ascending Order 
(MiUions of Acre-Feet) 
Year Sacramento Feather Yuba American SRI 
1917 7.1 4.7 2.5 2.9 17.3 
1936 7.1 4.3 2.6 3.4 17.4 
1954 9.3 4.2 1.9 2.0 17.4 
1946 8.2 4.2 2.4 2.9 17.6 
1922 6.7 5.1 3.0 3.3 18.0 
1975 9.4 4.9 2.4 2.6 19.2 
1973 9.6 4.7 2.7 3.0 20.0 
1953 9.7 5.2 2.6 2.7 20.1 
1910 9.1 4.6 2.8 3.6 20.1 
1943 8.5 5.6 3.1 3.9 21.1 
1993* 9.7 5.8 3.0 3.4 21.9 
1980 9.7 5.5 3.2 3.9 22.3 
1984 9.5 5.8 3.2 3.9 22.4 
1940 10.5 5.7 2.9 3.4 22.4 
1971 10.8 6.0 2.9 3.0 22.6 
1951 9.1 5.7 3.5 4.6 22.9 
1963 9.9 6.3 3.3 3.6 23.0 
1921 11.5 6.0 3.2 3.2 23.8 
1927 11.0 5.7 3.5 3.7 23.8 
1915 12.6 5.4 2.7 3.2 23.9 
1978 12.0 5.7 3.0 3.2 23.9 
1970 11.7 6.3 2.9 3.2 24.1 
1967 10.5 6.3 3.3 4.0 24.1 
1916 to. 7 6.2 3.3 3.9 24.1 
1942 11.3 6.7 3.4 3.9 25.2 
1965 10.4 6.9 3.9 4.5 25.7 
1986 10.9 6.7 3.5 4.6 25.7 
1911 10.1 7.1 3.6 5.6 26.4 
1906 11.3 6.9 3.7 4.8 26.7 
1969 11.8 7.1 3.7 4.4 27.0 
1941 14.3 6.5 3.1 3.1 27.1 
1914 13.7 7.0 3.1 4.0 27.8 
1952 11.5 8.0 4.1 5.0 28.6 
1958 15.1 7.0 3.5 4.1 29.7 
1956 13.3 8.0 4.0 4.6 29.9 
1909 14.6 7.5 4.0 4.6 30.7 
1938 14.7 8.6 4.0 4.5 31.8 
1974 15.9 8.4 4.0 4.3 32.5 
1982 13.3 9.0 4.9 6.1 33.3 
1907 13.9 9.5 4.5 5.8 33.7 
1983 17.2 9.4 4.7 6.4 37.7 
Notes: * Refers to 1993 forecast for SRI, C-DWR May I, 1993. 
1. California cooperative snow surveys full uatural flows. 
2. Data 1986 aud later are preliminary. 
3. Stations are as follows: Sacramento River above Bend Bridge, near Red Bluff; Inflow to Oroville Reservoir; Yuba River at Smartville; 
Inflow to Folsom Reservoir. 
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APPENDIXC 
CALIFORNIA WATER CODE: 
WATERSHORTAGEEMERGENC~ 
SECTIONS 350-358 OF THE WATER CODE, "WATER SHORTAGE EMERGENCIES" 
Section 350: The governing body of a distributor of 
a public water supply, whether publicly or privately 
owned and including a mutual water company, may 
declare a water shortage emergency condition to 
prevail within the area served by such distributor 
whenever it finds and determines that the ordinary 
demands and requirements of water consumers cannot 
be satisfied without depleting the water supply of the 
distributor to the extent that there would be 
insufficient water for human consumption, sanitation, 
and fire protection. 
Section 351: Excepting in event of a breakage or 
failure of a dam, pump, pipe line or conduit causing 
an immediate emergency, the declaration shall be 
made only after a public hearing at which consumers 
of such water supply shall have an opportunity to be 
heard to protest against the declaration and to present 
their respective needs to said governing board. 
Section 352: Notice of the time and place of hearing 
shall be published pursuant to Section 6061 of the 
Government Code at least seven days prior to the 
date of hearing in a newspaper printed, published, 
and circulated within the area in which the water 
supply is distributed, or if there is no such 
newspaper, in any newspaper printed, published, and 
circulated in the county in which the area is located. 
Section 353: When the governing body has so 
determined and declared the existence of an 
emergency condition of water shortage within its 
service area, it shall thereupon adopt such regulations 
and restrictions on the delivery of water and the 
consumption within said area of water supplied for 
public use as will in the sound discretion of such 
governing body conserve the water supply for the 
greatest public benefit with particular regard to 
domestic use, sanitation, and fire protection. 
Section 354: After allocating and setting aside the 
amount of water which in the opinion of the 
governing body will be necessary to supply water 
Source: C-DWR, 1977 
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needed for domestic use, sanitation, and fire 
protection, the regulations may establish priorities in 
the use of water for other purposes and provide for 
the allocation, distribution, and delivery of water for 
such other purposes, without discrimination between 
consumers using water for the same purpose or 
purposes. 
Section 355: The regulations and restrictions shall 
thereafter be and remain in full force and effect 
during the period of the emergency and until the 
supply of water available for distribution within such 
area has been replenished or augmented. 
Section 356: The regulations and restrictions may 
include the right to deny applications for new or 
additional service connections, and provision for their 
enforcement by discontinuing service to consumers 
willfully violating the regulations and restrictions. 
Section 357: If the regulations and restrictions on 
delivery and consumption of water adopted pursuant 
to this chapter conflict with any law establishing the 
rights of individual consumers to receive either 
specific or proportionate amounts of the water supply 
available for distribution within such service area, the 
regulations and restrictions adopted pursuant to this 
chapter shall prevail over the provisions of such laws 
relating to water rights for the duration of the period 
of emergency; provided, however that any distributor 
of water which is subject to regulation by the State 
Public Utilities Commission shall before making such 
regulations and restrictions effective secure the 
approval thereof by the Public Utilities Commission. 
Section 358: Nothing in this chapter shall be 
construed to prohibit or prevent review by any court 
of competent jurisdiction of any finding or 
determination by a governing body of the existence of 
an emergency or of regulations or restrictions adopted 
by such board, pursuant to this chapter, on the 
ground that any such action is fraudulent, arbitrary, 
or capricious. 
APPENDIXD 
NEEDED CHANGES IN WATER MANAGEMENT 
Part 1. State and Federal Government Perspective 
Part 2. Urban Perspective 
Part 3. Agricultural Perspective 
Part 4. Environmental Perspective 
Part 5. Point of View of Other Parties 
PART 1. STATE AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PERSPECTIVE 
1. Society should establish priorities for evaluating alternative uses of water during droughts. 
In times of shortages, certain uses of water may be sacrificed. 
2. The state has to look at water pricing and eliminate the existing large differences in the 
cost of water to different users. Because of price differences, some areas/users waste 
water, while others conserve. 
3. We need to refill about 8 million acre-feet of empty aquifers in California (subsidence, 
reserve for future droughts). 
4. The reservoir operations need to be improved; multireservoir systems should be 
optimized to include incidental uses (recreation, fisheries). 
5. An effort is needed to manage groundwater at all levels. Conjunctive use of groundwater 
can relieve the adverse effects of the groundwater overdraft (conjunctive use needs to be 
expanded in California). 
6. Remove federal restrictive policies to wheel nonproject water. 
7. The cost of saving the environment has to be evaluated, and water for the environment 
has to be made available at taxpayer cost. 
8. COB should handle a small loan program to assist small local communities during 
drought. 
9. Federal government should set quotas for U.S. immigration because 75 percent of new 
immigrants wind up in California. 
10. Greater centralization is needed to manage water in California. 
11. Groundwater recharge projects have to be developed to enhance natural recharge rates, 
and also more surface water should go into recharge during the times of high flow. 
12. Fish and Wildlife needs more equitable basis in water allocation so it can share water 
similar to that received by project users. 
13. The state needs to develop a mechanism that triggers drought response actions (such as 
the Water Bank) automatically without a lengthy and contentious legislative process. 
14. There is a need for political recognition to deal with protection of natural resources so 
that impacts to fish and wildlife are lessened in the future. 
15. Changes in water laws have to be made to recognize in-stream water rights. 
16. More goodwill, professionalism, and supportive legislation are needed to restore and 
maintain environmental resources. 
17. Media needs to reveal what is happening in agriculture (full spectrum of impacts and 
what it means to California to shut down farming in the state). 
18. The Warren Act restricting water movement should be revoked. 
19. Make the federal and state bureaucracies work together better to smooth out operations 
during drought. 
20. The rights have to be better defined to groundwater. 
21. The media should put more emphasis on the environmental and regulatory concerns rather 
than concentrating on state agencies only. 
22. The media should inform the public about the trade-offs being made during a drought. 
23. Make risk assessments associated with the effects of spills and flood releases on fisheries. 
24. Society needs to decided on what it wants. 
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PART 1. STATE AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PERSPECTIVE (Continued) 
25. In-stream flow standards and estuarine water quality standards need to be reassessed. 
26. All beneficial uses of water should be treated equally. 
27. Water management should combine resource values with economic principles to satisfy 
amount of water the customer wants. 
28. California should cut down on the amount of firm hydroelectric production (Le., during 
drought) to make water available for environmental and other purposes. 
29. Water industry should use a more rigorous analytical process in its water management 
decision-making process. 
30. The state should look into groundwater regulation (after 1977 the aquifers recovered in 
level but not in volume). 
31. Large groundwater basins in San Joaquin Valley should be adjudicated possibly through 
self-regulation. 
32. Agricultural districts should adjust their water delivery schedules to fit the water-
conserving farming practices. 
33. Agricultural conservation should be enhanced through continued research and 
development, advising and educating farmers on how to use less water, what kinds of 
machinery to use, how to manage labor, and overall increase in agricultural technical 
support services. 
34. Build coding towers on thermal power plants to minimize thermal pollution during 
drought. 
35. Better coordination is needed between energy conservation programs and water 
conservation programs, (e.g., showerheads-water, energy; toilets ULF-water, energy, 
sanitation). 
36. Water industry needs to remove subsidies and market water. 
37. There should be fewer players in California water management (now there are too many). 
38. The decisions on the operation of SWP should be made by the Director of C-DWR, not 
the Governor. 
39. SWP needs to build new facilities much faster than they are currently being built. 
40. A better method to allocate the supply is needed. The existing rule curve is not 
workable. 
41. New legislation and more institutional cooperation will be needed to make water 
marketing and transfers a viable alternative to more water development. 
42. SWP should become a quasi-governmental agency (or corporation) instead of being a part 
ofC-DWR. 
43. Changes in water allocation in California need to be made. 
44. Environmental standards must be revised. 
45. More effort should be put into balancing in-stream and off-stream uses of water by 
SWRCB. 
46. A way of moving water through the Delta should be found to satisfy the purveyors and 
environmental groups and to protect the resources in the Delta. 
47. More emphasis should be placed on conjunctive use of surface water and groundwater. 
48. The various impacts of drought (both short-term and long-term) should be quantified. 
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PART 1. STATE AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PERSPECTIVE (Continued) 
49. California needs additional water supply to deal with the expanding population. 
50. Water supply planning should not be used as a means of suppressing population growth, 
because it does not work. 
51. The most immediate need in water management is to resolve the Delta issues, even if 
agriculture and urban sectors will have to lose some water to the environment. 
52. Population growth in California has to be stabilized. 
53. An unbiased state water policy is needed for responding to drought emergencies. 
54. Appropriate measures of water supply reliability need to be institutionalized. 
55. More emphasis should be placed on water conservation and recycling. 
56. Water districts should pursue conjunctive use programs and groundwater recharge 
programs in order to eliminate groundwater overdraft. 
57. Special interest groups representing agricultural, urban, and environmental sectors should 
reach a consensus and stop blocking the actions of each other. 
58. Water marketing should be expanded, with provisions for not creating externalities that 
affect the environment. 
59. It is important to fix the Delta, because it is a major water transfer hub. 
60. Off-stream storage south of the Delta is needed as a part of the solution to the Delta's 
problems. 
61. The Three-Way Process should seek help in employing alternative dispute resolution 
techniques (ADR) to reach a consensus. 
62. More conservation technology and know-how should be infused into the California 
agriculture. 
63. A system of adequate economic incentive should be developed to encourage more farmers 
to adopt innovative and efficient irrigation technologies and practices. 
64. Irrigation districts should revise their schedules for delivering water to individual farmers 
to allow for optimum application of water. 
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PART 2. URBAN PERSPECTIVE 
1. There should be clear long-term carry-over storage goals (e.g., two-year supply on 
July 1). 
2. Water districts should build interconnections to aqueducts. 
3. A pipeline should be built to take reclaimed water from the Bay area to Central Valley, 
where it could be used for irrigation and groundwater recharge. 
4. Marginal cost pricing of water should be incorporated into water policy. 
5. Need to abandon irrational policies. Instead of rationing, water should be bought through 
the Water Bank. 
6. A sophisticated economic way of drought management should be developed. 
7. Massive education programs have to be implemented to educate the public on water issues 
and droughts. 
8. The water industry should be deregulated, and the market forces should determine the 
price of water. 
9. Water suppliers should prepare for the worst-case scenario during a drought and be ready 
for desalination. 
10. The state of California needs to talk and do some thinking ahead, look at issues 
collectively. 
11. Urban customers need to be advised on the meaning of "cutting down by 20 percent"; 
people need to read their meters; too much savings is bad for revenue. 
12. Better communication with the public is needed, especially when the agency is in a crisis 
mode. 
13. California should think of appointing a water czar with the power to cut across 
sociopolitical barriers and other types of problems. 
14. Media should increase public service announcements to encourage conservation. 
15. Improve the reliability of urban water supplies. 
16. Planning for drought protection should seek long-term optimality. 
17. Develop institutions for administering water marketing and water transfers and for 
protecting third parties. 
18. Communication and cooperation between state and federal agencies should be improved. 
19. Local water agencies should join in public information programs because of the "news 
shed effect" to save money and minimize confusion (act jointly and use common 
defmitions) . 
20. Water professionals should improve their ability to clearly communicate their situation 
and decisions to the media. 
21. State and federal government should determine the priorities of different uses of water 
during drought. 
22. State and federal government should get rid of constraints that prevent water transfers 
during drought. 
23. Long-term water supply plans should have an optimal level of drought protection built 
into them. 
24. More emphasis should be placed on practices with supply flexibility such as marketing 
and water transfer agreements. 
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PART 2. URBAN PERSPECTIVE (Continued) 
25. Contracts for CVP and SWP water have to be rewritten so that appropriate response 
actions can be taken earlier during a drought cycle. 
26. The general public should be educated to stop believing that a drought is not an excuse 
for water shortages. 
27. SWP and CVP should not be governed by the mandate to serve water for municipal, 
industrial, and agricultural uses; they also need to protect the environmental uses. 
28. Urban water suppliers should address environmental problems and improve environmental 
conditions of aquatic resources, because it is in their self-interest. 
29. Reclamation and reuse of water should be looked at, and the existing barriers and 
institutional impediments should be removed. 
30. Some degree of political involvement is needed in making water supply policies at the 
county, city, and local water district boards. The policymaking should not be made by 
shortsighted technicians. 
31. Agricultural interests should educate the farmers on how to deal with environmental and 
urban sectors through consensual ways. 
32. There has to be some degree of regulation in water transfers to minimize third-party 
impacts. 
33. Water Bank should be set up for normal supply year operations. 
34. The state should set clear standards for the use of greywater and the design of dual water 
systems to guide the local health departments. 
35. Groundwater aquifers have to be better mapped throughout the state. 
36. Regulatory agencies should not only look after environmental needs but also consider the 
needs of water users. 
37. Urban, environmental, and agricultural interests should make more efficient use of the 
water resources that they have. 
38. Drought surcharge should be used in the future as a water-rationing mechanism instead 
of the percent reduction or other rationing plans unaccompanied by price incentives. 
39. North and south as well as agriculture, urban areas, and environmental interests should 
work together to build a water policy consensus. 
40. Urban and other utility customers should be charged by separate bills for water, sewer, 
electricity, and trash. 
41. Rationing plans in the future should give urban customers certain amounts of water and 
let them decide which uses have to be curtailed. 
42. Rationing and pricing should always be used together to avoid revenue problems. 
43. Urban areas need more flexibility in supplying water (e.g., more supply sources). 
44. Overdraft of groundwater sources during normal weather should be avoided in order to 
have that option for drought. 
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PART 3. AGRICULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 
1. Water districts need to communicate better and more accurately water needs, available 
supplies, shortages (to media, civic leaders, processors of crops). 
2. People need to be educated about water needs, available supplies, and shortages to correct 
perceptions about water uses. 
3. Need groundwater banking, off-stream storage facilities in the Delta (10 years from now 
another drought; demands will go up and things will be worse). 
4. A Water Bank Office should be created independently of C-DWR as a broker and a 
streamlined approval process for water transfers should be developed. 
5. The Endangered Species Act has to be modified. It requires impossible things (barriers, 
mitigation), and it is not well thought out. 
6. Water managers should be allowed to do their job without bringing the public into the 
decision-making process (it's unproductive). 
7. The environmental constraints on Delta exports have to be reviewed, since more 
developed water, more flows, and more exports are needed. 
8. There is a great need for consensus building, the Three-Way Process and the state water 
plan (Governor) have achieved a lot. 
9. Something has to be done to improve the efficiency of transferring water through the 
Delta through a joint effort. 
10. A computer data bank containing water-planning and management information should be 
developed, continually updated, and made available to water agencies. 
11. Interconnections are a must, and all water districts should get these put in place. 
12. More water should be stored either in the ground or in reservoirs. 
13. Irrigation districts have to communicate better to the public the purposes for which they 
use water and the efficiencies in use that they achieve. 
14. More water storage facilities should be built and water supply infrastructure should be 
expanded. 
15. Bureau of Reclamation should build some safety valves into their operations and give the 
Secretary of the Department of the Interior discretionary emergency powers to deal with 
unexpected situations. 
16. The general public in California needs to be educated to understand why it takes so much 
water to grow food, that farmers do not waste water, and that the farmers do not destroy 
the environment and cause pollution but are concerned about the status of wildlife and 
fisheries and want to see these resources restored. 
17. The Three-Way Process should be used as an instrument to find a solution to the Delta 
problem, since the political process has failed to achieve its goal. 
18. CVP should be transferred to the state so that California could determine its fate through 
an integrated management of developed water. 
19. Agricultural water districts should learn from Westlands Water District about water 
management and water efficiency techniques. 
20. There is a need for national and state policy on food production. 
21. Agricultural water districts should be prepared to change their role during drought from 
one of helping farmers to grow crops to one that is more of a regulator that restricts 
water usage and acts more like a police force. 
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PART 4. ENVIRONMENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
1. Long-term solutions should be sought instead of implementing ad hoc decisions during 
a drought. 
2. Long-term planning should focus on alternatives such as conjunctive use, in-stream flow, 
water banking, and off-stream storage. 
3. The institutional barriers to water transfers should be removed. These barriers include 
issues such as, who owns the water, the district or farmers, the question of federal 
subsidies, and inflexible legislation such as the Warren Act. 
4. Efficiency of agricultural water districts with very cheap subsidized water has to be 
improved. A fundamental skepticism exists about water users doing the right thing when 
inefficiencies are allowed to continue indefinitely. 
5. SWP and CVP should make early cuts in water deliveries and maintain more water in 
storage in order to make drought progressively worse, but at the same time not allow 
severe impacts to take place. 
6. Better planning in anticipating prolonged drought is needed. The last-minute creation of 
the Water Bank is a peculiar way to manage water. 
7. A more flexible system of water management is needed. There needs to be more equity 
and fairness so that environment does not suffer the most. 
8. Standards generally set are not adequate to protect the environment. Locally it will be 
best to set baseline standards and supplement them by mitigation of environmental 
impacts. 
9. There needs to be more optimization in operating major projects. 
10. We need to be able to reallocate water rights into a fairer system to make allocation of 
short supplies more equitable. 
11. Environmental impacts need greater public recognition, and we must find more equitable 
ways of protecting the environment. Long-term strategies are needed. 
12. Urban areas should build in resiliency through conservation and water reclamation to 
prepare for a 10-15 year-long drought in the future. 
13. In the agricultural-urban-environmental process, people who sit at the negotiating table 
should convince their constituencies of the reasons for the decisions taken. 
14. Water reclamation should be a part of long-term water supply strategies. 
15. A holistic approach to water management is needed. (Urban runoff should be captured 
and infiltrated.) 
16. More conjunctive use of surface-water and groundwater should be made. 
17. General policy reform and consensual solutions should be emphasized in trying to change 
water management in California. 
18. Water resources should be managed better for the environment as well as for other 
purposes of use. 
19. Central coordination of water management is needed. 
20. The quality of the tributaries in the upstream portions of the major rivers needs to be 
improved. 
21. Firm supplies of water are needed for the existing wetlands as well as more wetlands. 
22. Media should try to understand the long-term changes that are needed to avoid future 
drought emergencies in the state. 
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PART 4. ENVIRONMENTAL PERSPECTIVE (Continued) 
1. Developing and passing new legislation during water emergencies should be avoided 
because it is usually "too hasty" and does not produce solid laws and regulations. 
2. A water fund should be established to purchase water for environmental purposes. 
3. Changes in the existing water law should be made because these changes are critical to 
realizing the full benefits of the structural and nonstructural solutions to California water 
problems. 
4. C-DWR should be divided into two parts-State Water Project and State Water 
Resources. 
5. More sophisticated water planning is needed at the local and regional levels of 
government and water institutions. 
6. More studies on water supply reliability conservation, reclamation, and other alternatives 
should be undertaken. 
7. Continuing work on water transfers is needed. 
S. More work on groundwater storage is needed. 
9. The Delta should be fixed to work better not only for the environment but also for its 
overall enhancement. 
10. Water institutions should be reformed and created that would not discriminate against the 
environment. 
11. The Governor needs to "twist [the] arms" of the agricultural sector in order to make the 
Three-Way Process happen. 
12. The risk of mismanaging the existing and new water supply facilities to benefit only 
particular interests (mostly urban) must be removed by reforming water laws and water 
institutions. 
13. In the Delta, along with the improved reliability of urban supplies, environment should 
be brought along, and all water use purposes should be optimized to achieve better water 
quality in the Delta. 
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PART S. POINT OF VIEW OF OTHER PARTIFS 
1. There should be more cooperation between urban water providers and the "green 
industry. " 
2. The benefits of turf and urban landscaping on urban environment (air qUality) should be 
assessed and articulated to the public. 
3. Landscape contractors should be educated on efficient use of water, and a licensing 
process should be established and enforced. 
4. More data about dry-year hydrology should be acquired. 
5. Anglers should be restricted; they are reaching spots in rivers and reservoirs that 
normally cannot be reached. Salmon are depleted by fishing pressures. 
6. The state should assist the "green industry" in achieving more efficient use of water for 
urban landscapes by (1) establishing licensing and enforcing it, (2) passing laws to 
encourage more efficient landscapes, and (3) educating landscapers and the public about 
conservation in outdoor water use. 
7. Water discharged from cooling towers in commercial buildings should be captured and 
used for landscape irrigation on-site. 
8. All water use must be measured, and people should learn how to read their water meters. 
9. Rationing plans should be based on a reasonable allocation of water amounts and 
combined with inverted block rate structures to force urban users to use water efficiently 
during droughts . 
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